United States v. Marrone & Paris

Opinions of the United
1995 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
2-23-1995
USA v Marrone & Paris
Precedential or Non-Precedential:
Docket 93-5738
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 93-5738
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JOHN MARRONE,
a/k/a JOHNNY MOOSE
JOHN MARRONE,
Appellant
No. 93-5740
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
MICHAEL PARIS,
Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Criminal Nos. 92-cr-00171-6, 92-cr-00171-9)
Argued: January 24, 1995
Before: SLOVITER, Chief Judge,
LEWIS and WEIS, Circuit Judges
(Filed February 23, 1995)
John C. Whipple (Argued)
Whipple, Ross & Hirsch
Parsippany, N.J. 07054
Attorney for Appellant John Marrone
Richard F. X. Regan (Argued)
Hayden, Perle & Silber
Weehawken, N.J. 07087
Attorney for Appellant Michael Paris
Faith S. Hochberg
United States Attorney
Leslie F. Schwartz (Argued)
Victor Ashrafi
Newark, N.J. 07102
Attorneys for Appellee
OPINION OF THE COURT
SLOVITER, Chief Judge.
John Marrone and Michael Paris appeal from sentences
imposed following their convictions on RICO and gambling
offenses. They were indicted, tried, and convicted with six
other defendants, all of whom were associated with the Genovese
Crime Family (GCF). Though all defendants appealed, this opinion
addresses only certain sentencing issues raised by Marrone and
Paris.1 Specifically, Paris argues that a RICO predicate act for
1
. Finding no merit in any of the contentions raised by the
other defendants, we have today affirmed the convictions and
sentences of all the other defendants.
which he was previously convicted should not have been used as
the basis for added criminal history points. In Marrone's case,
the predicate act was not used for criminal history points, but
to determine his status as a career offender. He contends this
was improper. We will discuss their contentions separately but
in one opinion because the legal issues overlap.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18
U.S.C. § 3742. To the extent that defendants challenge the
district court's legal interpretation of the Sentencing
Guidelines, we exercise plenary review. United States v.
Bierley, 922 F.2d 1061, 1064 (3d Cir. 1990).
I.
PARIS - CRIMINAL HISTORY POINTS
The indictment charged that Paris was an "associate" of
the GCF, subordinate to defendant Salvatore Lombardi, a
"caporegime" in the GCF. After a jury trial, Paris was convicted
on several counts, including conspiracy to conduct and
participate in the conduct of the GCF's affairs through a pattern
of racketeering activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)
(Count 1); conducting and participating in the conduct of the
GCF's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (Count 2); and various gambling
offenses not at issue in this appeal.
Paris had been previously convicted for a predicate act
charged in Count 2. Specifically, the indictment charged Paris
with an attempted bribery to which he pled guilty in New York
state court on February 26, 1992 and for which he was sentenced
to one to three years imprisonment. In convicting Paris on Count
2, the jury found this predicate act proven by special
interrogatory.
The district court did not factor the attempted bribery
into Paris' base offense level. Instead, the court assessed
three criminal history points against Paris under U.S.S.G. §
4A1.1(a), which placed him in criminal history category II. The
court then sentenced Paris to 57 months imprisonment running
consecutively to his state bribery sentence, followed by three
years supervised release, plus a fine of $7500 and a special
assessment of $250.
In sentencing a RICO defendant, the district court must
apply "the offense level applicable to the underlying
racketeering activity" or an offense level of 19, whichever is
greater. U.S.S.G. § 2E1.1. The district court found that Paris'
underlying conduct, apart from the attempted bribery, resulted in
an offense level of 17, and therefore assigned him a base offense
level of 19. The court also assessed a three level increase for
Paris' managerial and supervisory role, giving him a total
offense level of 22.
