United States v. Michael Nguyen

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 13-4769
_______________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
MICHAEL NGUYEN, a/k/a Turtle,
a/k/a Mike, a/k/a M,
Appellant
_______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal No. 2-04-cr-00767-015)
District Judge: Hon. Paul S. Diamond
_______________
Argued June 8, 2015
BEFORE: AMBRO and COWEN, Circuit Judges
RESTANI,* Judge
(Filed: July 20, 2015)
* Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge for the United States Court of International Trade,
sitting by designation.
David E. Fritchey, Esq.
Bernadette A. McKeon, Esq. (Argued)
Robert A. Zauzmer, Esq.
Office of United States Attorney
615 Chestnut Street
Suite 1250
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Counsel for Appellee
Cheryl J. Sturm, Esq. (Argued)
387 Ring Road
Chadds Ford, PA 19317
Counsel for Appellant
_______________
OPINION**
_______________
COWEN, Circuit Judge.
The petitioner-appellant, Michael Nguyen (“Petitioner”), has appealed the District
Court’s order denying his petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the plea bargaining process.
Because we conclude that denial was appropriate, we will affirm.
I.
Because we write solely for the parties, we will only set forth the facts necessary
to inform our analysis. While investigating the Benjamin Ton Drug Trafficking
_______________
** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
2
Organization, individuals and documents identified Petitioner as a wholesale customer of
the organization. In June of 2005, Petitioner was subpoenaed to testify before a grand
jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. He was appointed counsel for the limited
purpose of representing him in connection with that appearance. On advice of counsel,
Petitioner did not testify before the grand jury.
By the end of August of 2005, five of the six defendants charged in the original
indictment had entered into cooperation agreements. The sixth defendant entered into a
cooperation agreement in September 2005. On September 14, 2005, a superseding
indictment was issued, adding numerous charges and twenty new defendants, including
Petitioner. On September 29, 2005, at his initial appearance, Petitioner pled not guilty
and requested the appointment of counsel. The court appointed John Griffin.
Between September 2005 and August 2006, 21 of the 26 co-defendants charged in
the first superseding indictment pled guilty. The grand jury returned a second
superseding indictment on August 23, 2006, adding one new defendant and consolidating
the charges pending against the remaining five co-defendants, including Petitioner.
During this time, Petitioner was represented by Griffin.
Petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss His Counsel
On September 8, 2006, Petitioner asked the District Court to terminate Griffin’s
representation and appoint new counsel due to his attorney’s alleged failure to keep him
adequately apprised of the status of his case. Petitioner alleged in his motion that
September 29, 2005, the date of his arraignment, was the first and last occasion he “met,
3
spoke with or communicated in any form with Mr. Griffin.” (App. 312.) The District
Court held a hearing on Petitioner’s motion to dismiss his counsel, at which Petitioner
acknowledged that he had met with Griffin on the Monday before the hearing, but
reiterated his frustration with his counsel and asserted that the visit was the first time the
two had met since his arraignment. Griffin also testified, but chose not to specifically
address Petitioner’s complaints. Rather, he simply noted that he had “just recently
received discovery,” and that he had met with Petitioner to discuss it. (App. 318.)
Griffin’s brief testimony indicated that when he had spoken to Petitioner a few days
earlier, he believed they were ready to move forward, but that if Petitioner wanted new
counsel, he would “respect whatever the position the Court wants to make on this.” (Id.)
The District Court advised Petitioner that a change in counsel could delay his trial, but
given Petitioner’s insistence on new counsel, the District Court granted the motion and
subsequently appointed Steven Laver in December 2006 to represent him. Laver
represented Petitioner through to completion of his trial.
Petitioner’s Trial and Conviction
Petitioner’s trial commenced in August 2007. He was ultimately convicted of
conspiracy to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana and convicted of possession
with intent to distribute 50 pounds of marijuana, 100 pounds of marijuana, and 24 pounds
of marijuana. On May 12, 2008, Petitioner was sentenced to a term of 262 months’
imprisonment consecutive to the undischarged term of imprisonment. We affirmed that
conviction and sentence in an unpublished opinion. On October 16, 2010, Petitioner
4
filed a counseled motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 claiming ineffective assistance of
counsel in connection with the plea bargaining process.
