Wingate Inns International, Inc. v. Hightech Inn.com, LLC

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 10-3187
___________
WINGATE INNS INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Delaware
Corporation, successor in interest to HOTEL Franchising
Partnership doing business as WINGATE INNS, L.P.
v.
HIGHTECH INN.COM, LLC, and Oregon Limited Liability Company;
ENGINEERING DESIGN CORPORATION, an Oregon Corporation;
SHANTU N. SHAH, an individual; BAKULESH PATEL, an individual
SHANTU N. SHAH, an individual,
Third Party Plaintiff
v.
BUGGSI HOSPITALITY GROUP, LLC, an Oregon Limited
Liability Company; RAJU PATEL, Chief Financial Officer of
Buggsi Hospitality, an individual, ROBERT LOEWEN,
Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of
Wyndham Group, LLC, an individual,
Third Party Defendants
SHANTUN N. SHAH,
Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 07-cv-05014)
District Judge: Honorable Garrett E. Brown, Jr.
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 23, 2011
1
Before: SCIRICA, SMITH and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 26, 2011)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Shantu N. Shah, proceeding pro se, appeals from the order of the District Court
denying his motion for reconsideration and for default judgment and granting defendants‟
motion to dismiss. For the following reasons, we will affirm.
I.
In October 2007, Wingate Inns International, Inc. (“Wingate”) filed a complaint
in District Court against Hightech Inn.com, LLC (“Hightech”) and Bakulesh Patel
(“Bakulesh”) seeking to recover damages owed under a settlement agreement reached
after an alleged breach of a franchise agreement. Wingate also alleged that Shah was
secondarily liable for the damages. Shah answered the complaint and filed counterclaims
against Wingate, cross-claims against Hightech and Bakulesh, and a third-party
complaint against Buggsi Hospitality Group, LLC (“Buggsi”), Raju Patel (“Raju”), and
Robert Loewen (“Loewen”) (collectively “the defendants”). He alleged claims arising
under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (substantive RICO claim), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (conspiracy to
commit a violation under § 1962), Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.720 (Oregon RICO), N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 2C:41-2 (New Jersey RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Hobbs Act), 18 U.S.C. § 666(theft or bribery involving federal funds), and common law breach of fiduciary duty.
2
In April 2008, Wingate‟s claims against Hightech and Bakulesh were dismissed,
following a settlement agreement.
Pursuant to Shah‟s motions, the District Court entered default against Hightech
and Bakulesh in April 2008, and against Buggsi and Raju in May 2008, for failure to
appear. In June 2008, upon defense counsel‟s motion, the court vacated the default
against Hightech and Bakulesh and granted a motion to allow all of the defendants to join
a motion to dismiss filed by Loewen and Wingate. In May 2009, Shah filed another
request for entry of default against the defendants because they entered appearances late
in the action.
In December 2008, the District Court granted Loewen‟s motion to dismiss Shah‟s
third-party complaint. The court granted Shah two thirty-day extensions to file an
amended third-party complaint. Shah did not file the amended complaint, but eventually
filed a motion for reconsideration.
In December 2009, the court vacated the default against Raju. On the same day,
the District Court denied Shah‟s motion for reconsideration of its order dismissing his
claims against Loewen and granted Wingate‟s motion for judgment on the pleadings.1
The court granted Shah leave to amend his mail and wire fraud claims within thirty-days.
In January 2010, the District Court denied Shah‟s motions for entry of default against the
defendants and entry of default judgment against Buggsi. Instead of re-filing his mail
and wire fraud claims, Shah filed another motion for entry of default judgment against
1
Hightech, Bakulesh, and Raju joined the motion.
3
Buggsi and Raju and a motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing his claims
against Wingate.
On June 21, 2010, the District Court denied Shah‟s motions for reconsideration
and for default judgment, and granted the remaining defendants‟ (Hightech, Bakulesh,
Raju, and Buggsi) motion to dismiss. Shah filed a timely notice of appeal. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II.
A. Motion for Reconsideration
We review a denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion, while
reviewing the District Court‟s underlying legal determinations de novo and its factual
determinations for clear error. Max‟s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros,
176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999). A motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) must
rely on one of three grounds: (1) an intervening change in the law; (2) the availability of
new evidence; or (3) the need to correct clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.
N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995).
The District Court granted Wingate‟s motion for judgment on the pleadings,
finding that Shah did not allege facts sufficient to sustain a RICO claim (under federal or
state laws) or a conspiracy under the federal RICO statute. 2 In his motion, Shah asked
the District Court to reconsider its decision in light of Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494(2000), which he claimed overruled Lightning Lube v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153 (3d Cir.
2
In addition, the court determined that Shah‟s breach of fiduciary duty claim was merely
an unsupported conclusory allegation. The court also found that Shah lacked standing to
prosecute criminal acts under the Hobbs Act or the federal theft or bribery statutes.
4
1993) and constituted a change in RICO law. For substantially the reasons stated by the
District Court, this argument is without merit. Accordingly, we conclude that the District
Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reconsider.
B. Renewed Motion for Default Judgment
We review a denial of a motion for default judgment for abuse of discretion.
Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2000). A District Court considers
whether the plaintiff would be prejudiced if default is denied, whether the defendant
appears to have a litigable defense, and whether the defendant‟s delay is due to culpable
conduct. Id. Shah argues that Buggsi filed “late answers or appearances without an
excusable reason.” However, as the District Court found, late filing and appearances
cannot stand as the basis for a default judgment. Accordingly, the District Court properly
denied default judgment.
C. Motion to Dismiss
Our review of a District Court‟s order granting a motion to dismiss is plenary.
See Santiago v. GMAC Mortgage Group, Inc., 417 F.3d 384, 386 (3d Cir. 2005). “To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to „state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.‟” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.
Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
In deciding a motion to dismiss, a court must determine whether the complaint “pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.The District Court found that Shah failed to state a claim for relief under Federal
5
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). To survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint
must contain more than “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. His claims against
the moving defendants (Hightech, Bakulesh, Raju, and Buggsi) were the same as those he
raised against Wingate. As stated above, the District Court found that Shah failed to
allege sufficient facts to establish a pattern of racketeering, conspiracy under the RICO
statute, or any breach of fiduciary duty. The court properly concluded that the same
findings applied to Shah‟s claims against the moving defendants. Thus, we agree that
Shah filed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court‟s judgment. 3 Shah‟s
motion to strike Appellee‟s brief and index is denied.
3
Shah‟s motion to file a second reply brief is granted. We considered both of his reply
briefs in reaching our decision.
6