Williams v. Wynder

Opinions of the United
2007 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
5-15-2007
Williams v. Wynder
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 05-2682
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"Williams v. Wynder" (2007). 2007 Decisions. Paper 1108.
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 05-2682
____________
KYLE A. WILLIAMS,
Appellant
v.
JAMES WYNDER;
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
D.C. Civil Action No. 05-cv-00892
(Honorable James M. Munley)
____________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 26, 2007
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, FUENTES, and ALARCÓN,* Circuit Judges.
(Filed May 15, 2007)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
ALARCÓN, Circuit Judge.
*
The Honorable Arthur L. Alarcón, Senior Judge of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Kyle A. Williams appeals from the District Court’s order dismissing his pro se
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for failure to exhaust his
state remedies. Mr. Williams’s habeas petition asserted that the Pennsylvania Board of
Probation and Parole (the “Parole Board”) violated his constitutional rights by failing
adequately to notify him that it was revoking his parole, and failing to award him certain
credits for time spent in custody. He argues in this appeal that the District Court
erroneously dismissed his petition on the ground that he failed to seek allowance of
appeal from the Commonwealth Court’s adverse decision to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court. We will affirm because the record shows that he failed to exhaust his state court
remedies.
I
Mr. Williams initially sought administrative review of his claims by filing an
appeal to the Parole Board. The Parole Board denied his appeal on May 26, 2004. He
then filed a Petition for Review with the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court. That court
affirmed the Parole Board in a memorandum opinion filed January 3, 2005. Mr. Williams
did not file a petition for allowance of appeal in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, or seek
any further state court relief.
Mr. Williams then filed his federal habeas corpus petition in the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. On May 19, 2005, before the
Defendants were served with process, the District Court issued an order summarily
dismissing Mr. Williams’s claims under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254
2
Cases in the United States District Courts, for “failure to exhaust state court remedies.”
(Appx. 3a.) The District Court reasoned that “[i]t is clear that Williams has not exhausted
his claims in that he failed to file a petition for allowance of appeal in the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court. Further, there is no indication that such a petition would not be accepted
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.” (Appx. 6a.) Mr. Williams timely appealed from
the District Court’s order to this Court.
II
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued the following order on May 9, 2000:
[W]e hereby recognize that the Superior Court of Pennsylvania reviews
criminal as well as civil appeals. Further, review of a final order of the
Superior Court is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion, and
an appeal to this court will be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor. Pa. R.A.P. 1114. Further, we hereby recognize
that criminal and post-conviction relief litigants have petitioned and do
routinely petition this Court for allowance of appeal upon the Superior
Court’s denial of relief in order to exhaust all available state remedies for
purposes of federal habeas corpus relief.
In recognition of the above, we hereby declare that in all appeals from
criminal convictions or post-conviction relief matters, a litigant shall not be
required to petition for rehearing or allowance of appeal following an
adverse decision by the Superior Court in order to be deemed to have
exhausted all available state remedies respecting a claim of error. When a
claim has been presented to the Superior Court, or to the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, and relief has been denied in a final order, the litigant shall
be deemed to have exhausted all available state remedies for purposes of
federal habeas corpus relief. This Order shall be effective immediately.
In re: Exhaustion of State Remedies in Criminal and Post-Conviction Relief Cases, No.
218 Judicial Administration Docket No. 1 (Pa. May 9, 2000) (“Order 218").
3
This Court stated in Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2004) that “Order
No. 218 renders review from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ‘unavailable’ for purposes
of exhausting state court remedies under § 2254(c).” Id. at 233.
Mr. Williams argues that, under Order 218 and Lambert, he was not required to
seek allowance of appeal from the Commonwealth Court to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court to exhaust his state court remedies. He contends that, “[w]hile this Court has yet to
say specifically that Order No. 218 encompasses decisions of the Commonwealth Court
as well as decisions of the Superior Court relating to criminal convictions or post-
conviction relief appeals to the Superior Court, it is clear that Lambert v. Blackwell . . .
extends Order No. 218 to review of all cases by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.”
(Appellant’s Br. 12.) He further asserts that Rule 1114 of the Pennsylvania Rules of
Appellate Procedure, which forms part of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s rationale in
Order 218, applies equally to orders of the Commonwealth Court and the Superior Court.
Id. at 13. The Attorney General, in an amicus curiae brief,1 argues that Order No. 218
expressly applies only to appeals from the Superior Court that result from criminal
convictions or the denial of post-conviction relief.
“In construing state law, ‘we must determine how the highest court of the State
would decide an issue.’” Warriner v. Stanton, 475 F.3d 497, 505 n.5 (3d Cir. 2007)
1
The Attorney General filed an amicus curiae brief, instead of an Answer Brief,
because the District Court dismissed Mr. Williams’s petition before the Commonwealth
Defendants were served with process.
4
(quoting Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 464-65 (1967)).
