Mark Robinson v. John Wetzel

BLD-260 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 14-4144
___________
MARK ANTHONY ROBINSON,
Appellant
v.
SECRETARY JOHN WETZEL; MARIROSA LAMAS;
JEFFERY HORTON; ROBERT MARSH,
Deputy Superintendent, PRC Member;
TIMOTHY MILLER, Corrections Classification and
Inmate Program Manager, PRC Members, SCI Rockview
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 3-11-cv-02194)
District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
July 2, 2015
Before: AMBRO, JORDAN and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 14, 2015)
_________
OPINION*
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
_________
PER CURIAM
Mark A. Robinson, a prisoner, filed suit against prison officials under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 claiming that they transferred him to the Special Management Unit (“SMU”) as
retaliation for filing prison grievances and lawsuits, and did so with deliberate
indifference to his mental health needs and in violation of his due process rights.1 The
defendants moved for summary judgment, which the District Court granted. Robinson
appealed.
We have jurisdiction over his appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise
plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal order. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229
F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). We may affirm a district court for any reason supported by
the record. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
We will summarily affirm the District Court because this appeal does not present a
substantial question. See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
The District Court properly granted summary judgment on Robinson’s claim that
he was transferred to the SMU in retaliation for filing unspecified grievances and
lawsuits. A prisoner litigating a retaliation claim must show that the conduct provoking
the alleged retaliation was constitutionally protected, that he suffered some “adverse
action” at the hands of the prison officials “sufficient to deter a person of ordinary
1
Because we write solely for the benefit of the parties, we only include the facts relevant
to our decision.
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firmness from exercising his [constitutional] rights,” and that the constitutionally
protected conduct was a substantial motivating factor in the defendant’s conduct. Rauser
v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001) (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted). If a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden
shifts to the defendant “to demonstrate that even without the impetus to retaliate he would
have taken the action complained of.” Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 260 (2006).
Even assuming Robinson established a prima facie case of retaliation, summary
judgment was appropriate because the prison officials established that Robinson was
transferred to the SMU because he was continually disruptive, dangerous, and violent,
not because he filed numerous lawsuits and grievances against prison staff. Specifically,
the prison officials provided evidence showing that Robinson was found guilty of
numerous misconducts for threatening staff and assaulting other inmates and that these
rulings were upheld on review. The evidence further showed that two prison
psychologists evaluated Robinson and recommended his SMU-transfer. Neither
psychologist was named as a defendant or alleged to have acted with a retaliatory motive.
Moreover, although Robinson submitted evidence in opposition to summary judgment,
his submissions do not reveal any retaliatory motive for his transfer to the SMU. Given
the evidence of Robinson’s disruptive behavior, we cannot say that the prison officials’
decision to transfer him to the SMU was not within the broad discretion that we must
afford them. See Carter v. McGrady, 292 F.3d 152, 159 (3d Cir. 2002). We conclude
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that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the decision to transfer Robinson to the
SMU was “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests,” Turner v. Safley, 482
U.S. 78, 89 (1987), and that he would have been transferred because of his continually
disruptive behavior, notwithstanding any desire to retaliate against him.
Summary judgment was also appropriate on Robinson’s Eighth Amendment
claim. Robinson alleged that the decision to place him in the SMU was made with
deliberate indifference to his mental-health needs. However, the evidence shows that,
before he was ever considered for transfer to the SMU, Robinson was transferred to the
Special Assessment Unit over concerns about his mental health. At the Special
Assessment Unit, two licensed psychologists evaluated his mental health and made
recommendations for his future placement. The evidence further shows the prison
psychologists—not the named defendants—recommended Robinson’s transfer to the
SMU. There is no evidence in the record suggesting that the defendants were
deliberately indifferent to Robinson’s mental health needs, see Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 105 (1976), and the District Court properly awarded summary judgment on that
claim.
We will also affirm the District Court’s award of summary judgment on
Robinson’s due process claim. Robinson claimed that, under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, he was entitled to a hearing before being transferred to the
SMU. However, Robinson’s placement in the SMU did not constitute a dramatic
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departure from the accepted standards for conditions of confinement such that due
process was implicated. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Placement in
administrative segregation for days or months at a time does not implicate a protected
liberty interest. See Torres v. Fauver, 292 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2002) (no liberty interest in
avoiding 120 days of administrative custody); Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 706 (3d
Cir. 1997) (conditions in administrative segregation do not impose “atypical or
significant hardship”). Due process concerns arise when the conditions of confinement
impose “atypical and significant hardship[s] on the inmate in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. In his motion opposing summary
judgment, Robinson claimed that he suffered “atypical environmental [sic] significant
hardships,” but he did not explain the way in which the conditions in the SMU were
atypical or created such hardship. Moreover, the record contains no evidence suggesting
that Robinson’s transfer to the SMU constituted a departure from the accepted standards
for confinement conditions or created an atypical hardship. Therefore, we will
summarily affirm the District Court’s conclusion that Robinson’s transfer to the SMU did
not implicate a protected liberty interest.
Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court.
Furthermore, Robinson’s motion for appointment of counsel on appeal is denied.
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