Koray v. Sizer

Opinions of the United
1995 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
11-6-1995
Koray v Sizer
Precedential or Non-Precedential:
Docket 93-7357
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Recommended Citation
"Koray v Sizer" (1995). 1995 Decisions. Paper 284.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1995/284
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 93-7357
ZIYA K. KORAY,
Appellant
v.
FRANK SIZER; UNITED STATES BUREAU OF PRISONS;
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 92-01458)
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1
March 4, 1994
Decided April 25, 1994
Petition for Rehearing in banc denied June 17, 1994
Certiorari Granted January 13, 1995
On Remand from the Supreme Court of the United States
June 5, 1995
Before: SLOVITER, Chief Judge
COWEN and LEWIS, Circuit Judges
(Filed November 6, l995 )
Ziya K. Koray
Farmingdale New York 11735
Appellant Pro Se
Robert J. DeSousa
Office of United States Attorney
Lewisburg, PA 17837
Joseph D. Wilson
United States Department of Justice
Washington, DC 20044
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Attorneys for Appellees
OPINION OF THE COURT
SLOVITER, Chief Judge.
This case comes before us on remand from the United
States Supreme Court. Ziya Koray, who was sentenced to federal
prison camp after pleading guilty to commission of the offense of
laundering monetary instruments in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1), filed a request with the Bureau of Prisons to credit
toward his 41-month prison sentence approximately 150 days he
spent pursuant to court order in a community treatment center
pending sentencing. Koray argued that he was entitled to such
credit pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), which provides that a
defendant "be given credit toward the service of a term of
imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention
prior to the date the sentence commences." The Bureau of Prisons
denied Koray's request because it interprets that statute as
limited to credit for time spent in the custody of the Attorney
General in a corrections facility by a defendant who has been
denied bail.
Koray filed a habeas corpus petition in the district
court, which denied Koray's petition. On appeal, this court held
that the reference to "official detention" in 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b)
included "time spent under conditions of jail-type confinement,"
and reversed and remanded to the district court to ascertain
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whether the conditions under which Koray had been confined in the
treatment center met that standard. Koray v. Sizer, 21 F.3d 558,
567 (3d Cir. 1994).
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 115 S. Ct. 787(1995), and reversed. Reno v. Koray, 115 S. Ct. 2021 (1995). The
Court adopted the statutory interpretation proffered by the
Bureau of Prisons. It held that "official detention" of 18
U.S.C. § 3585(b) was coextensive with confinement imposed
pursuant to a court order detaining a defendant and committing
him to the custody of the Attorney General -- and accordingly was
exclusive of other instances of pre-sentence confinement,
regardless of their character or extent. The Court relied, in
large part, on the scope and meaning of related provisions of the
Bail Reform Act of 1984 (BRA). Under that statute, a court has
an option either to "release" a defendant on bail, albeit subject
to various restrictive conditions, or to "detain" the defendant
without bail by issuing a detention order "direct[ing] that the
person be committed to the custody of the Attorney General for
confinement in a corrections facility." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i)(2).
The Court reasoned that the phrase "official detention" in 18
U.S.C. § 3585(b), therefore, involves such commitment and custody
as necessary elements. 115 S. Ct. at 2025. The Court noted that
reference to "the official detention facility" in 18 U.S.C.
§3585(a) necessarily paralleled reference to "commit[ment] to the
custody of the Bureau of Prisons" in 18 U.S.C. § 3621(a), since
both clauses made provision for the proper administration of
sentenced defendants. Id. at 2025-26. References to "official
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detention" in other statutory provisions, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§3622(b) & (c), also supported the Government's position that the
phrase "official detention" in 18 U.S.C § 3585(b) was limited to
confinement in a correctional facility designated by the Bureau
of Prisons for the service of federal sentences. Id. at 2026.
The Court also referred to a number of additional
reasons for its conclusion, noting the uniform refusal of the
Courts of Appeals to interpret 18 U.S.C. § 3568, the predecessor
of 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), as authorizing sentence credit for pre-
sentence restrictions on defendants' liberty imposed as
conditions of release, and the practical difficulties attending
the fact-intensive inquiry into each defendant's circumstances of
confinement that this court's approach would have entailed. Id.
at 2026, 2028-29.
The Supreme Court remanded this matter to us for
further proceedings consistent with its opinion. We conclude
that the only proceeding that is appropriate is for us to remand
this matter to the district court to reenter the order denying
the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
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