Golden v. Golden

Opinions of the United
2004 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
9-3-2004
Golden v. Golden
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential
Docket No. 03-2184
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PRECEDENTIAL Circuit Judges, and DEBEVOISE,*
District Judge
UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT (Filed :September 3, 2004)
JULIA MORROW (Argued)
No. 03-2184 JOEL W. TODD
Dolchin, Slotkin & Todd
2005 Market Street
24th Floor
ROBERT GOLDEN, Attorney-in-Fact Philadelphia, PA 19103
for LEAH GOLDEN;
DONALD EARWOOD, Executor of the Counsel for Appellants
Estate of HELEN EARWOOD,
CHRISTOPHER M. TRETTA (Argued)
Appellants Yost & Tretta
1500 John F. Kennedy Boulevard
v. Two Penn Center Plaza, Suite 610
Philadelphia, PA 19102
DAVID S. GOLDEN;
DARLENE KOPOSKO JAMES T. DAVIS
MELINDA K. DELLAROSE
Davis & Davis
107 East Main Street
Uniontown, PA 15401
On Appeal from the
United States District Court Counsel for Appellees
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(Dist. Court No. 01-cv-00576)
District Judge:
Honorable David S. Cercone OPINION OF THE COURT
Argued: January 22, 2004
*
Honorable Dickinson R.
Debevoise, Senior United States District
Before: ALITO and CHERTOFF,
Judge for the District of New Jersey,
sitting by designation.
1
David S. Golden and Darlene Koposko are
CHERTOFF, Circuit Judge. both adult citizens of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania.
Robert Golden, attorney-in-fact for
Leah Golden, and Donald Earwood, On September 1, 1999, Irene I.
executor of the estate of Helen Earwood, King executed a Last Will and Testament
appeal a final order of the United States (the “Will”) and an inter vivos trust (the
District Court for the Western District of “Trust”). Pursuant to her testamentary
Pennsylvania dismissing their action for scheme, all of her property was transferred
lack of jurisdiction. Appellants’ action to the Trust, under which she named
sought, through various means, to herself the sole trustee. In the event of her
challenge the distribution of assets from incapacity or death, Appellee David
the estate of Irene I. King. In addition to Golden was to become the sole trustee.
asserting a number of familiar torts, As a redundancy, her Will also contained
including fraud and slander, the complaint a “pour over” provision, transferring all of
asserted several grounds for relief that her property to the Trust upon her death.
relate to probate law, including undue Under the terms of the original Trust, the
influence and breach of fiduciary duty as Trust corpus was, upon her death, to be
the executor of a will. Appellants also distributed in equal one-third shares
sought punitive damages. The District among Leah Golden, Ms. King’s sister-in-
Court dismissed the action as falling law, Helen Earwood, Ms. King’s sister,
within the probate exception to federal and Appellee David Golden, Ms. King’s
diversity jurisdiction. This case, therefore, brother.2 The original Trust, Will, and
requires us to explore the contours of the other attendant paperwork were prepared
probate exception. We will affirm in part by Nicholas J. Cook, Esq., and his office.
and reverse in part.
As set forth in the complaint, Ms.
Appellant Robert Golden is a King’s health deteriorated over the months
citizen of the state of New York and holds that followed. Concurrently, Appellee
general power of attorney for Leah David Golden began exercising increasing
Golden, also a citizen of the state of New control over both Ms. King’s finances
York. Appellant Donald Earwood is the and, allegedly, over Ms. King herself. At
personal representative of the estate of some point during the fall of 1999,
Helen Earwood, a citizen of the state of Appellee David Golden terminated Ms.
Georgia prior to her death.1 Appellees King’s professional home care services in
1 2
In diversity actions involving The legacies were contingent upon
estates, the courts look to the citizenship of the legatees surviving Ms. King. In the
the decedent to determine jurisdiction. See event that they predeceased, the Trust
28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2). named contingent beneficiaries.
2
favor of those provided by Appellee Golden.
Darlene Koposko and Koposko’s mother
On July 26, 2000, Ms. King died.
and daughter. During this time,
On September 19, 2000, Ms. King’s Will
Appellants allege, several of their attempts
was probated and letters testamentary
to visit Ms. King were either directly
thereafter issued. At some point
rebuffed by Appellee David Golden or
thereafter, Appellee David Golden,
met with so much hostility that they were
through Nicholas Cook, filed a
soon terminated.
Pennsylvania Inheritance Tax Return (the
By June 14, 2000, Ms. King was “tax return”) with the Fayette County
bedridden, experiencing excruciating pain Register of Wills listing the net value of
and unable to maintain bodily functions. Ms. King’s estate as $188,946.00.
She was being medicated for her pain and Distribution of the legacies has not
was prescribed hospice care. That occurred due to the pendency of the
morning, however, she purportedly instant litigation.
summoned Appellee Koposko to her side
Appellants brought this action in
and dictated the preparation of a document
the United States District Court for the
altering the distributive scheme
Western District of Pennsylvania on
enumerated in her Trust. Ms. Koposko
March 28, 2001. Appellants alleged
then purportedly prepared a handwritten
jurisdiction based on diversity of
instrument memorializing those changes
citizenship and an amount in controversy
(the “Addendum”), propped Ms. King up
in excess of $75,000. In addition to
in bed, watched her sign the instrument
seeking punitive damages, Appellants
and then, along with one of Ms.
asserted six causes of action: (1) undue
Koposko’s long-time friends, witnessed it.
influence; (2) fraud; (3) forgery; (4)
Appellee Koposko then allegedly placed
slander (asserted by Appellant Earwood
the Addendum in a dresser drawer where
only); (5) tortious interference with
it remained until June 27, 2000, when she
inheritance; and (6) breach of fiduciary
delivered it to the offices of Nicholas
duty as executor of a will (asserted against
Cook.
