United States v. Derrick Clemons

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 10-4454
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
DERRICK STEVEN CLEMONS,
Appellant
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No 2-10-cr-00028-001)
District Judge: Honorable Arthur J. Schwab
Argued on January 12, 2012
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, FUENTES, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges
(Filed: September 26, 2012)
Elisa A. Long
Lisa B. Freeland [ARGUED]
Office of Federal Public Defender
1001 Liberty Avenue - #1500
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
Counsel for Appellant
Rebecca R. Haywood [ARGUED]
David J. Hickton
Laura S. Irwin
Office of the United States Attorney
700 Grant Street - #4000
Pittsburgh, PA 15129
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Counsel for Appellee
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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McKEE, Chief Judge.
Derrick Clemons appeals his criminal conviction for possession with the intent to
distribute five grams or more of crack cocaine. He argues that the district court erred in
denying his motion to suppress physical evidence, and in refusing to retroactively apply
the provisions of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (“FSA”), and that the court erred in
denying counsel’s motion that the court disqualify itself from hearing his case. For the
reasons expressed below, we will affirm the denial of the motion to suppress and reverse
the ruling on the FSA claim. We need not consider the claim that the district judge
abused his discretion in refusing to disqualify himself from the proceedings.
I. Background
Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we assume familiarity
with the facts and procedural history. We note only that prior to sentencing, Clemons
asked the district court to retroactively apply the provisions of the FSA. The court
refused and sentenced Clemons to a sixty-month term of imprisonment followed by a
five-year term of supervised release. This appeal followed.
II. Discussion
A. Motion to Suppress
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Clemons challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress the
evidence that was obtained through a strip search while he was in custody. After he was
arrested and taken into custody pursuant to an outstanding warrant, police observed a
large bulge under his pants and they then conducted a visual inspection of his anal and
genital areas. They had information that, approximately five years earlier, Clemons had
concealed controlled substances near his genitals. The visual inspection revealed packets
of suspected controlled substances between his penis and scrotum. He now argues this
was a strip search that was impermissible under the circumstances.
However, we need not reach the question of whether the police officers properly
conducted a “strip search” under the Fourth Amendment. Even if we assume arguendo
that the search was unconstitutional, the evidence is admissible under the doctrine of
inevitable discovery. See United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 245 (3d Cir. 2011). The
inevitable discovery doctrine “considers what would have happened in the absence of the
initial search.” United States v. Herrold, 962 F.2d 1131, 1140 (3d Cir. 1992). Here, the
large plastic baggie containing drugs secured to Clemons’ genital area would have been
found during the routine intake process that is conducted before anyone is admitted to a
detention facility.
As we noted at the outset, Clemons was arrested on an outstanding arrest warrant.
He was clearly going to be placed in a detention facility of some kind pending a bail
determination, and he does not argue otherwise. It cannot seriously be argued that, under
those circumstances, he would not have been placed in routine intake procedures that
would have revealed that a baggie was secured between his penis and scrotum. Common
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sense suggests that that would have aroused his jailers’ curiosity and that they would
have thought that just a wee bit peculiar—thus prompting further inquiry. That inquiry
would have certainly disclosed the drugs. We therefore conclude that the district court
did not err in admitting the drugs.
B. Sentencing
To its credit, and in the finest tradition of representing the Government, the
Assistant United States Attorney here has conceded that the district court erred by failing
to conclude that the FSA was applicable in this case. See Appellee Br. at 39. Following
the implementation of the FSA, the threshold for a mandatory sentence increased to 28
grams of crack cocaine. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii). Because Clemons possessed
8.5 grams of crack cocaine, the mandatory minimum no longer applied to him.
The only dispute as to the FSA claim is whether this Court should remand for
resentencing. A sentence calculated using an erroneous Guidelines range generally
requires reversal, unless the miscalculation is harmless. United States v. Langford, 516
F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir. 2008). The Government contends that no remand is necessary
because the failure to apply the FSA constituted harmless error. We cannot agree.
Unless we can conclude that the district court would have imposed the same
sentence using the correct Guidelines range, we must remand for resentencing. Id. at
215-16. The 60-month sentence imposed here falls within both the incorrect Guidelines
range calculated using the mandatory minimum and the correct Guidelines range of 51 to
63 months. Thus, we cannot be sure that the district court would have imposed the same
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sentence had it concluded that the FSA did apply. Where, as here, a sentence falls within
both an incorrectly calculated range, and a correctly calculated range, we have no way of
knowing if the trial court would have imposed the same number of months if it had
started with the correct Guideline calculation. Accordingly, we will remand the case for
resentencing.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons expressed above we will affirm the denial of the motion to
suppress and vacate the sentence imposed. The case is remanded for resentencing limited
to one sentencing issue addressed herein. See United States v. Salinas-Cortez, 660 F.3d
695, 698 (3d Cir. 2001). Inasmuch as the district court has agreed to allow a different
judge to resentence if we ordered a remand, see United States v. Cunningham, No. 07-
0298 (W.D. Pa. Jul. 31, 2012) (order continuing disqualification), the case will be
reassigned to a different judge for resentencing.
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