Lopez v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
No. 11-1591
JOSE MIGUEL LOPEZ,
Appellant
v.
CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL SERVICES, INC.; LOUIS TRIPOLI;
WILLIAM ANDRADE; JAMES NEAL, M.D.;
JAMES RUMAN, R.N.; ROCK WELCH; ABU AHSAN, M.D.;
DEVON BROWN; CHARLES LEONE; WARDEN SOUTHERN STATE
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY; WARDEN OF NEW JERSEY STATE PRISON;
ST. FRANCIS HOSPITAL; JOHN DOES #1-10
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D. C. No. 1-04-cv-02155)
District Judge: Honorable Noel L. Hillman
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on April 24, 2012
Before: SLOVITER and ROTH, Circuit Judges
and POLLAK*, District Judge
(Opinion filed: September 26, 2012)
*Honorable Louis H. Pollak, Senior Judge of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sat by designation. Judge Pollak died on May 8,
2012; this opinion is filed by a quorum of the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46 and the
Third Circuit I.O.P. 12.1(b).
OPINION
ROTH, Circuit Judge:
This appeal relates to claims brought by a New Jersey state prisoner pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment. The prisoner alleged that prison officials and employees of a
company to which the state had delegated responsibility for arranging its inmates’
medical care violated this right by exhibiting deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs stemming from his Hepatitis C (HCV) infection. The District Court
rejected these claims and granted summary judgment to these defendants. We will affirm
that judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
Jose Lopez (Lopez) filed this action in 2004. At that time, he was incarcerated at
Bayside Prison, a state prison in New Jersey, and had been incarcerated in various other
state prisons since 1983. Between 1983 and 1996, the New Jersey Department of
Corrections (NJDOC) arranged itself for the provision of healthcare to its inmates. When
Lopez suffered a head injury in 1992 that required medical attention, the NJDOC had him
treated at St. Francis Hospital. A spinal tap was performed at that time, which showed
that Lopez had HCV. St. Francis, however, neither informed him of this diagnosis nor
provided him a copy of its medical records pertaining to him.
2
In 1996, NJDOC entered into a contract with Correctional Medical Services, Inc.
(CMS), pursuant to which that company would assume responsibility for arranging
medical care for state inmates. From this time until 2002, Lopez required medical
attention only occasionally, for routine testing and minor treatment. Then, on May 9,
2002, he started vomiting blood and was taken to the emergency room at South Jersey
Hospital. Doctors there found that he had serious esophageal varices that were causing
the bleeding, and they also suspected that he had HCV. He was first transferred to St.
Francis for additional treatment and then discharged back to the prison infirmary on May
13th, where he was monitored until May 29th. On July 9th, Lopez returned to the
infirmary because he had a nose bleed. He was at that point referred for HCV screening.
He tested positive for HCV on July 23rd and learned of his condition that day. He
eventually began a course of drug therapy, but because of poor results and side effects,
that treatment was ultimately discontinued.
On May 7, 2004, Lopez filed a lawsuit asserting a number of claims relating to the
diagnosis and treatment of his HCV. Among the defendants in this suit were various
NJDOC officials sued in their individual and official capacities (NJDOC defendants),
including Devon Brown, Commissioner of the NJDOC; Charles Leone, Administrator of
Bayside Prison; Ronald Cathel, Administrator of Southern State Correctional Facility;
and Roy Hendricks, Administrator of New Jersey State Prison. Also named as
defendants were CMS and a number of its employees (CMS defendants), including
William Andrade, James J. Neal, James Ruman, Rock Welch, and Abu Ahsan. Lopez’s
claims against these two groups of defendants included one brought under 42 U.S.C. §
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1983 alleging that they had violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment through failing to screen for HCV, failing to treat HCV, and
failing to timely inform him that he had HCV. The District Court granted summary
judgment to the NJDOC and CMS defendants on those claims. 1 That judgment, as it
pertains to the claims brought against the NJDOC defendants, in their individual
capacities, and the CMS defendants, is now presented for our review. 2
II. DISCUSSION
The District Court had federal question jurisdiction over Lopez’s § 1983 claims
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Our review of the District Court’s grant of summary judgment is plenary. Blackhawk v.
Pennsylvania, 381 F.3d 202, 206 (3d Cir. 2004). Our task is thus identical to that
performed by the District Court: to determine whether there is any genuine issue of
material fact in relation to Lopez’s Eighth Amendment claim and whether the NJDOC
and CMS defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 (1986). A fact is material if, under the governing substantive
1
Lopez also brought a § 1983 claim against St. Francis alleging a violation of his Eighth
Amendment rights. In addition, he brought claims against all defendants alleging
violations of his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection, violations of his rights
under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and common law
fraud. Finally, he brought claims against just St. Francis and the CMS defendants
alleging negligence, medical malpractice, and intentional and negligent infliction of
emotional distress. The common law claims against St. Francis were resolved through
settlement, and the defendants obtained summary judgment on all others. None of these
claims is before us on appeal.
2
On September 1, 2008, Lopez died from complications of liver disease. The
administrator of his estate, his son, also named Jose Lopez (Plaintiff), substituted as the
plaintiff in this action, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1), and continues in that capacity.
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law, a dispute about it might affect the outcome of the suit; there is a genuine issue as to
it if there is evidence in the record from which a reasonable jury could find in the
nonmoving party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1996).
Finally, we note that we are free to affirm the District Court’s judgment on grounds
different from those upon which it relied. In re Mushroom Transp. Co., 382 F.3d 325,
344 (3d Cir. 2004).
Plaintiff is correct that the Eighth Amendment requires that prisoners receive
access to basic medical treatment. Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).