Appellee David Golden only). Appellants
The Addendum reduced the amount essentially alleged that their shares under
of the legacy granted to Leah Golden from Ms. King’s Trust were reduced either as a
one-third of Ms. King’s estate to “the sum result of Appellees’ outright forgery, or as
of [$5,000].” J.A. at 48. In a similar a result of Appellees’ wrongful influence
manner, the Addendum reduced the on, or slanderous statements to, Ms. King.
amount of the legacy granted to Helen
On June 20, 2002, after discovery
Earwood from one-third of Ms. King’s
was complete, the parties filed cross
estate to “the sum of [$10,000].” Id. The
remainder of the estate, according to the
Addendum, was to pass to Appellee David
3
motions for summary judgment.3 On issues of subject matter jurisdiction,
November 18, 2002, the District Court defects in the pleading of the amount in
conducted a pretrial conference but, on controversy cannot be waived and, as a
March 23, 2003, sua sponte dismissed the consequence, may be raised by any party
action for lack of subject matter at any time during litigation of the dispute.
jurisdiction. Appellants timely appealed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); see also, e.g.,
Kontrick v. Ryan, __ U.S. __, 124 S.Ct.
Appellees present two arguments
906, 915 (2004). The federal courts
against subject matter jurisdiction. First,
themselves, of course, have a continuing
they claim that Appellants have failed to
obligation to investigate their jurisdiction
satisfy the amount in controversy
over the matters before them. See Exxon
requirement for diversity jurisdiction. See
Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Second, they urge
364 F.3d 102, 104 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting
that Appellants’ action falls under the
Desi’s Pizza, Inc. v. City of Wilkes-Barre,
probate exception to federal diversity
321 F.3d 411, 420 (3d Cir. 2003));
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Markham v. Allen,
Meritcare Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins.
326 U.S. 490 (1946); Waterman v. Canal-
Co., 166 F.3d 214, 217 (3d Cir. 1999).
Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 215 U.S. 33,
Even if no party reaches the issue,
45 (1909); Moore v. Graybeal, 843 F.2d
therefore, the courts may take the initiative
706, 709 (3d Cir. 1988). We exercise
and probe the sufficiency with which the
plenary review over a district court’s
amount in controversy has been pled. See
dismissal for lack of subject matter
Meritcare, 166 F.3d at 217.
jurisdiction. See Bakhtriger v. Elwood,
360 F.3d 414, 417 (3d Cir. 2004). Where a federal cause of action is
based on diversity jurisdiction, the
I.
complaint must allege an amount in
A. controversy between the parties in excess
of the statutory minimum. See 28 U.S.C.
Appellees contend that the amount
§ 1332(a). The amount need not be
in controversy has not been adequately
proven; rather, the amount is judged from
pled. The amount in controversy is a
the face of the complaint and is generally
statutory limit on the subject matter over
established by a good faith allegation. See
which the federal courts have jurisdiction.
Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).4 As with all
348, 353 (1961) (measuring “good faith”
by whether it appears “to a legal certainty
3
Appellants’ motion sought only the claim is really for less than the
partial summary judgment on their undue jurisdictional amount”) (internal
influence, fraud and forgery claims. quotations and citations omitted); St. Paul
4
At all times during this
controversy, the statutory minimum was $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
4
Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 335
U.S. 283, 288 (1938); see also Jumara v. (1969); Suber, 104 F.3d at 588 (3d Cir.
State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 877 (3d 1997); see also 14B Wright, Miller &
Cir. 1995). Each plaintiff must meet the Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure 3d
amount in controversy § 3704 at 134 (1994).
requirement—claims may not be
Claims for punitive damages may
aggregated among plaintiffs to meet the
be aggregated with claims for
statutory minimum. See Meritcare, 166
compensatory damages unless the former
F.3d at 218 (citing 14B Wright, Miller &
are “‘patently frivolous and without
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure 3d
foundation.’” Packard, 994 F.2d at 1046
§ 3704 at 134 (1994)). On the other hand,
(quoting Gray v. Occidental Life Ins. Co.,
courts do not separately evaluate each of
387 F.2d 935, 936 (3d Cir. 1968)).
the causes of action asserted by any one
Punitive damage claims are per se
plaintiff against any one defendant.5
“‘patently frivolous and without
foundation’” if they are unavailable as a
matter of state substantive law. See In re
5
The notable exception occurs Corestates Trust Fee Litig., 39 F.3d 61, 64
where recovery on one of the plaintiff’s (3d Cir. 1994); Packard v. Provident Nat.
claims excludes recovery for one or more Bank, 994 F.2d 1039, 1046 (3d Cir.
of the others. See Suber v. Chrysler Corp., 1993). Where guidance from state
104 F.3d 578, 588 (3d Cir. 1997). substantive law is absent, the federal
In cases where a plaintiff has sued
multiple defendants on the theory that they
share liability, several circuit courts each defendant is liable for the entire
measure pleading of the amount in amount, although the plaintiff only
controversy under the rubric of recovers the entire amount once. Cf.
“aggregation.” See, e.g., Middle Tenn. Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Div., Nat
News Co. v. Charnel of Cincinnati, Inc., Steel Corp., 495 F.2d 213, 218-19 (6th Cir.
250 F.3d 1077, 1081 (7th Cir. 2001); 1974). If that amount of liability is above
Jewell v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 290 the statutory threshold, jurisdiction has
F.2d 11, 13 (5th Cir. 1961). Thus, a attached. Any other rule would effectively
plaintiff is permitted to “aggregate” his or multiply the amount in controversy
her claims against the multiple defendants requirement by the number of defendants
to meet the statutory requirement. We alleged to share liability.
have never passed on the issue. Here, all but one of Appellants’
Although we think the causes of action assert that the Appellees
“aggregation” approach reaches the correct are jointly liable. In pleading the amount
result, we do not see the question as one of in controversy, therefore, the Appellants
aggregation. Rather, an assertion of joint need not have distinguished among the
and several liability is an assertion that Appellees.
