Prevost v. Hazlet

Opinions of the United
2005 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
12-16-2005
Prevost v. Hazlet
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 04-3891
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005
Recommended Citation
"Prevost v. Hazlet" (2005). 2005 Decisions. Paper 101.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005/101
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2005 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 04-3891
RICHARD PREVOST,
Appellant
v.
TOWNSHIP OF HAZLET; FRANCIS C. EMERY
a/k/a Frank Emery; JAMES BRODERICK; ROBERT J. MULLIGAN;
EUGENE KILEY; PATRICIA R. JOHNSON; MARGARET J. MARGIOTTA
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 04-cv-01237)
District Judge: Honorable Garrett E. Brown, Jr
Argued on June 28, 2005
Before: ROTH, RENDELL and BARRY, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: December 16, 2005)
Joseph R. Brennan, III, Esquire (ARGUED)
Kelly & Brennan
1800 Highway 34, Suite 403
Wall Township, NJ 07719
Counsel for Appellant
J. Sheldon Cohen, Esquire (ARGUED)
Decotiis, Fitzpatrick, Cole & Wisler
500 Frank W. Burr Boulevard
Glenpointe Centre West
Teaneck, JN 07666
Eric L. Harrison, Esquire
Methfessel & Werbel
3 Ethel Road
P.O. Box 3012, Suite 300
Edison, NJ 08818
Counsel for Appellees
OPINION
ROTH, Circuit Judge:
This is an appeal from the District Court’s dismissal of a § 1983 suit brought by
Richard Prevost, a former police officer in the Township of Hazlet. Prevost’s suit alleges
that defendants Township of Hazlet and several of its employees, under color of state law,
manipulated civil service procedures to deprive him of his job without due process. In
addition to filing this suit, Prevost pursued the administrative procedures available to him
under New Jersey law to contest the disciplinary charges imposed by the Township at the
time of his termination. The District Court dismissed the case on the grounds that
abstention was appropriate under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), in light of these
state administrative proceedings. For the reasons discussed below, we will reverse the
2
District Court’s decision and remand the case.
I. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have appellate
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We exercise plenary review over the legal determination of whether the
requirements for Younger abstention have been met and, if so, we review the District
Court's decision to abstain for abuse of discretion. O'Neill v. City of Phila., 32 F.3d 785,
790 (3d Cir. 1994).
II. Abstention
Although the general rule is that the pendency of a state court proceeding is not a
reason for a federal court to decline to exercise jurisdiction established by Congress,
McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 281-82 (1910), an exception to that rule is Younger
abstention. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), established a principle of abstention
when federal adjudication would disrupt an ongoing state criminal proceeding. This
principle has been extended to civil proceedings and state administrative proceedings.
Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979), Williams v. Red Bank Board of Education, 662
F.2d 1008, 1017 (3d Cir. 1981). Three requirements must be met before Younger
abstention is appropriate: (1) there must be an ongoing state proceeding that is judicial in
nature, (2) the state proceedings must implicate important state interests, and (3) the state
proceedings must afford an adequate opportunity to raise the federal claims. Schall v.
Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 1989).
3
The District Court misapplied the third prong of the Younger requirements. Here,
the state administrative proceeding is Prevost’s appeal of the disciplinary charges
imposed by the Township. Prevost filed an appeal from these charges with the Merit
System Board, which resulted in a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge in May
2003. After the ALJ affirmed the “removal” of Prevost from his position, Prevost filed an
appeal with the Merit System Board, which was denied in October 2003. Prevost then
appealed this decision to the Superior Court of New Jersey, where the matter was pending
at the time of the District Court’s decision. The parties advised us at oral argument that
this appeal has now been decided.
The state administrative proceeding, while based on the same factual
circumstances as this suit, did not afford Prevost the opportunity to raise the claims he
argues here. First, the only party to the state administrative proceeding was the
Township, while the defendants in this case include the Township and several of its
employees. Second, the state administrative proceeding was limited to the question of
whether the Township’s termination of Prevost was in accordance with state statutes and
regulations. Here, Prevost argues that the defendant employees of the Township
manipulated state regulations to deprive him of employment, in violation of his
constitutional rights, a claim that does not fall within the scope of the administrative
hearing. Third, the only possible relief from the state administrative proceeding was
reinstatement and limited compensatory damages. This case includes a § 1983 action
seeking punitive and compensatory damages that are not available in the state
4
administrative proceeding. Prevost’s suit also seeks injunctive relief to restrain the
Township and its employees from publishing information about Prevost and the state
administrative proceeding could neither consider this claim nor award injunctive relief.
In Hospital Council of Western Pennsylvania v. City of Pittsburgh, 949 F.2d 83,
90 (3d Cir. 1991), we concluded that, because the constitutional claims asserted by a state
employee in a § 1983 action could not have been fully raised in related state
administrative proceedings, abstention by the District Court was not appropriate. The
same conclusion is warranted here. Prevost’s constitutional claims could not have been
and were not considered in the state administrative proceedings. At most, if it was
concerned about the state administrative proceeding, the District Court could have stayed
this suit pending the conclusion of the state appeals. As the state administrative
proceedings are now final, it is appropriate, on remand, for the District Court to proceed
with this case.
III. Conclusion
The District Court’s dismissal of this case will be reversed because the District
Court erred in abstaining due to a related state administrative proceeding. We will
remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
5