Joseph Aruanno v. Allen

ALD-284 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-2260
___________
JOSEPH ARUANNO,
Appellant
v.
SGT. ALLEN; PAUL LAGANA; OFFICER LAROSA;
OFFICER SINGLETARY; OFFICER SAJACK;
OFFICER CIFELLI; GEORGE HAYMAN; DR. MERRILL MAIN
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 09-cv-01250)
District Judge: Honorable Stanley R. Chesler
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
September 13, 2012
Before: SLOVITER, FISHER and WEIS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed September 21, 2012)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM.
Pro se Appellant Joseph Aruanno appeals from the order of the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissing his civil rights action for failure
to state a claim. We will affirm the District Court‟s judgment.
The District Court‟s opinions entered on June 1, 2011 and April 10, 2012 contain
recitals of the allegations of Aruanno‟s complaint and amended complaints under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, from which the District Court quoted extensively. It suffices for us to
note the following. Aruanno is confined at the Special Treatment Unit (STU) in Avenel,
New Jersey, and he filed his complaint without prepayment of fees, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915. He named as defendants eight staff members at the STU, alleging that they
violated his constitutional rights in connection with a March 2007 incident involving a
sign posted in the yard. Aruanno alleged that they used excessive force and conducted an
illegal strip search when they placed him in “lock up,” even after they saw videotape
evidence showing that the guilty party was not Aruanno. Aruanno also alleged that he
was denied access to his legal papers, to his attorney, and to the courts during his
placement in isolation. Further, he contended that the Defendants retaliated against him
because of his litigation activities. He alleged that he suffered physical and mental harm
as a result of the Defendants‟ actions.
Having granted Aruanno leave to proceed under the in forma pauperis statute, the
District Court screened the initial complaint and subsequent amended complaints, filed
2
with leave of the court, for dismissal for failure to state a claim under section
1915(e)(2)(B). With each complaint, the District Court dismissed the claims with an
explanation of the deficiencies of the allegations. For example, in its opinion entered
May 5, 2010, the District Court noted that Aruanno had failed to plead facts showing
unconstitutional conduct by any Defendant, and that, with one exception, Aruanno had
failed to even mention any of the Defendants by name within the description of his
claims. Later, by opinion and order entered June 1, 2011, the District Court dismissed
with prejudice several of the claims and Defendants in Aruanno‟s amended complaint.
Specifically, the District Court concluded that Aruanno‟s allegations did not rise to the
level of constitutional violations concerning segregated confinement, strip search,
retaliatory conduct, and denial of access to the courts. The District Court also dismissed
Defendants Lagana, Hayman, and Main, because Aruanno failed to assert any specific
allegations of wrongdoing by them. Lastly, the District Court dismissed without
prejudice Defendants Allen, LaRosa, Singletary, Sajack, and Cefelli, noting Aruanno‟s
non-specific allegation that “all” of them (insofar as they were identified as officers in the
initial complaint) were responsible for placing him in solitary confinement and assaulting
him.
The District Court granted Aruanno a final opportunity to assert an excessive force
claim against one or all of the officers, suggesting that he file a self-contained section
1983 complaint form to list each defendant and describe the events with specificity.
3
Aruanno then filed a document titled “Final Amended Complaint,” along with a motion
for appointment of counsel. On April 13, 2012, the District Court evaluated the new
submission and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted and denied the counsel motion, concluding that granting further leave to
amend would be futile, and that appointment of counsel was unwarranted.
Aruanno filed a notice of appeal, which contains argument in support of his
appeal. The parties were advised that the appeal would be submitted for possible
summary action. Aruanno has filed a response in support of his appeal.
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise
plenary review over the District Court‟s sua sponte dismissal under section
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). The legal
standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim under section
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to a motion filed
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See id. “To survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
„state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‟” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
Upon careful consideration, we agree with the District Court‟s assessment of
Aruanno‟s complaint and amended complaints, and we will affirm for substantially the
same reasons presented in the District Court‟s opinions. Aruanno did not allege facts
4
showing that his placement in lock up was atypical or a significant hardship under Sandin
v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). Nor did he allege facts that the strip search was so
outside the scope of reasonable search policy that it would rise to the level of a Fourth
Amendment violation. See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1517
(2012). Moreover, his allegations fall short of the standards for stating claims of
retaliation and of denial of access to the courts. See Carter v. McGrady, 292 F.3d 152,
157-58 (3d Cir. 2002) (retaliation); Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d
Cir. 2008) (citing Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002)) (access to courts).
We will briefly address the issues Aruanno presents on appeal.
Aruanno protests that the District Court incorrectly dismissed the supervisory
defendants because he did not intend to advance a respondeat superior liability theory.
Rather, he insists that all of the defendants were personally involved in the events
surrounding the March 2007 incident. However, nowhere does Aruanno allege any
specific examples of any conduct--unconstitutional or otherwise--by Defendants Lagana,
Hayman, and Main. Aside from naming them individually as defendants, Aruanno does
not further mention them in his filings. Aruanno also argues that the District Court
ignored his claim that he was denied medical attention, but his allegations do not identify
any particular injury, any particular defendant, or any particular conduct that would
amount to such a claim. Indeed, in his response in support of his appeal, Aruanno
acknowledges that he “cannot remember which one of the countless assaults was each
5
defendant most involved with.” Response at 2. Based on the record, we agree that the
allegations in the complaint and amended complaints fail to meet the Iqbal standard.
Aruanno seems to argue in his notice of appeal that the District Court should have
read his amended complaints in conjunction with his previous submissions. However,
the District Court advised Aruanno before he filed his final amended complaint that his
previously dismissed complaints do not serve any function in the case, and that the
second amended complaint should name each defendant and state facts concerning each
defendant. Regardless, we note that none of the allegations in the complaint or amended
complaints sufficiently states a claim, whether viewed within their respective documents
or in combination with each other.
We discern no error in the District Court‟s dismissal of Aruanno‟s case for failure
to state a claim. Accordingly, because this appeal presents no substantial question, we
will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court. See Third Circuit LAR 27.4
and I.O.P. 10.6.
6