Zeffie Surgick v. Acquanetta Cirella

DLD-084 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 12-3475
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ZEFFIE NETIA SURGICK; CORDELIA JOHNSON
v.
ACQUANETTA CIRELLA; ROSE SURGICK;
K. HOVNANIAN ENTERPRISES, INC.,
C/O ACQUANETTA CIRELLA [IN THE MATTER
OF JAMES LESLIE SURGICK (DECEASED)];
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
Zeffie Surgick,
Appellant
__________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civ. No. 09-cv-03807)
District Judge: Noel L. Hillman
__________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
January 10, 2013
Before: AMBRO, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 14, 2013)
_________________
OPINION
_________________
PER CURIAM
Appellant Zeffie Surgick and Cordelia Johnson, now deceased, brought suit pro se
against Acquanetta Cirella, Rose Surgick, K. Hovnanian Enterprises, Inc., and the
Internal Revenue Service (“the Service”) in the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey after Surgick unsuccessfully sought information directly from the
Service, see 26 U.S.C. § 6103(e). Surgick and Johnson claimed that the defendants
denied them access to tax records and other information relating to the estate of their
father, James Leslie Surgick, and thereby violated their First Amendment and statutory
rights to freedom of information. In addition, they alleged that Cirella and Rose Surgick,
in exercising power of attorney over the estate, conspired to defraud them by concealing
the value of the estate, in violation of New Jersey law. 1
In an order filed on June 15, 2010, the District Court granted K. Hovnanian’s
motion to dismiss and advised Surgick and Johnson to amend their complaint with
respect to the Service. K. Hovnanian had argued, and the District Court agreed, that, as a
private corporation, it was not subject to the Freedom of Information or Privacy Acts, and
it had no legal obligation to the plaintiffs to disclose its tax records.
In August, 2010, Surgick and Johnson filed an amended complaint, alleging that
the Service violated the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) by withholding
information pertaining to James Leslie Surgick and his estate, and his investment
interests. In a June 19, 2011 Opinion, the District Court recognized that dismissal of the
amended complaint should probably be granted to the extent that the plaintiffs sought
disclosure from the Service of K. Hovnanian’s tax information, but the court was
concerned about FOIA’s segregation requirement. Additionally, the District Court
recognized that representations made by the Service that its officials had conducted a
reasonable investigation for the documents requested; discovered that most of those
1
Zeffie Surgick, Cordelia Johnson, Rose Surgick and Acquanetta Cirella are four of
James Leslie Surgick’s 12 children.
2
documents were either destroyed or did not exist; and had provided the documents it did
have, should be presented in a motion for summary judgment.
In August, 2011, the Service moved for summary judgment, Fed. R. Civ. Pro.
56(a), arguing that the plaintiffs did not have a valid FOIA claim regarding the tax
documents of James Leslie Surgick and his estate, and that it was entitled to summary
judgment regarding the request for the tax return information for K. Hovnanian because
K. Hovnanian had not consented to disclosure and because its tax records were exempt
from disclosure. Cirella and Rose Surgick filed a motion to dismiss the amended
complaint for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction.
In an order entered on March 29, 2012, the District Court granted summary
judgment to the Service. After a careful review of the specific information requested and
the Service’s declarations and exhibits regarding its investigation and actions, and the
response in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, the District Court
determined that there was no triable issue with respect to whether the Service was
improperly withholding information from the plaintiffs. In a thorough opinion, the
District Court concluded that the Service provided reasonable and sufficiently detailed
declarations of two Disclosure Specialists, and that those declarations established that all
files likely to contain responsive materials were searched. Officials had followed up on
the results of the searches by working with the Federal Records Center to locate any
responsive documents, and the Service had provided the plaintiffs with the only
responsive documents that were located. The Service had also properly advised the
plaintiffs that the majority of the requests sought records which were destroyed in
accordance with the Service’s record retention schedule, were nonexistent, or were never
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filed with the Service. In addition, the District Court determined that summary judgment
was proper on the plaintiffs’ requests regarding K. Hovnanian's tax information. The
plaintiffs had not obtained K. Hovnanian’s consent to disclosure, and FOIA’s segregation
requirement did not apply because the documents sought were fully exempt from
disclosure and did not contain any non-exempt information that the Service could
segregate and disclose. In the margin, the court concluded that there was no need for a
“Vaughn index.” See Surgick v. Cirella, 2012 WL 1067923 (D.N.J. March 29, 2012).
