Michael Rinaldi v. United States

ALD-091 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 11-2741
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MICHAEL RINALDI,
Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 09-cv-01700)
District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo
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Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
Janaury 26, 2012
Before: SLOVITER, FISHER AND NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: February 3, 2012 )
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM
Michael Rinaldi, a federal prisoner, appeals from the District Court’s dismissal of
his complaint and denial of his motion for reconsideration. For the reasons that follow,
we will summarily affirm the District Court’s orders. See I.O.P. 10.6.
I.
Rinaldi filed a complaint in the District Court pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims
Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq. Rinaldi alleged that on September 5, 2008, he
was assaulted by his cellmate in the Special Housing Unit (“SHU”) at the Schuylkill
Federal Correctional Institution, in Minersville, Pennsylvania. As a result of the assault,
Rinaldi suffered a lost tooth and received seven stitches to his lip and chin. Rinaldi stated
that Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) staff knew that his assailant was violent and mentally
unstable, and that he had a history of assaulting other cellmates. Rinaldi asserted that the
BOP was negligent in failing to separate him from his assailant prior to the assault
because they were aware of his assailant’s violent history.
The District Court granted the United States’ motion to dismiss, agreeing that
Rinaldi’s claim is barred by the discretionary function exception to the FTCA’s waiver of
sovereign immunity. After the District Court denied Rinaldi’s motion for
reconsideration, he timely appealed to this Court.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review
over the applicability of the discretionary function exception to the waiver of sovereign
immunity. See Mitchell v. United States, 225 F.3d 361, 362 (3d Cir 2000).
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The FTCA offers a limited waiver of the federal government’s sovereign
immunity as to negligent acts of government employees acting within the scope of their
employment. 28 U.S.C. § 2671, et seq. Thus, in certain circumstances, prisoners may
invoke the FTCA to seek damages for injuries received while in confinement. United
States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 153 (1963). However, the FTCA is subject to exceptions,
such as the discretionary function exception. This exception provides that no liability
shall lie for claims “based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function or duty . . . whether or not the discretion involved be
abused.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
To determine whether the discretionary function exception to the waiver of
immunity applies, a court must determine (1) whether the act involves an element of
judgment or choice, rather than a course of action prescribed by a federal statute,
regulation, or policy; and (2) even if the challenged conduct involves an element of
judgment, whether that judgment is of the kind that the discretionary function exception
was designed to shield. Mitchell v. United States, 225 F.3d at 363.
The BOP conduct at issue in this case--the alleged failure to protect Rinaldi from
his assailant--is governed by a federal statute which requires the BOP to provide for the
“protection” and “safekeeping” of inmates in its care. See 18 U.S.C. § 4042(a)(2), (3).
As the District Court explained, however, this statute leaves the implementation of these
duties to the discretion of BOP officials. Moreover, there is no federal statute, regulation
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or policy that requires the BOP to take a particular course of action to ensure an inmate’s
safety from attacks by other inmates.
Accordingly, we agree with the District Court that the acts of the BOP officials in
this case clearly involved an element of judgment or choice, thereby satisfying the first
prong of the Mitchell analysis. See Cohen v. United States, 151 F.3d 1338, 1342 (11th
Cir. 1998) (explaining that “even if § 4042 imposes on the BOP a general duty of care to
safeguard prisoners, the BOP retains sufficient discretion in the means it may use to
fulfill that duty to trigger the discretionary function exception.”).
As to the second prong of the applicable test, a judgment as to how best to protect
one prisoner from attack by another “is of the kind that the discretionary function
exception was designed to shield.” Mitchell, 225 F.3d at 363; see, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 547-48 (1979) (holding that prison administrators should be afforded wide-
ranging deference in implementing and executing policies because discretion is needed to
preserve internal discipline and maintain institutional security); Whitley v. Albers, 475
U.S. 312, 321-22 (1986) (prison officials have discretionary power over the safety of the
institutions they operate). Indeed, courts have routinely held that federal prisoners’
FTCA claims for injuries by fellow inmates are barred by the discretionary function
exception. Calderon v. United States, 123 F.3d 947, 950-51 (7th Cir. 1997)
(discretionary function exception applied to FTCA claim for government’s failure to
protect plaintiff from attack by cellmate); Cohen, 151 F.3d at 1340-45 (reversing
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judgment in favor of prisoner who brought an FTCA action for injuries sustained as the
result of an attack by another inmate).
In sum, because both prongs of the Mitchell test are satisfied here, we conclude
that the District Court did not err in determining that Rinaldi’s claim is barred by the
discretionary function exception to the FTCA.
Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the orders of the District Court dismissing
the complaint and denying the motion for reconsideration. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d
Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
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