Petitioner’s § 2255 Motion
Petitioner’s motion raised several grounds of ineffective assistance, including that
trial counsel failed to “provide reasonably accurate advice concerning all aspects of the
case,” including a candid estimate of the probable outcome, the probable outcome of
alternative choices, the maximum and minimum sentences that could be imposed, and
what sentence was likely. (App. 72.) Although the initial motion did not clearly
distinguish between Griffin and Laver, Petitioner has not appealed any of his claims
against Laver and those claims are not before us.
The District Court held an evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s motion. In addition
to Petitioner’s counsel who had been appointed in connection with his grand jury
appearance, Petitioner, Griffin, and Assistant United States Attorney David Fritchey all
testified.
The District Court’s Denial of the § 2255 Motion
In considering the habeas petition, the District Court “largely discredit[ed] the
testimony of [Petitioner],” and credited the testimony of Griffin and Fritchey. (App. 5.)
Under the circumstances presented, the Court concluded that Petitioner had not been
constructively denied counsel during a critical stage of his proceedings, refused to apply
the standard in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), and instead analyzed
Petitioner’s claims under the standard in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
5
Finding that Petitioner could not meet the latter standard, the District Court denied the
petition and declined to issue a certificate of appealability (“COA”). Petitioner appealed,
and we granted Petitioner a COA only as to his claim that he was constructively denied
the right to be represented by effective counsel during a time when plea negotiations
could have taken place.
II.
Petitioner asserts that Griffin abandoned him during a critical stage of his
proceedings and that his case is therefore governed by the standard in Cronic. We
decline to apply Cronic and instead apply the standard announced in Strickland.
Application of the Cronic Standard
In United States v. Cronic, counsel representing the defendant was given only 25
days to prepare for trial even though the Government had taken four and a half years to
investigate and had reviewed thousands of documents. The defendant was convicted and
the Sixth Circuit reversed, inferring that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right had been
violated. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 649-52. The Supreme Court disagreed that the inference
was warranted in that case, but identified three circumstances where reversal of a
conviction under the Sixth Amendment is required “without inquiring into counsel’s
actual performance or requiring the defendant to show the effect it had on the trial.” Bell
v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695 (2002).
As the Supreme Court reiterated in Bell v. Cone, the three circumstances are as
follows: (1) circumstances involving the complete denial of counsel at a critical stage in
6
the proceedings, (2) where “counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to
meaningful adversarial testing,” and (3) where counsel is called upon to render assistance
under circumstances where competent counsel very likely could not. Id. at 695-96.
Here, Petitioner argues that he was effectively denied counsel at a critical stage in his
proceedings.
As an initial matter, we conclude that the District Court’s findings regarding the
adequacy of Griffin’s representation were not clearly erroneous. The District Court
credited Griffin’s testimony, discredited Petitioner’s, and we discern nothing in the
record that would warrant us substituting our own judgment for either credibility
determination. See Ross v. Varano, 712 F.3d 784, 796 (3d Cir. 2013) (“applying the
clear error standard of review . . . an appellate court ordinarily accepts a district court’s
credibility determinations.” ). Moreover, the District Court found as follows: (1) that
Griffin had several discussions with Petitioner early in the representation about pleading
guilty, (2) that Petitioner had made it clear to Griffin that he was not interested in
entering into any kind of plea agreement or negotiations, (3) that Griffin was certain that
Petitioner wanted to go to trial and recalled his refusal to plead guilty, and (4) that, at the
time Griffin ended his representation, he had never received any indication that Petitioner
wanted to do anything other than go to trial. These factual findings are each supported
by the record and Griffin’s specific testimony.
Because Griffin’s credited testimony establishes that he discussed with Petitioner
the possibility of pleading, the advantages that accompany it, and met with him to discuss
7
the Government’s discovery when he received it, Petitioner has not demonstrated
abandonment such that are we are persuaded to apply Cronic. The cases relied on by
Petitioner do not convince us otherwise.
In Appel v Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 214 (3d Cir. 2001), we applied Cronic to a claim
of constructive denial of counsel to a state court defendant at his competency hearing.
But in Appel, despite the fact that the petitioner’s counsel had been assigned to represent
him by the Public Defender, the petitioner had informed them that he wished to represent
himself and did not want them to represent him. Indeed, even after the state trial court
denied the petitioner’s waiver of counsel, the petitioner’s assigned counsel continued to
refuse to act as defendant’s counsel. The District Court, on habeas review, concluded
that despite their obligation to act as counsel at the petitioner’s competency hearing, the
record was undisputed that they had failed to do so. Id. at 215. We agreed. “In short,
attorneys Kraft and Crowe, because they did not believe they were counsel, never
conducted any investigation; did not provide Dr. Schwartz or the court with any
information about [the petitioner]; and did not attempt to litigate the competency
determination in any way.” Id. (all emphases in original). Accordingly, we concluded
that there was “ample support for the District Court’s conclusion that Kraft and Crowe
abandoned their duty to both the court and their client when they decided not to conduct
any investigation on [the petitioner’s] competency.” Id. (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). In contrast, no such complete abandonment occurred here.
