Dudash v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs

Opinions of the United
2006 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
2-8-2006
Dudash v. Director OWCP
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 05-3025
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 05-3025
HELEN DUDASH
(Widow of Michael Dudash, Jr.),
Petitioner
v.
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
On a Petition for Review of an Order
of the Benefits Review Board
(No. 04-698 BLA)
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 7, 2006
Before: BARRY, STAPLETON AND GREENBERG, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed February 8, 2006)
OPINION OF THE COURT
PER CURIAM
Helen Dudash seeks review of a decision of the Benefits Review Board (“Board”)
affirming an Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision to deny her survivor’s
benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act (“BLBA”), 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945. Under the
BLBA, Mrs. Dudash is entitled to survivor’s benefits only if her husband’s death was
“due to pneumoconiosis.”1 See 30 U.S.C. § 901(a). Mrs. Dudash bears the burden of
proving this by a preponderance of the evidence. See Dir., OWCP v. Greenwich
Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 277-78 (1994). Mrs. Dudash can sustain her burden by showing
that pneumoconiosis was the cause or a “substantially contributing cause” of her
husband’s death or that the death was caused by complications of pneumoconiosis. See
20 C.F.R. § 718.205(c)(1),(2). Pneumoconiosis is a “substantially contributing cause” of
death if it actually hastens death. Lukosevicz v. Dir., OWCP, 888 F.2d 1001, 1006 (3d
Cir. 1989). The ALJ denied Mrs. Dudash’s claim, determining that the evidence in the
record did not support a finding that Mr. Dudash’s pneumoconiosis was a contributing
cause of his death. Mrs. Dudash appealed to the Board, which affirmed the ALJ’s
decision on April 15, 2005.
We have jurisdiction over this petition for review under section 422(a) of the
BLBA, which incorporates section 21(c) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 921(c). See Shendock v. Dir., OWCP, 893 F.2d 1458,
1459 n.1 (3d Cir. 1990) (en banc). We review the Board’s decision for errors of law as
well as for whether it has adhered to its scope of review. Mancia v. Dir., OWCP, 130
1
Pneumoconiosis, also known as “Black Lung Disease,” is defined as "a chronic
dust disease of the lung and its sequelae, including respiratory and pulmonary
impairments, arising out of coal mine employment." 30 U.S.C. § 902(b).
2
F.3d 579, 584 (3d Cir. 1997). We also review the record to decide whether the ALJ’s
findings are supported by substantial evidence, which is “such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id.Mrs. Dudash’s husband, Michael Dudash, Jr., worked as a coal miner for 40 years
and was diagnosed with pneumoconiosis in connection with this work. Mr. Dudash’s
first living miner claim for BLBA benefits was denied, but he was awarded benefits in
1990. Mr. Dudash died at the age of 78 on July 10, 2000, and Mrs. Dudash subsequently
filed this claim for survivor’s benefits. After her claim was denied by the District
Director, her request for a formal hearing before an ALJ was granted and a hearing was
held on January 13, 2004. At the hearing, both parties presented documentary evidence,
and Mrs. Dudash testified. Mrs. Dudash’s documentary evidence consisted of the
medical opinions and curricula vitae of Drs. Carl Bemiller and Stephen Swain, Mr.
Dudash’s treating physicians during the 10 years preceding his death. Respondent
presented numerous exhibits, including copies of Mr. Dudash’s medical and
hospitalization records dating back to the early 1980's, the death certificate, and a medical
opinion from Dr. Michael Sherman stating that, based on his review of the medical
records, there was no evidence that pneumoconiosis contributed to Mr. Dudash’s death.
None of the three physicians testified at the hearing.
Mrs. Dudash argues that the ALJ erred by failing to accord controlling weight to
the treating physicians’ opinions. Under 20 C.F.R. § 718.104(d), an ALJ is required to
consider the relationship between the miner and any treating physician whose report is in
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the record. In considering this relationship, an ALJ must consider the nature and duration
of the relationship, and the frequency and extent of treatment. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 718.104(d)(1)-(d)(4). Further, an ALJ may give controlling weight to the opinion of a
treating physician in appropriate cases. See id. at § (d)(5). However, such controlling
weight is not automatically given, as the ALJ must also consider “the credibility of the
physician’s opinion in light of its reasoning and documentation, other relevant evidence
and the record as a whole.” See id.
In her decision, the ALJ acknowledged the relationship between Mr. Dudash and
Drs. Bemiller and Swain and considered all of the factors given in § 718.104(d). The
ALJ declined to accord great weight to either doctor’s opinion, however, because she
found the opinions conclusory, insufficiently reasoned, and not well-documented. The
ALJ also found contrary probative evidence in the record which suggested Mr. Dudash’s
long-standing heart problems, rather than his pneumoconiosis, as a possible reason for his
death.
An ALJ must accept the documented opinion of a physician exercising reasoned
medical judgment. Mancia v. Dir., OWCP, 130 F.3d 579, 588-89 (3d Cir. 1997). A
medical opinion need not be expressed in terms of a “reasonable medical certainty” in
order to qualify as a “reasoned medical judgment. See id. at 588. However, a mere
statement of conclusion, without an explanation as to its basis, does not constitute
“reasoned medical judgment.” See Lango v. Dir., OWCP, 104 F.3d 573, 577 (3d Cir.
