Sondra L. McKenna and James R. McKenna v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation

OPINION OF THE COURT

ADAMS, Circuit Judge.

After trial, but prior to the presentation of the case to the jury, the district court in this diversity case granted defendants’ motion for a directed verdict on the ground that Ohio law barred recovery. Because we are persuaded by a careful review of the Ohio decisional law, as well as other relevant sources, that the Supreme Court of Ohio would not construe its statute of limitations so as to preclude recovery in this case, we reverse.

I.

James and Sondra McKenna brought this suit for negligence, misrepresentation, and products liability against Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation (Ortho). The plaintiffs charged that Mrs. McKenna suffered severe personal injury and permanent disability as a result of ingesting Ortho-Novum, an oral contraceptive manufactured and marketed by Ortho. Following the birth of the McKennas’ second child, Mrs. McKenna began using Ortho-Novum in January 1965, after receiving assurances both from Or-tho’s published brochure and from her personal physician, that the drug was safe and posed no serious risks. In 1967, Mrs. McKenna developed severe headaches and also experienced two attacks of transient ischemia. While hospitalized in 1969 for a stomach ailment involving vessel wall damage, Mrs. McKenna was told that she had high blood pressure, which was characterized as hypertension. In June 1969, Mrs. McKenna ceased using the oral contraceptives. Three years later, in March 1972, she suffered a catastrophic cerebrovascular stroke that left her severely and permanently paralyzed.¹

One year and nine months thereafter, in November 1973, the McKennas commenced this action in a Pennsylvania state court by a praecipe for a writ of trespass.² On Or-tho’s motion, the suit was removed to the federal district court in Pittsburgh, where it was ultimately tried. The plaintiffs claimed that Mrs. McKenna’s injuries were caused by her ingestion of Ortho-Novum; that Mrs. McKenna relied on Ortho’s false assurances about the product’s safety in deciding to use Ortho-Novum; that Ortho knew or should have known that these statements were false; and that Ortho-Novum posed a risk of serious harm to its users.

Prior to trial, the district court denied Ortho’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the McKennas knew, or reasonably should have known, more than two years prior to the commencement of the suit, that Mrs. McKenna’s injuries resulted from the ingestion of Ortho-Novum. During the four weeks of jury trial, the McKennas introduced expert witnesses who testified that the cerebrovascular stroke was the ultimate result of either vessel-wall damage or high blood pressure, and that both of these conditions, as well as the headaches and transient ischemia attacks, were caused by Mrs. McKenna’s ingestion of Ortho-Novum. At the close of trial, but prior to submission of the case to the jury, the district court granted Ortho’s motion for a directed verdict on the ground that the action was barred under Ohio’s statute of limitations. The district court concluded that the Ohio statute began to run, at the latest, in 1969 when Mrs. McKenna developed high blood pressure, and that the cause of action was accordingly barred because it was filed more than two years after that time. It is this conclusion that we review here.

II.

Although Pennsylvania courts ordinarily apply the statute of limitations of the forum state,³ the Pennsylvania “borrowing statute” in effect when the case was tried provided a statutory exception to this rule. It declared:

When a cause of action has been fully barred by the law of the state in which it arose, such bar shall be a complete defense to an action thereon in any of the courts of this Commonwealth.⁴

The district court, in granting Ortho’s motion for a directed verdict, reasoned that the Pennsylvania statute borrowed not only Ohio’s two-year limitations period, but also Ohio’s law governing the determination when the cause of action arises. In their appeal, the McKennas contend that this was error; they argue that even though the Pennsylvania statute “borrows” the law of Ohio regarding the length of the applicable limitations period, the question when that limitations period begins to run must be determined not by Ohio but by Pennsylvania law.

