Borough of West Mifflin v. Lancaster

Opinions of the United
1995 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
1-31-1995
West Mifflin v Lancaster
Precedential or Non-Precedential:
Docket 94-3025
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
N0. 94-3025
BOROUGH OF WEST MIFFLIN and WAYNE F. EVAN,
Petitioners,
v.
GARY L. LANCASTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT
OF PENNSYLVANIA; ALAN D. LINDSEY and RANDALL COUGHANOUR;
THE EDWARD J. DeBARTOLO CORPORATION, An Ohio Corporation;
CENTURY III ASSOCIATES, A Pennsylvania Partnership;
SAM VINDOVICH; PAUL PONGRACE; JEFFERY HEIDENREICH;
ROBERT STEFFEY; JOHN THOMPSON; ROBERT F. DONNELLY,
INDIVIDUALS, JANE DOE; JOHN DOE 1; JOHN DOE 2;
JOHN DOE 3; JOHN DOE 4 and JOHN DOE 5,
Respondents
GARY L. LANCASTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE,
Nominal Respondent
Petition for a Writ of Mandamus to the United States
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 93-cv-1527)
Argued Tuesday, June 21, 1994
BEFORE: STAPLETON, GARTH, AND PRATT*, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed January 31, 1995)
_____________________________________
* Honorable George C. Pratt, United States Circuit Judge for
the Second Circuit, sitting by designation.
Patricia A. Monahan (Argued)
Gaitens, Tucceri & Nicholas, P.C.
519 Court Place
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
Attorney for Petitioners
Gary N. Altman (Argued)
206 Derrick Avenue
Uniontown, PA 15401
Attorney for Respondents
Lindsey and Coughanour
Theodore O. Struk
Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C.
Two PPG Place, Suite 400
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
Attorney for Remaining
Respondents
OPINION OF THE COURT
PRATT, Circuit Judge:
FACTS AND BACKGROUND
The operative facts giving rise to this mandamus application
are set forth in the civil complaint of respondents Alan D.
Lindsey and Randall Coughanour. In September 1991 Lindsey and
Coughanour were involved in disputes with security guards at an
indoor shopping mall on Route 51 in West Mifflin Borough, just
south of Pittsburgh, Pa. They had travelled to the mall to shop,
but upon their arrival, they were "harassed, threatened, and
assaulted" by the security guards. When the guards refused their
request that the police be summoned, Lindsey and Coughanour
themselves telephoned the West Mifflin Police Department
requesting assistance. West Mifflin Police Officer Evan, one of
the petitioners in this mandamus application, responded to the
call. Evan refused to arrest or admonish any of the guards, but
told Lindsey and Coughanour to leave the mall and never come
back; otherwise, they would be arrested.
The following day, Lindsey returned to the mall in an
attempt to talk to someone from the DeBartolo organization, which
owned the mall, to find out why he had been accosted and why he
was not permitted on the mall without permission. During the
next three weeks Lindsey repeatedly and unsuccessfully attempted
to contact Sam Vindovich, the mall manager, one of the defendants
in the underlying action, to find out why he and Coughanour were
banned from the mall. Lindsey finally consulted his present
counsel, who advised him that the law permitted his entrance to
the mall as long as the mall was open to the public.
On September 27, 1991, Lindsey and Coughanour returned to
the mall to shop, but were accosted and handcuffed in the mall
men's room, and then dragged through the mall corridor to mall
offices to await the arrival of Officer Evan.
Evan then wrote out summary offense citations for disorderly
conduct and defiant trespass. Lindsey and Coughanour were
photographed by a Polaroid camera, and the photographs were at-
tached to printed forms that said "DEFIANT TRESPASS". These
paper forms contained, among other things a warning that, if
Lindsey and Coughanour came onto the mall property again, they
would be arrested. These preprinted forms were then displayed on
a bulletin board in the mall at the security offices for everyone
passing in front of the board to see.
The handcuffs were then removed, and Lindsey and Coughanour
were ordered to leave the mall, separately, which they did. They
were prosecuted and convicted in Common Pleas Court on charges
stemming from the incidents at the mall, but on February 26,
1993, a three judge panel of the Superior Court in Allegheny
County vacated the convictions and discharged them.
Lindsey and Coughanour then filed a seven count complaint in
the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania,
claiming that they had committed no crimes while at the mall and
that they had been maliciously abused and prosecuted. As
defendants, they named the Borough of West Mifflin and Officer
Evan ("the municipal defendants"), who are the petitioners in
this mandamus proceeding, as well as the owners, supervisors, and
security officers of the mall ("the DeBartolo defendants").