5
courts must attempt to predict the position $250,000.00.6 But if the filing of the tax
that the state courts would take on the return with the Orphans’ Court was a
question. Corestates, 39 F.3d at 64. If determination by that court of the actual
appropriately made, therefore, a request value of the estate, then a determination by
for punitive damages will generally satisfy a federal court that the estate should have
the amount in controversy requirement been valued higher than $188,946 would
because it cannot be stated to a legal constitute an impermissible collateral
certainty that the value of the plaintiff’s impeachment of a state court judgment.
claim is below the statutory minimum. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust, Co., 263
U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia
B.
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.
With the foregoing general 462 (1983); see also Exxon, 364 F.3d at
principles in mind, we turn to the specific 104. Although this Court asked counsel,
allegations of the complaint. through supplemental briefing, to clarify
how the Orphans’ Court treated the tax
Appellees argue that the
filing, they were unable to do so.
compensatory damages at stake fall below
the $75,000 threshold. They observe that Nevertheless, the jurisdictional
the tax return filed with the Pennsylvania amount in controversy may be satisfied on
Orphans’ Court lists the estate’s net value another basis: the complaint seeks punitive
at $188,946.00. The original Trust damages. If punitive damages are
provided that Appellants each receive a available under Pennsylvania state law for
one-third share of the estate, or the causes of action asserted by the
$62,982.00. But the amended Trust Appellants, and if the claims for punitive
provided for a distribution of $10,000 to damages are not otherwise “patently
Helen Earwood and $5,000 to Leah frivolous and without foundation,” then
Golden. Thus, Appellees argue, Appellant the pleadings satisfy the necessary amount
Earwood has alleged an amount in in controversy. Packard, 994 F.2d at
controversy of $52,982.00 and Appellant 1046.
Golden $57,982.00, each less than the
Pennsylvania law permits the
statutory minimum.
recovery of punitive damages for “torts
Appellants respond that the that are committed willfully, maliciously,
statutory minimum has been met because or so carelessly as to indicate wanton
the complaint alleged that, but for
Appellees’ conduct, the value of the estate
would have been valued in excess of 6
The complaint alleged, for
example, that Appellee David Golden had
either wasted estate assets prior to Ms.
King’s death, or failed to report them on
the tax return.
6
disregard of the rights of the party action for tortious interference with
injured.” Thompson v. Swank, 176 A. inheritance by both Appellants against
211 (Pa. 1934); see also SHV Coal, Inc. v. both Appellees.7 There is no direct
Continental Grain Co., 587 A.2d 702, 704 pronouncement by the Pennsylvania courts
(Pa. 1991). The Pennsylvania Supreme that punitive damages are recoverable in
Court has adopted section 908(2) of the actions for tortious interference with
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which inheritance, but punitive damage awards
states that “[p]unitive damages may be have been upheld in actions for analogous
awarded for conduct that is outrageous, torts. See, e.g. Judge Tech. Servs., Inc. v.
because of the defendant’s evil motive or Clancy, 813 A.2d 879, 888-90 (Pa. Super.
his reckless indifference to others.” Ct. 2002) (tortious interference with
Restatement (Second) Torts § 908(2) contractual relations). Given the
(1979); see also Feld v. Merriam, 485 Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s broad
A.2d 742, 747-48 (Pa. 1984). The pronouncements with respect to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has also availability of punitive damages, and
discussed with approval Comment b of given the assertion of allegedly intentional
that section, which states that “[r]eckless or reckless conduct here, we may
indifference to the rights of others and confidently predict that the Pennsylvania
conscious action in deliberate disregard of courts would not bar the recovery of
them . . . may provide the necessary state punitive damages in this action.8
of mind to justify punitive damages.” Corestates, 39 F.3d at 64. From the face
Restatement (Second) Torts § 908 cmt. b;
see also SHV, 587 A.2d at 704-05; Martin 7
v. Johns-Manville Corp., 494 A.2d 1088, We note that the Pennsylvania
1096-98 (Pa. 1985), overruled on other Courts recognize only the tort of
grounds by Kirkbride v. Lisbon intentional interference with inheritance.
Contractors, Inc., 555 A.2d 800, 801 (Pa. See Cardenas v. Schober, 783 A.2d 317,
1989). 324 n.2 (Pa. Super Ct. 2001). We interpret
the complaint to allege that tort. Id. at
The complaint asserts conduct on 325.
the part of Appellees that Appellants Our focus on Appellants’ claims for
allege to be, at least, recklessly tortious. slander and tortious interference with
For example, the complaint asserts a cause inheritance is deliberate. As will become
of action for slander by Appellant apparent, infra, they are the only two
Earwood against both Appellees. claims that survive this appeal.
Pennsylvania permits the recovery of
8
punitive damages for slander claims. See Of course, whether punitive
Walder v. Lobel, 488 A.2d 622, 626 (Pa. damages are appropriate in this case is a
Super. Ct. 1985) (defamation generally). question for the finder of fact. See G.J.D.
The complaint also asserts a cause of v. Johnson, 713 A.2d 1127, 1131 (Pa.
1998).