Nor is Petitioner aided by the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Mitchell v. Mason, 325
8
F.3d 732, 742 (6th Cir. 2003). In Mitchell, the petitioner complained that he had not
seen or talked to his lawyer in the five months leading up to trial, and that his counsel
was suspended for the month immediately preceding trial. Id. at 742. The trial judge
postponed a decision on the petitioner’s motion until a time when his counsel could
appear. Then, on the second day of jury selection, the court revisited the issue of the
petitioner’s request for new counsel. Id. at 735-36. At that time, the petitioner’s counsel
testified at length, but did not dispute the substance of the petitioner’s assertions. The
court concluded that Cronic applied and that the petitioner had been completely denied
counsel at a critical stage. Id. at 744.
Mitchell is easily distinguished from this case. First and foremost, in Mitchell,
because his attorney was suspended for the 30 days before his trial, the petitioner was
actually completely denied counsel for a period of time prior to his trial. Although the
Sixth Circuit noted that this fact “does not decide this case” such that an attorney’s
suspension would lead to an automatic application of Cronic, “it does contribute to the
weight of the evidence that demonstrates that there was no consultation between [the
petitioner] and his attorney prior to trial.” Id. at 747. There obviously was no such
period of actual non-representation in this case.
Second, in Mitchell, the petitioner indicated that following his bail hearing, his
attorney had not visited him once in prison and that he had not had the opportunity to
speak to him in court until his lawyer next represented him at the final conference four
months later. Id. at 735. Here, although Petitioner arguably did not speak to his attorney
9
for a longer period of time, Petitioner’s case, which was designated complex, appears to
have been advancing more slowly. It is not the case that Petitioner saw Griffin at his bail
hearing and then did not see or hear from him again until the final pre-trial conference.
Rather, Griffin, upon receiving discovery from the Government, met with Petitioner to
review it and to again discuss the status of his case.
On the factual record before us, and in light of the District Court’s decision to
credit Griffin’s testimony over Petitioner’s, Petitioner has not demonstrated that he was
constructively denied counsel during the pre-trial period. As we conclude that Cronic
does not apply, we turn to an analysis of Petitioner’s claims under the Strickland
standard.
Application of the Strickland Standard
Strickland requires Petitioner to show the following: (1) that his attorney’s
representation was unreasonable under “prevailing professional norms,” and (2) that but
for the deficiency in representation, there was a reasonable probability that the “result of
the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694. Petitioner
cannot meet this standard.
Petitioner cannot establish that he suffered any prejudice as a result of Griffin’s
alleged ineffectiveness. Because Griffin was replaced by Laver, against whom Petitioner
has chosen not to appeal his claim of ineffective assistance, his claim is limited to the
argument that he was denied an opportunity to plead or cooperate during the time Griffin
represented him as a result of Griffin’s ineffective assistance. But to establish prejudice,
10
Petitioner must begin by proving that a plea agreement was formally offered by the
Government. See Kingsberry v. United States, 202 F.3d 1030, 1032 (8th Cir. 2000)
(holding, in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, that to establish
prejudice, the petitioner must begin by proving that a plea agreement was formally
offered by the Government).
Here, however, it is undisputed that while Fritchey testified he spoke to Griffin
several times, the Government never made any formal offer. Moreover, even if Petitioner
could demonstrate that the Government offered a plea bargain or a cooperation
agreement – which of course he cannot – there is insufficient evidence that Petitioner
would have taken it. Griffin testified, credibly according to the District Court, that
Petitioner was resolute in his opposition to accepting any kind of offer. And Fritchey
testified that Laver informed him that Petitioner “thought he had a defensible case, and he
wanted to go to trial.” (App. 278.) On this record, Petitioner’s speculation that had he
known the potential prison sentence he faced, he would have accepted a guilty plea or
cooperation deal – offers that were never made and therefore never his to accept – is
simply insufficient to establish prejudice under Strickland.
III.
In light of the foregoing, the order of the District Court entered on November 5,
2013, will be affirmed.
11