Specifically, Lindsey and Coughanour alleged: (1) state law
claims of malicious prosecution, malicious abuse of process,
assault, and conspiracy against all defendants; (2) a negligence
claim against the municipal defendants; (3) a negligence claim
against the DeBartolo defendants; and (4) a federal claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 which alleged that the municipal defendants and
the DeBartolo defendants conspired to deprive Lindsey and
Coughanour of their civil rights through harassment, assault,
false arrest, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process in
violation of the 4th, 5th, and 14th amendments.
Relying on the federal civil rights claim, the municipal
defendants filed a notice of removal from the state court to the
United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania. Lindsey and Coughanour then moved to remand the
case back to state court. Magistrate Judge Kenneth J. Benson
recommended a remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) of the entire
case, including the § 1983 claim. He found that
[t]he issues of state law clearly predominate in this
matter. Not only do they predominate with respect to
the state law claims, but there is also a predominance
of state law issues with respect to the single claim
pursuant to § 1983.
United States District Judge Gary L. Lancaster adopted the report
and recommendation "as the opinion of the court" and entered a
two page Memorandum and Order granting Lindsey and Coughanour's
motion to remand the entire case.
The municipal defendants now seek in this court a writ of
mandamus to compel Judge Lancaster to accept jurisdiction of this
action, which, they contend, was properly removed under § 1441(a)
and (b). They argue that by remanding the entire case under
§ 1441(c), Judge Lancaster exceeded his authority.
DISCUSSION
Preliminarily, it is clear that we have jurisdiction to
review the district court's remand order. While appellate review
of remands is somewhat restricted (see 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d);
Aliota v. Graham, 984 F.2d 1350, 1354-55 (3rd Cir. 1993)), this
case, which was removed because it included a § 1983 civil rights
claim brought under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, falls within the
specific exception to § 1447(d), which states that
an order remanding a case to the State court from which
it was removed pursuant to section 1443 ["civil rights
cases"] of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or
otherwise.
28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). Thus, Congress has demonstrated a special
concern to preserve our power to review remand orders in civil
rights cases.
A. Federal Jurisdiction Generally.
Removal and remand issues must be considered in light of the
general principles of federal subject matter jurisdiction. There
are several sources for original jurisdiction in the federal
courts: federal question jurisdiction of civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,
28 U.S.C. § 1331; diversity of citizenship jurisdiction of civil
actions where the matter in controversy exceeds $50,000, and is
between citizens of different states, 28 U.S.C. § 1332; and other
specific jurisdictional statutes, such as RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962,
et. seq.; Civil Rights Cases, 28 U.S.C. § 1443; ERISA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002, et. seq.; and FELA, 45 U.S.C. § 51-60.
In addition,
* * * in any civil action of which the district courts
have original jurisdiction [except diversity cases],
the district courts shall have supplemental
jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related
to claims in the action within such original jurisdic-
tion that they form part of the same case or
controversy under Article III of the United States
Constitution.
28 U.S.C. § 1367. Section 1367 also grants jurisdiction over
claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional
parties, thereby codifying what had been dubbed "pendent-party"
jurisdiction as well as some forms of "ancillary" jurisdiction.
Thus § 1367 provides federal courts with statutory authority to
hear some claims that lack an independent basis for federal
subject matter jurisdiction.
B. Removal Jurisdiction Generally.
Cases begun in state court over which a federal court may
also have jurisdiction can be removed by the defendants under 28
U.S.C. § 1441 ("Actions removable generally").
Section 1441(a) reads in relevant part:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of
Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of
which the district courts of the United States have
original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant
or the defendants, to the district court of the United
States for the district and division embracing the
place where such action is pending. For purposes of
removal under this chapter, the citizenship of
defendants sued under fictitious names shall be
disregarded.
Under (a), therefore, unless otherwise barred by Congress,
any civil action brought in a state court (plaintiff's choice)
over which a federal district court would have original
jurisdiction may be removed by the defendant (defendant's choice)
to a district court. This would include both federal question
and diversity cases as well as the miscellaneous federal
jurisdiction cases.
In the case now before us, Lindsey's and Coughanour's state
court action included a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, over which
the federal court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and
1343, plus a variety of state law claims arising out of the same
events and circumstances, over which the federal court has
supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367. Because the district
court had subject matter jurisdiction, the action was properly
removed from state court under § 1441(a).