7
of the complaint, Appellants’ punitive without the power to probate a will or
damage claim is not “patently frivolous administer an estate.9 Markham, 326 U.S.
and without foundation.” Packard, 994 at 494; Canal-Louisiana, 215 U.S. at 43;
F.2d at 1046. Thus, at this stage in the see also Georges v. Glick, 856 F.2d 971,
litigation, it does not “appear to a legal 973 (7th Cir. 1988); Rice v. Rice Found.,
certainty” the Appellants’ claims fall 610 F.2d 471, 475 (7th Cir. 1979).
below the statutory minimum. Horton,
The probate exception extends
367 U.S. at 353 (internal quotations and
both to matters of “pure” probate and to
citations omitted).
matters “ancillary” to probate. See Farrell
Appellants have adequately pled v. O’Brien, 199 U.S. 89, 110 (1905); see
the amount in controversy. We move to also Dragan v. Miller, 679 F.2d 712, 715
the more tangled question presented on (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
appeal: whether the probate exception 1017 (1982); Rice, 610 F.2d at 475. On
precludes the federal courts from the other hand, strictly in personam
exercising subject matter jurisdiction over actions whose subject matter relates only
Appellants’ substantive causes of action. incidentally to probate can be maintained
in federal court because the exercise of
II.
jurisdiction under such circumstances
The lineage of the probate would not “interfere with the probate
exception to federal diversity jurisdiction proceedings or [require the court to]
can be readily traced. As early as 1875, assume general jurisdiction of the probate
the Supreme Court observed that “a court or control of the property in the custody of
of equity will not entertain jurisdiction of the state court.” Markham, 326 U.S. at
a bill to set aside a will or the probate 494.
thereof,” and dismissed the action before
it on that basis. In re Broderick’s Will, 88
9
U.S. (21 Wal.) 503, 509 (1875). Later Although the Supreme Court’s
opinions by the Court were more explicit reasoning in Markham and Canal-
as to the reason: the Judiciary Act of 1789 Louisiana was directed to the equitable
and its successors granted the federal power of the federal courts, the same result
courts equitable powers coextensive with occurs where the complaint seeks legal
those held by the English Chancery Court relief. The power of the federal courts to
in 1789. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. grant legal relief was limited by the
20, § 11, 1 Stat. 78; Markham, 326 U.S. at Judiciary Act of 1789 to be coextensive
494; Canal-Louisiana, 215 U.S. at 43. with the English common-law courts.
Because probate matters in late eighteenth Like the Chancery Court, the common-law
century England were assigned to the courts did not consider probate matters.
ecclesiastical court and not to the Cf. Markham, 326 U.S. at 494; Rice v.
Chancery Court, the federal courts are Rice Found., 610 F.2d 471, 475 (7th Cir.
1979).
8
Where is the line of demarcation? Moore, 843 F.2d at 710. Likewise, the
Various descriptions of the probate probate exception bars federal courts from
exception over the years often seem to adjudicating claims that challenge
substitute one opaque verbal formulation management of the estate. Cf. Princess
for another. See Markham, 326 U.S. at Lida, 305 U.S. at 459, 465-67 (treating a
494; Princess Lida of Thurn and Taxis v. claim of trustee mismanagement as related
Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 466-67 (1939); f o r j u r i s d ictional purp oses t o
Canal-Louisiana, 215 U.S. at 46; Farrell, administration of the corpus). Third,
199 U.S. at 110; Dragan, 679 F.2d at 715; federal courts may nevertheless exercise
Lamberg v. Callahan, 455 F.2d 1216, jurisdiction over an otherwise barred
1216 (2d Cir. 1972). But however one probate-related cause of action if the
articulates the precise contours of the action would be maintainable inter partes
probate exception, three principles in the state courts of general jurisdiction.11
discernable from caselaw are enough to Sutton v. English, 246 U.S. 199, 205
guide our disposition of this appeal.
First, the federal courts lack the Desi’s Pizza, 321 F.3d at 419. A rule, like
power to actually probate a will. See the one announced in Moore, prohibiting
Markham, 326 U.S. at 494; Moore, 843 federal court review of claims seeking to
F.2d at 709; see also Georges, 856 F.2d at annul or set aside an already-probated will
973. Second, where a will has already is entirely consonant with the Rooker-
been probated, permitting an action that Feldman doctrine, and comports with the
seeks, expressly or in fact, to assail or federalism and comity concerns that the
contradict a judgment of the probate court doctrine embodies. See Moore, 843 F.2d
generally constitutes an impermissible at 710.
interference with the probate.10 See
11
This rule even applies where the
will has already been probated and a
10
This view of the interference judgment favorable to the plaintiff might
prong is fortified by other considerations. annul or set aside the will (i.e., collaterally
Federal courts, with the exception of the impeach the probate). But this rule is
Supreme Court, cannot “sit[] in direct strictly construed. It is not enough that the
review of the decisions of a state tribunal.” cause of action be recognized; the state
Gulla v. North Strabane Twp., 146 F.3d courts must also recognize and sanction
168, 171 (3d. Cir. 1998) (citing Feldman, the use of that cause of action to
460 U.S. at 482; Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416). collaterally impeach a probate. As we
This rule, known as the Rooker-Feldman observed in Moore, it is in this way that
doctrine, prohibits federal courts from state substantive law can “expan[d] the
considering any claim “inextricably power of a federal courts to hear matters
i n t e rt w i n ed” wit h a state court related to but independent of probate
adjudication. See Exxon, 364 F.3d at 104; proceedings.” 843 F.2d at 709.
9
(1918); Farrell, 199 U.S. at 110-11; see the trust operates as a will, distributing
also Moore, 843 F.2d at 709. This corpus upon the death of the settlor. They
supplemental rule means that a state can point out that trusts, by definition, do not
effectively contract the scope of the pass through probate. That being so, they
probate exception if it allows its courts of argue, actions involving trusts should per
general jurisdiction to adjudicate se not be subject to the probate exception.
challenges to probate.
