Randall v. Martinez

Opinions of the United
2008 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
7-15-2008
Randall v. Martinez
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 08-1458
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DLD-244 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 08-1458
___________
EDWIN RANDALL,
Appellant
v.
R. MARTINEZ, WARDEN
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 07-cv-02151)
District Judge: Honorable John E. Jones, III
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
June 26, 2008
Before: BARRY, CHAGARES and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed July 15, 2008 )
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Edwin Randall appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his petition for a writ
of habeas corpus. The Government has filed a motion for summary affirmance. Because
Randall’s appeal does not present a substantial question, we will grant the Government’s
motion and summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4;
I.O.P. 10.6.
In a petition submitted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Randall alleged that prison
disciplinary proceedings violated his due process rights. When he filed his petition in
November 2007, the prison had imposed sanctions including transfer to a higher-security
facility,1 loss of 40 days’ good conduct time, and temporary revocation of certain
privileges. However, by the time the Government filed its response in January 2008, for
reasons not clear from the record, the warden directed expungement of the incident report
and restoration of Randall’s good conduct time and other privileges. Consequently, the
Government argued that Randall’s petition was moot. In support, the Government
submitted the declaration of L. Cunningham, supervisory attorney for the Allenwood
facility, which stated that prison staff had “confirmed they had generated the
documentation necessary to restore inmate Randall’s Good Conduct Time as well as the
privileges which were affected by this incident report.”
The District Court accepted the Government’s argument and dismissed the petition
as moot by order entered January 30, 2008. In doing so, the District Court failed to
consider Randall’s traverse, which was entered on the docket that same day. Randall
1
Randall was transferred from the minimum security facility in Bennettsville, South
Carolina, to the Allenwood low security facility in White Deer, Pennsylvania.
2
therefore filed a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Federal Rule of Procedure 59(e)
requesting the District Court to consider his traverse, which raised arguments opposing
the Government’s mootness argument. Specifically, although he conceded that
expungement provided partial relief, he argued that the controversy remained live because
the prison failed to remove two sanctions: the transfer to the higher-security facility and
the deduction of 40 days’ good conduct time. Although it found his Rule 59(e) motion
untimely, the District Court addressed Randall’s motion on its merits, granted it only for
the limited purpose of considering the traverse, and denied it in all other respects.2
We review the District Court’s denial of habeas corpus relief de novo, Reinert v.
Larkins, 379 F.3d 76, 83 n.2 (3d Cir. 2004), and its factual findings for clear error. See,
e.g., Ruggiano v. Reish, 307 F.3d 121, 126 (3d Cir. 2002). As Randall concedes, his
petition is moot to the extent it sought expungement of the disciplinary charges because
he has received that relief. In addition, a habeas corpus petition is not the proper vehicle
for Randall’s challenge to his disciplinary transfer to a higher-security facility. His claim
does not present a challenge to the fact or length of his conviction, see Leamer v. Fauver,
288 F.3d 532, 542 (3d Cir. 2002), or challenge the manner of its execution. Cf. Woodall
v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2005) (indicating that while certain
types of transfers may give rise to habeas claims, “a garden variety prison transfer” would
2
Randall did not separately appeal the District Court’s decision on the Rule 59(e)
motion. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii). We therefore reference the District Court’s
Rule 59(e) order for informational purposes only.
3
not). We therefore focus on Randall’s claim concerning the prison’s alleged failure to
restore his 40 days’ good conduct time.
This claim presents a challenge to the length of Randall’s confinement and is
therefore cognizable in a petition for habeas corpus. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475, 487 (1973). However, Randall’s evidence that the prison failed to restore his good
conduct time 3 failed to refute the Government’s evidence that the prison generated the
paperwork necessary to restore the good conduct time.4 Indeed, because all parties agree
that Randall is entitled to and will be credited for the 40 days’ good conduct time, we
surmise that to the extent that any “controversy” remains, it appears to be attributable to
some sort of administrative delay in updating Randall’s records.5
Accordingly, Randall’s appeal does not present a substantial question. We
therefore grant the Government’s motion and summarily affirm the judgment of the
3
In support of his Rule 59(e) motion, Randall presented what appears to be a
computer-generated report entitled “Sentence Monitoring Computation Data as of 1-22-
2008” containing the phrase “COMP UPDATED BY DSCC TO REFLECT DIS-40
DAYS.” The District Court found that “[t]he meaning of this phrase is not clear from the
face of the document.”
4
Randall’s argument that the good conduct time had not yet been credited to him is not
necessarily inconsistent with the Government’s position that the paperwork had been
completed so he will eventually be credited with the good conduct time. The Government
did not submit evidence demonstrating that the good conduct time had yet been actually
restored.
5
In support of his appeal, Randall has submitted what appears to be an updated
computer report dated March 13, 2008, which reflects the notation “COMP UPDATED
BY DSCC TO REFLECT DIS-40 DAYS.” Without further explanation, we, like the
District Court, cannot be confident of the meaning of this phrase.
4
District Court dismissing the petition. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. We are
confident that, if they have not already done so, prison officials will ensure that the
relevant records are corrected to reflect an accurate computation of Randall’s sentence.
Nevertheless, we make clear that our disposition is without prejudice to Randall pursuing
an appropriate habeas corpus petition in the District Court if, for some reason, the issue
has not been addressed within 180 days of the date of this opinion.