Myers v. AK Steel Corp.

Opinions of the United
2005 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
12-8-2005
Myers v. AK Steel Corp
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 04-4258
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"Myers v. AK Steel Corp" (2005). 2005 Decisions. Paper 139.
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 04-4258
___________
JOSEPH MYERS,
Appellant
v.
AK STEEL CORPORATION;
BUTLER ARMCO INDEPENDENT UNION, U.A.W.
___________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 04-cv-00674)
District Judge: The Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose
___________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 18, 2005
Before: SMITH, STAPLETON, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: December 8, 2005 )
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Joseph Myers, an employee of the AK Steel Corporation and a
member of the Butler Armco Independent Union, U.A.W., was terminated in 2001 for
insubordination. He filed suit against both AK Steel and the Union alleging that he was
retaliated against for refusing to follow his employer’s allegedly unsafe and illegal
trucking practices and that the Union failed to adequately represent him with respect to
his termination. The District Court dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim for
which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6). We will affirm.
I.
Myers was terminated from his employment at AK Steel for failure to
follow his supervisor’s orders. An arbitrator upheld Myers’ termination. Myers
subsequently brought state law breach of contract claims against both AK Steel and the
Union and a state law fraud claim against AK Steel. At all times relevant to this appeal,
Myers was represented by appellee Butler Armco Independent Union, U.A.W. This case
was removed to the U.S. District Court pursuant to the Labor Management Relations Act
(LMRA). See 29 U.S.C. § 185(a); 29 U.S.C. § 160(b).
AK Steel moved to dismiss all claims against it pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
Pro. 12(b)(6) because Myers’ claims were preempted by § 301 of the LMRA and hence,
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time-barred under § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The Union
moved to have all claims against it dismissed.
The District Court granted the motions to dismiss on all counts. It held that
Myers’ breach of contract claims were preempted by § 301 and therefore, time-barred
under § 10(b). The District Court also found Myers’ fraud claims to be time-barred under
Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations for fraud claims.
Myers raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the District Court
erred in granting defendants’ motions to dismiss; (2) whether the District Court erred in
applying the § 10(b) statute of limitations to Myers’ claims; (3) whether the District Court
erred in failing to estop defendants’ from asserting the statute of limitations defense; and
(4) whether the District Court erred when it applied the § 10(b) statute of limitations
because it placed an undue burden on Myers.
We need only discuss the applicability of the § 10(b) statute of limitations
to Myers’ claims because they are preempted by § 301 of the LMRA, and consequently,
time-barred under the six-month statute of limitations established in § 10(b) of the NLRA.
II.
Although Myers attempts to portray this as an independent contract claim, it
cannot be considered without reference to the collective bargaining agreement.
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Therefore, the preemptive effect of § 301 is implicated. Section 301 has broad
preemptive effect and precludes state consideration and regulation of collective
bargaining disputes. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210 (1985). However,
§ 301 does not limit federal court jurisdiction exclusively to disputes arising out of
collective bargaining agreements. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama,
353 U.S. 448, 450-41 (1957). Section 301 also encompasses state claims that require the
application and interpretation of collective bargaining agreements. Allis-Chalmers Corp.,
471 U.S. at 210; see also, Angst v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 969 F.2d 1530 (3d Cir. 1992)
(employees’ breach of contract claim regarding a “buy out plan” through which departing
employees would receive benefits in a lump sum payment was preempted by § 301);
Young v. Anthony’s Fish Grottos, Inc., 830 F.2d 993 (9th Cir. 1987) (employee’s breach
of contract claim and state law tort claims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation,
intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress
were all preempted by § 301).
Myers also alleges that his Union failed to represent him adequately in his
discharge process and failed to advise him of the limited time in which he had to file suit.
A hybrid suit such as this must be brought within the six-month statute of limitations
mandated by § 10(b) of the NLRA. DelCostello v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462
U.S. 151, 169 (1983).
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An employee alleging breach of the collective bargaining agreement
between his or her employer and the union must exhaust contractually-mandated
grievance and arbitration procedures before he or she is permitted to file suit under § 301.
See e.g., Clayton v. Int’l Union, 451 U.S. 679, 681 (1981); Republic Steel Corp. v.
Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652-53 (1965). Hence, the date on which the statute began to run
was November 30, 2001, the day on which Myers exhausted the arbitration process
mandated under the collective bargaining agreement. Because he did not file suit in the
District Court until nearly two and half years after the arbitrators’ ruling, his claims are
time barred under § 10(b).
Finally, Myers argues that the statute should be equitably tolled because he
was defrauded by AK Steel. However, the fraud he claims concerned AK Steel’s alleged
disregard for the law of freight transport. Even assuming this was fraud, it did not
prevent him from filing his claim within the statute of limitations. Equitable tolling
principles apply only when fraudulent conduct inhibits the plaintiff’s ability to bring a
timely suit. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Farmer, 865 F. Supp. 1143, 1153 (E.D. Pa.
1994).
IV.
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Myers’ claims are preempted by § 301 of the LMRA. Therefore, he was
required to file suit within the six-month statute of limitations period of § 10(b). Because
he filed his claims nearly two and a half years after the conclusion of the arbitration
proceedings, Myers’ claims are time barred. The order of the District Court will be
affirmed.
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