This mistakes the scope of the
In sum, federal courts have the probate exception, which is not limited to
power to entertain in personam diversity the formal act of probating a will. As
actions, firmly grounded in recognized described previously, the probate
legal theories, if their resolution will not exception bars a federal court from
undercut the past probate of a will or entertaining both matters of “pure”
result in the federal court “assum[ing] probate and matters “ancillary” to probate.
general jurisdiction of the probate or Farrell, 199 U.S. at 110; Moore, 843 F.2d
control of the property in the custody of at 709; see also Dragan, 679 F.2d at 715;
the state court.” Markham, 326 U.S. at Rice, 610 F.2d at 475. Accordingly, the
494. Where relief can be granted without Seventh Circuit has rejected a per se rule
challenging the probate c ourt’s identical to the one proposed by the
determinations or management of the res, Appellants here. See Storm v. Storm, 328
the exercise of federal jurisdiction could F.3d 941, 944-45 (7th Cir. 2003); see also
not “interfere with the probate.” And, in Georges, 856 F.2d at 974 n. 2. In
any event, if the actions would be Georges, the Seventh Circuit noted that
maintainable inter partes in the state analysis of the probate exception applies
courts of general jurisdiction, the state has as well to trusts that act as “will
presumably determined as a matter of law substitutes”:
that such actions will not disrupt the
The plaintiffs argue that the
activities of the state probate courts.
probate exception is
A. inapplicable here because
this action relates to the
The parties acknowledge, as they
execution of an inter vivos
must, the foregoing threshold principles.
trust, not to a will. We
From that point of departure, however,
reject such a per se rule.
they proceed down different analytical
The inter vivos trust is
paths.
clearly a will substitute.
Appellants contend that the probate However, the fact that this
exception is categorically inapplicable to case does involve a will
this case. They argue that the probate substitute does not
exception by its terms applies only to a automatically render the
will, and not to a trust—even if, as here, probate exception
10
applicable. se apply to preempt this action. Of course,
we have already observed that the state
856 F.2d at 974 n.2.
can shrink the probate exception by
The probate exception protects the assigning probate related claims to a state
state’s interest in managing all challenges court of general jurisdiction. But the
addressing an estate res located in that reverse does not follow. A state cannot
state or with which the state has some expand the probate exception—and defeat
meaningful connection. That interest is no otherwise proper federal jurisdiction over
less compelling if the estate res is a matter—simply by vesting exclusive
distributed by trust rather than by a will. authority over otherwise in personam
We agree with the Court of Appeals for actions in the probate court. See Canal-
the Seventh Circuit in holding that causes Louisiana, 215 U.S. at 43-44; Payne v.
of action involving trusts are treated under Hook, 74 U.S. (7 Wal.) 415, 429-30
the probate exception in the same way as (1869); see also 17 Wright, Miller &
actions involving wills. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure 3d
§ 4211, at 475 (1988). That is to say, if a
Appellees take the opposite
claim is otherwise outside the scope of the
categorical position, and contend that the
probate exception, a federal court is not
probate exception applies categorically to
divested of jurisdiction simply because the
all claims here. They argue that, because
state places that sort of claim in state
the Pennsylvania legislature has
probate court. See Marshall v. Lauriault,
transferred to the Orphans’ Court the
372 F.3d 175, 181 (3d Cir. 2004).
power to administer and oversee actions
seeking to reform trusts, see 20 Pa. C.S.A. Accordingly, we reject the
§ 711(3),12 the probate exception must per categorical argument of each party.
Instead, we must examine the substance of
each of the claims to determine whether it
12
In relevant part, 20 Pa. C.S.A. § falls within the probate exception.
711 states:
B.
[J]urisdiction of the court of
common pleas over the We first turn to the claims of undue
following shall be exercised influence, forgery and breach of fiducuary
through its orphans’ court duty as an executor.
division:
Once a will has been probated, it
generally constitutes an impermissible
(3) The administration and
interference with the probate for a federal
distribution of the real and
court to entertain a cause of action that
personal property of inter
seeks, in fact or in effect, to attack a
vivos trusts, and th e
determination of the probate court.
reformation or setting aside
of any such trusts . . . .
11
We take a fairly broad view of the invalidate the will . . . . We
types of actions that interfere with the are not impressed with the
probate proceedings. Moore, 843 F.2d at concept that granting her
710. Under that broad view, we must relief would not interfere
conclude that Appellants’ claims for with the probate
undue influence, forgery and breach of proceedings if done by an
fiduciary duty as an executor would award of damages rather
interfere with the already-completed than by an order to the
probate proceedings and, therefore, are executor directing
subject to the probate exception. distribution of the estate.
Either way the substance is
In Moore, this Court upheld the
the same.
district court’s dismissal under the probate
exception of an action seeking to establish Id. (internal citations omitted). Under
rights in an estate that had already been Moore, therefore, actions that seek in
probated. 843 F.2d at 710. Moore, a effect to reform a will or overturn a
legatee under an earlier, revoked will, determination of will validity by the
sought a declaration that the will probated probate court constitute an impermissible
by the Delaware probate court was invalid interference with the probate.
as a result of either undue influence or
Here, the practical effect of each of
lack of testamentary capacity. See id. at
Appellants’ claims for undue influence
707. We held that Moore’s action was
and forgery would do exactly that: declare
barred by the probate exception because it
the Addendum and its distributive scheme
would interfere with the Delaware courts’
invalid or unenforceable. To be sure, the
past probate of the estate by partially
Register of Wills and the Orphans’ Court
reversing the bequests. See id. at 710. In
never directly passed on the Trust or its
other words, a judgment favorable to
Addendum. But the Register of Wills did
Moore would necessarily adjudicate a
probate Ms. King’s Will which, in turn,
matter normally determined as a part of
passed all of her property “under the terms
probate. “[W]e are satisfied that
of [her] trust agreement . . . and any
jurisdiction cannot be sustained on the
amendments thereto.” J.A. at 38. As we
theory that this is an action by a legatee
see it, therefore, by probating Ms. King’s
which does not interfere with the probate
Will, the Register also implicitly
proceedings.” Id. We noted that the result
determined the Trust, the Addendum and
did not change simply because Moore cast
their combined distributive scheme to be
her action to recover damages rather than
valid and enforceable.13 Appellants’
to reform the will.