The McKennas premise their argument on this Court’s prior decision in Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Bendix-Westinghouse Automotive Air Brake Company.⁵ In Mack Trucks, we were asked to decide when an action for indemnity arose, for the purpose of determining whether the Pennsylvania “borrowing statute” was applicable to that action. Noting the “familiar rule” that a statute of limitations “begins to run when the cause of action arises, as determined by the occurrence of the final significant event necessary to make the claim suable,” we held that a “cause arises where as well as when the final significant event that is essential to a suable claim occurs.”⁶ Because the final significant event essential to the action for indemnity happened in Florida, we concluded that Florida’s statute of limitations applied.

Mack Trucks’ application of the Pennsylvania “borrowing statute,” the McKennas claim, depended upon the ascertainment of where the cause of action arose, which in turn was based on the prior determination of when it accrued. In support of this interpretation, the McKennas rely on Prince v. Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania,⁷ which held, on the basis of Mack Trucks, that the “borrowing statute” applies “only upon satisfaction of two contingencies: (1) the cause of action must arise in another state; and (2) the cause of action must be totally barred by the law of that state. Under the Mack Truck analysis,” the district court concluded, “satisfaction of the first contingency is determined by finding where the cause of action arose, and the determination is to be governed by Pennsylvania law.”⁸

The crux of the justification offered for this construction of Mack Trucks is the assertion that we determined when the cause of action arose in that case by references to Pennsylvania law. But, as the most recent decision addressing this issue points out, “Mack Trucks relied not only on Pennsylvania cases but also on cases from other jurisdictions.”⁹ Nor was there any suggestion in Mack Trucks that Florida would have commenced the running of the statute of limitations at a time different from when Pennsylvania would have. Inasmuch as Mack Trucks did not even discuss this issue, we do not find that decision controlling here.

We are persuaded, rather, that the apparent purpose of the Pennsylvania “borrowing statute” requires us to look to the law of the state where the cause of action arose to determine not only the prescribed period of limitations but also the point at which the statute begins to run. By its terms, the “borrowing statute” bars a plaintiff from suing in Pennsylvania “when [the] cause of action has been fully barred by the laws of the state ... in which it arose . . ..” In our view, the essential question posed under the “borrowing statute” is whether the action in question is precluded by the laws of the state in which it accrued, and the answer to that question also must be based on the law of the state in which the claim arose. To do otherwise might well revive an action which is “fully barred by the laws” of another state. Accordingly, because the McKennas’ cause of action arose in Ohio, we must look to Ohio law to determine when Ohio’s statute of limitations commenced to run. And the question for decision, then, is whether Ohio’s statute of limitations commenced to run prior to the date Mrs. McKenna knew, or reasonably should have discovered, that her injuries were caused by Ortho-Novum.¹⁰

III.

Given that Ohio law governs the question for decision, the task remains to determine what the pertinent Ohio law is and then to apply it to this controversy. The question of how a federal court is to ascertain and apply state decisional law to a particular case has provoked considerable comment from courts and commentators alike.¹¹ As some have noted, the concept that a federal court must determine state law is somewhat misleading inasmuch as it implies the existence of a readily accessible and easily understood body of state law.¹² On the contrary, the law of a state is frequently “dynamic rather than static,”¹³ and consists of a working body of rules, which find expression in a number of sources. It is this working body of rules to which a federal court must look in order to ascertain the state law that governs in a particular case.

In those few instances in which the highest state court has recently spoken to the precise question at issue in a particular setting, the duty of the federal court to determine and apply state law is easily met. After all, “[t]he State’s highest court is the best authority on its own law.”¹⁴ The problem of ascertainment arises when, as here, the highest state court has not yet authoritatively addressed the critical issue. Recent opinions of this Court make clear that our disposition of such cases must be governed by a prediction of how the state’s highest court would decide were it confronted with the problem.¹⁵ Although some have characterized this assignment as speculative or crystal-ball gazing, nonetheless it is a task which we may not decline.

