Peter Abels v. Dish Network Service

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 12-1291
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PETER ABELS
Appellant
v.
DISH NETWORK SERVICE, LLC
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 2:10-cv-01550)
District Judge: Honorable Terrence F. McVerry
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
December 11, 2012
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., NYGAARD and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
(Filed: December 12, 2012 )
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge.
Peter A. Abels (“Abels”) filed suit against DISH Network Service, LLC (“DISH”)
alleging age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. The District Court granted DISH’s
motion for summary judgment, and Abels now appeals from that decision. For the
reasons that follow, we will affirm.
I.
Abels was hired by DISH in June of 2000, when he was forty-two years old, to
work as a Field Service Specialist in DISH’s East Pittsburgh location. In 2002, at the
urging of Warehouse Manager Brian Manns (“Manns”), Abels transferred to work in the
warehouse as an Inventory Specialist. Manns was Abels’ immediate supervisor, and
Manns was in turn supervised by the General Manager Paul Pevornik (“Pevornik”). In
2002, at the age of forty-four, Abels was promoted from Inventory Specialist to Senior
Inventory Specialist. In 2003, when Abels was forty-five, DISH implemented a
Reduction in Force (“RIF”), which affected Inventory Specialists. During the RIF, Dish
retained its two oldest inventory specialists, including Abels, and terminated the
youngest. From 2003, when he was age forty-five, until 2008, when he was age fifty-
one, Abels received positive employment evaluations and annual raises.
While employed by DISH, Abels frequently complained about coworkers smoking
too close to the warehouse door. Though smoking does not make Abels physically ill, it
upset him that coworkers were violating the company’s smoke free policy. In response to
Abels’ numerous complaints, DISH created a designated smoking area, sent emails
reminding employees to use the designated smoking area, issued the same reminders
during meetings, and reminded employees caught smoking outside of the designated area
to only smoke within the designated area. DISH also placed a “NO SMOKING” sign
outside the warehouse door, purchased a receptacle for cigarette butts, and placed it away
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from the warehouse door. This was principally done to accommodate Abels, though he
asserts these actions accomplished nothing, and he continued to complain about the
smoking issue.
In 2006, Abels got in an argument with a Quality Assurance Specialist who
walked into the warehouse with a cigarette. During the argument, Abels yelled at the
Specialist, called him names, and used profanity. 1
Lynne Shawley, the Human Resources Representative for several DISH locations,
including East Pittsburgh, had received numerous complaints from other employees
regarding Abels’ poor attitude and his hostile, belligerent, and gruff demeanor. Though
Abels argues that Shawley failed to document these complaints, he admits that sometime
in the month preceding his termination, Shawley met with him to discuss the complaints.
Additionally, as a result of personal interactions with Abels, Shawley found that Abels
exhibited a disgruntled and hostile attitude and that he had difficulty moving beyond past
perceived wrongs.
On February 26, 2009, Abels left the premises in the middle of his shift without
permission. Abels claims he went to Pevornik’s office to complain that his computer
access had been limited, and that Installations Manager Frank Grubbs (“Grubbs”) was
with Pevornik and witnessed the meeting. Abels asserts Pevornik “lied to [his] face”
about the computer issue, and that Abels then began to feel sick to his stomach. Abels
alleges that at this point he announced he was sick and that he was going home for the
1
Abels was written up for his conduct, but refused to sign the Written Warning because
he found it unjust that he was written up while someone who had violated the smoke free
policy did not receive a warning.
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day. He claims that on his way out of the warehouse, he ran into his immediate
supervisor Manns, informed Manns he was sick and going home early, and that Manns
responded, “okay, see you tomorrow.” Abels also claims he told David Stone (“Stone”),
a coworker, he was going home sick. Abels concedes he never sought permission to
leave early from Pevornik or Manns, and he never received permission from Pevornik. 2
Grubbs does not remember this meeting, and while Pevornik remembers the
meeting, he asserts that Abels only complained about employees smoking. Pevornik
claims he left his office to investigate Abels’ smoking allegations, and when he returned,
Abels had gone.
Manns stated he crossed paths with Abels as he was entering the building and
Abels was leaving. He described their brief conversation as follows:
I’m like “Hey, what’s going on?” [Abels] says, “I’m outta
here.” I said, “Well, what’s up?” He goes, “I’m sick from
smoking. I’m going home.” He goes, “They’re out back.
They’re smoking again.” I said, “Well, come on in and sit
down and let’s talk about it.” He said, “I already talked to
[Pevornik].”
Manns did not discuss the matter further because Pevornik was Mann’s supervisor, and
he did not believe it necessary to delve into a matter already settled by his supervisor.
Shawley testified that Pevornik informed her Abels had left without permission
because he was angry about the smoking situation. Shawley spoke with Manns about the
2
Abels does not argue that Manns gave him permission to leave early when he allegedly
said “okay see you tomorrow.” It is apparent that Manns did not give permission for two
reasons. First, Abels did not ask for permission from Manns to leave early, so the alleged
“see you tomorrow” was not in response to a request. Second, Manns testified he wanted
to talk further with Abels about the issue before he left, but Abels declined, saying he had
already met with Pevornik.