Regardless of how Moore
characterizes her claim, she 13
The Register of W ills is a judicial
is seeking in substance to
officer under Pennsylvania law, subject to
12
claims for undue influence and forgery is that Appellee David Golden
would strike at that determination of misappropriated or wasted estate assets
validity, however. For a will that is the prior to probate. See In re Lux’s Estate,
result of undue influence or that is forged 389 A.2d 1053, 1055 (Pa. 1978). The
is necessarily invalid. See 20 Pa. C.S.A. § complaint also arguably raises the theory
2502; In re Fleming’s Estate, 109 A. 265, that Appellee David Golden breached his
267-68 (Pa. 1919);14 In re Carothers duty as the executor of Ms. King’s estate
Estate, 150 A. 585, 586 (Pa. 1930). An by operating under a conflict of interest.
implicit federal court judgment that the These claims strike at management of the
Addendum is invalid or unenforceable estate, and the District Court is
would be inconsistent with the Orphans’ nonetheless without jurisdiction to
Court’s probate jurisdiction over Ms. adjudicate it. In Pennsylvania, all claims
King’s estate. As the Seventh Circuit has that an estate’s executor engaged in self-
observed, application of the probate dealing are handled in the probate court,
exception depends not on how the federal either by removal of the offending
claim is labeled, but on whether the action executor, see 20 Pa. C.S.A. § 3182, or by
is “in effect one to declare [the] . . . will assessing a penalty against that executor.
invalid because of undue influence.” See In re Estate of Harrison, 745 A.2d
Dragan, 679 F.2d at 717. 676, 679 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000). Claims
for breach of fiduciary duty as executor of
Appellants’ claim for breach of
an estate are never adjudicated outside the
fiduciary duty as the executor of a will is
probate context. Appellants’ breach of
also at odds with the probate jurisdiction
fiduciary duty claim—indeed, under either
of the Orphans’ Court. Based on the
theory—is, therefore, a classic example of
complaint, the primary theory of
a claim that is so “ancillary” to probate
Appellants’ breach of fiduciary duty claim
that it is not justiciable in federal court.
See Farrell, 199 U.S. at 110. That is
because, as the Supreme Court observed in
appellate review by the Orphans’ Court. Princess Lida, claims of mismanagement
See Mangold v. Neuman, 91 A.2d 904, of an estate relate “solely as to
905-06 (Pa. 1952). administration and restoration of corpus.”
14 305 U.S. at 281; see also Mangieri v.
The Pennsylvania Statute of
Mangieri, 226 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2000)
Wills, 20 Pa. C.S.A. § 2502, provides, in
(holding probate exception excludes claim
relevant part, that “[e]very will shall be in
that fiduciary should refund money to the
writing and shall be signed by the testator
estate).
at the end thereof.” In short, if the
signature on a testamentary document is Moreover, these theories of
forged, that document must be invalid as it recovery do not come within any state law
was never validly executed. See inter partes exemption from the probate
Fleming’s Estate, 109 A. at 267-68.
13
exception. Pennsylvania law does not vest court of common pleas. . . .
in the Pennsylvania courts of general
Case law confirms
jurisdiction any power to establish rights
that an action contesting the
in an estate on the theories of undue
validity of a will on grounds
influence, forgery or breach of fiduciary
of lack of testamentary
duty as an executor. Indeed, at least with
capacity, undue influence,
respect to undue influence, authority is
and confidential
directly to the contrary. See Lucidore v.
relationship must be
Novak, 570 A.2d 93, 94-95 (Pa. Super. Ct.
brought as an appeal from
1990). In Lucidore, the plaintiffs
probate in the orphans’
attempted to sue, in the Court of Common
court division of the court
Pleas, the executrix and the attorney of the
of common pleas . . . . [I]t
estate of their deceased aunt. Id. at 94. At
is incorrect to file a
the time of the suit, the deceased’s will
complaint in the civil
had already been probated by the Orphans’
division seeking to set aside
Court and Letters Testamentary had
the will.
issued. Id. The complaint alleged that the
defendants had exercised undue influence Id. at 94-95.
over the deceased, and sought an
We are persuaded, therefore, that
injunction against disposition of assets
the Pennsylvania courts do not recognize
from the estate on the ground that “the
undue influence as a tort existing outside
will was obtained as a result of the undue
the probate context. Further, no
influence.” Id.Pennsylvania case permits a suit, in the
The Court of Common Pleas state courts of general jurisdiction to sue
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction for forgery of a will or breach of fiduciary
and the Pennsylvania Superior Court duty as executor of an estate. These
affirmed, saying that undue influence theories of recovery also contest the
claims fell exclusively within the ambit of validity of the will, and must be addressed
the probate court: “as an appeal from probate.” Id. at 95.
[T]here is no doubt that the C.
appellants incorrectly
Appellants’ claim for the tort of
captioned the nature of their
fraud presents a somewhat closer question.
action as a complaint in
Fraud is a well-established tort in
equity in that this action
Pennsylvania. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Ernst,
must be an appeal from
647 A.2d 882, 889 (Pa. 1994). And if the
probate. Further, there is no
Appellants were pressing a theory of fraud
doubt that appellants
that did not in any way challenge the
brought the action in the
Orphans’ Court’s probate of Ms. King’s
incorrect division of the
14
estate, the District Court might well have intent.15 See In re Glover’s Estate, 669
jurisdiction over those claims. But as it A.2d at 1016-17. In that case as well,
stands, both of the fraud theories that the Appellants’ theories are inimical to the
complaint might conceivably support determinations of the Orphans’ Court that
entail a direct challenge to determinations the Will, the Trust, the Addendum and
of the Orphans’ Court. their combined distributive scheme are
both valid and enforceable.
