Zolinda Kiriakidis v. Borough of Vintondale

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 14-2934
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ZOLINDA KIRIAKIDIS; JULIAN BABITZ,
Appellants
v.
BOROUGH OF VINTONDALE; ERIC YACKULICH
_____________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 3-12-cv-00188)
District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson
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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
February 9, 2015
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Before: CHAGARES, VANASKIE, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: April 13, 2015)
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OPINION*
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VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.
Appellants Zolinda Kiriakidis and Julian Babitz appeal from a District Court order
dismissing, with prejudice, their civil-rights action against Appellees Eric Yackulich and
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
does not constitute binding precedent.
the Borough of Vintondale. The District Court concluded that Kiriakidis’s excessive
force claim against Yackulich, a police officer with the Vintondale police department,
was barred by the statute of limitations. The District Court dismissed Appellants’
malicious prosecution claims because the underlying state criminal proceedings had not
terminated in their favor. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
I.
We accept the allegations in the complaint as true and construe those facts in the
light most favorable to the Appellants. See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224,
233 (3d Cir. 2008). On the evening of August 28, 2010, Kiriakidis was driving from a
funeral home back to her house when she noticed Officer Yackulich tailing her in a
marked police car. Officer Yackulich followed for a short distance and then activated his
lights, signaling Kiriakidis to pull over. Kiriakidis stopped her car on the side of the road
in an isolated area a short distance from the center of town. Officer Yackulich then
walked up to the side Kiriakidis’s car and “accused her of improper vehicle operation.”
(App. at 21.)
When Officer Yackulich went back to his police cruiser to check Kiriakidis’s
motor vehicle and driver information, Kiriakidis fled in her car, driving two-tenths of a
mile to a more populated area. She then parked, exited her car, and continued on foot “to
an adjacent building in the hope that her friend . . . Babitz” would be able to help her.
(Id.) Before reaching Babitz’s location, however, she was intercepted by Officer
Yackulich. Once he caught up to her, Officer Yackulich “violently threw [Kiriakidis] to
the ground, which consisted of brick paving, pulled her erect by her shoulders, and [then]
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forcibly threw her against the building, causing severe injuries.” (Id.) Officer Yackulich
then pulled Kiriakidis’s arms behind her back and handcuffed her.
While Officer Yackulich was effectuating this arrest, Babitz approached the scene
to see whether he could offer some assistance. Officer Yackulich responded to Babitz’s
presence by threatening to arrest him. Officer Yackulich then threw Kiriakidis in the
back of his police cruiser and turned off the car’s air conditioning unit. A short time
later, Officer Yackulich drove Kiriakidis to the police station where she underwent drug
and alcohol testing. During this entire period, her arms remained handcuffed behind her
back. At approximately 4:00 AM the next morning, a magisterial district judge held a
bail hearing and released Kiriakidis on her own recognisance.
Both Kiriakidis and Babitz were charged criminally with several counts relating to
the incident.1 After a jury trial, Kiriakidis was acquitted of all charges that were
submitted to the jury. However, the magisterial district judge convicted her of
disregarding a traffic lane, 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3309(1), and disorderly conduct by
making unreasonable noise, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5503(a)(2).
Babitz was charged with seven counts, including one count of failing to disperse,
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5502, and six counts of disorderly conduct. He was convicted
by a magisterial district judge of disorderly conduct for creating unreasonable noise in
1
The nine charges against Kiriakidis were as follows: two counts of fleeing or
attempting to elude an officer, 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3733(a), two counts of
disorderly conduct, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5503(a)(2) & (a)(4), one count of reckless
driving, 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3736(a), one count of disregarding a traffic lane, id. §
3309(1), one count of failing to drive at a safe speed, id. § 3361, one count of failing to
stop at a stop sign, id. § 3323(b), and one count of resisting arrest, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
§ 5104.
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violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5503(a)(2) and for using obscene language or
gestures in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5503(a)(3). The other charges against
Babitz were dismissed. Neither Appellant appealed the convictions.
On August 29, 2012, Appellants filed a three-count civil-rights complaint in the
Western District of Pennsylvania. The original complaint asserted an excessive force
claim on behalf of Kiriakidis and a malicious prosecution claim on behalf of Babitz
against Officer Yackulich. The original complaint also asserted a claim against the
Borough of Vintondale Police Department under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978). Appellees moved to dismiss on February 19, 2013. The District
Court granted that motion on September 26, 2013, finding that (a) Kiriakidis’s excessive
force claim was barred by the statute of limitations; (b) Babitz’s malicious prosecution
claim was deficient because he had not alleged the crimes with which he had been
charged or that the criminal prosecution had terminated in his favor; and (c) the Borough
of Vintondale Police Department was not a legal entity capable of being sued. The
dismissal order granted Appellants leave to file an amended complaint.
On October 16, 2013, Appellants filed an amended complaint. The amended
complaint repeated Kiriakidis’s excessive force claim and Babitz’s malicious prosecution
claim, naming as defendants Officer Yackulich and the Borough of Vintondale. The
amended complaint also added a malicious prosecution claim on behalf of Kiriakidis
against Officer Yackulich and the Borough of Vintondale. Appellees filed a second
motion to dismiss on November 5, 2013. By memorandum and order dated May 6, 2014,
the District Court granted Appellees’ motion and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
4
The District Court concluded that Kiriakidis’s excessive force claim was untimely, and
that the malicious prosecution claims failed because the underlying criminal actions had
not terminated in either Appellant’s favor. Appellants timely appealed.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the District Court’s dismissal
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Wiest v. Lynch, 710 F.3d 121, 128 (3d Cir. 2013). We review
the denial of Appellants’ request for leave to amend for abuse of discretion. Krantz v.