In arriving at a defendant's criminal history, a
district court must add three criminal history points "for each
prior sentence of imprisonment" exceeding 13 months. U.S.S.G. §
4A1.1(a). The Guidelines define "prior sentence" as "any
sentence previously imposed upon adjudication of guilt . . . for
conduct not part of the instant offense." Id. § 4A1.2(a)(1)
(emphasis added). The commentary to section 4A1.2 explains that
a prior sentence is one "imposed prior to sentencing on the
instant offense . . . . A sentence imposed after the defendant's
commencement of the instant offense, but prior to sentencing on
the instant offense, is a prior sentence if it was for conduct
other than conduct that was part of the instant offense." Id. §
4A1.2, comment. (n.1).
Paris argues that because the bribery was included as a
predicate act, it was part of the "instant offense" and therefore
should not have been the basis of criminal history points.2 The
district court was not persuaded that the bribery conduct should
be encompassed for sentencing purposes into the "instant offense"
and instead treated it as a prior sentence. It relied on
commentary to section 2E1.1 (Racketeering) which discusses when
conduct is to be assigned to criminal history rather than to the
"instant offense." Under that commentary, conduct charged as
part of the "pattern of racketeering activity" that was the
subject of an earlier conviction and sentence should be treated
as a "prior sentence" under section 4A1.2(a)(1) (referring to
instructions for Computing Criminal History) and not as part of
the "instant offense" if the defendant was convicted for that
conduct before the "last overt act of the instant offense." See
U.S.S.G. § 2E1.1, comment. (n.4) (hereafter Application Note 4).3
2
. Paris raises but does not fully develop this argument in his
brief. However, he joins in the arguments of his co-appellant
Marrone, who does develop the issue in the context of challenging
his classification as a career offender.
3
. The full text of Application Note 4 provides:
We are bound by "commentary in the Guidelines Manual
that interprets or explains a guideline . . . unless it violates
the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with,
or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline." Stinson v.
United States, 113 S. Ct. 1913, 1915 (1993). We must therefore
determine whether Application Note 4, under which certain
sentences imposed for conduct underlying a RICO conviction are
treated as "prior sentences" for criminal history purposes, is
inconsistent with section 4A1.2(a)(1).
In a series of cases, albeit in another context, we
have noted that Congress did not intend "RICO to be a substitute
for the predicate offense," but instead "intended to create
separate offenses for the predicate acts and the substantive RICO
charge." United States v. Esposito, 912 F.2d 60, 63-64 (3d Cir.
1990), cert. dismissed, 498 U.S. 1075 (1991); see also United
States v. Grayson, 795 F.2d 278, 283 (3d Cir. 1986) ("Congress,
in enacting RICO, sought to allow the separate prosecution and
(..continued)
Certain conduct may be charged in the count of
conviction as part of a "pattern of racketeering
activity" even though the defendant has previously been
sentenced for that conduct. Where such previously
imposed sentence resulted from a conviction prior to
the last overt act of the instant offense, treat as a
prior sentence under § 4A1.2(a)(1) and not as part of
the instant offense. This treatment is designed to
produce a result consistent with the distinction
between the instant offense and criminal history found
throughout the guidelines. If this treatment produces
an anomalous result in a particular case, a guideline
departure may be warranted.
U.S.S.G. § 2E1.1, comment. (n.4).
punishment of predicate offenses and a subsequent RICO
offense."), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1054, 481 U.S. 1018 (1987);
United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214, 232 (3d Cir.) ("The
predicate offenses . . . are not themselves the RICO violation[;]
they are merely one element of the crime. [RICO] does not
prohibit the commission of the individual racketeering acts.
Rather, it bans the operation of an on-going enterprise by means
of those acts."), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983).
Similarly, for criminal history purposes, the
Sentencing Commission has clarified that a RICO violation should
be considered separate from any previously convicted predicate
act. See U.S.S.G. App.C, amend. 142 (Application Note 4 added
"to clarify the treatment of certain conduct for which the
defendant previously has been sentenced as either part of the
instant offense or prior criminal record"). Although a predicate
act constitutes an element of a RICO violation, the previously
convicted RICO offender is in effect a repeat offender who breaks
the law once by committing a predicate act and again by engaging
in a pattern of racketeering activity. The Sentencing Commission
has declared that a repeat offender "is more culpable than a
first offender and thus deserving of greater punishment," and
that "[r]epeated criminal behavior is an indicator of a limited
likelihood of successful rehabilitation." U.S.S.G. Ch.4, Part A,
intro. comment.
