Jadwiga Warwas v. City of Plainfield

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 11-1736
JADWIGA WARWAS,
Appellant
v.
CITY OF PLAINFIELD
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D. C. No. 2-07-cv-04431)
District Judge: Honorable Jose L. Linares
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on April 27, 2012
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., ROTH and TASHIMA*, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 25, 2012)
OPINION
ROTH, Circuit Judge:
Jadwiga Warwas brought this action, asserting (1) interference with her Family
and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) rights and (2) retaliation against her for
*Honorable A. Wallace Tashima, Senior United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth
Circuit, sitting by designation.
asserting her First Amendment petition rights. The District Court entered summary
judgment in favor of the City of Plainfield, New Jersey, and Warwas appealed. For the
reasons expressed below, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
I. Background
We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and
legal history of this case. Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our
analysis.
Warwas, a licensed medical doctor, commenced employment with Plainfield as a
Health Officer in 2003. Due to stress from several incidents unrelated to this litigation,
Warwas developed peptic ulcers and clinical depression. As a result, she could not work
for several months and sought sick leave under the FMLA. Plainfield requested that
Warwas’s treating physician complete a medical provider certification form so it could
determine her eligibility for FMLA leave. Warwas’s physician complied and certified
that Warwas “was restricted to home and could not work/attend school.” Plainfield
granted the FMLA leave.
Although Warwas was on FMLA leave and indicated that she had an acute serious
health condition and was not able to work, she continued to work at home on a part-time
job she had with the City of Paterson, New Jersey. 1 When Plainfield discovered this, it
sought to terminate Warwas’s employment with Plainfield, asserting that she had violated
1
Warwas asserts that during her interview she informed Plainfield about the part-
time position as a Quality Assurance Coordinator. Plainfield denies knowledge of
Warwas’s part-time employment.
2
its policy on outside employment. 2 After a disciplinary hearing, the charges were
sustained and Warwas’s employment was terminated on September 30, 2006. Warwas
appealed to the Merit System Board, which transferred the matter to the Office of
Administrative Law. An administrative law judge (ALJ) then determined that Warwas
did not commit any misconduct because her part-time work “was not on City time nor in
any way concealed” and that she “engaged in outside employment on her own unused
sick or vacation time for which she was charged during her sick leave.” 3 Although the
Merit System Board adopted the ALJ’s factual findings, it nevertheless determined that
Warwas’s utilization of paid sick time while she engaged in secondary employment was
prohibited. Accordingly, she was found guilty of conduct unbecoming an employee. The
Board, however, determined that termination was “too harsh a penalty;” therefore, it
ordered Warwas’s immediate reinstatement and modified the punishment to a fine and an
official written reprimand. Neither party appealed the decision.
Upon Warwas’s return to work with Plainfield on April 7, 2008, she was informed
that her office was unavailable and that she should return in two days. The parties
dispute whether Warwas ever returned to work. On April 22, 2008, Plainfield informed
Warwas that she was on unauthorized leave without pay and that further absences would
result in her termination. When she failed to report to work for the remainder of the
2
Plainfield’s Municipal Code prohibits employees from engaging in outside
employment “without the prior and continued approval of the Department Director.”
3
In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ found that Warwas disclosed her part-time
position with Paterson and that no Plainfield official either objected to her continued
employment or required her to abandon it as a condition of employment with the City.
3
week, Plainfield issued a preliminary notice of disciplinary action. Warwas never
requested a hearing, and, on May 19, 2008, Plainfield terminated her employment.
Warwas brought this action. After the close of discovery, Plainfield moved for
summary judgment. The District Court granted the motion and entered judgment against
Warwas. She appealed.
II. Discussion
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review of the District
Court’s order granting summary judgment, and, in doing so, resolve all factual disputes
and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Callison v. City of Phila., 430 F.3d 117, 119 (3d Cir. 2005). Summary judgment is
appropriate when there “is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
A. FMLA Interference Claim
Warwas alleges that Plainfield interfered with her FMLA rights by terminating her
employment while she was on leave. The District Court did not reach the merits of this
claim because it found that the doctrine of issue preclusion barred her from seeking relief
under the FMLA. The District Court held that the propriety of Warwas’s termination was
already adjudicated by the Board, a quasi-judicial entity, and her interference claim
merely sought to re-litigate the Board’s factual conclusion that she was guilty of conduct
unbecoming an employee because she engaged in and received compensation for
secondary employment while utilizing paid sick time.