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incident after Pevornik notified her, and Manns told her Abels had said, “I’m outta here”
before he departed, and that Abels had not mentioned anything about being sick.
Stone remembered that Abels told him he was leaving work early, but could not
recall if Abels had told him he was leaving because he was sick.
Shawley recommended that DISH treat Abels’ conduct as a voluntary resignation.
In reaching this decision, she relied on her prior conversations with Abels, the frequent
complaints she had received about Abels, the information provided her by Pevornik and
Manns regarding Abels’ angry departure in the middle of his shift, and her experience in
human resources. Manns was assigned the task of informing Abels that DISH was
treating his conduct as a voluntary resignation; Shawley told Manns what to tell Abels,
and Pevornik instructed Manns to follow Shawley’s script. Manns did so.
Abels filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), which issued a Notice of Right to Sue letter on August 23, 2010.
On November 22, 2010, Abels filed a complaint in the federal District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania, alleging that DISH had discriminated against him on
the basis of age, in violation of the ADEA. On September 30, 2011, DISH moved for
summary judgment. On December 15, 2011, a Magistrate Judge filed a Report and
Recommendation, recommending that DISH’s motion be granted. On January 30, 2012,
the District Court issued an order granting DISH’s motion for summary judgment and
adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge as the opinion of the
District Court, and Abels timely appealed.
II.
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The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we exercise
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We apply plenary review to an appeal from a
district court’s grant of summary judgment. Jacobs Constructors, Inc. v. NPS Energy
Servs., Inc., 264 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2001). Summary judgment shall be granted if
“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “In making this determination, we must
consider the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”
Jacobs Constructors, Inc., 264 F.3d at 369 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A fact is material if it “could affect the outcome of the
proceeding, and a dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is sufficient to
permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Roth v. Nofalco
LLC, 651 F.3d 367, 373 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
A. Legal Framework for ADEA Claims
The District Court analyzed the motion for summary judgment under the analysis
set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under the
McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff bears the burdens of persuasion and
production to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. 3 Smith v. City of
Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 689 (3d Cir. 2009). After the plaintiff satisfies this
3
A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADEA if he
provides proof that: 1) the plaintiff was forty years of age or older; 2) that the plaintiff
suffered an adverse employment action; 3) that the plaintiff was qualified for the job; and
4) that the plaintiff was replaced by someone who was sufficiently younger than plaintiff
to support an inference of discriminatory animus. Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d
684, 689 (3d Cir. 2009).
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requirement, the burden of production, but not persuasion, shifts to the defendant to
provide evidence of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment
action. Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108 (3d Cir. 1997). If the
defendant provides this evidence, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate
that the defendant’s justification was a pretext for discriminatory animus. City of
Allentown, 589 F.3d at 691. The plaintiff always has the burden of persuasion. Id.
The plaintiff may demonstrate that the defendant’s legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason is pretextual by submitting evidence that allows a fact finder to either 1) disbelieve
or discredit the employer’s justification; or 2) believe discrimination was more likely than
not a “but for” cause of the adverse employment action. Fuentes v. Perksie, 32 F.3d 759,
764 (3d Cir. 1994); see also Keller, 130 F.3d at 1108 (applying Fuentes in ADEA
context). Regardless of the method, the plaintiff’s evidence must allow a reasonable jury
to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that age discrimination was a “but for” cause
for the adverse employment action. Gross v. FBL Financial Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167,
177-78 (2009); City of Allentown, 589 F.3d at 691.
Abels argues on appeal that the District Court erred in finding that Abels did not
discredit DISH’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for its decision to treat Abels’
conduct as a voluntary resignation.
B. Application to Current Case
Abels attempted to meet his burden at step three of the McDonnell Douglas
framework by discrediting DISH’s explanation for its adverse employment action, under
the first prong of Fuentes, and he claims the District Court erred in holding he did not
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sustain his burden. 4 As support, Abels notes he testified that he had informed his
superiors that he was sick and had to leave, and that none of DISH’s witnesses
contradicted him. Abels claims the District Court erred in finding this did not sufficiently
discredit DISH’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for discharging him.
To discredit an employer’s proffered justification under the first prong of Fuentes
the non-moving plaintiff must demonstrate such weaknesses,
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or
contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons
for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find
them unworthy of credence, . . . , and hence infer that the
employer did not act for [the asserted] non-discriminatory
reasons.
Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765 (emphasis in original) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). In this matter, DISH considered the following in deciding to treat Abels’
conduct as a voluntary resignation: his angry departure in the middle of his shift without
permission, his hostile and belligerent demeanor, and the numerous complaints from his
coworkers about him. Abels must provide evidence that will “allow a factfinder to
reasonably infer that each of [DISH’s] proffered non-discriminatory reasons . . . was
either a post hoc fabrication or otherwise did not actually motivate the employment
action . . . .” Id. at 764 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted). While Abels
need not discredit each reason articulated, he must “cast substantial doubt on a fair
number of them” so that “the factfinder’s rejection of some of the defendant’s proffered
reasons may impede the employer’s credibility seriously enough so that a factfinder may
4
The parties concede, for purposes of this motion, that Abels made out his prima facie
case. In addition, Abels does not argue DISH did not satisfy its burden to produce
evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.