From the complaint, the Appellants
could argue two possible theories of fraud. Since the Appellants’ fraud claims
First, that the Appellees forged the effectively seek to challenge the Orphans’
Addendum and Ms. King’s signature on it Court’s probate of Ms. King’s estate, we
and thereby defrauded the Orphans’ Court must go on to ask: Would Pennsylvania
and robbed the Appellants of their allow a court of general jurisdiction to
inheritance. See, e.g., In re Fleming’s entertain such a fraud claim anyway? To
Estate, 109 A. at 267-68. Second, that the be sure, fraud may be a recognized tort in
Appellees fraudulently induced Ms. King Pennsylvania. But we are not aware that
into signing the Addendum by making her any court in Pennsylvania has permitted a
believe that it said something other than plaintiff to seek to challenge the past
what it actually said, and thereby deprived probate of an estate through the vehicle of
the Appellants of their inheritance. See, a fraud action. As we have observed, it is
e.g., In re Estate of Glover, 669 A.2d not enough under the inter partes
1011, 1016-17 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996). exemption from the probate exception for
a state court to recognize a cause of
Under either theory, the
action; rather, the state court must
Addendum—which the Orphans’ Court
recognize the use of that action to impeach
implicitly found to be valid and
a probate. Any other rule would reward
enforceable—is either invalid or
creative pleading and would undermine
unenforceable. If Appellants’ first
both the fundamental assumptions of the
possible fraud theory is correct and the
“inter partes” exemption from the probate
Addendum and Ms. King’s signature on it
exception and the finality that the probate
were forged, the documents are obviously
system requires. See Moore, 843 F.2d at
invalid as a forgery. See 20 Pa. C.S.A. §
2502; In re Fleming’s Estate, 109 A. at
267-68. We have already explained why 15
Pennsylvania law is not clear
such a theory falls within the probate
whether a will whose execution was the
exception. And if the Appellants’s second
r e s u l t o f f r a u d a n d
theory is correct, the Addendum is either
misrepresentation—though technically
invalid or unenforceable because Mrs.
meeting all statutory requirements— is
King was misled about what she was
invalid or is simply unenforceable. See In
signing and, therefore, the document does
re Paul’s Estate, 180 A.2d 254, 261-62
not reflect Ms. King’s testamentary
(Pa. 1955); Glover, 669 A.2d at 1016-17.
15
710; see also Storm, 328 F.3d at 945. been slandered and damaged by the
Thus, Appellants’ fraud claims must be Appellees is in no way contrary to the
dismissed—as with their claims for undue Orphans’ Court’s determination that the
influence, forgery and breach of fiduciary Will, the Trust, the Addendum and their
duty as executor of a will—because combined distributive scheme are valid
recovery on those claims would not be and enforceable. To be sure, the amount
otherwise maintainable in th e of Earwood’s damage as a result of the
Pennsylvania courts of general alleged slander might—though it need
jurisdiction, would be contrary to a not—be measured by the difference
determination of the probate court, and between the legacy under the Addendum
would impermissibly “interfere with the and the legacy under the Trust. But a
probate proceedings.” Markham, 326 judgment that the Appellees slandered
U.S. at 494; Moore, 843 F.2d at 710. Earwood and caused her some amount of
damage does nothing to impeach the
D.
Orphans’ Court’s determination that Ms.
As already noted, federal courts King intended to and succeeded in
retain the power to entertain in personam distributing her estate via the scheme laid
diversity actions involving parties to a will out in the Trust and its Addendum. The
if the resolution of the action will have no District Court has jurisdiction to consider
effect on the past probate of a will. The Appellant Earwood’s claim for slander.
first of Appellants’ causes of action that is
So, too, is there jurisdiction over
saved by this principle is Appellant
Appellants’ claims for tortious
Earwood’s claim for slander.
interference with inheritance. Despite its
A claim for slander is a strictly in entwinement with probate, a cause of
personam action. It is, in this case, also action for tortious interference with
firmly based on a recognized legal inheritance is one brought in personam. It
theory—the Pennsylvania courts have long is no different from any other tort—the
recognized the tort of slander. See, e.g., plaintiff is asserting that some tortious
Klumph v. Dunn, 66 Pa. 141 (Pa. 1870); action on the part of the defendant has
Chubb v. Gsell, 34 Pa. 114 (Pa. 1859); see caused him or her damage. Further,
also Corabi v. Curtis Pub. Co., 273 A.2d though it may not be so in other states,16 a
899, 908 (Pa. 1971). Moreover, even claim for tortious interference with
assuming that slander is proven, relief can inheritance is one based on a legal theory
be granted without challenging the
Orphans’ Court’s determinations of estate
16
value and testamentary document validity, In Moore, for example, we
enforceability and distributive scheme. concluded that the Delaware state courts
That is to say, a determination by the would not permit a plaintiff to bring an
District Court that Earwood may have action for tortious interference with
inheritance. 843 F.2d at 710-11.
16
recognized by the Pennsylvania state Cf. id.
courts. See Mangold, 91 A.2d at 907;
True, any cause of action for
Cardenas, 783 A.2d at 325-26.
tortious interference of inheritance
Further, relief can be granted brought in Pennsylvania implicitly
without challenging the Orphans’ Court’s contends that the testator’s intent was, at
determinations of estate value and some point in time, something other than
testamentary document vali dity, what the Orphans’ Court found it to be at
enforceability and distributive scheme. In the testator’s death. Indeed, one of the
Pennsylvania, the elements of tortious elements of tortious interference with
interference with inheritance are: inheritance in Pennsylvania is that the
testator intended to make a distribution to
(1) The testator indicated an
the plaintiff but was prevented from doing
intent to change his will to
so by the defendant. The tort claim,
provide a described benefit
therefore, does posit that the distributive
for plaintiff,
scheme that the Orphans’ Court found to
(2) The defendant used be in place at the time of the testator’s
fraud, misrepresentation or death is different from the one the testator
undue influence to prevent at some point intended.
execution of the intended
But this is not the same as a
will,
challenge to the validity, enforceability or
(3) The defendant was interpretation of a testamentary document
successful in preventing the passed on by the Orphans’ Court. Id. To
execution of a new will; and the contrary. The theory of the tort is that
the will actually probated was valid and
(4) But for the Defendant’s
enforceable because it reflected
[sic] conduct, the testator
testamentary intent at the time it was
would have changed his
made, but that the alleged tortfeasor
will.
wrongly induced the testator to maintain
Cardenas, 783 A.2d at 326. In no event that will. Whatever the outcome of an
does an action for tortious interference action for tortious interference with
with inheritance in Pennsylvania challenge inheritance, the Orphans’ Court’s
the Orphans’ Court’s determination of determinations of testamentary document
value of the estate. Cf. Mangold, 91 A.2d validity, enforceability and interpretation
at 907. Nor may a plaintiff use an action will, as they must, remain unaffected. Id.for tortious interference with inheritance
An example will help to clarify the
to challenge the validity or enforceability
point. Take a hypothetical testator who
of the testamentary documents (if any)
adopts a valid testamentary distributive
admitted to probate, or the testamentary
scheme that does not provide for person P.
scheme established by those documents.
