Galina Valeeva v.

CLD-115 and CLD-116 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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Nos. 15-3002 & 15-3011
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IN RE: GALINA ANATOLIY VALEEVA,
Petitioner
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On Petitions for Writ of Mandamus
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Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.
January 22, 2016
Before: FISHER, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: February 4, 2016)
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OPINION*
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PER CURIAM
Galina Anatoliy Valeeva has filed petitions for writ of mandamus seeking to have
this Court “construe a trust,” compel the respondents to appear and answer for their
breach of that trust, and to enforce the trust on her behalf. We will deny the petitions.
Valeeva’s mandamus petitions are anything but a model of clarity. As best we can
decipher, it appears that Valeeva takes issue with foreclosure and civil ejectment
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
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proceedings that were initiated against her in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks
County. See Mandamus Pet. in C.A. No. 15-3011 at 3-4. In her supplemental filing,
Valeeva further complains of the forced eviction that she asserts occurred on August 28,
2015. See Doc. in Supp. at 1. She apparently wants this Court to “construe” a trust
which would require the respondents to hold the foreclosed property in trust for her use
and benefit, while discharging and releasing her from all liabilities. See Mandamus Pet.
in C.A. No. 15-3002 at 9, 13.
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy. See Kerr v. United States Dist. Ct., 426
U.S. 394, 402 (1976). Within the discretion of the issuing court, mandamus is generally a
means “to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to
compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so.” In re Diet Drugs Prods.
Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting In re Patenaude, 210 F.3d 135,
140 (3d Cir. 2000)). To obtain mandamus relief, a petitioner must establish that “(1) no
other adequate means exist to attain the relief he [or she] desires, (2) the party’s right to
issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable, and (3) the writ is appropriate under the
circumstances.” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam) (internal
quotation marks, alteration omitted).
Under the All Writs Act, Congress has conferred jurisdiction on this Court to issue
writs of mandamus “in aid of” our jurisdiction and “agreeable to the usages and
principles of law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). We may therefore consider a petition for
mandamus only if the action involves subject matter that may at some time come within
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this Court’s jurisdiction. See United States v. Christian, 660 F.2d 892, 894 (3d Cir.
1981) (explaining that, “[b]efore entertaining” a petition for a writ of mandamus, “we
must identify a jurisdiction that the issuance of the writ might assist”). Valeeva,
however, points to no such jurisdiction and we are not aware of any. She has filed no
action in any of the district courts in this Circuit; thus, there is no pending action over
which a writ of mandamus might aid our jurisdiction.
Additionally, Valeeva has failed to demonstrate a clear and indisputable right to
have this Court “construe” a trust whereby her former property is held for her benefit and
use while all liabilities are “discharged and released.” To the extent Valeeva takes issue
with any order entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County in the foreclosure
and/or ejectment actions, her recourse is through the state court system. Accordingly, we
do not hesitate to conclude that Valeeva has failed to demonstrate that she is entitled to
mandamus relief, and we will deny these petitions without further discussion.
Finally, because Valeeva has not shown that “disclosure will work a clearly
defined and serious injury to the party seeking closure,” In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d
183, 194 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 16 F.3d 549, 551 (3d Cir.
1994)), we deny her motion to seal her filings.
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