1997). Dr. Bemiller’s one-page opinion reads, in pertinent part:
4
Mr. Dudash Jr. had a long history of working in the coal
mines for many years. He later became symptomatic with
shortness of breath secondary to Black Lung Disease
(Pulmonary Anthrasilicosis) which also aggravated his
Coronary Artery Atherosclerosis. Obviously the Coal
Workers Pneumoconiosis contributed to his poor health of
many years duration and to his death.
This opinion correctly states the undisputed fact that Mr. Dudash suffered from
pneumoconiosis. However, the opinion provides no explanation for its conclusion that
pneumoconiosis contributed to Mr. Dudash’s death. We agree with the ALJ’s
determination that this opinion is conclusory and is not entitled to controlling weight.
Dr. Swain’s opinion includes more of Mr. Dudash’s medical history but does not
fare any better. The ALJ found this opinion vague as to whether Mr. Dudash’s
pneumoconiosis hastened his death and declined to give it significant weight. The
opinion relates some of Mr. Dudash’s heart problems and notes that he “continued to
have marked dyspnea and difficulty breathing until the time of his death, all of which
were hastened by his severe lung disease.” As noted by the ALJ, the phrasing of this
statement makes it unclear whether the lung disease hastened the dyspnea and breathing
difficulties or hastened the death. Even if read in the latter fashion, however, we agree
with the ALJ that this unsupported conclusory statement fails to qualify as “reasoned
medical judgment.” See Lango, 104 F.3d at 577. While Dr. Swain’s opinion refers to
medical records which could be retrieved, “[i]f there is anything objectively that needs to
be detailed,” it does not cite to particular records supportive of the conclusion that
5
pneumoconiosis contributed to Mr. Dudash’s death. See Respondent’s Supp. App. at 28.
We agree with the Board that the ALJ did not err in declining to give controlling weight
to the opinions of Drs. Bemiller and Swain.
The ALJ credited Dr. Sherman’s opinion over that of Drs. Bemiller and Swain,
finding it well-reasoned and supported by the medical evidence in the record. The ALJ
also determined that Dr. Sherman’s credentials as a Board-certified pulmonologist
entitled his opinion to additional weight. Mrs. Dudash argues that the ALJ erred in
weighing Dr. Sherman’s opinion more heavily than the opinions of Drs. Bemiller and
Swain, asserting, among other things, that Dr. Sherman had never examined her husband.
Mrs. Dudash further claims that Dr. Sherman’s opinion was not any better reasoned or
supported than those of the treating physicians, and that the ALJ erred in finding
sufficient “contrary probative evidence” in the record to counteract the treating
physicians’ opinions. Other than observing that Dr. Sherman’s opinion, on its face,
addresses more of the medical evidence in the record, we decline to compare the various
strengths and weaknesses of the competing opinions, as such comparison is unnecessary
to the resolution of this case. It is the ALJ’s responsibility, as fact finder, to assess
whether a report is sufficiently documented and reasoned. See Jericol Mining Inc. v.
Napier, 301 F.3d 703, 712 (6th Cir. 2002) (evaluation of a physician’s report is essentially
a credibility matter for the fact finder to decide). We see no error in the ALJ’s assessment
of Dr. Sherman’s opinion, but even if we did, such error would be harmless. See
Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. Cooper, 965 F.2d 443, 449 (7th Cir. 1992).
6
Regardless of the weight given to Dr. Sherman’s opinion, Mrs. Dudash failed to carry her
burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that pneumoconiosis either
caused or contributed to her husband’s death. See Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. at 277-
78.
Mrs. Dudash stresses that her husband’s death certificate listed pneumoconiosis as
an underlying cause of death and argues that the ALJ erred by according the death
certificate no weight. See Informal Brief at 5. We have held that death certificates on
their own, without supporting testimony or documentary or physical evidence derived
from an autopsy, do not constitute reliable evidence on the question whether
pneumoconiosis played a role in the death. See Lango, 104 F.3d at 576-77; Mancia, 130
F.3d at 587; Hillibush v. U.S. Dept. Of Labor, 853 F.2d 197, 204 (3d Cir. 1988). Mr.
Dudash’s death certificate lists “Cardiac Arrythmia with Cardiorespiratory Arrest” as the
immediate cause of death and “Cardomyopathy” and “Coal Worker’s Pneumoconiosis” as
underlying causes. The ALJ accorded no weight to the death certificate despite the
inclusion of pneumoconiosis, because no rationale was provided for this inclusion, the
death certificate was not signed by a medical doctor, and no autopsy was performed. As
noted by the ALJ, although the medical records contain numerous references to Mr.
Dudash’s lung conditions, including pneumoconiosis, nothing in those records supports a
conclusion that the pneumoconiosis contributed to or hastened his death. Moreover,
neither the treating physicians’ opinions nor Mrs. Dudash’s informal brief point to any
specific information in the record to support such a conclusion. Given the lack of
7
supporting evidence in the record, we hold that the ALJ did not err in declining to accord
any weight to the death certificate.
After a careful review of the briefs and the record, we hold that the ALJ properly
and thoroughly evaluated all of the relevant evidence in concluding that pneumoconiosis
was not a substantially contributing cause of Mr. Dudash’s death. As the ALJ’s findings
were supported by substantial evidence in the record, we hold that the Board properly
deferred to these findings. Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.
8