Prudential Inves. Fund Mgmt. LLC, 305 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 2002).
III
Kiriakidis argues that her excessive force claim was timely. Kiriakidis’s § 1983
claim is governed by Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury
actions, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524. Bougher v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74, 78
(3d Cir. 1989). While the appropriate limitations period is established by state law,
federal law controls when her claim arose. Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120,
126 (3d Cir. 1998).
Kiriakidis was allegedly assaulted by Officer Yackulich on the evening of August
28, 2010. She filed this action on August 29, 2012, one day after the limitations expired.
While acknowledging that the physical assault occurred on August 28, 2010, Kiriakidis
asserts that her excessive force claim includes being handcuffed during the early morning
hours or August 29th, rendering the filing of her action timely. The amended complaint,
however, does not aver that the handcuffs were excessively tight, or that they caused her
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substantial pain or injury. Furthermore, the amended complaint only avers that she
sought medical treatment for injuries she sustained when Officer Yackulich allegedly
“threw her to the ground and against the wall.” (App. at 22.) We conclude that
Kiriakidis’s claim accrued and was known to her on the evening of August 28, 2010.
Thus, her complaint was filed one day late and is barred by the statute of limitations. See
Monkelis v. Mobay Chem., 827 F.2d 937, 938 (3d Cir. 1987) (“[T]he statute of limitations
expires on the anniversary date of the event, not the day following.”).
We next address Appellants’ contention that they each stated plausible claims for
malicious prosecution. To prevail on a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, Appellants
must show, among other things, that “the criminal proceeding ended in [their] favor.”
DiBella v. Borough of Beachwood, 407 F.3d 599, 601 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Estate of
Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003)). We have held that “the favorable
termination of some but not all individual charges does not necessarily establish the
favorable termination of the criminal proceeding as a whole.” Kossler v. Crisanti, 564
F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2009). Where, as here, Appellants were simultaneously acquitted
of some charges and convicted of others, we must determine whether “the offenses as
stated in the statute and the underlying facts of the case . . . indicate that the judgment as
a whole” reflects the Appellants’ innocence.2 Id.2
Appellants urge us to adopt the dissenting view expressed in Kossler, 564 F.3d at
196-99 (Aldisert, J., dissenting), and apply the Second Circuit’s approach in Janetka v.
Dabe, 892 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1989). However, Janetka “does not conflict with our
analysis here,” because the plaintiff in that case “was charged with two distinct offenses
involving distinct allegations”—disorderly conduct directed toward a bystander and
resisting arrest directed toward a police officer. Kossler, 564 F.3d at 190 (quoting
6
Turning first to Kiriakidis, of the original nine counts, she was convicted of
disregarding a traffic lane and disorderly conduct by making unreasonable noise. Given
the factual context contained in the complaint and the disposition of the charges, we
cannot conclude that the judgment as a whole reflects Kiriakidis’s innocence. The traffic
lane conviction indicates Officer Yackulich had reason to initiate the traffic stop. The
disorderly conduct conviction establishes that Kiriakidis intended “to cause public
inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creat[e] a risk thereof” by making
“unreasonable noise.” 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5503(a)(2). Thus, there was at the
inception of the encounter conduct by Kirakidis that supported a finding that she had
violated the laws of Pennsylvania. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that
Kiriakidis could show favorable termination of the underlying criminal proceedings.
Kossler, 564 F.3d at 188.
Babitz’s argument fares no better. In the amended complaint, Babitz alleges that
he approached Officer Yackulich to “offer some assistance [to] perhaps remedy the
situation” during the arrest. (App. at 24.) However, when these facts are taken together
with his criminal convictions, we conclude the judgment does not indicate Babitz’s
innocence. Indeed, the disorderly conduct convictions show that Babitz intended “to
cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof” by
engaging in various types of prohibited conduct. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5503. Under
Janetka, 892 F.2d at 190). The criminal counts in the case at hand are more analogous to
those set forth in Kossler because they implicate sufficiently similar conduct, stemming
entirely from a traffic stop and subsequent exchange between Appellants and Officer
Yackulich. We conclude that Kossler applies and is binding.
7
Kossler, Babitz has failed to demonstrate that the criminal judgment, as a whole,
confirms his innocence. 564 F.3d at 188. Accordingly, we agree with the District Court
that dismissal of the malicious prosecution claims was warranted.
Because we conclude that there was no constitutional violation, Appellants cannot
sustain a claim against the Borough of Vintondale under Monell. For the same reason,
we need not reach the question of qualified immunity.
Finally, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Appellants’ request for leave to file a second amended complaint. Appellants were on
notice of the original complaint’s deficiencies, but failed to remedy these shortcomings in
the amended complaint. Under these circumstances, the District Court acted well within
its discretion in not accepting a third complaint in this action. See Krantz, 305 F.3d at
145.
IV.
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the District Court’s May 6, 2014
order.
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