Patricia Dodson v. Coatesville Hospital Corp

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
______________
No. 18-3065
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PATRICIA A. DODSON,
Appellant
v.
COATESVILLE HOSPITAL CORPORATION d/b/a Brandywine Hospital
______________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 2-16-cv-05857)
District Judge: Hon. Michael M. Baylson
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
May 21, 2019
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Before: McKEE, SHWARTZ, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: June 3, 2019)
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OPINION*
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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge.
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7,
does not constitute binding precedent.
Plaintiff Patricia Dodson filed suit against her former employer, Coatesville
Hospital Corporation (“the Hospital”), alleging age discrimination in violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) and Pennsylvania Human Relations Act
(“PHRA”) and associational disability discrimination, in violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and PHRA.1 The District Court granted the Hospital’s motion
to dismiss the age discrimination claims, Dodson v. Coatesville Hosp. Corp., No. CV 16-
5857, 2017 WL 2798560, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 28, 2017) (“Dodson I”), and thereafter
granted its motion for summary judgment on the associational disability discrimination
claims. Dodson v. Coatesville Hosp. Corp., No. CV 16-5857, 2018 WL 4007083, at *1
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 2018) (“Dodson II”). For the following reasons, we will affirm both
orders.
I2
We first address Dodson’s appeal of the order dismissing her age discrimination
claims. We begin by setting forth the relevant factual allegations.
1
Dodson also brought ADA and PHRA retaliation claims but withdrew them.
2
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1367.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the Court’s order
dismissing Dodson’s age discrimination claim for failure to state a claim under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d
Cir. 2009). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). We
disregard “a pleading’s legal conclusions” but “assume all remaining factual allegations
to be true” and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Connelly v.
Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 790 (3d Cir. 2016).
2
A
In May 2010, the Hospital hired Dodson as Director of Physician Practices.
Dodson reported to Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) Bryan Burklow. In January 2011,
Dodson’s husband underwent surgery for colon cancer and began an extensive course of
treatment. Another member of Dodson’s immediate family received emergency medical
treatment for a mental health condition in September 2011.
At a management meeting in October 2011, Burklow stated that employee health
insurance costs influence the Hospital’s profitability and observed that some of the
leadership had “serious illnesses” in their families, speculating this was “because of our
age.” App. 35 ¶ 19. The Hospital terminated Dodson in November 2011. She was 51
years old.
Dodson filed claims of age discrimination against the Hospital alleging that since
Burklow became CEO, the Hospital has “engaged in a pattern of behavior leading to the
terminations or resignations of older and middle aged employees.” App. 35 ¶ 20. In
support of this allegation, Dodson listed twelve “older and middle aged employees” who
either resigned or were terminated by the Hospital within a year of Dodson’s termination.
B
To succeed on her age discrimination claim, Dodson must establish that her age
was a “but-for” cause of her termination. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167,
177-78 (2009). Since Dodson relies on circumstantial evidence, we use the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework, the first step of which involves evaluating the
plaintiff’s prima facie case. Fasold v. Justice, 409 F.3d 178, 184 (3d Cir. 2005). If the
3
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the employer must demonstrate that it had a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action, which the plaintiff must then show
was “mere pretext” for unlawful discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973). A prima facie case of age discrimination under both the
ADEA and the PHRA, see Fasold, 409 F.3d at 184, requires the plaintiff to allege that:
(1) the plaintiff is at least forty years old; (2) the plaintiff suffered an adverse
employment decision; (3) the plaintiff was qualified for the position in question; and
(4) the adverse action occurred under circumstances that create an inference that
plaintiff’s age was a motivating factor,3 see O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp.,
517 U.S. 308, 310 (1996).
The Hospital contends that Dodson failed to plead facts establishing the fourth
element. We agree. First, Burklow’s single stray remark that the managers are more
likely to confront issues of illness and death “because of our age” does not suggest
3
We have sometimes phrased the fourth element as requiring the plaintiff to show
that she “was ultimately replaced by another employee who was sufficiently younger so
as to support an inference of a discriminatory motive.” Willis v. UPMC Children’s Hosp.
