United States v. Naranjo

Opinions of the United
2007 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
3-29-2007
USA v. Naranjo
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 05-5395
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 05-5395
___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
ADOLFO NARANJO,
Appellant.
________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(Criminal No. 03-CR-00253)
District Court Judge: The Honorable James T. Giles
___________
Argued March 12, 2007
BEFORE: FUENTES, VAN ANTWERPEN, and SILER,* Circuit Judges.
(Filed: March 29, 2007)
Robert Epstein (ARGUED)
Assistant Federal Defender
Elizabeth T. Hey
Assistant Federal Defender
David L. McColgin
Assistant Federal Defender
*
The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, Jr., Senior Judge for the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Maureen Kearney Rowley
Chief Federal Defender
Federal Community Defender Office
Eastern District of Pennsylvania
Suite 540 West – Curtis Center
601 Walnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Counsel for Appellant
David E. Troyer (ARGUED)
Assistant United States Attorney
Robert A. Zauzmer
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief of Appeals
Patrick L. Meehan
United States Attorney
United States Attorney’s Office
Eastern District of Pennsylvania
615 Chestnut Street, Suite 1250
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Counsel for Appellee
_______________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________________
FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
In March 2003, a jury convicted Adolfo Naranjo of attempt to distribute and
possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Naranjo appeals the District Court’s denial
of his motion to suppress statements he made to federal customs agents. For the
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following reasons, we will affirm.
I.
We have previously provided the factual background of this matter and will only
briefly recount the facts and relevant procedural history. See United States v. Naranjo,
426 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2005) (Naranjo I). In March 2003, federal agents detained and
handcuffed Naranjo outside his apartment building after suspecting him of transporting
cocaine. Naranjo consented to a search of his apartment where Agent Michael Rodgers
told him that he was not under arrest but that agents would like to talk to him. Naranjo
agreed to speak and Agent Rodgers took him to an enclosed patio downstairs.
While Naranjo was handcuffed, Agent Rodgers interrogated him at length,
eliciting a number of incriminating statements. Agent Michael Fleener, who had told
Naranjo before any questioning that he did not have to speak to the agents, also asked
some questions during the interrogation. Rodgers eventually heard from a supervisor that
Naranjo could be arrested. After Naranjo returned from a trip to the bathroom, Rodgers
read him his Miranda rights. Naranjo then made more incriminating statements before
being taken to a customs house.
Before trial, Naranjo moved to suppress the statements he made to the agents. The
District Court held a hearing on July 29, 2003, at which the government conceded that the
pre-Miranda statements were inadmissible because Naranjo had been in custody. Two
days later, the parties reconvened, and the District Court denied Naranjo’s motion with
regard to the post-Miranda statements. The Court explained that under the standard
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established in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), Naranjo knowingly and
intelligently waived his Miranda rights and then made statements voluntarily.
While Naranjo’s appeal was pending before this Court, the Supreme Court issued
Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), which addressed the admissibility of post-
Miranda statements given after a suspect has already made incriminating remarks during
pre-Miranda custodial interrogation. Although five Justices in Seibert concluded that the
defendant’s post-Miranda statements must be suppressed, the case did not produce a
majority opinion. As we explained in Naranjo I, lower courts must apply the reasoning of
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence because it “provides the narrowest rationale for resolving
the issues raised by two-step interrogations.” 426 F.3d at 231. Justice Kennedy stated
that “in the infrequent case . . . in which the two-step interrogation technique was used in
a calculated way to undermine the Miranda warning,” the test should be whether
“curative measures are taken before the post-warning statement is made.” Seibert, 542
U.S. at 622. When there is not a “deliberate two-step strategy,” according to Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence, “[t]he admissibility of postwarning statements should continue to
be governed by the principles of Elstad.” Id.
In accordance with Seibert, we remanded to the District Court for determination of
whether Agent Rodgers’ failure to issue Miranda warnings was “an interrogation
technique, ” or instead “was inadvertent or a ‘rookie mistake.’” Naranjo I, 426 F.3d at
232. The District Court held a second suppression hearing, and then denied the motion
to suppress. This appeal followed, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
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review the District Court’s factual findings for clear error and we exercise plenary review
over the application of law to those facts. See United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336
(3d Cir. 2002).
II.
After a second suppression hearing, the District Court concluded that “there was
no deliberate effort by Agent Rodgers or Agent Rodgers in concert with other agents to
trick Mr. Naranjo into making incriminating statements. . . . Miranda warnings were not
timely given because of mistake.” App. 371. This determination was not clearly
erroneous.
Agents Rodgers, Fleener, Tommy Boatman, and James Stever testified at the
second suppression hearing. Agent Rodgers stated that at the time of the interrogation, he
did not believe he had to administer Miranda warnings until Naranjo was placed under
arrest. The District Court credited this testimony, as well as the statements of other
agents that they were not deliberately withholding Miranda warnings. In addition, even
though proper Miranda warnings were not initially administered, the fact that Agents
Rodgers and Fleener told Naranjo at the outset that he did not have to speak to them
suggests that they were not employing a deliberate two-step strategy. See United States
v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1314 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he fact that some warnings were
given strongly evidences that the [question-first] tactic was not being used.”).
We are distressed by the failure of the agents to issue Miranda warnings in a
timely fashion. But the District Court is in the best position to assess whether this failure
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was deliberate. The District Court has held two suppression hearings and has had ample
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the agents and to evaluate the veracity of their
testimony. We believe the Court did not err by concluding that the agents merely made a
mistake.
III.
As noted above, Elstad continues to govern the admissibility of post-Miranda
statements when law enforcement has not deliberately employed a two-step strategy.
Elstad instructs lower courts to determine if the post-Miranda statements were
“knowingly and voluntarily made.” Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309. We believe the District
Court did not err in concluding that Naranjo knowingly waived his Miranda rights and
then made voluntary statements to the agents.
The Elstad Court explained that courts should examine all “the surrounding
circumstances and the entire course of police conduct” in determining voluntariness and
noted that “[t]he fact that a suspect chooses to speak after being informed of his rights is,
of course, highly probative.” Id. at 318. After the first suppression hearing, the District
Court noted that before they interrogated Naranjo, the agents told him that he did not have
to speak to them. The Court concluded that Naranjo understood and acknowledged the
Miranda warnings, and then wanted to make further statements. There is no evidence in
the record that the agents used coercive tactics or referenced Naranjo’s prior
incriminating statements. The District Court’s determination that Naranjo knowingly and
voluntarily waived his Miranda rights is not clearly erroneous.
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IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court properly denied Naranjo’s motion to
suppress statements made after customs agents administered him Miranda warnings.
Accordingly, we will affirm.
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