Because the FOIA claim was dismissed, and there thus was no longer a federal
question, the District Court, in addition, sua sponte declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ state law claims and dismissed them without prejudice, 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). However, because the plaintiffs were proceeding pro se, the District
Court gave them one final opportunity to amend the complaint to allege a basis for
diversity jurisdiction over defendants Cirella and Rose Zurgick.
Surgick and Cordelia Johnson’s daughter Charlotte Surgick responded by filing an
amended complaint, again claiming that Cirella and Rose Surgick denied them their
rightful inheritance. 2 In an order entered on April 27, 2012, the District Court noted that
ninety days had passed since the court was notified of Cordelia’s death, and the issue
whether Charlotte could be substituted under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 25(a)(1) had not been
properly addressed in a substitution motion. Accordingly, the court dismissed Cordelia’s
claims. 3 The District Court then signaled its intention to dismiss Surgick’s amended
2
Cordelia Surgick died in November, 2011.
3
Rule 25(a)(1) provides: “If a party dies and the claim is not extinguished, the court may
order substitution of the proper party. A motion for substitution may be made by any
party or by the decedent’s successor or representative. If the motion is not made within
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complaint against Cirella and Rose Surgick on the basis of the probate exception to
federal court jurisdiction, see generally Three Keys Ltd. v. SR Utility Holding Co., 540
F.3d 220 (3d Cir. 2008). Surgick was given one more extension of twenty days in which
to properly plead a basis for federal court jurisdiction.
Surgick, in response, moved to withdraw her amended complaint against Cirella
and Rose Surgick; she also filed a notice of appeal on May 14, 2012, seeking review of
the District Court’s March 29, 2012 order granting summary judgment to the Service.
We dismissed the appeal on July 12, 2012 as premature, see C.A. No. 12-2409, because
Cirella and Rose Surgick remained parties to the action and because the order appealed
had not been certified by the District Court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 54(b). In an
order entered on July 19, 2012, the District Court granted the motion to withdraw the
amended complaint and finally dismissed the claims against Cirella and Rose Surgick,
thereby bringing the case to a close. Surgick had sixty days from the date of this order in
which to file a timely notice of appeal, see Fed. R. App. Pro. 4(a)(1)(B) (authorizing 60-
day appeal period when United States is party). No notice of appeal was filed by
September 17, 2012. Instead, she filed a notice of appeal on October 16, 2012.
Meanwhile, on August 28, 2012, Surgick filed a petition for panel rehearing in our
court in her jurisdictionally defective appeal, see C.A. No. 12-2409, which we denied.
But she also mailed a copy of her rehearing petition to the District Court, where it was
treated as a notice of appeal and filed on August 30, 2012. It was forwarded to this
Court, resulting in the instant appeal. Our Clerk granted Surgick leave to appeal in forma
pauperis and advised her that the appeal was subject to summary dismissal under 28
90 days after service of a statement noting the death, the action by or against the decedent
must be dismissed.”
5
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or summary affirmance under Third Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P.
10.6.
The Service has moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and K.
Hovnanian Enterprises has submitted a letter joining in that motion. The Service argues
that the notice of appeal filed on October 16, 2012 was not timely filed under appellate
Rule 4, and the petition for rehearing which the Clerk of the District Court treated as a
notice of appeal, although timely filed under Rule 4, should not be treated as a notice of
appeal. In support, the Service argues that Surgick, although appearing pro se, is not an
unsophisticated litigant. When the jurisdictional defect in the appeal docketed at C.A.
No. 12-2409 was called to her attention, for example, she moved to withdraw the
amended complaint against Cirella and Rose Surgick. Moreover, Surgick knows the
proper format for a notice of appeal, having previously filed one. Surgick has filed a
motion to strike, in which she argues, in effect, that we should exercise jurisdiction in the
instant appeal.
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c) provides that a notice of appeal specify
the party taking the appeal, designate the order being appealed, and name the court to
which the appeal is taken. Fed. R. App. Pro. 3(c)(1)(A)-(C). “Form 1 in the Appendix of
Forms is a suggested notice of appeal.” See id. at Rule 3(c)(5). Without a doubt,
Surgick’s petition for panel rehearing does not conform to Form 1, but if a document
filed within the time specified by Rule 4 gives the notice required by Rule 3, it is
effective as a notice of appeal. Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248 (1992). The
requirements of Rule 3 are to be construed liberally, but “Rule 3’s dictates are
jurisdictional in nature, and their satisfaction is a prerequisite to appellate review.” Id. In
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Smith, the Supreme Court held that an inmate’s informal brief, submitted in response to a
briefing order, could qualify as a notice of appeal; the case was remanded to the appeals
court.