Under § 1441(b) diversity cases have an additional obstacle
to removal: a resident defendant is barred from removing to
federal court. If jurisdiction is based on a federal question,
however, there is no residency restriction. This shows an added
concern of Congress that cases such as this one -- civil rights
claims raising federal questions -- should be permitted to be
heard in federal courts.
C. Application of § 1441(c).
The dispute on this mandamus application focuses on the
effect of subdivision (c) of § 1441. That provision, prior to
1990, read:
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of
action, which would have been removable if sued upon
alone, is joined with one or more otherwise non-
removable claims or causes of action, the entire case
may be removed and the district court may determine all
issues therein, or, in its discretion, remand all
matters not otherwise within its original jurisdiction.
In 1990, Congress amended § 1441(c) in a manner which the parties
contend affects our decision in this case. See Judicial
Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650 § 312, 104 Stat.
5089, 5114 (1990). Section 1441(c) now reads:
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of
action within the jurisdiction of 1331 of this title is
joined with one or more otherwise non-removable claims
or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and
the district court may determine all issues therein,
or, in its discretion, may remand all matters in which
State law predominates.
In enacting the amendment to § 1441(c), Congress altered two
provisions of the statute. First, it replaced the phrase "a
separate and independent claim or cause of action, which would
have been removable if sued upon alone" with "a separate and
independent claim or cause of action within the jurisdiction of
1331 of this title". Second, it replaced the phrase "the
district court may . . . remand all matters not otherwise in its
original jurisdiction" with "the district court may . . . remand
all matters in which State law predominates."
A fair reading of the Congressional intent in enacting the
amendment to § 1441(c) is that it was designed to restrict
removal to only those cases falling within the court's federal
question jurisdiction and to bring the remand provisions into
harmony with 28 U.S.C. § 1367, thereby possibly avoiding
piecemeal litigation. See David D. Siegel, Commentary on 1988
and 1990 Revisions to Section 1441, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441 (1994).
In the present case, the district court relied upon the
addition which reads "the district court may . . . remand all
matters in which State law predominates" to remand the entire
case, including the § 1983 claim, to state court. It did so
without regard for the requirement, which the Congress left
unchanged when it amended § 1441(c), that the federal cause of
action removed by the municipal defendants had to be "separate
and independent" from the state causes of action.
Thus, § 1441(c) provides for removal or remand only where
the federal question claims are "separate and independent" from
the state law claims with which they are joined in the complaint.
However, where there is a single injury to plaintiff for which
relief is sought, arising from an interrelated series of events
or transactions, there is no separate or independent claim or
cause of action under § 1441(c). American Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951). Suits involving pendent (now "supple-
mental") state claims that "derive from a common nucleus of
operative fact", see United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,
725 (1966), do not fall within the scope of 1441(c), since
pendent claims are not "separate and independent". Carnegie-
Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 354 (1988).
It is apparent, then, that "§ 1441(c) grants the district
court only a limited authority to remand a case." Kabealo v.
Davis, 829 F. Supp. 923, 926 (S.D. Ohio 1993) (citing to Buchner
v. F.D.I.C., 981 F.2d 816 (5th Cir. 1993)). In Kabealo, the
plaintiff had brought a federal claim under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962, et.
seq, along with state law claims of engaging in a pattern of
corrupt activity under Ohio law, breach of fiduciary duty, breach
of contract, and fraud. Defendant filed a notice of removal, and
the plaintiffs moved for remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c). The
district court of Ohio concluded that some cases had analyzed
§ 1441(c) too broadly, and held, as petitioners have argued here,
that:
Even if it is assumed that § 1441(c) would authorize
the remand of an entire case, including federal claims,
plaintiff must establish that remand of this case would
be appropriate under 1441(c). That section provides
for removal or remand only where the federal claims are
"separate and independent" from the state law claims
with which they are joined in the complaint [citing
authorities]. Where there is a single injury to
plaintiff for which relief is sought, arising from an
interrelated series of events or transactions, there is
no separate and independent claim or cause of action
under 1441(c). American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn,
341 U.S. 6 (1951). The use of different counts to
plead different legal theories or multiple theories of
recovery does not automatically make those counts
separate and independent.
Kabealo, 829 F. Supp. at 926. The court then found that because
the plaintiff in that case relied on the same set of facts for
all counts of the complaint, including the RICO count, § 1441(c)
did not authorize remand, because the federal claims were not
separate and independent under that section.
