Bennie Anderson v. Warden Berks County Prison

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 14-1191
___________
BENNIE ANDERSON,
Appellant
v.
WARDEN OF BERKS COUNTY PRISON;
MR. JOE HERMAN (COUNSELOR)
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 5-13-cv-00903)
District Judge: Honorable Timothy J. Savage
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 20, 2015
Before: CHAGARES, JORDAN and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Filed: February 25, 2015)
___________
OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Pro se appellant Bennie Anderson, a Pennsylvania state prisoner, appeals the
District Court’s order granting summary judgment to the defendants. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise a plenary standard of review. See Camp
v. Brennan, 219 F.3d 279, 280 (3d Cir. 2000). For the reasons detailed below, we will
affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.
Anderson is serving a life sentence for murder. For most of the 15 years that he
has been incarcerated, he has been held at SCI-Huntington. On July 25, 2012, he was
temporarily transferred to the Berks County Jail (“the Jail”), via a writ of habeas corpus
ad testificandum, to testify under subpoena for the defense in an unrelated capital murder
case, Commonwealth v. Williams, which was proceeding in the Berks County Court of
Common Pleas. Anderson was discharged back to SCI-Huntington on August 22, 2012.
According to Anderson, the staff at the Jail — including defendants George
Wagner (the Jail’s warden) and Joseph Herman (a caseworker at the Jail) — singled him
out for negative treatment. Anderson says that many Jail employees had been friends
with the victim in Commonwealth v. Williams, and they sought to prevent him from
testifying. Anderson claims that he was served only unappetizing nutraloaf to eat, placed
in a cold cell, denied a blanket and mattress during the day, provided with lighting for
only three hours a day, had his sleep disrupted, and was threatened by guards. A mistrial
was declared in Commonwealth v. Williams before Anderson was required to testify, and
he was returned to SCI-Huntington after less than a month in the Jail.
After proceedings not relevant here, in 2013, Anderson filed an amended
2
complaint against Wagner and Herman under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Anderson alleged that
the defendants, by exposing him to the conditions described above, violated his Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and retaliated against
him in violation of his First Amendment rights. The defendants moved for summary
judgment, and the District Court granted their motion. Anderson then filed a timely
notice of appeal to this Court.
We agree with the District Court’s disposition of Anderson’s Eighth Amendment
claims. In order to establish a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, an inmate must
show (1) a deprivation that is “objectively, sufficiently serious,” such that he was denied
“the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” and (2) a “sufficiently culpable state
of mind” on the part of the defendant official. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834
(1994) (quotation marks omitted). Anderson has failed to make the necessary showing to
survive summary judgment.
First, as the District Court stressed, Anderson has complained that nutraloaf is
“disgusting,” but has not alleged that it is unhealthful or caused him to suffer any side
effects. Therefore, in this case, “a temporary Nutraloaf diet does not deny the minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities, [and] its use [thus] falls short of the threshold
deprivation necessary to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.” LeMaire v.
Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1456 (9th Cir. 1993). Further, while Anderson avers that the light
in his cell was illuminated for just three hours each evening, he has not challenged the
defendants’ evidence that his cell had a window that let in sufficient natural light during
3
the day. See Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021, 1026-27 (3d Cir. 1988). We likewise
agree with the District Court that Anderson was not subjected to cruel and unusual
punishment when his mattress was removed during the day (and returned at night). See
Franklin v. Lockhart, 883 F.2d 654, 654-55, 657 (8th Cir. 1989); see generally Peterkin,
855 F.2d at 1027.
The District Court also correctly granted judgment to the defendants on
Anderson’s claim concerning his cell’s temperature. While he complains that it was cold,
he presented no evidence (or even allegations) establishing the “severity of the cold.”
Dixon v. Godinez, 114 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 1997). The defendants have shown that
the entire prison was cooled during the summer (the period relevant here) by central air
conditioning, that all the cells were the same temperature, and that no other prisoners
complained. Further, Anderson acknowledges that he was given a blanket at night, which
is when he says his cell was the coldest. In these circumstances, Anderson’s conclusory
statement that his cell was cold is insufficient to withstand summary judgment. See
Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., 560 F.3d 156, 161 (3d Cir. 2009); cf.