4
Despite Warwas’s arguments that her FMLA claim is not precluded, we need not
determine whether the District Court erred because, even assuming arguendo that she
could proceed to the merits of her interference claim, summary judgment was
nevertheless appropriate. See Oss Nokalva, Inc. v. European Space Agency, 617 F.3d
756, 761 (3d Cir. 2010) (“It is an accepted tenet of appellate jurisdiction that we may
affirm a judgment on any ground apparent from the record, even if the district court did
not reach it.”) (internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted).
The FMLA permits eligible employees to take up to “12 workweeks of leave
during any 12-month period,” 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1), if a “serious health condition . . .
makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such employee,”
id. at § 2612(a)(1)(D). To prevent an employer’s interference with this leave, the FMLA
grants employees a cause of action, an interference claim. See id. at §§ 2615 & 2617. To
assert an interference claim, a plaintiff must prove that she was denied benefits that she
was entitled to under the FMLA. Callison, 430 F.3d at 119. The FMLA, however, does
not prohibit the termination of an employee who abuses her leave, id. at 121; Crouch v.
Whirlpool Corp., 447 F.3d 984, 986 (7th Cir. 2006), nor does it shield an employee from
dismissal merely because the alleged misconduct occurred while on leave. Callison, 430
F.3d at 121. Consequently, an employer may defeat an FMLA claim if the discharge was
based upon the employer’s honest belief that the plaintiff either misused or failed to use
her medical leave for the intended purpose. Crouch, 447 F.3d at 986.
The record clearly indicates that Plainfield terminated Warwas for reasons entirely
unrelated to the exercise of her rights under the FMLA. It is also beyond dispute that
5
Plainfield believed Warwas failed to use FMLA leave for the intended purpose when,
despite her assertion and a doctor’s note that a serious medical condition prevented her
from working, she worked for Paterson while on sick leave. See Crouch, 447 F.3d at
986. Warwas is not entitled to a greater degree of protection for violating Plainfield’s
Municipal Code merely because she was on FMLA leave when caught and terminated.
Consequently, Warwas was terminated not for her use of FMLA leave, but rather for the
perceived misuse of the leave and for her failure to return to work. See Sarnowski v. Air
Brooke Limousine, Inc., 510 F.3d 398, 403 (3d Cir. 2007). We, therefore, conclude that
summary judgment was appropriate on this claim. 4
B. First Amendment Retaliation Claim
Warwas asserts that her appeal to the Board for reinstatement of employment was
protected by the First Amendment’s Petition Clause and that Plainfield’s May 2008
termination of her employment for failing to report to work constituted retaliation for
petitioning the Board. To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, based upon the
Petition Clause, a plaintiff must prove (1) that the First Amendment protected the activity
in question, (2) that a government agent responded with a retaliatory action, and (3) that
the protected activity was a substantial factor in the retaliation. Brightwell v. Lehman,
637 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 2011). In circumstances where the plaintiff is a government
employee, the First Amendment only protects against retaliatory actions if the protected
4
Warwas also contends that Plainfield failed to advise her of its policy regarding
outside employment during FMLA leave and, in doing so, interfered with her FMLA
rights. We find this argument without merit.
6
activity involved a matter of public concern. Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, __
U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2500 (2011).
Here, Warwas sought review of disciplinary findings, which included whether
termination was an appropriate penalty for her alleged misconduct. Thus, her action
concerned a private personnel grievance, not a matter of public concern. Id. at 2501.
Because Warwas did not address matters of public concern, she was not protected by the
First Amendment. See Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 187 (3d Cir. 2009). Thus, we
will affirm the District Court’s entry of summary judgment on this claim. 5
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
5
Warwas also asserts that the District Court erred because it improperly applied
the summary judgment standard by resolving disputed issues of material fact in favor of
Plainfield. We find this argument without merit.
7