Smith-Bey v. Director of Federal Bureau of Prisons

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 11-3871
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TELEDO SMITH-BEY,
Appellant
v.
DIRECTOR OF FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 11-cv-03927)
District Judge: Honorable Noel L. Hillman
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 17, 2012
Before: RENDELL, FUENTES AND WEIS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: February 27, 2012)
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM.
Teledo Smith-Bey, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from the District
Court’s order denying his petition for a writ of mandamus. We will affirm.
In his mandamus petition, Smith-Bey cited 42 U.S.C. § 17541(a)(1)(G), a
provision of the Second Chance Act of 2007, for the proposition that the Bureau of
Prisons (“BOP”) is required to provide incentives to inmates who participate in skills
development programs. Smith-Bey averred that he had completed more than 20 skills
development programs, but that he had not been extended any incentives for doing so. In
his unsuccessful pursuit of these unspecified incentives, Smith-Bey filed a formal
grievance with the prison and exhausted the administrative remedies available to him.
Undeterred, Smith-Bey filed in the District Court a petition for a writ of mandamus,
seeking to have the District Court compel the BOP to perform the duties that Smith-Bey
alleges are mandated by § 17541(a)(1)(G). The District Court denied relief, and Smith-
Bey appealed.
We have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise
plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal. See Stehney v. Perry, 101 F.3d 925,
929 (3d Cir. 1996). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361, a district court has jurisdiction over
mandamus actions “to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency
thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.” Mandamus relief is to be awarded only
in extraordinary circumstances, where the petitioner demonstrates that he has no
alternative means to achieve the relief sought, and that he has a clear and indisputable
right to the writ. Stehney, 101 F.3d at 934 & n.6.
In denying the mandamus petition, the District Court reasoned that Smith-Bey had
not demonstrated a clear and indisputable right to the writ. We agree. Section
17541(a)(1)(G) requires the Attorney General and the Director of the BOP to establish
incentives for prisoner participation in skills development programs. However, the BOP
Director is given wide latitude in developing and offering incentives, see § 17541(a)(2),
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and the statute does not require that any particular incentives be given. Given the
discretion afforded to the Director, Smith-Bey has not shown a clear and indisputable
right to relief, making mandamus an inappropriate remedy.
We will therefore affirm the decision of the District Court.
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