The Commission accordingly provided that where a
defendant has previously been convicted for a RICO predicate act,
that conviction should be factored into the defendant's criminal
history score rather than the base offense level. Cf. U.S.S.G. §
2D1.5, comment. (n.3) (if a conviction for engaging in a
continuing criminal enterprise in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848 is
supported by conduct for which the defendant has previously been
sentenced, "[a] sentence resulting from a conviction sustained
prior to the last overt act of the instant offense is to be
considered a prior sentence under § 4A1.2(a)(1) and not part of
the instant offense").
Apparently no appellate court has addressed this issue
in an opinion in the RICO context. However, in United States v.
Crosby, 913 F.2d 313, 315 (6th Cir. 1990), the court sustained
the Commission's approach in the context of the guideline on
continuing criminal enterprise, saying: "If a conviction occurs
while the criminal enterprise is continuing, a court should
include the sentence resulting from that conviction in the
criminal history for calculating the sentence for involvement in
a continuing criminal enterprise. . . . The sentencing guidelines
reflect the unique nature of a continuing criminal enterprise by
including prior sentences in the defendant's criminal history,
even if the prior sentences are for crimes committed in
furtherance of the continuing criminal enterprise." Cf. United
States v. Minicone, 960 F.2d 1099, 1111 (2d Cir.) (government
unsuccessful in arguing that district court erred in assessing
prior conviction of RICO defendant only in calculating criminal
history and not in calculating base offense level; "district
court reasonably construed Note 4 to mean that the conduct
underlying the previously imposed sentence should not be used in
calculating the base level for the instant [RICO] offense"),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1511, 113 S. Ct. 199 (1992).
The Commission's treatment of the prior conviction for
a RICO predicate act, reflected in its commentary in Application
Note 4, avoids the anomaly of treating a RICO defendant with a
previous conviction for conduct that is part of a continuing
pattern of racketeering activity as a first offender with a
criminal history category of I.4 Admittedly, the Sentencing
Commission could have amended the guidelines to achieve the same
result. It was, however, equally free to amend the commentary
"if the guideline which the commentary interprets will bear the
construction." Stinson, 113 S. Ct. at 1919.
Application Note 4 constitutes an interpretation of the
RICO guideline that "may not be compelled by the guideline text"
but is nonetheless "not plainly erroneous or inconsistent" with
section 4A1.2(a)(1). Stinson, 113 S. Ct. at 1920 (quotation and
citation omitted). We are therefore bound to accept Application
Note 4 as written.5
4
. To be sure, absent Application Note 4 the previously
convicted conduct would be factored into the RICO defendant's
base offense level. However, here as in most cases, the increase
in criminal history score resulting from Application Note 4
produces a higher guideline range than would the incorporation of
the previously sentenced conduct into the base offense level.
5
. Effective November 1, 1993, the Sentencing Commission amended
the commentary to section 4A1.2 to state, "Conduct that is part
of the instant offense means conduct that is relevant conduct to
the instant offense under the provisions of § 1B1.3 (Relevant
Conduct)." U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, comment. (n.1) (Nov. 1993).
Marrone argues that this brings section 4A1.2 into conflict with
Application Note 4. We do not so read it. Instead, Application
Note 4 represents the Commission's permissible construction of a
Neither United States v. Hallman, 23 F.3d 821 (3d Cir.)
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 216 (1994), nor United States v. Kenyon,
7 F.3d 783 (8th Cir. 1993), compel a contrary result. In
Hallman, we held that a state conviction for forgery could not
count as a prior sentence under section 4A1.2(a)(1) because it
was "part of a common scheme and plan" including the instant
offense of possession of stolen mail, where all of the stolen
mail was in the form of checks or credit cards and the forged
check underlying the state conviction was from a sequence of
checks found within the stolen mail. See Hallman, 23 F.3d at
826. Because Hallman was not a RICO defendant who participated
in a pattern of racketeering activity apart from any single
predicate act, reducing his criminal history score neither
implicated Application Note 4 nor contravened the policy of the
criminal history guideline.