An accurate forecast of Ohio’s law, as it would be expressed by its highest court, requires an examination of all relevant sources of that state’s law in order to isolate those factors that would inform its decision. The primary source that must be analyzed of course, is the decisional law of the Ohio Supreme Court. In the absence of authority directly on point, decisions by that court in analogous cases provide useful indications of the court’s probable disposition of a particular question of law. It is important to note, however, that our prediction “cannot be the product of a mere recitation of previously decided cases.”¹⁶ In determining state law, a federal tribunal should be careful to avoid the “danger” of giving “a state court decision a more binding effect than would a court of that state under similar circumstances.”¹⁷ Rather, relevant state precedents must be scrutinized with an eye toward the broad policies that informed those adjudications, and to the doctrinal trends which they evince.¹⁸

Considered dicta by the state’s highest court may also provide a federal court with reliable indicia of how the state tribunal might rule on a particular question.¹⁹ Because the highest state court “enjoys some latitude of decision in ascertaining the law applicable to a particular dispute even where there may be dicta in point,” ²⁰ however, a federal court should be circumspect in surrendering its own judgment concerning what the state law is on account of dicta. As Professor Charles Alan Wright has written, “much depends on the character of the dictum.”²¹ Of somewhat less importance to a prognostication of what the highest state court will do are decisions of lower state courts and other federal courts. Such decisions should be accorded “proper regard” of course, but not conclusive effect.²² Thus, the Supreme Court has held that although the decision of a lower state court “should be ‘attributed some weight the decision [is] not controlling . ’ where the highest court of the State has not spoken on the point. . Thus, under some conditions, federal authority may not be bound even by an intermediate state appellate court ruling.”²³ Additionally, federal courts may consider scholarly treatises,²⁴ the Restatement of Law,²⁵ and germane law review articles²⁶ —particularly, it seems, of schools within the state whose law is to be predicted.²⁷

In sum, a federal court attempting to forecast state law must consider relevant state precedents, analogous decisions, considered dicta, scholarly works, and any other reliable data tending convincingly to show how the highest court in the state would decide the issue at hand. The rule of Erie calls on us to apply state law and not, as the dissent notes, “to participate in an effort to change it”²⁸ merely because we doubt its soundness. At the same time, however, blind adherence to state precedents “without evaluating the decision[s] in the light of other relevant data as to what the state law is, will result in injustice and a perversion of the state law which the federal court sets out to apply.”²⁹ As this Court has declared:³⁰

A diversity litigant should not be drawn to the federal forum by the prospect of a more favorable outcome than he could expect in the state courts. But neither should he be penalized for his choice of the federal court by being deprived of the flexibility that a state court could reasonably be expected to show.

IV.

In support of its conclusion that Ohio’s statutes of limitation bar the McKennas’ actions, the district court relied, as does the dissent here, primarily on Wyler v. Tripi,³¹ decided nine years ago by the Ohio Supreme Court. The central dispute in that case concerned the date on which a cause of action for medical malpractice accrued. Expressly following the rule announced in a series of prior decisions,³² Wyler held that the cause of action came into existence at the latest, at the time the physician-patient relationship terminated, and not when the plaintiff discovered the injury.

The “termination of treatment” concept was developed very early in Ohio law³³ as an exception to the traditional rule that statutes of limitation commenced to run at the time an individual sustained injury as the result of the tortious act of another.³⁴ It was designed, as the Wyler court observed, “to avoid the harsh results of the traditional rule”³⁵ by tolling the applicable statute of limitations until the conclusion of the physician-patient relationship. Although this doctrine represents a “marked departure from the general rule,” it “affords little relief in cases where the injury is one which requires a long developmental period before becoming dangerous and discoverable.”³⁶ In such cases, the termination exception extends the period before the statute of limitations begins to run, “but does so by a factor which bears no logical relationship to the injury incurred.”³⁷

It was this kind of issue with which the Ohio Supreme Court was confronted in Wyler. The plaintiff there alleged that improper treatment by her physician ultimately resulted in the manifestation of asceptic necrosis, necessitating the replacement of her hip and the subsequent removal of her leg. Because the plaintiff failed to discover the alleged negligence within a year after she left the care of her physician, application of either the traditional rule or the “termination of treatment” exception would not prevent what the Wyler majority itself termed “the unconscionable result that the injured party’s right to recovery can be barred by the statute of limitations before [s]he is even aware of its existence.” ³⁸ Troubled by this result, the Ohio court examined the laws of various jurisdictions and the growing trend away from the traditional rule and towards adoption of the discovery rule. According to this approach, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff actually discovers, or with due diligence should have discovered, the negligence alleged.

