R. D. v. Shohola Inc

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 18-1968
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R. D.
v.
SHOHOLA, INC.,
Appellant
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 3-16-cv-01056)
District Judge: Honorable James M. Munley
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Argued February 12, 2019
Before: HARDIMAN, SCIRICA, and COWEN, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed: April 24, 2019)
Melissa A. Murphy-Petros [Argued]
Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker
55 West Monroe Street
Suite 3800
Chicago, IL 60603
Counsel for Appellant
Jacqueline DeCarlo
Justin L. Klein [Argued]
Hobbie Corrigan & DeCarlo
125 Wyckoff Road
Eatontown, NJ 07724
Jerry A. Lindheim
Locks Law Firm
601 Walnut Street
The Curtis Center, Suite 720 East
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Counsel for Appellee
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OPINION*
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
This interlocutory appeal involves an order of the District Court denying a motion
to quash a subpoena. Plaintiff R.D. issued a deposition subpoena to Gary Trobe, an
investigator hired by Defendant Shohola, Inc. to assist with its defense. According to
R.D., Trobe intimidated three third-party witnesses (E.J., G.M., and Massachusetts State
Police Detective Matthew Cosgrove). Shohola filed a motion to quash the subpoena,
arguing the depositions of its investigator would violate the work-product doctrine.
Because the District Court did not apply the standard in Appeal of Hughes, 633 F.2d 282
(3d Cir. 1980), to determine whether the witness intimidation exception to the work-
product doctrine applies to Trobe’s interaction with each witness, we will affirm in part,
reverse in part, and vacate in part and remand.
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does
not constitute binding precedent.
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I1
R.D. brought claims of battery, negligence, and negligent hiring and supervision
against Shohola, alleging he was sexually abused as a minor child while attending a
camping trip Shohola conducted. R.D. subpoenaed Trobe’s deposition, asserting that he
could question Trobe about his interactions with third-party witnesses E.J., G.M., and
Detective Cosgrove because E.J. testified Trobe intimidated him. Shohola moved to
quash the subpoena, arguing it violated the work-product doctrine. Magistrate Judge
Carlson denied Shohola’s motion. The District Court affirmed the Magistrate Judge’s
order on appeal because it was not clearly erroneous. Shohola now argues the District
Court abused its discretion when it denied Shohola’s motion to quash Trobe’s deposition
subpoena because the testimony would reveal attorney work product.
In challenging the subpoena, Shohola claims that any potential questioning of
Trobe about his interactions with these witnesses constitutes opinion work product
because the inquiry would inevitably disclose defense counsel’s impressions, legal
theories, and strategies. Shohola concedes that evidence of witness intimidation is not
1
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and we have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 pursuant to the doctrine established in Perlman v.
United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918). The Perlman doctrine allows “an interlocutory appeal
of a disclosure order if it is directed at a disinterested third party lacking a sufficient stake
in the proceeding to risk contempt by refusing compliance.” In re Grand Jury, 705 F.3d
133, 144 (3d Cir. 2012). It applies here because R.D. seeks the deposition testimony of
Shohola’s private investigator, which Shohola argues is protected by work-product
doctrine. We review discovery orders for an abuse of discretion. Eisai, Inc. v. Sanofi
Aventis U.S., LLC, 821 F.3d 394, 402 (3d Cir. 2016).
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protected work product, but argues R.D. has not sufficiently demonstrated that Trobe
intimidated the three third-party witnesses.
The District Court held otherwise, affirming the Magistrate Judge’s finding that
R.D. “made a sufficient threshold showing of possible witness misconduct or coercion.”
R.D. v. Shohola Camp Ground & Resort, 2018 WL 1919560, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 24,
2018). The Court supported the Magistrate Judge’s reasoning that
so long as [R.D.] does not intend to seek any documents or other tangible
materials from Trobe, and only intends to determine the facts surrounding
Trobe’s conduct and communications with third-party witnesses, and does
not seek any information regarding defense counsel’s mental impressions
or legal strategy, plaintiff may depose Trobe without violating the work-
product doctrine.
Id. Thus, the Court affirmed the Magistrate Judge’s order allowing R.D. to depose Trobe
on his interactions with all three witnesses: E.J., G.M., and Detective Cosgrove.