Corselli v. Coughlin, 842 F.2d 23, 27 (2d Cir. 1988) (reversing summary judgment in
favor of prison officials where the inmate alleged that he was exposed temperatures so
cold that ice formed in the toilet bowl of his cell).1
We will, however, vacate the District Court’s judgment as to Anderson’s
retaliation claim. To establish a claim of retaliation under the First Amendment,
1
Anderson also complained about numerous other conditions; we agree with the District
Court’s analysis of those issues.
4
Anderson must show that (1) the conduct in which he was engaged was constitutionally
protected; (2) he suffered adverse action at the hands of prison officials; and (3) his
constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision to
take the adverse action. Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333-34 (3d Cir. 2001). The
District Court concluded that Anderson’s claim failed because he did not actually testify
in Commonwealth v. Williams, and because he was “treated as any other prisoner serving
a life sentence.” Each of those conclusions is problematic.
First, we have held that an individual has a First Amendment right to respond to a
subpoena and testify in a third party’s case. See Pro v. Donatucci, 81 F.3d 1283, 1290
(3d Cir. 1996). This right extends to prisoners like Anderson. See Cornell v. Woods, 69
F.3d 1383, 1388 (8th Cir. 1995); Franco v. Kelly, 854 F.2d 584, 589 (2d Cir. 1988).
While a mistrial was declared in the trial before Anderson was called to testify, we have
concluded that the First Amendment protects an individual’s “interest in responding to a
subpoena,” even when the individual does not actually testify. Pro, 81 F.3d at 1291; see
also Konits v. Valley Stream Cent. High Sch. Dist., 394 F.3d 121, 125 (2d Cir. 2005).
Thus, accepting the facts as he presented them, Anderson engaged in constitutionally
protected conduct.
Second, while the defendants have claimed that they treated Anderson just like
any other prisoner who is serving a life sentence, he presented evidence to the contrary.
In his affidavit, he stated that he was harassed by guards throughout the night; had his
mattress, pillow, and blanket removed each day; was fed nutraloaf three times a day; and
5
was subjected to various other privations.2 The documents in the record reveal that
inmates of Anderson’s classification — “modified security status” — were not typically
treated this way.
More specifically, in light of his classification, Anderson was supposed to receive,
among other things, “regular meals” (i.e., not solely nutraloaf) and his “mattress all day.”
Supplemental Appendix (SA) 144; see also SA 117 (Warden Wagner’s answers to
interrogatories); SA 150 (Jail’s confinement sheet); SA 162 (Jail’s review log).
Anderson stated, in his affidavit, that he received neither. Further, Anderson asserted that
the guards banged on his cell door and threatened him each night, thus constantly
interrupting his sleep. Moreover, Anderson explicitly linked this treatment to his exercise
of his First Amendment rights, claiming that the guards immediately identified him as a
witness in Commonwealth v. Williams and then repeatedly threatened to assault him if he
testified. See Rauser, 241 F.3d at 334. Thus, at the summary-judgment stage, the
District Court erred in rejecting Anderson’s retaliation claim on the ground that he was
not singled out in any way.3 See generally Boyle v. Cnty. of Allegheny Pa., 139 F.3d
386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998) (“at the summary judgment stage, a court may not weigh the
evidence or make credibility determinations; these tasks are left to the fact-finder”).
2
See generally Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 108 n.7 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that an
affidavit is “about the best that can be expected from [a pro se prisoner] at the summary
judgment phase of the proceedings” (quotation marks, alterations omitted)).
3
We stress that we express no opinion as to the ultimate merit of Anderson’s retaliation
claim or whether it is vulnerable to any defenses (like failure to exhaust under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(a)).
6
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order insofar as it granted
judgment to the defendants on Anderson’s Eighth Amendment claims. We will vacate
the order insofar as it granted judgment to the defendants on Anderson’s retaliation claim,
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
7