In order to show a violation of Lopez’s right to such treatment, however, Plaintiff must
identify “acts or omissions [on the part of the defendants] sufficiently harmful to
evidence deliberate indifference to [Lopez’s] serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A defendant exhibits such deliberate indifference if he “knows
of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Natale v. Camden Cnty.
Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Mere medical
malpractice, negligence, and courses of treatment inconsistent with the desires of the
prisoner, though, do not constitute deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.
Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d. Cir. 2004). Instead, we have found deliberate
indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs only where a prison official knows of a
prisoner’s need for medical treatment but intentionally refuses to provide it, delays
necessary medical treatment for a non-medical reason, or prevents a prisoner from
receiving needed medical treatment. Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197. A deliberate indifference
claim can also be made out against a supervisor, which requires showing that “(1) [the
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supervisor’s policies] created an unreasonable risk of the Eighth Amendment injury; (2)
the supervisor was aware that the unreasonable risk was created; (3) the supervisor was
indifferent to that risk; and (4) the injury resulted from the policy [].” Beers-Capitol v.
Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 134 (3d. Cir. 2001).
A. NJDOC Defendants
We find that the NJDOC defendants were entitled to summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim. These defendants can only be held liable under
§ 1983 for a deprivation of a constitutional right if they had some “personal involvement”
in it. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). Plaintiff presents no
evidence that any of the named NJDOC defendants had such personal involvement in the
alleged unconstitutional failures to adequately diagnose, treat, and inform Lopez of his
HCV. With respect to defendant Roy Hendricks, the only connection to Lopez is his
service as Administrator of New Jersey State Prison, where Lopez was incarcerated
between 1983 and 1996. Hendricks, however, did not assume that role until 1998, well
after Lopez’s departure; he thus could not possibly have had any personal involvement in
any actions, omissions, or policies that violated Lopez’s Eighth Amendment rights.
Defendant Ronald Cathel’s only connection to Lopez is similar – he began serving as
Administrator of Southern State Correctional Facility two years after Lopez’s
imprisonment there ended, and he therefore also could not have had any personal
involvement in the alleged deprivation of Lopez’s Eighth Amendment rights. Defendant
Devon Brown became Commissioner of the NJDOC in 2002, while Lopez was a state
inmate and just months before he received his HCV diagnosis, and defendant Charles
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Leone likewise became Administrator of Bayside Prison in 2002, while Lopez was a
prisoner there. There is no evidence in the record, however, indicating that either of these
men were personally involved – through acts, omissions, or policies – in the allegedly
deficient diagnosis and treatment of Lopez’s HCV. They, too, therefore cannot be held
liable for violating Lopez’s Eighth Amendment rights.
B. CMS Defendants
We find that the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to the CMS
defendants was also appropriate. There is no evidence that defendants William Andrade,
James J. Neal, James Ruman, or Rock Welch ever had any personal involvement with
Lopez’s actual medical care. Though defendant Abu Ahsan did participate in Lopez’s
medical care, this involvement began only after Lopez learned of his HCV and was
receiving treatment for it, and is thus irrelevant to Plaintiff’s claims. As a result, these
defendants cannot be held liable for actually failing to screen, treat, or inform Lopez of
his HCV. Plaintiff can succeed in his claims against them only if he can show that they
were responsible for some policy that resulted in Lopez’s injury. Because CMS cannot
be held responsible for the acts of its employees under a theory of respondeat superior in
a § 1983 action, it too can only be held liable on the basis of some policy it had that
caused the alleged violation of Lopez’s Eighth Amendment rights. See Natale, 318 F.3d
at 583-84.
Plaintiff alleges that CMS had policies not to screen or treat inmates for HCV and
not to inform inmates that were known to have HCV of their diagnoses, all in order to
avoid the costs of testing and treatment. With respect to an alleged policy not to screen
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for HCV, however, the record shows that, actually, thousands of inmates were tested for
the infection in the years at issue. Though Plaintiff objects to CMS’s having a policy of
screening only inmates who presented with both symptoms of HCV and evidence of
HCV as the cause rather than an alternate policy under which all inmates with risk factors
for an infection would be screened, that choice, as a medical judgment, cannot serve as
the basis of a deliberate indifference claim. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107. To support his
next allegation that CMS had a policy of denying appropriate treatment to inmates that it
knew to be infected with HCV, Plaintiff relies on a “fact sheet” allegedly distributed in
1998 by Louis Tripoli, a CMS official. Plaintiff claims that this document was
distributed to “discourage the overtreatment of HCV” and that it advocated for allocating
resources to the treatment of other diseases rather than to the treatment of HCV. This
document does not appear in the record. Even if it did, though, it would not sustain
Plaintiff’s argument because there is no evidence that Tripoli’s suggestions were ever
translated into CMS policy. Finally, Plaintiff claims that a CMS policy of not informing
inmates with HCV of their condition is evidenced by the fact that, in 2002, it was
allegedly discovered that many inmates were unaware that their medical records
indicated that they had HCV. There is no evidence, however, of a CMS policy
specifically designed to bring about this result, and we therefore reject Plaintiff’s
argument.
We thus find that there is no evidence to support Plaintiff’s claim that CMS had
policies to deny prison inmates testing and treatment for HCV and to further intentionally
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keep infected inmates uninformed of their HCV status. As a result, Plaintiff cannot
prevail on his Eighth Amendment claims against any of the CMS defendants.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 3
3
Plaintiff also contends that the District Court erred in denying his motion for
reconsideration. This motion, filed 174 days after the District Court granted summary
judgment to all defendants on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims, was untimely, and
we therefore reject that argument. See D.N.J. L. Civ. R. 7.1(i).
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