II
While the District Court correctly limited Trobe’s deposition to cover the narrow
issue of whether he intimidated witnesses, it did not apply the controlling standard for
doing so. In Appeal of Hughes, we held that the work-product doctrine does not protect
efforts by an attorney’s agent to intimidate witnesses. 633 F.2d at 290–91. A party can
successfully subpoena an attorney’s agent “on the ground that the work product involved
misconduct” by demonstrating “a reasonable basis for such a belief.” Id. at 291. In the
context of the crime-fraud exception to the work-product doctrine and attorney-client
privilege, we have explained that “reasonable basis” is less than a preponderance of the
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evidence, but not close to zero. See In re Grand Jury, 705 F.3d 133, 153–54 (3d Cir.
2012).
In evaluating whether R.D. has established a “reasonable basis” for his belief that
Trobe intimidated witnesses, the District Court must also consider the evidence of
misconduct for each witness individually. Cf. id. at 159–61 (evaluating claims of work-
product and attorney-client privilege for documents and testimony under the crime-fraud
exception on an individual basis). Otherwise, a party could use a threshold showing of an
agent’s misconduct with one witness as a means for delving into every one of the agent’s
innumerable interactions with other witnesses. To avoid such overbroad discovery, we
will assess the District Court’s order by evaluating whether there is a “reasonable basis”
to support allegations of intimidation for each witness: E.J., G.M., and Detective
Cosgrove.
A
We agree with Magistrate Judge Carlson’s conclusion (affirmed by the District
Court) that R.D. made a sufficient threshold showing that Trobe tried to influence E.J.
E.J. testified that: Trobe informed him the police might contact him about the incident; he
felt intimidated by Trobe; and he subsequently retained counsel after meeting with Trobe.
While neither the Magistrate Judge nor the District Court cited the Appeal of Hughes
standard, these statements meet the “reasonable basis” threshold because they provide
“more than groundless suspicion” that Trobe might have engaged in misconduct. 633
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F.2d at 291. So we will affirm the portion of the District Court’s order allowing R.D. to
depose Trobe on the narrow issue of whether he attempted to intimidate E.J. We leave it
to the sound discretion of the District Court to determine how to oversee the conduct of
Trobe’s deposition to ensure that Shohola’s attorney work product is protected to the
fullest extent possible under the circumstances.
B
While the District Court reached the right conclusion about Trobe’s interaction
with E.J. without applying Appeal of Hughes, the allegation that Trobe tried to influence
G.M. is weaker under this standard. Unlike E.J., G.M. did not testify he felt intimidated
by Trobe. However, he said Trobe was persistent in arranging a meeting and tried to
influence the wording of his statement. Because this evidence is not as strong as E.J.’s
testimony and the District Court has not yet examined it under the Appeal of Hughes
standard, we will vacate and remand the Court’s determination that R.D. can question
Trobe about potential misconduct involving G.M. On remand, the District Court should
determine whether, consistent with Appeal of Hughes, Trobe can be asked about his
interactions with G.M.
C
Finally, we hold that the District Court abused its discretion in concluding that
R.D. could depose Trobe about his interaction with Detective Cosgrove. R.D. has
presented no evidence whatsoever—let alone evidence of intimidation—of Trobe’s
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communications with Detective Cosgrove, and the Court cannot impute inferences
supporting allegations of Trobe’s misconduct with E.J. and G.M. to his interactions with
Detective Cosgrove. Accordingly, we will reverse the portion of the District Court’s
order allowing R.D. to depose Trobe about his interactions with Detective Cosgrove.
D
We conclude by recognizing the validity of Shohola’s concern that a deposition
narrowly tailored to witness intimidation could still reveal protected work product. As the
District Court noted previously, it has various tools at its disposal to manage this
situation. We endorse the District Court’s decision to uphold several aspects of the
Magistrate Judge’s deposition order, such as reserving Shohola’s right to file a later
motion in limine for divulged work product and offering to hold the deposition in the
courthouse to moderate disputes. The District Court might also require the parties to
submit written questions, and it might choose to supervise the deposition. After the
District Court makes a determination about Trobe’s alleged misconduct with G.M., we
leave to the District Court’s discretion the task of policing the scope of protected work
product during Trobe’s deposition.
* * *
For these reasons, we will affirm in part, reverse in part, and vacate in part the
District Court’s order denying Shohola’s motion to quash Trobe’s subpoena and we will
remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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