Although the court’s examination of the cases persuaded it that “there is much to recommend the adoption of the discovery rule,”³⁹ a bare majority nonetheless “reluctantly conclud[ed]” that “the courts of Ohio should not decree such an adoption.”⁴⁰ The sole justification for refusing to adopt the discovery rule was that such action should be left to the legislature. The court was “convinced that to [adopt the discovery rule] would place [it] in the obvious and untenable position of having not only legislated, but of having done so directly in the face of a clear and opposite legislative intent.” ⁴¹ Referring to the legislature’s failure to adopt the discovery rule by legislation, the court concluded: “In consideration of the obvious and repeated disinclination of the General Assembly to amend its malpractice statute of limitations, we are compelled to adhere to our former decisions on the question and refrain from judicially adopting that which has so clearly been legislatively rejected.”⁴²

Notwithstanding this extensive pronouncement of the court’s position, this same court during the following year employed the discovery rule in Melnyk v. Cleveland Clinic⁴³ The plaintiff there alleged that a physician employed by the Clinic had negligently left a metallic forceps and a nonabsorbent sponge in his abdomen. Even though the plaintiff failed to discover the negligence until more than one year after he left the care of the physician, the Ohio Supreme Court refused to bar his action, and held that the applicable one-year statute of limitations was tolled “until such time as the patient discovers, or by exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the negligent act.”⁴⁴

Although the Melnyk court took great pains, as does the dissent in this case, to distinguish Melnyk from Wyler on the ground that the former did not involve the “problems faced in the defense of a ‘stale’ claim for medical malpractice,”⁴⁵ the distinction, as a recent commentator on Ohio law has argued, “in essence is an artificial one.” ⁴⁶ Indeed, Wyler expressly took note of the fact that courts adopting the discovery doctrine viewed it “as being entirely consistent with the policy of the statute of limitations to prevent ‘stale claims.’ ”⁴⁷ The holding of Wyler declining to adopt the discovery rule depended not at all on the policy of discouraging stale claims, but solely upon the court’s reluctance to contravene what it then believed to be the policy of the state legislature. By embracing the discovery rule in Melnyk, therefore, the Ohio Supreme Court “completely abandoned the rationale which served as the basis and justification for the Wyler decision, namely, that of legislative prerogative in this area.”⁴⁸

Melnyk’s implicit rejection of the Wyler rationale — that only the state legislature may properly decide whether to apply the discovery rule — appears well justified. As evidence of the alleged intent of the legislature to eschew the discovery rule, Wyler referred to the legislature’s failure to enact legislation modifying the court’s prior decisions that interpreted the statute of limitations for medical malpractice.⁴⁹ Legislative inaction, however, “is a weak reed upon which to lean in determining legislative intent.” ⁵⁰ A statute of limitations is a product of legislation, but it is the judiciary’s task to interpret and enforce such an enactment. The Ohio statute in question here is phrased in general terms and requires only that an action for bodily injury “shall be brought within two years after the cause thereof arose.”⁵¹ The legislature left unresolved when a cause of action arises and when the statute commences to run. And, in Ohio, these kinds of determinations have always been the product of “judicial interpretation, not legislative promulgation.”⁵² Consequently, application of the discovery rule to the facts of this case in no way intrudes on the authority of the state legislature. Indeed, Ohio’s selection of the termination exception represented not only a marked departure from the traditional rule, but also a judicial determination as to when a cause of action accrues. Melnyk’s choice of the discovery rule, at least in the absence of an expression by the legislature prohibiting such an adoption, therefore appears fully compatible with the court’s responsibility to ascertain and comply with legislative intention.⁵³