of Pittsburgh, 808 F.3d 638, 644 (3d Cir. 2015). The Willis formulation can be traced
back to a case in which we held that “an ADEA plaintiff may establish the fourth element
of the McDonnell Douglas test for a prima facie case by showing that s/he was replaced
by a person sufficiently younger to permit an inference of age discrimination.” Maxfield
v. Sinclair Int’l, 766 F.2d 788, 793 (3d Cir. 1985). This is just one way to establish the
fourth element. A plaintiff may also establish the fourth element with proof that, during a
reduction in force, younger employees were retained when plaintiff was fired, Showalter
v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 190 F.3d 231, 234-36 (3d Cir. 1999), or with other facts
sufficient “to create an inference that an employment decision was based on” age,
O’Connor, 517 U.S. at 312.
4
discriminatory animus, and it was not directed at Dodson.4 Second, Dodson failed to
allege any other facts that might give rise to an inference that she was terminated because
of her age, such as the age of the employee who replaced her or whether similarly
situated employees were not terminated because they were significantly younger.5 The
Court therefore correctly dismissed Dodson’s age discrimination claims.
II6
We now turn to Dodson’s appeal of the order granting summary judgment for the
Hospital on her associational disability discrimination claims. We begin by setting forth
the relevant facts.
4
While factors other than age can serve as a “proxy” for age discrimination,
Tramp v. Associated Underwriters, Inc., 768 F.3d 793, 801 (8th Cir. 2014) (reversing
grant of summary judgment on age discrimination claims where company was aware of
high health insurance costs for older employees, had recommended that they switch to
Medicare instead of the company’s health plan, and had referenced that losing the oldest
and sickest employees had lowered insurance costs), Dodson’s allegations fail to raise an
inference that she was terminated due to her age.
5
Standing alone, Dodson’s allegation that twelve other “older workers” resigned
or were terminated within a year of her termination does not give rise to an inference that
either their or her separations were the result of age discrimination. Among other things,
these individuals were not similarly situated to Dodson as they held different positions,
and there is no allegation Burklow played a role in their departures.
6
Our review of the District Court’s order granting summary judgment is plenary,
Mylan Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 723 F.3d 413, 418 (3d Cir. 2013), and we
view the facts and make all reasonable inferences in favor of Dodson, the non-movant,
Hugh v. Butler Cty. Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir. 2005). Summary
judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the non-moving party fails to make
“a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has
the burden of proof.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
5
A
As the Director of Physician Practices, Dodson managed the operations of existing
physician practices and recruited new ones. She knew when she accepted the position
that there had been turnover in the role and that there were operational issues at several of
the practices. To address these issues, Dodson placed managers in various practices to
manage day-to-day operations. Her responsibilities expanded as the Hospital acquired
additional practices.
Dodson testified that her relationship with Burklow was initially “very
professional,” but that after her husband was hospitalized and diagnosed with cancer in
July 2010, her relationship with Burklow “disintegrated.” App. 118. Burklow “became
increasingly interested in [her] husband’s diagnosis and treatment plan.” App. 76.
Dodson insists that Burklow “did not have a genuine concern” and instead was focused
on her job and how much time she would need to take off. App. 106-07. Although
Dodson admitted that Burklow never said anything disparaging to Dodson about her
husband’s illness or expressed concern about the cost of his treatment to the Hospital, she
claims that Burklow repeatedly referenced his own experience dealing with his
daughter’s brain cancer and subsequent mental health problems, and emphasized how
expensive and disruptive such illnesses could be. Burklow said his questions and
references to his own experience were demonstrations of empathy.
In December 2010 or January 2011, Burklow and Dodson attended a meeting with
a physician in a practice group during which Burklow suggested that Dodson was
distracted by her husband’s illness. Dodson further testified that beginning in February
6
or March 2011, Burklow “started to criticize, without any [basis],” Dodson’s work. App.