Not surprisingly, Surgick’s petition for panel rehearing which was filed on the
District Court docket on August 30, 2012 as a notice of appeal references on page 1
Surgick’s existing appeal to our Court (without identifying the specific court of appeals
docket number), and indicates an intent to have review of the District Court’s order of
March 29, 2012. On the second page of the petition, Surgick notes that her case became
appealable upon entry of the District Court’s July 19, 2012 order dismissing the
remaining claims against Cirella and Rose Surgick, and she notes that she “now” appeals
the order of the District Court denying her claim against the Service for disclosure of
records. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Rule 3(c)(1) is satisfied, and that
we have jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We will summarily affirm the District Court’s order granting summary judgment
in favor of the Service and against Zeffie Surgick. Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and
I.O.P. 10.6, we may summarily dispose of an appeal when it clearly appears that no
substantial question is presented by the appeal. Summary judgment is appropriate where
the moving party shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322 (1986). Although the initial burden is on the moving party to show the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact, the burden on the moving party may be discharged by
showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. See
id. at 325. Thus, to withstand a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the
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nonmoving party must identify specific facts and affirmative evidence that contradict that
which is offered by the moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
257 (1986). A party opposing summary judgment must do more than just rest upon mere
allegations. See Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2001).
A District Court may order the production of documents pursuant to FOIA, 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B), where (1) the requested documents are agency records; (2) the
records have been withheld by the agency; and (3) the withholding was improper. See
Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 644 F.2d 969, 974 (3d Cir. 1981). The
agency has a duty to conduct a reasonable search for responsive records. See Abdelfattah
v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 488 F.3d 178, 182 (3d Cir. 2007). To establish for
summary judgment purposes the adequacy of its search, the agency should provide a
“reasonably detailed affidavit, setting forth the search terms and the type of search
performed, and averring that all files likely to contain responsive materials . . . were
searched.” Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
With respect to James Leslie Surgick and his estate, the plaintiffs sought tax
returns and records for numerous years. Based on the record in this case, the Service
established that it complied with its duty to conduct an adequate search of its Integrated
Data Retrieval System and to turn over all responsive documents in its possession.
Surgick failed to identify specific facts and affirmative evidence to contradict the
evidence offered by the Service in support of its argument that its search was adequate
and it was not improperly withholding documents. Thus, summary judgment was proper.
With respect to K. Hovnanian, the plaintiffs sought corporate tax returns and
information concerning James Leslie Surgick’s interests in the corporation. Pursuant to
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FOIA exemption 3, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), and the tax code, 26 U.S.C § 6103(e)(1), the
Service is prohibited from releasing K. Hovnanian’s tax information to the plaintiffs
without K. Hovnanian’s consent, which the plaintiffs did not obtain. Section
6103(e)(1)(A)-(F) prohibits the disclosure of third-party tax return information, and
subparagraph (b)(2) broadly defines “return information” to include a “taxpayer's
identity, the nature, source, or amount of his income, payments, receipts, deductions,
exemptions, credits, assets, liabilities, net worth, tax liability, tax withheld, deficiencies,
over assessments, or tax payments …,” id. at 6103(b)(2). Accordingly, summary
judgment was proper here as well. FOIA’s segregation requirement, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)
(unnumbered paragraph) (any “reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be
provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are
exempt under this subsection”), is not applicable because the Service established that the
information requested is exempt from disclosure, and established that there was no form
of non-exempt information in the documents requested which the Service could segregate
and legally disclose to the plaintiffs. See Church of Scientology v. Internal Revenue
Serv., 484 U.S. 9, 16 (1987) (“Congress did not intend [section 6103] to allow the
disclosure of otherwise confidential return information merely by the redaction of
identifying details.”). A “Vaughn index,” see Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir.
1973), was unnecessary because the information sought plainly was confidential taxpayer
information.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the District Court granting summary
judgment to the Internal Revenue Service and against Zeffie Surgick on her FOIA claim
is summarily affirmed. The Service’s and K. Hovnanian’s motions to dismiss for lack of
9
appellate jurisdiction are denied. Surgick’s motion to strike is denied as stated but has
been considered as a jurisdictional response.
10