Moreover, the Ohio Supreme Court in Melnyk distinguished its decision in Wyler as speaking only to the question of when a cause of action arises, and not to the determination whether the running of the statute of limitations is, for some reason, tolled.⁵⁴ It then proceeded to hold that the running of the statute of limitations on Melnyk’s cause of action was tolled until such time as he discovered, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the negligent act, even though his cause of action accrued, under Wyler, at the termination of the patient-physician relationship. On this analysis, the holding in Wyler determines only when the McKennas’ cause of action accrued; it is inapposite to the question whether the action was tolled until such time as the McKennas could know how Mrs. McKenna’s injuries occurred.

It is claimed, nonetheless, that “Melnyk does not overrule Wyler,” but “merely carves out a very specific and narrow exception” ⁵⁵ to the termination rule when, as in that case, surgical instruments are left in a patient’s body. For this reason, the dissent would not apply the discovery rule to the circumstances of this case. In its view, we are improperly modifying a “decadent” and “unenlightened” doctrine of state law simply because we disagree with it. On the contrary, however, we fully recognize our responsibility to accurately apply the pertinent Ohio law. Indeed, we do not dispute that federal courts must faithfully adhere to state substantive law in non-federal matters. But, as commentators have emphasized, such adherence should be wise and discerning. This Court has noted only recently that “while a federal diversity court must not fashion a wholly independent federal standard with which to determine matters of substantive right, it likewise must not conceive of its role as applying the state decisional law to the case at hand in a narrow and mechanical fashion.”⁵⁶ Rather, a federal court must “be sensitive to the doctrinal trends of the state whose law it applies, and the policies which inform the prior adjudications by the state courts.”⁵⁷ ■'

In our view, the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Melnyk not only abandoned the sole justification proffered for its opposition in Wyler to the adoption of the discovery rule, but also manifested a recognition that this approach alone avoids the harsh and inequitable results of applying the traditional rule in such cases. “Certainly a federal court sitting in diversity should not mechanically follow precedent and blindly apply principles of stare decisis when it appears that the corresponding state court would adjust its common law to meet changing conditions.”⁵⁸ A fair scrutiny of the relevant Ohio precedents, with an eye toward the principles and policies underlying them, strongly indicates that the Ohio Supreme Court would extend the discovery rule set forth in Melnyk to include the type of personal injury action present here.

The task of a federal court sitting in diversity is often difficult, for it must forsake its own expertise and assume that of the foreign state. Required as we are to predict how the Ohio Supreme Court would decide the present case, however, we believe that the Court would hold that the applicable statutes of limitation in this case were tolled until the McKennas knew, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the cause of Mrs. McKenna’s injuries. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

1 . The complaint alleged that as a direct result of her use of Ortho-Novum, Mrs. McKenna suffered the following permanent injuries: paralysis of both legs and arms; bilateral facial paralysis; double vision; impairment of speech; impairment of hearing; internal injuries; shock and injury to her nervous system.

2 . The district court noted that inasmuch as the plaintiffs’ counsel is a Pittsburgh attorney, “it was natural” that suit was brought in Pennsylvania.

3 . Under the doctrine of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply state rather than federal decisional law to questions of a “substantive” character. In order to determine which state’s law applies, a federal court must ascertain the substantive law that would be applied to the question by a court of the state in which it is located, Klaxon Co. v. Stanton Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1943), in this case Pennsylvania. Inasmuch as all of the significant events pertinent to this action occurred in Ohio, it is not disputed that the cause of action arose in Ohio and that under Pennsylvania’s conflict of law rules, see Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964), the substantive law of Ohio governs this action.

4 . Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 12, § 39 (repealed 1978).

