Dyche v. Bonney

Opinions of the United
2008 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
5-7-2008
Dyche v. Bonney
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 07-1061
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008
Recommended Citation
"Dyche v. Bonney" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 1258.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/1258
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2008 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 07-1061
CHARLES DYCHE,
Appellant
v.
LINDA BONNEY;
JOHN 1 DOE; JOHN 2 DOE;
JEFFREY MILLER; BARBARA CHRISTIE
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
D.C. Civil Action No. 04-cv-1833
(Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo)
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 17, 2008
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, BARRY and ROTH, Circuit Judges.
(Filed May 7, 2008)
OPINION OF THE COURT
SCIRICA, Chief Judge.
Appellant Charles Dyche applied to become a Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”)
trooper on May 21, 2003. As part of the application process, he admitted prior illegal but
uncharged sexual conduct with a minor. He asserts the PSP promised him that his
disclosure of this incident, which would normally disqualify an applicant, would not
impede his admission to the Pennsylvania State Police Academy (“Academy”). Dyche
was subsequently admitted to the Academy, which the PSP asserts was an oversight by its
review panel. On February 27, 2004, after seventeen weeks in training at the Academy,
the PSP rescinded Dyche’s acceptance into the training program based on the incident he
disclosed.
Dyche filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting violations of his constitutional
due process and associational rights by Linda Bonney, Director of Human Resources for
the PSP. Following discovery, Dyche moved to amend his complaint to add the PSP, PSP
Commissioner Jeffrey Miller, and PSP Chief Counsel Barbara Christie as defendants and
to assert a breach of contract claim against all the defendants. On November 22, 2005,
the District Court granted his motion in part, allowing him to add Miller and Christie, but
denied his motion to add the PSP or to assert a breach of contract claim against any of the
defendants. The court subsequently denied Dyche’s Motion for Reconsideration on
December 21, 2005, and denied leave to file a second amended complaint on March 13,
2006. On December 7, 2006, the court granted Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment on all of Dyche’s claims, holding Dyche failed to establish a protected property
interest to support his due process claim. This appeal followed.
As the District Court correctly concluded, there is no evidence of an explicit
employment contract between Dyche and the PSP. Even so, Dyche contends his claim
2
for breach of contract is proper as a claim of promissory estoppel. He asserts he relied to
his detriment on the PSP’s representation that he would not be disqualified from
admission to the Academy for disclosing his prior sexual misconduct. But Dyche’s
promissory estoppel theory is invalid under Pennsylvania law. See Paul v. Lankenau
Hosp., 569 A.2d 346, 348 (Pa. 1990) (“An [at-will] employee may be discharged with
[or] without cause, and our law does not prohibit firing an employee for relying on an
employer’s promise.”).1
1
Dyche contends Paul is inapposite because the court referenced the doctrine of
equitable estoppel, rather than promissory estoppel, in reaching its holding. He contends
Travers v. Cameron County Sch. Dist., 544 A.2d 547 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988), which held
that allegations of detrimental reliance on promises of employment were sufficient to
state a cause of action based on promissory estoppel, is instead applicable here. Dyche’s
reliance on Travers–a lower court opinion decided prior to Paul–is misplaced. The
holding in Paul was not narrowly confined to equitable estoppel; rather, Paul rejected the
theory that detrimental reliance in general could be an exception to the employment at-
will doctrine. The court there explained that, in Pennsylvania, “as a general rule, there is
no common law cause of action against an employer for termination of an at-will
employment relationship.” Paul, 569 A.2d at 348 (citation omitted). And, as the court
further explained, “[e]xceptions to this rule have been recognized in only the most limited
of circumstances, where discharges of at-will employees would threaten clear mandates
of public policy.” Id. Applying these principles, the court held that Pennsylvania law
“does not prohibit firing an employee for relying on an employer’s promise.” Id.
Moreover, Dyche’s contention that Paul’s estoppel holding should be read narrowly is
undercut by the fact that, in Pennsylvania, the doctrines of equitable and promissory
estoppel are closely related. As the court in Travers explained, “[p]romissory estoppel is
an outgrowth of equitable estoppel,” with equitable estoppel functioning as an affirmative
defense under Pennsylvania law while “promissory estoppel may serve as an independent
cause of action.” Travers, 544 A.3d at 550 (citations omitted). Accordingly, under the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Paul, Dyche’s promissory estoppel theory is
not a legally cognizable cause of action in Pennsylvania.