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rationally disbelieve the remaining proffered reasons. . . .” Id. at 764 n.7. Abels claims
that none of DISH’s witnesses contradicted his assertion that he informed several
supervisors and a coworker that he was going home sick. Even if this were true, it is
irrelevant for three reasons.
1. It is immaterial whether Abels told any supervisors he was sick
Whether Abels told his supervisors that he was sick is not a material fact because
it does not “affect the outcome of the proceeding.” Roth, 651 F.3d at 373. Abels’ health
was not the basis for DISH’s action; DISH treated Abels as having voluntarily resigned
because, in part, he left work early without permission. Therefore, the lack of
permission to leave work early is the material fact, about which Abels must demonstrate
a “genuine dispute.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). There is no such dispute regarding this fact.
Abels admits he did not request permission to leave early from either Pevornik or Manns;
he informed them he was leaving, and did not await a response. Abels also concedes that
Pevornik did not give him permission to leave early. The fact that Abels told his
supervisors that he was sick, if true, does not create a genuine issue as to whether he left
mid-shift without permission. 5
2. Abels has not shown DISH’s decision was motivated by age-based discrimination
Abels must show that age-based discrimination was a “but-for” cause of this
decision; he “cannot simply show that the employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken,
5
Abels attempts to cast doubt regarding the issue of permission by arguing that Shawley
and Pevornik said employees who were ill could leave without permission. A reading of
the deposition transcripts to which Abels cites, however, reveals that is not what either of
them said. Pevornik testified that managerial approval was needed before an employee
could leave mid-shift.
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since the factual dispute at issue is whether the discriminatory animus motivated the
employer, not whether the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent.” Fuentes,
32 F.3d at 765; see also Gross, 557 U.S. at 176-78 (plaintiff must show age-based
discriminatory animus is a “but-for” cause of adverse employment action). “‘The
question is not whether the employer made the best, or even a sound, business decision; it
is whether the real reason is [discrimination].’” Keller, 130 F.3d at 1109 (quoting Carson
v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 159 (7th Cir. 1996)).
The evidence shows that Abels was terminated after Shawley made the
recommendation to treat Abels’ conduct as a voluntary resignation and Pevornik accepted
that recommendation. Pevornik informed Shawley that Abels was angry and disgruntled
and had left in the middle of his shift. Shawley then spoke with Manns about the
incident, who told her that Abels had only said “I’m outta here” before he left. As a
result, both Shawley and Pevornik believed that Abels had left work angrily that day,
without permission, due to the smoking situation, not illness. For purposes of the ADEA,
it is irrelevant if they were mistaken in that belief. Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765; see also
Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 332 (3d Cir. 1995) (“We do not sit
as a super-personnel department that reexamines an entity’s business decisions. . . . no
matter how mistaken the firm’s managers, the ADEA does not interfere.”) (citation
omitted). Even if Shawley and Pevornik had misinterpreted the reasons for Abels’
leaving, that does not provide evidence that the true motivation behind their decision was
age-based discrimination. Nor does it change the fact that they correctly determined
Abels had left without permission, which was one of the bases for their decision.
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3. Abels does not discredit the other factors that went into DISH’s decision
Aside from Abels’ unsanctioned departure from the premises, DISH cites two
other factors it considered in deciding to treat Abels’ conduct as a voluntary resignation:
his hostile demeanor at work, and the numerous complaints Shawley had received from
other employees about him. Abels did not provide sufficient evidence to discredit these
considerations. He attempted to challenge Shawley’s allegation of coworker complaints
by noting that Shawley did not record any of these complaints. However, Abels concedes
Shawley called a meeting with him sometime prior to February 26, 2009 to discuss these
complaints, which indicates they are not a “post hoc fabrication . . . that is, . . . a pretext.”
Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764. Similarly, Abels has not offered any evidence to discredit
Shawley’s determinations, based on her own interactions with Abels, that he had a hostile
and belligerent attitude in the workplace. Though Abels need not “cast doubt on each
proffered reason in a vacuum,” he has not “manage[d] to cast substantial doubt on a fair
number of them,” such that “a factfinder may rationally disbelieve the remaining
proffered reasons.” Id. at 764, n.7.
Abels has established, at most, a dispute as to a non-material fact: whether he told
his supervisors he was sick. The only material fact regarding his leaving work early is
whether he received permission to do so, and it is undisputed he did not. Abels failed to
provide any evidence that DISH’s interpretation of his conduct was based on age
discrimination, and he similarly failed to rebut or discredit the other factors that went into
DISH’s decision to terminate him. Looking at the record in the light most favorable to
Abels, he did not satisfy his burden to establish that DISH’s legitimate nondiscriminatory
11
reasons for discharge were pretextual and that age was a “but for” cause of the adverse
employment action.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order granting
DISH’s motion for summary judgment.
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