In Kenyon, on which Paris and Marrone both rely, the
defendant pled guilty in state court to possession of cocaine and
in federal court to conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to
distribute. The court held that it was error to count the state
conviction toward Kenyon's criminal history score because the
conduct underlying the state conviction "comprise[d] part of the
conduct" and was "part of the same criminal scheme" for which he
was convicted in federal court. Kenyon, 7 F.3d at 787. Like
(..continued)
defendant's criminal history in the unique context of a RICO
offense.
Hallman, however, Kenyon was not charged with participating in a
pattern of racketeering activity as defined in RICO.
Paris argues in the alternative that Application Note 4
does not apply by its own terms because his bribery sentence did
not result "from a conviction prior to the last overt act of the
instant offense." U.S.S.G. § 2E1.1, comment. (n.4). He notes
that he pled guilty to the bribery in state court on February 26,
1992, which was after the date of the last overt act charged in
the indictment (February 17, 1992). See App. at 182-83.
However, Application Note 4 refers to the last overt act of the
offense, not the last act charged in the indictment, and the
district court found that the last overt act of the offense,
Marrone's purchase of a silencer from an undercover officer,
occurred on March 18, 1992, after Paris' guilty plea. His
bribery conviction thus properly falls under Application Note 4,6
and the district court did not err in treating it as part of
criminal history.7
6
. In the district court and at oral argument in this court,
Paris argued that Marrone's purchase of a silencer was not
chargeable to him because it was not reasonably foreseeable. He
did not make this argument in his brief and therefore may have
waived it. In any event, Application Note 4 does not refer to
the last act chargeable to the defendant, and Paris has cited no
authority to support such a requirement.
7
. We find no merit in Paris' other arguments that (1) the
judgments of conviction as to Count 1 must be vacated and
reversed because the government failed to adduce sufficient
evidence connecting him to the RICO conspiracy and to the RICO
enterprise; (2) the district court erred in assessing him a
three-level upward adjustment for "aggravating role" under
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b); (3) the district court erred in refusing to
allow a two-level downward adjustment for acceptance of
responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1; and (4) the district court
II.
MARRONE-CAREER OFFENDER STATUS
Marrone also argues that the district court erred in
its treatment of his prior sentence, in his case for arson, which
he contends was part of the "instant offense." Unlike Paris,
whose prior sentence was used as the basis to add criminal
history points, the arson sentence was used in Marrone's case to
classify him as a career offender.
The indictment charged that Marrone was a "made member"
of the GCF, subordinate to Salvatore Lombardi. After the jury
trial, Marrone was convicted on several counts, including
conspiracy to conduct and participate in the conduct of the GCF's
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (Count 1); conducting and participating in
the conduct of the GCF's affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (Count
2); and various gambling offenses not at issue in this appeal.
One of the predicate acts charged in Count 2 against
Marrone was a 1982 arson for which he was sentenced in a New
Jersey state court in 19858. In convicting Marrone on Count 2,
the jury found this predicate act proven by special
interrogatory.
(..continued)
erred in declining to reduce his guideline sentence for time
spent in jail prior to the commencement of his sentence under
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) or by way of a downward departure pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 2E1.1, comment. (n.4), and U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, p.s.
8
. The presentence report does not state when Marrone was
convicted for the arson, though it occurred after the
commencement of the conduct charged as RICO in the indictment.
As in the case of Paris, the district court did not
factor the arson into Marrone's base offense level. Instead, the
court relied on his arson conviction, as well as an unrelated
earlier conviction for using extortionate means to collect an
extension of credit in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 894, to classify
him as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 (Nov. 1992). The
district court then sentenced Marrone to a total of 293 months
imprisonment, followed by three years supervised release, and a
special assessment of $350.
A defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant
was at least eighteen years old at the time of the instant
offense; (2) the instant offense is a felony that is a crime of
violence or a controlled substance offense; and (3) the defendant
has "at least two prior felony convictions" of a crime of
violence or a controlled substance offense. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.9
To have two prior felony convictions, the defendant must have
"committed the instant offense subsequent to sustaining" the two
convictions, and the sentences for the two convictions must be
"counted separately under the provisions of § 4A1.1(a), (b), or
(c)." Id. § 4B1.2(3).
9
. A career offender's offense level is the greater of the
offense level applicable to the underlying conduct or the
appropriate offense level specified in section 4B1.1. A career
offender automatically receives a criminal history category of
VI. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Here, the district court assigned Marrone
a total offense level of 33, two levels lower than that
calculated in the presentence report but still greater than the
relevant level under § 4B1.1.
Marrone argues first that his designation as a career
offender was improper because the 1982 arson cannot be used as a
"prior conviction" under section 4B1.1, which he notes is to be
governed by section 4A1.2(a)(1). In effect, he would have us
disregard Application Note 4 to section 2E1.1, the racketeering
guideline. In our discussion of Paris' sentencing we have
already rejected the argument made by Marrone that Application
Note 4 is inconsistent with section 4A1.2(a)(1). We have
concluded instead that Application Note 4 is a permissible
interpretation of the guidelines applicable in the specific
context of RICO. Therefore, we agree with the government that a
prior conviction for a predicate act can increase a RICO
defendant's criminal history score.
Marrone's argument seems to be predicated on the
assumption that the "two prior felony convictions" referred to in
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 which are necessary before the defendant is
designated as a career offender must be separate from the
"instant offense." That assumption is mistaken. Although
section 4B1.2 defines "two prior felony convictions" under the
career offender guideline to mean that the sentences of at least
two such convictions are "counted separately," it does not
mandate that these convictions must have resulted from "conduct
not part of the instant offense." Instead, "the sentences that
must be separate in this sense are the sentences imposed for the
prior convictions . . . . The two prior convictions must be
separate from each other," not necessarily from the instant
offense. United States v. Belton, 890 F.2d 9, 10-11 (7th Cir.
1989) (permitting state conviction that "punished conduct . . .
part of [the instant] offense" to serve as predicate felony for
career offender guideline). Here, Marrone's two prior
convictions were separate from each other and he does not contend
otherwise.
Moreover, as the Belton court recognized, classifying a
defendant as a career offender because of conduct related to the
offense of conviction is consistent with the policy of the career
offender guideline. See Belton, 890 F.2d at 10 ("Continuing to
participate in a drug conspiracy after having been convicted of a
drug offense manifests a propensity for recidivism as plainly as
if the conspiracy had been started from scratch."). A career
offender is "incorrigible, undeterrable, recidivating, [and]
unresponsive to the 'specific deterrence' of having been
previously convicted," id., an accurate description of Marrone,
who continued to participate in racketeering activity despite his
convictions for extortion and arson.
Marrone next argues that his designation as a career
offender was improper because the "instant offense" was not
committed subsequent to his arson conviction as required by
section 4B1.2(3) if it is to be used for career offender
purposes. However, his RICO conduct, i.e. the "instant offense,"
continued well past his arson conviction, and "continued
participation in a conspiracy [or RICO offense] after a felony
conviction renders that conviction a prior felony conviction" for
purposes of career offender sentencing. United States v. Elwell,
984 F.2d 1289, 1298 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2429
(1993). See also Belton, 890 F.2d at 10 ("[T]he 'subsequent'
offense need not be entirely subsequent to preserve the relation
between the [career offender] guideline and its animating policy
of punishing the recidivist more severely.").
We find no error in the district court's designation of
Marrone as a career offender.10
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgments
of conviction and sentences of Michael Paris and John Marrone.
10
. We find no merit in Marrone's additional arguments that
(1) the district court should have ordered a detailed bill of
particulars due to the lack of specificity of the pleading of the
Count 1 racketeering acts, and (2) there was insufficient
evidence to support the jury's finding of proven on racketeering
act 6(a) of Count 1 and racketeering act 4 of Count 2.