Kabealo, drawing heavily upon Buchner, stands alone among
the district courts in having reached the same conclusion as
Buchner reached and as we reach here. Other district courts have
apparently read the 1990 amendments as broadening rather than
narrowing the scope of their discretion to remand. We cannot
agree.
For instance, in Moore v. DeBiase, 766 F. Supp. 1311 (D.N.J.
1991), the complaint presented allegations similar to the
allegations found in the present case. Moore had accused
DeBiase, a police supervisor, of malicious abuse of authority,
abuse of police procedure, a conspiracy to terminate Moore,
defamation, and violation of § 1983 by depriving him of his
"rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the United States
Constitution and New Jersey Law." Id. at 1314. Moore also
sought damages against the Borough of Dunnellen and the Dunnellen
Police Department under conspiracy and respondeat superior
theories. Id.
Without determining that Moore's § 1983 claim was "separate
and independent" from his state law claims, the district court
remanded all of Moore's claims, including his § 1983 claim. It
did so in the belief that the phrase "all matters in which State
law predominates" in § 1441(c) permits the remand of even federal
claims within the district court's original federal jurisdiction
if, in the discretion of the district court, state law
predominated in the action as a whole.
As we have pointed out, however, unless the federal question
claims removed by the defendant were "separate and independent"
from the state law claims, § 1441(c) cannot apply and the
district court must retain the federal claim. Hence, the
district court's discretion to remand under § 1441(c) can pertain
only to those state law claims which the district court could
decline to hear under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. (See Section 4 infra
"Application of § 1367(c)"). Thus, we reject the reasoning of
Moore v. DeBiase and those courts which have adopted its
rationale. See, e.g. Holland v. World Omni Leasing, Inc., 764 F.
Supp. 1441 (N.D. Ala. 1991); Martin v. Drummond Coal Co., Inc.,
756 F. Supp. 524 (N.D. Ala. 1991).
Similarly in the present case, Lindsey and Coughanour rely
on the same series of events for all counts of their complaint,
including the federal § 1983 count; therefore, the federal claim
is not separate and independent under 1441(c), and the district
court had no authority to remand the case under that section.
D. Application of § 1367(c).
The plaintiffs insist that, even if the district court was
not authorized to remand this entire case under § 1441(c), its
action should be sustained under the authority of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c) which gives a district court discretion to decline to
hear certain state claims it would have supplemental jurisdiction
to entertain under § 1367(a). We disagree for two reasons.
First, nothing in § 1367(c) authorizes a district court to
decline to entertain a claim over which is has original
jurisdiction and, accordingly, that section clearly does not
sanction the district court's remand of this entire case,
including the civil rights claims, to the state court.
Further, § 1367(c) cannot legitimately be invoked to affirm
even the district court's remand of the state claims to the state
court. While we agree with plaintiffs that the discretion
bestowed by § 1367(c) exists with respect to removed claims as
well as claims filed initially in the district court, it is
apparent that the district court has not exercised that
discretion in this case. The magistrate judge's opinion, adopted
by the district court, refers only to § 1441(c) and it is
apparent from that opinion that the court remanded the entire
case based solely on the authority of that section. Moreover,
the result of an exercise of discretion under § 1367(c) in
circumstances like those before the district court would have
been two parallel proceedings, one in federal court and one in
the state system, and a district court cannot properly exercise
its discretion under § 1367(c) without taking that fact into
account. The district court's § 1441(c) analysis accordingly
cannot serve as a surrogate for a § 1367(c) analysis that was not
conducted.
As we have indicated, § 1367(c) is potentially applicable in
a removed case involving federal claims and state claims over
which the district court has supplemental jurisdiction. A dis-
trict court may thus be called upon to exercise its discretion at
any time during the course of such a proceeding in light of the
circumstances that then exist. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 727. Because
the district court in this case may hereafter be called upon to
exercise its discretion under § 1367(c), we offer the following
guidance.
Subsection (a) of § 1367 directs that "in any civil action
of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the
district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all
other claims that are so related to [the original jurisdiction
claims] that they form part of the same case or controversy."
Subsection (c) goes on to describe four categories of such claims
which the district courts may nevertheless decline to adjudicate:
(c) The district courts may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection
(a) if --
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of
State law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over
the claim or claims over which the district
court has original jurisdiction,
(3) the district court has dismissed all
claims over which it has original juris-
diction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are
other compelling reasons for declining
jurisdiction.
While § 1367(c) does not specify what disposition the
district court is to make of state claims it decides not to hear,
based on the teachings of Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 343, we
believe that in a case that has been removed from a state court,
a remand to that court is a viable alternative to a dismissal
without prejudice. See Balazik v. County of Dauphin, No. 94-
7350, slip op. at 15-17 (3d. Cir. January 5, 1995).