76.
Throughout 2010 and 2011, the Hospital had financial troubles. Dodson testified
that the Hospital had been looking to eliminate positions since she started. In March
2011, the Hospital’s parent company directed Burklow to eliminate thirty-five positions.
During a management meeting in late October 2011, Dodson’s department was
specifically identified as a drain on the Hospital’s finances. During the same meeting,
Burklow remarked that many of the managers or members of their families had suffered
illness, likely because of their ages. Burklow testified that three or four of the managers
in the meeting had been ill or had ill relatives and that he made the statement to show
empathy for their circumstances.
Days before she was fired, Burklow advised Dodson that the Hospital was
conducting a reduction in force and asked her to provide him with a list of positions in
her department that could be cut. Dodson believed that, with her suggestions, Burklow
would meet his targets. However, Burklow later informed her that he “didn’t make his
numbers” and the Hospital was eliminating her position. App. 99. Burklow was the sole
decision-maker. Burklow testified that Dodson’s termination was about “hit[ting] a
number,” not her performance. App. 146. During the November 2011 reduction in force,
the Hospital eliminated eight positions including Dodson’s.
Dodson asserts that her termination was discriminatory. She claims that even
though she took off limited time from work, Burklow repeatedly asked whether she
would need to miss work to care for her husband, and made critical comments to Dodson
7
about another employee’s use of family and medical leave. She also claims that although
she never discussed her family’s health insurance with Burklow, he must have known
about the costs.7 Specifically, Dodson explained that when a “[Hospital-]insured
employee or a dependent utilizes hospital services it actually costs the hospital money.
My husband was a pretty high user of those services and had multiple procedures done,
had an extended ICU stay and I’m sure that it cost the hospital a considerable amount of
money.” App. 123. However, both Burklow and the human resources manager testified
that the Hospital did not track by employee the cost of providing health insurance.
After Dodson was fired, Burklow established a management committee to take
over Dodson’s role running the practices. An employee whom Dodson had supervised
declared that she was not aware of the formation of such a committee but that after
Dodson was fired, she took over most of Dodson’s responsibilities. More than three
years after Dodson’s termination, the Hospital hired a replacement for her position.
B
Dodson asserts that her termination violates the ADA and PHRA. She specifically
invokes the ADA and PHRA association provisions, which prohibit denying equal jobs to
qualified individuals because of their association with someone with a disability. 42
U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4); 43 Pa. Stat. § 955(l). Because Dodson has offered no direct
evidence of associational disability discrimination, this claim is also assessed under the
7
As further evidence of Burklow’s knowledge of her family’s confidential
medical information, she claims that in September 2011, the day after Dodson brought
her son to the emergency room to address suicidal ideation, Burklow, whom she had not
told about the incident, asked her how her son was doing.
8
McDonnell Douglas framework, which requires her to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination and show that the Hospital’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for
terminating her was pretextual.
Even assuming that Dodson established a prima facie case of associational
disability discrimination,8 she failed to adduce proof that the Hospital’s stated reason for
her firing was pretextual. At the pretext stage, “the plaintiff must convince the factfinder
that not only was the employer’s proffered reason false, but the real reason was
impermissible discrimination.” Willis v. UPMC Children’s Hosp. of Pittsburgh, 808 F.3d
638, 645 (3d Cir. 2015). The Hospital has presented a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason for Dodson’s termination: the need to reduce costs. Burklow explained that the
Hospital was no longer recruiting additional practices and he believed that the existing
8
Multiple courts of appeals have adopted the following standard for a prima facie
case of associational disability discrimination:
(1) the plaintiff was “qualified” for the job at the time of the adverse
employment action; (2) the plaintiff was subjected to adverse employment
action; (3) the plaintiff was known by his employer at the time to have a
relative or associate with a disability; [and] (4) the adverse employment
action occurred under circumstances raising a reasonable inference that the
disability of the relative or associate was a determining factor in the
employer’s decision.
