Mulholland v. Thomas Jefferson University Hospital, Inc.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 11-3412
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DAVID MULHOLLAND; MEGAN MULHOLLAND, Husband and Wife,
Appellants
v.
THOMAS JEFFERSON UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, INC.;
THOMAS JEFFERSON UNIVERSITY PHYSICIANS;
CATALDO DORIA, MD, individually; JEAN NOVAK,
BSN, individually; JAMES F. BURKE, JR., MD,
individually; GEORGE FRANCOS, MD, individually;
JOHN DOES A AND B, physicians, nurses and/or
business entities
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 09-cv-04322)
District Judge: Honorable Joel A. Pisano
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Argued July 10, 2012
Before: FUENTES, HARDIMAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: July 30, 2012)
Louis P. McFadden, Jr. [Argued]
Suite 307
222 New Road
Linwood, NJ 08221-0000
Attorney for Appellants
Daniel F. Ryan, III [Argued]
Jeffrey P. Brien
Anthony P. DeMichele
Stephanie M. Hohing
O’Brien & Ryan
2250 Hickory Road
Suite 300
Plymouth Meeting, PA 19462-0000
Attorneys for Appellees
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
David and Megan Mulholland appeal the District Court’s dismissal of their
complaint for failure to comply with New Jersey’s affidavit-of-merit statute. See N.J.
Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:53A-26 to -29. We will affirm.
I
Because we write for the parties, who are well acquainted with the case, we recite
only the essential facts and procedural history.
In 2009, David received a transplanted kidney from a donor who, prior to the
surgery, had tested positive for cytomegalovirus (CMV). David and his wife, Megan,
tested negative for the virus. David could have received a kidney from Megan, but
ultimately chose the other donor so that Megan would be able to donate a kidney to their
son if he someday needed it. Before he consented to the surgery, David had been told of
the serious risk of CMV infection associated with the transplant procedure, but not of the
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different CMV test results. For more than two years following the transplant, David
suffered complications from a CMV infection, which ended with the removal of the
transplanted kidney. Megan also contracted CMV during this period.
David and Megan filed a diversity suit against Thomas Jefferson University
Hospital, Inc., where the transplant was performed, and against several medical
professionals who were involved in transplanting the kidney and treating David
(collectively, Defendants). The amended complaint alleges five counts—lack of
informed consent, assault and battery, professional malpractice, negligence, and
fraudulent misrepresentation—but the Mulhollands abandoned all but the first and last
claims during the course of litigation in the District Court. The District Court dismissed
the complaint for failure to satisfy the affidavit-of-merit requirement, 1 and the
Mulhollands timely filed a notice of appeal.
1
The affidavit-of-merit statute provides in pertinent part:
In any action for damages for personal injuries, wrongful death or property
damage resulting from an alleged act of malpractice or negligence by a
licensed person in his profession or occupation, the plaintiff shall, within 60
days following the date of filing of the answer to the complaint by the
defendant, provide each defendant with an affidavit of an appropriate
licensed person that there exists a reasonable probability that the care, skill
or knowledge exercised or exhibited in the treatment, practice or work that
is the subject of the complaint, fell outside acceptable professional or
occupational standards or treatment practices. The court may grant no
more than one additional period, not to exceed 60 days, to file the affidavit
pursuant to this section, upon a finding of good cause.
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II
We will affirm largely for the reasons stated by the District Court, whose decision
we subject to plenary review. Newell v. Ruiz, 286 F.3d 166, 167 n.2 (3d Cir. 2002). The
Mulhollands offer two arguments for reversal. First, they contend that under New Jersey
law, an affidavit is not required to proceed with a lack-of-informed-consent or fraudulent-
misrepresentation claim. In the alternative, they assert that they substantially complied
with the affidavit requirement.
We squarely rejected the first argument in Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d
154, 161–62 (3d Cir. 2000), holding that under New Jersey law, an affidavit is a
necessary predicate to a lack-of-informed-consent action. We are permitted to reconsider
this holding “‘in light of intervening authority,’ including intervening decisions of state
law [by] its highest court.” Covell v. Bell Sports, Inc., 651 F.3d 357, 364 (3d Cir. 2011)
(quoting Reich v. D.M. Sabia Co., 90 F.3d 854, 858 (3d Cir. 1996)). The Mulhollands
In the case of an action for medical malpractice, the person executing the
affidavit shall meet the requirements of a person who provides expert
testimony or executes an affidavit as set forth in section 7 of P.L. 2004, c.
17 (C.2A:53A-41). In all other cases, the person executing the affidavit
shall be licensed in this or any other state; have particular expertise in the
general area or specialty involved in the action, as evidenced by board
certification or by devotion of the person’s practice substantially to the
general area or specialty involved in the action for a period of at least five
years. The person shall have no financial interest in the outcome of the
case under review, but this prohibition shall not exclude the person from
being an expert witness in the case.
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-27.
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proffer a few New Jersey Supreme Court precedents addressing the affidavit requirement
since Chamberlain, see Couri v. Gardner, 801 A.2d 1134 (N.J. 2002); Palanque v.
Lambert-Woolley, 774 A.2d 501 (N.J. 2001); Hubbard ex rel. Hubbard v. Reed, 774 A.2d
495 (N.J. 2001), but none of these cases considered the affidavit requirement as applied
to a lack-of-informed-consent claim. Accordingly, Chamberlain controls our disposition
here. Because the evidence necessary to prove fraudulent misrepresentation in this case
would be nearly identical to that needed to show lack of informed consent, Chamberlain
also disposes of the Mulhollands’ second cause of action.
As the Mulhollands were subject to the affidavit requirement, the only remaining
question is whether they complied with it. They forthrightly concede that their affidavit
was untimely, and we agree with the District Court that their affiant, a family medicine
practitioner, does not meet the expertise standard found in N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-27.
The Mulhollands argue under the New Jersey Supreme Court’s doctrine of “substantial
compliance” that they should be excused from this failure. See Ferreira v. Rancocas
Orthopedic Assocs., 836 A.2d 779, 783 (N.J. 2003) (discussing the five-part substantial-
compliance test). That Court has applied this doctrine where a medical-malpractice
defendant’s name was omitted from the affidavit, which was otherwise “timely served”
and accompanied by “an extensive medical expert’s report that clearly focused on his
conduct and on the totality of the circumstances attending” the alleged tort, Fink v.
Thompson, 772 A.2d 386, 394–95 (N.J. 2001), and in another case where “plaintiff’s
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counsel obtained a detailed expert’s report verifying the legitimacy of the claim long
before filing the complaint, immediately shared it with defendant’s carriers, and engaged
in settlement discussions with defendants based on the report,” Galik v. Clara Maass
Med. Ctr., 771 A.2d 1141, 1152 (N.J. 2001). Unlike the plaintiffs in those cases, the
Mulhollands can show neither a lack of prejudice to Defendants, who may be held liable
if we accept the substantial-compliance argument and who were not timely “notified . . .
about the merits of the . . . claims filed against them,” Palanque, 774 A.2d at 506, nor a
reasonable explanation for noncompliance. The District Court correctly held that the
Mulhollands did not substantially comply with the affidavit requirement. 2
III
For the aforementioned reasons, we will affirm.
2
The Mulhollands also invoke the “extraordinary circumstances” exception
recognized in Ferreira, 836 A.2d at 783, but because they address it for the first time in
their reply brief, the argument has been waived. E.g., United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d
197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005).
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