Section 1367(a)'s grant of "supplemental" jurisdiction was
intended to broaden the preexisting scope of what had previously
been termed "pendent" jurisdiction to include claims involving
the addition of parties. H.R. Rep. No. 416, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 29 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6875.
Section 1367(c), on the other hand, was intended simply to codify
the preexisting pendent jurisdiction law, enunciated in Gibbs and
its progeny, concerning those instances in which a district court
is authorized to decline to hear a state claim it would have the
power to hear because of its relationship to an original federal
jurisdiction claim. H.R. Rep. No. 416, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6875
(Subsection 1367(c) "codifies the factors that the Supreme Court
has recognized as providing legitimate bases upon which a
district court may decline jurisdiction over a supplemental
claim, even though it is empowered to hear the claim."). It is
of particular importance in the present context to note that the
"substantially predominates" standard found in § 1367(c)(2) comes
directly from the Supreme Court's opinion in Gibbs and should be
understood in that context. The Court there explained the
doctrine of pendent jurisdiction as follows:
It has consistently been recognized that pendent
jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of
plaintiff's right. Its justification lies in
considerations of juridical economy, convenience and
fairness to litigants; if these are not present a
federal court should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction
over state claims, even though bound to apply state law
to them, Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64.
Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both
as a matter of comity and to promote justice between
the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed
reading of applicable law. Certainly, if the federal
claims are dismissed before trial, even though not
insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state
claims should be dismissed as well. Similarly, if it
appears that the state issues substantially
predominate, whether in terms of proof, of the scope of
the issues raised, or of the comprehensiveness of the
remedy sought, the state claims may be dismissed
without prejudice and left for resolution to state
tribunals.
* * * *
[Even after the pretrial process has been completed and
trial commenced,] recognition of a federal court's wide
latitude to decide ancillary questions of state law
does not imply that it must tolerate a litigant's
effort to impose upon it what is in effect only a state
law case. Once it appears that a state claim
constitutes the real body of a case, to which the
federal claim is only an appendage, the state claim may
fairly be dismissed.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726-27 (footnotes omitted).
Under Gibbs jurisprudence, where the claim over which the
district court has original jurisdiction is dismissed before
trial, the district court must decline to decide the pendent
state claims unless considerations of judicial economy,
convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative
justification for doing so. Lovell Mfg. v. Export-Import Bank of
the United States, 843 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1988); Growth Horizons,
Inc. v. Delaware County, 983 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1993). Where the
original federal jurisdiction claim is proceeding to trial,
however, such considerations will normally counsel an exercise of
district court jurisdiction over state claims based on the same
nucleus of operative facts unless the district court can point to
some substantial countervailing consideration. This is the
teaching of our opinion in Sparks v. Hershey, 661 F.2d 30 (3d
Cir. 1981), where the complaint asserted a civil rights claim
under § 1983, a state wrongful death claim, and a state survival
act claim, all based on the same jailhouse suicide. We there
observed:
We do not hold that where there is a common nucleus of
operative facts, state claims must always be appended
to the federal claim; but where, as here, the district
court does not set forth a persuasive, reasoned
elaboration for dismissing the state claims, we are
inclined to believe that the dictates of "judicial
economy, convenience, fairness to the parties, and
comity" . . . are better served by recognizing pendent
jurisdiction. This is especially true where it is
desirable to avoid the possibility of duplicating the
recovery of damages. Here it is preferable for a
single fact finder, under proper instruction from the
court, to consider the varying elements of damages
recoverable under the federal § 1983 claim and the
state wrongful death and survival actions . . . . We
will therefore reverse the district court's order
dismissing the pending state claims and direct that
court to exercise jurisdiction over them.
Sparks, 661 F.2d at 33-34 (citations omitted).
Plaintiffs do not suggest that subparagraphs (1), (3), or
(4) of § 1367(c) are applicable here. They do maintain that
their state claims substantially predominate over their federal
claims and, accordingly, that this case falls within subparagraph
(2). The district court is in a better position than we to pass
upon this contention. Moreover, even if § 1367(c) does not
authorize a refusal to hear the state claims based on the current
record, it might provide that authority at some later stage in
the proceeding. Accordingly, the following observations
concerning § 1367(c)(2) are offered solely by way of guidance and
are not intended to foreclose the district court from hereafter
exercising its discretion under § 1367(c) upon appropriate
application.