This provision was replaced by a similar provision which provides that:

(b) General rule — The period of limitation applicable to a claim accruing outside this Commonwealth shall be either that provided or prescribed by the law of the place where the claim accrued or by the law of this Commonwealth, whichever first bars the claim.

42 Pa.Const.Stat.Ann. § 5521 (eff. June 27, 1978).

Section 39 remains determinative in this action, because of a savings clause which provides:

No cause of action fully barred prior to the effective date of this Act shall be revised by reason of the enactment of this Act.

Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 586, No. 142, § 25(b), reprinted in 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 5521 note.

5 . 372 F.2d. 18 (3d Cir. 1966).

6 . 372 F.2d at 20.

7 . 282 F.Supp. 832 (E.D.Pa.1968).

8 . 282 F.Supp. at 840.

9 . Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 453 F.Supp. 527, 532 (W.D.Pa. 1978).

10 . The Ohio statute of limitations applicable to Sondra McKenna’s claim is Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2305.10 (Page 1954), which provides:

An action for bodily injury or injuring personal property shall be brought within two years after the cause thereof arose.

The pertinent statute for James McKenna’s derivative claim is Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2305.09 (Page 1954), which provides in part:

An action for any of the following causes shall be brought within four years after the cause thereof accrued:

(D) For an injury to the rights of the plaintiff not arising on contract nor enumerated in [other] sections ... of the Revised Code.

11 . See, e. g., Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 87 S.Ct. 1776, 18 L.Ed.2d 886 (1967); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 76 S.Ct. 273, 100 L.Ed. 199 (1955); Becker v. Interstate Properties, 569 F.2d 1203 (3rd Cir. 1977); C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts, § 158, at 267-71 (3d ed. 1976); 1A Moore’s Federal Practice, para. 0.309, 3323-3330 (2d ed.) and id. 73-74 (1978 -79 Supp.); Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, The Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67 Yale L.J. 187 (1957); Note, Federal Interpretation of State Law — An Argument for Expanded Scope of Inquiry, 53 Minn.L.Rev. 806 (1969).

12 . See, e. g., Note, Federal Interpretation of State Law — An Argument for Expanded Scope of Inquiry, 53 Minn.L.Rev. 806, 811 (1969).

13 . Id.

14 . Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465, 87 S.Ct. 1776, 1783, 18 L.Ed.2d 886 (1965). “If there be no decision by that Court then federal authorities must apply what they find to be the state law after giving ‘proper regard’ to relevant rulings of other courts of the state.” Id. The Erie Court expressly intended that federal courts were to be governed by the law of each state whether it “be declared by its legislature or by its highest court in a decision.” 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 822, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938).

15 . E. g., Becker v. Interstate Properties, 569 F.2d 1203, 1205 (3d Cir. 1977) (“Inasmuch as no New Jersey cases are squarely on point, it is important to make clear that our disposition of this case must be governed by a prediction of what a New Jersey court would do if confronted with the facts before us.”); Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 733 (3d Cir. 1976) (“This appeal requires us to predict how the New Jersey Supreme Court would react when presented with novel and difficult questions of tort law.”); Wise v. George C. Rothwell, Inc., 496 F.2d 384, 387 (3d Cir. 1974) (“We are bound to apply the standard of care the Delaware Supreme Court would apply were it faced with the issue now before us.”). Our position is in accord with the rule accepted by a majority of the other Circuits. E. g., Soo Line R. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 547 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1977); Gates Rubber Company v. USM Corp., 508 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1975); Warren Bros. Co. v. Cardi Corp., 471 F.2d 1304 (1st Cir. 1973).

It is regrettable that Ohio has not yet established a certification procedure that would enable this Court to obtain a definitive answer to the crucial question in this case from the Ohio Supreme Court. The United States Supreme Court has expressed its approval of such a procedure. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390-91, 394-95,- 94 S.Ct. 1741, 1743-44, 1745 — 46, 40 L.Ed.2d 215 (1974).

16 . E. g., Becker v. Interstate Properties, 569 F.2d 1203, 1205-06 (3d Cir. 1977).