Under Pennsylvania law, “the rules of statutory construction apply to regulations as well
as to statutes.” Pa. State Police, Bureau of Liquor Control Enforcement v. Benny Enters.,
Inc., 669 A.2d 1018, 1021 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995) (citing Fraternal Order of Police
Lodge No. 5 v. City of Philadelphia, 590 A.2d 384 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991)). Order 218 is
analogous to a regulation, because the Pennsylvania Constitution empowers the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court “to prescribe general rules governing practice, procedure
and the conduct of all courts . . .” and “to provide for assignment and reassignment of
classes of actions or classes of appeals among the several courts as the needs of justice
shall require . . .,” PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(c), and because “the administrative directives
of [the Pennsylvania Supreme] Court have the full force and effect of ‘rules,’ as described
in Art. V § 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.” See Snyder v. Commonwealth of Pa.,
Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 502 A.2d 1232, 1234 (Pa. 1985)
(concluding that a statutory provision was suspended to the extent it conflicted with a
Pennsylvania Supreme Court administrative directive forbidding court employees from
engaging in partisan political activity). In construing Order 218, therefore, we must look
to the canons and rules of statutory construction applicable under Pennsylvania law.
The Pennsylvania Statutory Construction Act, 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1501 et
seq. (2007), provides that “[t]he object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is
to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.” 1 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 1921(a) (2007). “[A] statute’s plain language generally provides the best
5
indication of legislative intent.” McGrory v. Commonwealth of Pa., Dep’t of Transp.,
915 A.2d 1155, 1158 (Pa. 2007). “We will resort to other considerations to discern
legislative intent only when the words of the statute are not explicit.” Id. (citing 1 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921(c)).
Order 218's plain language encompasses only “adverse decision[s] by the Superior
Court” and “appeals from criminal convictions or post-conviction relief matters.” It does
not mention appeals from the Commonwealth Court, or appeals from decisions regarding
the Parole Board’s computation of imprisonment time or denial of rights in the context of
parole revocation. The Supreme Court’s inclusion of one thing in Order 218 implies the
exclusion of other things not mentioned. See Commonwealth of Pa. v. Ostrosky, 866
A.2d 423, 430 (Pa. Super. 2005), aff’d, 909 A.2d 1224 (Pa. 2006) (“The maxim,
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, ‘establishes the inference that, where certain things
are designated in a statute, all omissions should be understood as exclusions.’” (quoting
Commonwealth of Pa. v. Charles, 411 A.2d 527, 530 (Pa. Super. 1979))). Consequently,
Order 218's plain meaning excludes appeals from decisions, such as the one in this case,
issued by the Commonwealth Court and involving challenges to actions by the Parole
Board.
Mr. Williams argues that “there is no doubt that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
should it be called upon to clarify Order No. 218, would include reviews from the
Commonwealth Court within [the order’s] ambit.” (Appellant’s Br. 13.) As support for
this argument, Mr. Williams states that “[h]istorically, the Superior Court and the
6
Commonwealth Court were a single court” and that “Pa. [Rule of Appellate Procedure]
1114 . . . which . . . is specifically referenced in Order 218, expressly applies to final
orders of the Commonwealth Court as well as the Superior Court.” Id. That argument is
unavailing, however, because neither the origin of the Commonwealth Court nor the
scope of Rule 1114 has any bearing on Order 218's plain meaning.
Mr. Williams’s contention might, alternatively, be construed as an argument that
Order 218's plain meaning should not be followed because it would produce absurd
results given Rule 1114's equal applicability to appeals from “final order[s]” of the
Commonwealth Court and the Superior Court. PA. R.A.P. 1114. See Koken v. Reliance
Ins. Co., 893 A.2d 70, 81 (Pa. 2006) (“[W]hen ascertaining the intent of the General
Assembly . . . we presume that it ‘does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of
execution or unreasonable.’”) Following Order 218's plain meaning would not be absurd
or unreasonable, however, because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reasonably could
have intended to restrict only the number of appeals it receives from Superior Court
decisions regarding criminal convictions and post-conviction relief matters. Indeed, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court expressly stated in Order 218 that “criminal and post-
conviction relief litigants have petitioned and do routinely petition this Court for
allowance of appeal upon the Superior Court’s denial of relief in order to exhaust all
available state remedies for purposes of federal habeas corpus relief.” Order 218 contains
no comparable reference to routine filings of appeals from Commonwealth Court
decisions in matters involving challenges to actions by the Parole Board. Mr. Williams
7
has failed to show that the routineness of the latter category of appeals is equivalent to
that of the former category, so as to render the Supreme Court’s apparent distinction
between the two categories absurd or unreasonable.
Because Order 218 does not apply to appeals from Commonwealth Court
decisions, or decisions in matters involving challenges to Parole Board actions, the
District Court correctly held that Mr. Williams was required to exhaust his available state
remedies by filing a petition for allowance of appeal in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
The time for Mr. Williams to file a petition for allowance of appeal to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has now expired. PA. R.A.P. 1113(a) (30-day time limit
after entry of the order of the Superior Court or Commonwealth Court sought to be
reviewed). Mr. Williams consequently is time-barred under state law from seeking
allocatur to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and his failure to seek allocatur is an
adequate and independent state ground barring federal court review of his claims. See
Bronshtein v. Horn, 404 F.3d 700, 707 (3d Cir. 2005) (a state law ground for a state court
decision, “that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the
judgment[,]” precludes federal habeas court review of questions of federal law decided by
the state court). He has not made a showing of cause or prejudice to excuse the default.
Therefore, we will affirm the decision of the District Court.
8