Den Hartog v. Wasatch Acad., 129 F.3d 1076, 1085 (10th Cir. 1997); accord Stansberry
v. Air Wis. Airlines Corp., 651 F.3d 482, 487 (6th Cir. 2011); Hilburn v. Murata Elecs.
N. Am., Inc., 181 F.3d 1220, 1231 (11th Cir. 1999). Our Court has observed that the
fourth element can be met, for example, where an adverse employment action was
“motivated by unfounded stereotypes or assumptions about the need to care for a disabled
person”; the “disabled relative’s perceived health care costs to the company”; “fear of an
employee contracting or spreading a relative’s disease”’; or because the employee was
perceived to be distracted by the relative’s disability. Erdman v. Nationwide Ins. Co.,
582 F.3d 500, 511 & n.7 (3d Cir. 2009).
9
individual practice managers could manage the practices without a director. Dodson
questions the Hospital’s evidence supporting its justification and claims that Burklow’s
statements regarding her husband’s illness demonstrate that Burklow held an unfounded
assumption that Dodson was distracted by her husband’s illness and that treatment for his
illness was a significant expense for the Hospital. These arguments are unavailing.
First, with respect to Dodson’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
concerning its reason for termination, Dodson fails to appreciate that the Hospital’s
burden is “relatively light,” and is satisfied
by introducing evidence which, taken as true, would permit the conclusion that
there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the unfavorable employment decision.
The employer need not prove that the tendered reason actually motivated its
behavior, as throughout this burden-shifting paradigm the ultimate burden of
proving intentional discrimination always rests with the plaintiff.
Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994) (emphasis omitted) (internal citation
omitted). Dodson claims that the Hospital did not produce any documents showing that
its work force reduction was legitimate and necessary, and instead relied only on
Burklow’s memory of how the reduction-in-force decisions were made. She suggests
that his testimony should be rejected because his recollection that he was ordered to
reduce a gross payroll amount is inconsistent with evidence that he was directed to reduce
a specific number of positions. Even if that were accurate,9 “proof that the employer’s
proffered reason is unpersuasive, or even obviously contrived, does not necessarily
9
Notably, Dodson admitted that the Hospital had financial difficulties and sought
to cut costs through staff reductions, and thus she corroborates Burklow’s account that
staff reductions were the means to reduce costs.
10
establish that the plaintiff’s proffered reason . . . is correct. . . . [I]t is not enough . . . to
dis[]believe the employer; the factfinder must believe the plaintiff’s explanation of
intentional discrimination.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133,
146-47 (2000) (alteration in original) (emphasis, internal quotation marks, and citations
omitted).
Second, while “a decision motivated by unfounded stereotypes or assumptions
about the need to care for a disabled person may be fairly construed as [discrimination]
‘because of the . . . disability’ itself,” Erdman v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 500, 511
(3d Cir. 2009) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4)), Dodson has not demonstrated that
Burklow harbored “unfounded stereotypes and assumptions” about the impact of her
husband’s illness on her job performance or the Hospital’s expenses. Indeed, Burklow
testified that her termination was based on the need to reduce employees, not on her job
performance. App. 146. Additionally, Dodson’s counsel conceded at oral argument
before the District Court that there is no evidence in the record that Burklow, the
undisputed decision-maker, knew whether Dodson and her family received their health
insurance from the Hospital, whether her husband received care at the Hospital, or the
precise cost of his care. Dodson’s conclusory, self-serving assertions regarding her
impressions of Burklow’s thoughts are “insufficient to withstand a motion for summary
judgment” on her associational discrimination claims. Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey &
Chilcote, P.C., 560 F.3d 156, 161 (3d Cir. 2009).
Accordingly, the District Court did not err in granting summary judgment for the
Hospital on Dodson’s associational disability claims.
11
III
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.
12