17 . 1A Moore’s Federal Practice, para. 0.307, at 3077 (2d ed. 1979).

18 . Becker v. Interstate Properties, 569 F.2d 1203, 1206 (3d Cir. 1977); Medvecz v. Choi, 569 F.2d 1221, 1226 n. 14 (3d Cir. 1977).

19 . Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 365 U.S. 293, 81 S.Ct. 555, 5 L.Ed.2d 571 (1961).

20 . 1A Moore’s Federal Practice, para. 0.307, at 3097 (2d ed. 1979).

21 . C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts, § 58, at 270 (3d ed. 1976) (“Mere obiter may be entitled to little weight, while a carefully considered statement by the state court, though technically dictum, must carry great weight, and may even, in the absence of any conflicting indication of the law of the state, be regarded as conclusive.”) (footnotes omitted).

22 . See Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 471, 87 S.Ct. 1776, 1785, 18 L.Ed.2d 886 (1951).

23 . Id. (quoting King v. Order of Travelers, 333 U.S. 153, 160-61, 68 S.Ct. 488, 492-93, 92 L.Ed. 608 (1948)), (footnotes omitted). Unlike the dissent, I am not persuaded that the lower state court and federal court decisions relied on by the defendant, see dissenting opinion at 672, either specifically address or definitively resolve the question at issue here.

24 . Patch v. Stanley Works, 448 F.2d 483, 488 (2d Cir. 1971).

25 . Id.; Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964).

26 . Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 312 F.2d 485, 497 (8th Cir. 1963); Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F.Supp. 56, 60 (N.D.Iowa 1960).

27 . Note, Federal Interpretation of State Law— An Argument for Expanded Scope of Inquiry, 53 Minn.L.Rev. 806 (1976).

28 . Tarr v. Manchester Ins. Corp., 544 F.2d 14, 15 (1st Cir. 1978); majority opinion at 11.

29 . 1A Moore’s Federal Practice, para. 0.309, 3112 (2d ed. 1979).

30 . Becker v. Interstate Properties, 569 F.2d 1203, 1206 (1977).

31 . 25 Ohio St.2d 164, 267 N.E.2d 419 (1971).

32 . 25 Ohio St.2d at 164, 267 N.E.2d at 419, following DeLong v. Cambell, 157 Ohio St. 22, 104 N.E.2d 177 (1952); Bowers v. Santee, 99 Ohio St. 361, 124 N.E. 238 (1919); Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902).

The Ohio Supreme Court’s consideration of the application of the “discovery rule” to statutes of limitations thus far has occurred solely in the context of actions for medical malpractice involving Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2305.-11 (Page 1954), rather than in the context of personal injury negligence actions under Ohio Rev.Code Ann. 2305.10 (Page 1954). The Ohio Supreme Court has noted, however, that the limitation-of-action question “obtains, in principle, irrespective of whether the case is treated as belonging under R.C. 2305.10 or under R.C. 2305.11.” Melnyk v. Cleveland Clinic, 32 Ohio St.2d 198, 201 n. 1, 290 N.E.2d 916, 917 n. 1 (1973).

33 . See Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902).

34 . See, e. g. Fee’s Administrator v. Fee, 10 Ohio 469 (1891) (action for trespass on property). In the usual case — when the act constituting negligence causes direct and immediate injury — the action accrues and the period of limitations runs from the date of the act. When the negligent act is injurious only in its consequences, however, Ohio courts have held that the cause accrues and the limitations run only from the time that some consequential injury or damage manifests itself. In Cook v. Yager, 13 Ohio App.2d 1, 233 N.E.2d 326 (1968), for example, the syllabus stated that where the negligent act “causes no contemporaneous injury or damage to the patient but the forces set in motion by such violation proximately cause injury or damage thereafter, then, . . the cause and the statute of limitations pertaining to the cause of action does not begin to run until the date such consequential injury or damage first manifests itself.” 13 Ohio App.2d at 10-11, 233 N.E.2d at 332; see Brush Beryllium Co. v. Meckley, 284 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1960). This principle of Ohio law apparently accords with the majority rule:

As a general rule, the occurrence of an act or omission, whether it is a breach of contract or of duty, whereby one sustains a direct injury, however slight, starts the statute of limitations running against the right to maintain an action. It is sufficient if nominal damages are recoverable for the breach or for the wrong, and where that is the case it is unimportant that the actual or substantial damage is not discovered or does not occur until later.

