Charles Garrett, III v. Commissioner of Internal Reven

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
No. 19-1743
__________
CHARLES E. GARRETT, III; GILDA T. GARRETT,
Appellants
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
__________
On Appeal from the United States Tax Court
(IRS-1 : 17-25282)
Tax Court Judge: Honorable L. Paige Marvel
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
November 1, 2019
BEFORE: HARDIMAN, PHIPPS, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed December 18, 2019)
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OPINION*
__________
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
The Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service sent a certified mail joint
notice of deficiency and penalties—pursuant to I.R.C. § 6212(a)1—to the last
known address of appellants Charles and Gilda Garrett. But the Garretts had
moved to a new address and never received the notice. They petitioned for a
redetermination, claiming that the notice was invalid. The United States Tax Court
concluded—pursuant to I.R.C. § 6213(a)2—that it lacked jurisdiction because the
Garretts’ petition was not timely. It granted the Commissioner’s motion to
dismiss. On appeal, the Garretts continue to claim that the notice is invalid. We
will affirm.3
To determine whether the Tax Court was correct we must first decide if
Section 6213(a) is jurisdictional.4 Our analysis focuses on the ‘“text, context, and
relevant historical treatment”’ of the law.5 We, first, examine the plain language of
1
26 U.S.C. § 6212(a).
2
26 U.S.C. § 6213(a).
3
We review the Tax Court’s dismissal of the taxpayers’ petition for lack of jurisdiction
de novo. Sunoco, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 663 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir.
2011).
4
See Rubel v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 856 F.3d 301, 304 (3d Cir. 2017). A
jurisdictional statute in this context is distinguished from a claim-processing statute that
does not speak to a court’s authority but rather “promote[s] the orderly progress of
litigation by requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified
times.” Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435 (2011).
5
Rubel, 856 F.3d at 304 (quoting Reed Elsevier, Inc., v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 166
(2010)).
2
the statute to determine whether the words refer to ‘“the power of the court rather
than to the rights or obligations of the parties.’”6 Section 6213(a) states as follows:
Within 90 days . . . after the notice of deficiency authorized in
section 6212 is mailed (not counting Saturday, Sunday, or a
legal holiday in the District of Columbia as the last day), the
taxpayer may file a petition with the Tax Court for a
redetermination of the deficiency. . . . The Tax Court shall
have no jurisdiction to enjoin any action or proceeding or
order any refund under this subsection unless a timely petition
for a redetermination of the deficiency has been filed and then
only in respect of the deficiency that is the subject of such
petition. Any petition filed with the Tax Court on or before
the last date specified for filing such petition by the Secretary
in the notice of deficiency shall be treated as timely filed.7
Congress spoke in unequivocal terms, stating that the Tax Court “shall have no
jurisdiction” unless a petition to redetermine a deficiency is timely filed.8 Because it
used these words we know that Congress was addressing the court’s power, rather than
the rights and obligations of the parties.9 Moreover, it is noteworthy that the statute
specifically addresses which court actions are authorized and prohibited based on a
party’s compliance with the filing time limit of this petition. The unambiguous language
combined with this tight linkage between the court’s authority and a statutory deadline
leads inevitably—without resorting to further analysis—to the conclusion that Congress
6
Id. (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 274 (1994)).
7
26 U.S.C. § 6213(a) (emphasis added).
8
Id.
9
See Rubel, 856 F.3d at 305.
3
limited the court’s authority to review only Section 6212(a) petitions that are timely
filed.10 Therefore, Section 6213(a) is jurisdictional.11
We next review whether the Tax Court correctly determined that the
Garretts’ petition is untimely. No one disputes the facts on which the Tax Court
relied. The Commissioner sent the notice of deficiency by certified mail to the
Garretts’ address as it was known to the Commissioner on the date it posted,
April 10, 2017.12 The Garretts filed their petition with the Tax Court on
December 5, 2017, 239 days after the Commissioner mailed the notice, long after
the ninety days mandated by Section 6213(a).
The Garretts argue that the Commissioner knew their new address on
April 12, 2017, and that by failing to act on this knowledge (particularly after the
notice was returned undelivered) the Commissioner violated their due process
rights which invalidated the notice. The Commissioner agrees that the Garretts’
address changed in Internal Revenue Service records on April 12, 2017, but relies
on I.R.C. § 6212(b) which specifies that notice sent to the taxpayer’s “last known
10
Id.
11
This is consistent with jurisprudence acknowledging that filing deadlines in tax statutes
are generally treated as jurisdictional because the Commissioner has a demonstrable
“need for ‘finality and certainty’” to ensure a stream of revenue that is predictable. Id. at
306 (quoting Becton Dickinson & Co., v. Wolckenhauer, 215 F.3d 340, 351 (3d Cir.
2000) accord United States v. Brockcamp, 519 U.S. 347, 349-54 (1997)).
12
This address is the one that appeared on the Garretts’ federal tax return for the year
2015, filed on October 14, 2016. See Treas. Reg. § 301.6212-2(a) (The last known
address is that which appears on the most recently filed tax return.).
4
address” is sufficient. Congress designed the requirement in Section 6212(a) that
the Commissioner use the last known address to give the Commissioner safe
harbor by allowing constructive notice.13 The Garretts cite to no other portion of
this statute that imposes any additional requirements on the Commissioner to
provide valid notice. Moreover, examining the equities of individual
circumstances, as the Garretts advocate here, runs contrary to the purpose of a
jurisdictional filing deadline.14 Hence, on April 10, 2017, the date the notice
posted, the Commissioner fulfilled its requirement for sufficient notice under the
law.
Therefore, for all of these reasons, we will affirm the order of the Tax Court.
13
See Gyorgy v. Commissioner Internal Revenue, 779 F.3d 466, 473 (7th Cir. 2015); see
also Cropper v. Commissioner Internal Revenue, 826 F.3d 1280, 1285 (10th Cir. 2016).
The Garretts’ reliance on Jones v Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006) is unpersuasive as it
does not refer to a petition for an opportunity to receive prepayment review of a
deficiency under Section 6212(a), nor does it refer to Section 6213(a).
14
See Brockcamp, 519 U.S. at 352 (“Tax law . . . is not normally characterized by case-
specific exceptions reflecting individualized equities.”).
5