17
At some point, Testator contemplates elements of tortious interference with
changing the testamentary distributive inheritance do not call into question the
scheme to add a legacy for P, but person D probate court’s determination of
somehow intentionally prevents the testamentary document validity or
change. Thus, at the time of Testator’s enforceability.17 The probate of a will,
death, the only scheme providing for the therefore, does not prevent a party from
distribution of Testator’s assets is the bringing an action for tortious interference
earlier—and valid—scheme leaving with inheritance in the Pennsylvania
nothing to P. courts of general jurisdiction.
The original testamentary scheme To be sure, while an action for
was a true and correct expression of tortious interference with inheritance does
Testator’s then-intent. Because Testator not challenge the validity or enforceability
never revoked or superseded the earlier of the distributive scheme affirmed by the
testamentary scheme, that scheme probate court, recovery on that theory
remained valid, and the Orphans’ Court may, de facto, alter the distributive
was required to probate it. Independent of scheme. It was this consideration that
the validity and enforceability of gave us pause in Moore. 843 F.2d at 710.
Testator’s earlier scheme, D harmed P, There, we affirmed the dismissal of the
because, but for D’s actions, Testator plaintiff/appellant’s claim for tortious
would have amended the testamentary interference with inheritance because such
scheme and P would have received a an action would be “so inconsistent with
legacy. If P sues D for tortious the Delaware statutory plan for exclusive
interference, that suit does not impeach the review of probate proceedings that
validity or enforceability of the original allowing it would subvert the probate
will. To the contrary, it relies on that law.” Id. Central to our reasoning,
validity to support the claim that D
damaged P by preventing the testamentary
17
scheme from being changed. Cf. Georges, Indeed, this is one of the key,
856 F.2d at 974 (finding jurisdiction over outc ome-dete r minative distinc tio ns
a claim for legal malpractice in between Appellants’ fraud claims and their
preparation of a trust because the claim tortious interference with inheritance
“does not seek to disturb the finality of the claims. Recovery on Appellants’ fraud
. . . probate proceedings”). claims would require the District Court to
directly contradict the Orphans’ Court’s
Under Mangold and Cardenas, P
determination that the Will, the Trust, the
may sue D in the Pennsylvania courts of
Addendum and their combined distributive
general jurisdiction for tortious
scheme are valid and enforceable.
interference with inheritance. Mangold,
Appellants’ tortious interference with
91 A.2d at 907; Cardenas, 783 A.2d at
inheritance claims, by contrast, require no
325-26. Put simply, in Pennsylvania, the
such contradiction.
18
however, was the fact that the Delaware The District Court has jurisdiction
courts did not unambiguously permit to consider Appellants’ claims for slander
tortious interference with inheritance and tortious interference with inheritance.
claims in the courts of general jurisdiction. Of course, we take no position as to
Id. at 710 & n.4. That being so, it was not whether the Appellants have alleged
the province of the federal courts to sufficient facts to meet the elements of
entertain actions whose de facto effect those torts as the Pennsylvania courts have
would be to re-allocate estate assets post- defined them. That inquiry is for the
probate. District Court. 19
But unlike in Moore, the state
courts in this case do unambiguously Id. (emphasis added, citations omitted).
recognize the viability, outside the probate Even though “Indiana law would require
context, of claims for tortious interference [his] tort claim be heard in the probate
with inheritance. State law, therefore, [court],” plaintiff/appellant Storm sued in
compels a different result in this case. federal court rather than wait for the will
Pennsylvania law permits actions for to be admitted to probate. Id. at 945.
tortious interference with inheritance in Storm failed, therefore, to meet the state
the courts of general jurisdiction and a law jurisdictional prerequisite that “a will
federal court must adjudicate such claims contest [be] unavailable to supply an
just as they would any other tort claim adequate remedy.” That being so, the
brought pursuant to our diversity Indiana courts of general jurisdiction—
jurisdiction.18 a n d , by e xte nsion, the f e d e r a l
courts—could not entertain Storm’s action
for tortious interference with inheritance.
18
State law also compels the Id. at 945-946. The Seventh Circuit
difference between our result and the dismissed the claim, calling the action “in
Seventh Circuit’s holding in Storm. 328 substance a will contest.” Id. at 945.
F.3d at 945. Storm was strongly guided by By contrast, the Pennsylvania courts
the fact that the plaintiff/appellant failed to contemp late no such jurisdictional
meet a state law jurisdictional prerequisite prerequisite to bringing a claim for tortious
for his tortious interference w ith interference with inheritance. The
inheritance claim. concerns that guided the result in Storm,
[Tortious] interference with therefore, are not present here.
inheritance is a recognized
19
tort in Indiana; such an For example, in resolving the
action may be brought in a still-undecided cross motions for summary
court of general jurisdiction, judgment as they apply to Appellants’
provided a will contest is claims for tortious interference with
unavailable to supply an inheritance, the District Court will have to
adequate remedy. determine whether the facts as alleged
19
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the
judgment of the District Court will be
affirmed in part and reversed in part and
the case will be remanded for further
proceedings in accordance with this
opinion.
establish that Ms. King intended to change
her will to benefit the Appellants and that
she would have succeeded in doing so but
for the Appellees’ actions.
20