51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions § 109, at 681 (1970).

In the present case, the district court determined that consequential injury or damage resulting from Mrs. McKenna’s ingestion of Or-tho-Novum manifested itself, at the latest, in 1969 when Mrs. McKénna developed hypertension. Although the classification of this development, rather than the occurrence of Mrs. McKenna’s transient ischemia attacks or excruciating headaches or, for that matter, the occurrence of the cerebrovascular stroke in 1972, as the first manifestation of consequential injury or damage seems somewhat arbitrary, it nonetheless appears consistent with the applicable principles of Ohio law.

35 . 25 Ohio St.2d at 168, 267 N.E.2d at 421.

36 . Id.

37 . Id.

38 . Id.

39 . 25 Ohio St.2d at 170-71, 267 N.E.2d at 423.

40 . Id.

41 . Id.

42 . 25 Ohio St.2d at 172, 267 N.E.2d at 424.

43 . 32 Ohio St.2d 198, 290 N.E.2d 916 (1972).

44 . 32 Ohio St.2d at 201, 290 N.E.2d at 918.

45 . 32 Ohio St.2d at 200, 290 N.E.2d at 917.

46 . 6 Akron L.Rev. 265, 273 (1973).

47 . 25 Ohio St.2d at 170, 267 N.E.2d at 423.

48 . 6 Akron L.Rev. 265, 272 (1973).

49 . 25 Ohio St.2d at 171-72, 267 N.E.2d 419, 423-24.

50 . Berry v. Branner, 245 Or. 307, 311, 421 P.2d 996, 998 (1966).

51 . Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2305.10 (Page 1954). The provision pertinent to Mr. McKenna’s derivative claim is similarly phrased, but states that such actions “shall be brought within four years after the cause thereof occurred . ..” Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2305.09 (Page 1954).

52 . 6 Akron L.Rev. 265, 273 (1973).

53 . A further indication that the legislature did not intend to preclude judicial adoption of the discovery doctrine was provided by the recent amendment of the medical malpractice statute. Even though that statute still allows a one year period of limitations for such actions, the judiciary’s role in determining when a cause of action arises and when the limitations period begins to run is implicitly recognized by a new provision which expressly provides that “in no event shall any medical claim against a physician ... be brought more than four years after the act or omission constituting the alleged malpractice occurred.” Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2305.11(B) (Page Supp.1978).

Moreover, without deciding the issue the court in Melnyk suggested that as a result of an amendment to the Ohio Constitution, Ohio’s statutes of limitation may now have “become the sole demesne of the [Ohio Supreme] Court.” 32 Ohio St.2d at 200 n. 3, 290 N.E.2d at 917 n. 3. As amended, Article IV, Section 5(B) of the Ohio Constitution now provides in part: “The supreme court shall prescribe rules governing practice and procedure in all courts of the state, which rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive rights.”

54 . Under the longstanding Ohio “syllabus rule,” only that which is stated in a syllabus or in an per curiam opinion represents an accurate and authoritative statement of law by the Ohio Supreme Court. E. g., In State ex rel. Canada v. Phillips, 168 Ohio St. 191, 200, 151 N.E.2d 722, 724 (1958).

55 . Dissenting opinion typescript at 670.

56 . Medvecz v. Choi, 569 F.2d 1221, 1226 (1977).

57 . Becker v. Interstate Properties, 569 F.2d 1203, 1206 (1977).

58 . Id. at 1215-16 (Hunter, J., dissenting).