3
Even if Dyche’s promissory estoppel claim were not legally barred, it would be
untenable on the facts he has alleged. Dyche has not asserted the PSP made any
representation or promise that, if relied on, could have substituted for an employment
contract. Rather, Dyche asserts only that he was promised his prior sexual conduct with a
minor would not be held against him for the purpose of his admission to the Academy.
But once admitted, all PSP candidates serve an 18-month probationary period, during
which time they have no expectation of continued employment and are therefore
employed at-will.2 See Blanding v. Pennsylvania State Police, 12 F.3d 1303, 1307 (3d
Cir. 1993); Cooley v. Pennsylvania Hous. Fin. Agency, 830 F.2d 469, 471 (3d Cir. 1987)
(absent a showing that state law has created a legitimate expectation of continued
employment, a public employee is presumed to be an at-will employee); Pipkin v.
Pennsylvania State Police, 693 A.2d 190, 192-93 (Pa. 1997). Dyche has not alleged any
promise with respect to an alteration of the statutory requirement that he serve a full
probationary period upon admission to the Academy.
Even assuming his factual assertions to be true, Dyche was promised only the
opportunity to become an at-will employee. Even if promissory estoppel could give
2
Section 205(f) of the Administrative Code of 1929, as amended, 71 P.S. § 65(f),
provides:
All new cadets and troopers shall serve a probationary period of eighteen
months from date of original enlistment, during which time they may be
dismissed by the Commissioner for violations of rules and regulations,
incompetency, and inefficiency without action of a court martial board or
the right of appeal to a civil court.
4
contractual force to this promise, Dyche could not have reasonably relied upon it as a
guarantee of ongoing employment; as an at-will employee, his admission to the Academy
could have been rescinded, as it was here, “for any reason, or for no reason at all.”
Rutherfoord v. Presbyterian-University Hosp., 612 A.2d 500, 503 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Accordingly, the District Court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Dyche leave to amend. See Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360,
373 (3d Cir. 2000) (“We review the District Court’s decision to deny . . . [a] request to
amend for abuse of discretion.”). Amending his complaint to add a breach of contract
claim against the Defendants would have been futile. See Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co., 352 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2004) (district court has discretion to deny leave to
amend if it is apparent from the record that the amendment would be futile).
Dyche also contends his procedural due process rights were violated by the
rescindment of his admission to the Academy without notice or an opportunity to be
heard. But it is a fundamental rule that the Fourteenth Amendment’s procedural
protection of property only safeguards interests that a person has already acquired in
specific benefits. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1972). Probationary
troopers and cadets of the Pennsylvania State Police do not have a property interest in
their continued employment. E.g., Blanding, 12 F.3d at 1307; Graham v. Pennsylvania
State Police, 634 A.2d 849, 851 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993).
Dyche, relying on the same facts he asserts in support of promissory estoppel,
contends he nevertheless had a “legitimate expectation of continued employment” based
5
on the circumstances of his application. But again, Dyche asserts only a “mutually
explicit understanding,” based on representations by PSP officials, that his prior sexual
conduct with a minor would not disqualify him from admission to the Academy. Dyche
does not contend the PSP made any promise or representation that his probationary status
would have been altered after his admission to the Academy. Nor does he offer any facts
supporting the existence of an agreement to alter his probationary status upon admission,
as such a promise by PSP officials would have conflicted with the statutorily-mandated
18-month probationary period for cadets. And as a probationary PSP candidate, Dyche
“does not have an expectation of continued employment until he successfully completes
his initial eighteen month period of employment.” Pipkin, 693 A.2d at 193. Accordingly,
the District Court properly granted summary judgment on Dyche’s procedural due
process claim. See Robb v. City of Philadelphia, 733 F.2d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 1984) (“[T]o
have a property interest in a benefit that is protected by procedural due process, ‘a person
clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a
unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to
it.’” (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577)).
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the orders of the District Court.
6