As we have noted, the "substantially predominates" standard
of § 1367(c)(2) comes from Gibbs. It is important to recognize
that this standard was fashioned as a limited exception to the
operation of the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction -- a doctrine
that seeks to promote judicial economy, convenience, and fairness
to litigants by litigating in one case all claims that arise out
of the same nucleus of operative fact. When a district court
exercises its discretion not to hear state claims under
§ 1367(c)(2), the advantages of a single suit are lost. For that
reason, § 1367(c)(2)'s authority should be invoked only where
there is an important countervailing interest to be served by
relegating state claims to the state court. This will normally
be the case only where "a state claim constitutes the real body
of a case, to which the federal claim is only an appendage,"
Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 727 -- only where permitting litigation of all
claims in the district court can accurately be described as
allowing a federal tail to wag what is in substance a state dog.
Given the origin of the "substantially predominate"
standard, a district court's analysis under § 1367(c)(2) should
track the Supreme Court's explication of that standard in Gibbs.
We do not understand plaintiffs to suggest that there is a
substantial quantity of evidence supporting their state claims
that would not be relevant to the federal claims that the
defendants, acting under color of state law, conspired to violate
plaintiffs' constitutional rights by assaulting, wrongfully
arresting, and maliciously prosecuting them. Thus, in the
terminology of Gibbs, the state issues would not appear to
"substantially predominate . . . in terms of proof." 383 U.S. at
726. Nor would they appear to "substantially predominate . . .
in terms of . . . the comprehensiveness of the remedy sought."
Id. The remedy sought based on the state claims is the same
remedy sought based on the federal claims -- damages for the same
set of injuries to the plaintiffs. As we observed in Sparks, 661
F.2d at 33-34, the difficulty of avoiding duplicative recoveries
is a factor tending to weigh against litigating related federal
and state claims in different fora.
This leaves the issue of whether the state claims can be
said to "substantially predominate . . . in terms of . . . the
scope of the issues raised." Id. It is true that the state
claims here outnumber the federal claims. The "substantially
predominate" standard, however, is not satisfied simply by a
numerical count of the state and federal claims the plaintiff has
chosen to assert on the basis of the same set of facts. An
analysis more sensitive to the relevant interests is required.
While federal constitutional tort law under § 1983 derives
much of its content from the general common law of torts,
plaintiffs' civil rights claims based on the alleged assault,
arrest, and prosecution are nevertheless governed exclusively by
federal law. Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 2370-71 (1994).
While the claims based upon the arrest and the prosecution may
require an inquiry into whether the defendants had probable cause
to believe a crime had been committed and this may in part
require some reference to the state criminal law, the probable
cause issue and the other issues raised by these claims are
nevertheless issues of federal law and concern. E.g. id.; Rose
v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1989); Lee v. Mihalich, 847 F.2d
66 (3d Cir. 1988); Losch v. Borough of Parkesburg, 736 F.2d 903(3d Cir. 1984).
There are, to be sure, a complementary set of state law
issues arising out of the state claims based on the alleged
assault, arrest, and prosecution. But these state issues do not
appear from our vantage point to substantially predominate over
the comparable but distinct federal issues. Plaintiffs do not
suggest that these state issues are more important, more complex,
more time consuming to resolve, or in any other way more
significant than their federal counterparts.
The only other state issues are those which may arise from
the plaintiffs' negligence claims against the municipal
defendants and the DeBartolo defendants. The dimensions of those
claims are not clear at this stage of the case, but it seems
unlikely to us that they will cause the state issues to
"substantially predominate" within the meaning of § 1367(c)(2).
If the factual allegations of the complaint are accepted at face
value, as we are required to do at this point, this case involves
several substantial claims that the plaintiffs' constitutional
rights have been infringed. In such circumstances, we believe it
will be the rare case, at least, where the addition of
straightforward negligence claims based on the same facts as the
constitutional claims will cause the state issues to
substantially predominate.
In short, while we do not foreclose the parties from
hereafter arguing, and the district court from hereafter
considering, the issue posed by § 1367(c)(2), we think it
unlikely that either will be able to point to a countervailing
interest that would justify bifurcating this case into a federal
and a state suit that will essentially duplicate each other.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the
1983 claim and supplemental jurisdiction over the other claims,
which arose out of the same incidents and addressed the same
course of conduct by the defendants; therefore, the federal and
nonfederal claims were not "separate and independent", and the
district court had no authority under § 1441(c) to remand either
part or all of the case.
Accordingly, the petition for a writ of mandamus is granted.