Stephen James v. Sutliff Saturn Inc

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 10-4742
___________
STEPHEN COREY JAMES,
Appellant
v.
SUTLIFF SATURN, INC.
_______________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
D.C. Civil Action No. 09-cv-1081
(Honorable William W. Caldwell)
______________
Argued January 10, 2012
Before: SCIRICA, RENDELL and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: March 15, 2012)
LISA JO FANELLI-GREER, ESQUIRE (ARGUED)
2806 Sunset Court
P.O. Box C
Grantham, Pennsylvania 17027
Attorney for Appellant
SCHAUN D. HENRY, ESQUIRE (ARGUED)
RICHARD L. ETTER, ESQUIRE
McNees, Wallace & Nurick
100 Pine Street
P.O. Box 1166
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17101
Attorneys for Appellee
ELIZABETH E. THERAN, ESQUIRE (ARGUED)
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
131 M Street, N.E., 5th Floor
Washington, D.C. 20507
Attorney for Amicus-Appellant,
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
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OPINION OF THE COURT
_________________
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge.
Stephen Corey James appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on
race and disability discrimination claims he brought against Sutliff Saturn, Inc., under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the Pennsylvania Human
Relations Act (PHRA), 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 951 et seq. We will affirm the District
Court’s judgment on the race discrimination claim but vacate and remand on the
disability claim.
I.
James, who is African-American, was hired in 1999 as an appearance technician at
Sutliff’s Carlisle Pike facility. Over the next five years, James was disciplined three
times. In 2005, he was transferred to Sutliff’s Harrisburg location. On November 7, 2005,
Sutliff granted James medical leave to undergo knee surgery. During his absence, Sutliff
promoted a white technician to fill James’s position. When James returned to work on
March 7, 2006, Sutliff terminated his employment.
2
As a result of his termination, James filed pro se a charge of race discrimination
with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (PHRC) and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on March 16, 2006. After obtaining
counsel, James sought to amend his charge to include a claim for disability
discrimination. On September 2, 2006, James contacted the PHRC through counsel to
request the amendment, which Randall R. Smedley, a Human Relations Representative,
acknowledged by letter on November 3, 2006. Smedley’s response directed James to
complete an intake questionnaire, which was not an official PHRC form, but rather a
printout from the PHRC’s internal case management system. James completed the form,
signing and dating each page. The completed printout and a cover letter were hand-
delivered to Smedley on December 22, 2006. In the letter, James’s counsel asked
Smedley to contact her if he required any further information.
James received no further communication from the PHRC or the EEOC until the
EEOC’s Philadelphia Office sent a letter, dated March 5, 2009, notifying James of the
dismissal of his discrimination charge and his right to sue in federal or state court. James
contacted the PHRC and was informed that his state charge had been dismissed in 2008.
James then obtained a copy of the PHRC’s 2008 Letter of Determination, which did not
state any grounds for the dismissal. Shortly thereafter, James learned that Smedley had
retired from the PHRC without processing his amendment. The disability charge had
never been added to his race discrimination charge.
James filed suit in federal court on June 6, 2009, alleging race and disability
discrimination. The District Court granted Sutliff’s motion for summary judgment on the
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race discrimination claim, finding that James failed to show that Sutliff’s proffered
legitimate explanation for the discharge was a pretext for discrimination. The court also
granted summary judgment on the disability claim, reasoning that James failed to
properly verify the amendment as required by statute. 1
II.
A.
We analyze James’s discrimination claims according to the familiar burden-
shifting approach of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See
Stanziale v. Jargowsky, 200 F.3d 101, 105 (3d Cir. 2000). 2 Under this approach, the
plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case. The burden then shifts to the employer to
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge. If the defendant does
so, the presumption of intentional discrimination disappears, but the plaintiff can still
prevail by showing that the employer’s proffered reason is merely a pretext for
discrimination.
This appeal challenges the District Court’s application of the last stage of the
burden-shifting framework and requires us to determine whether James put forth
sufficient evidence of pretext. On summary judgment, James may meet his burden by
1
The District Court had original jurisdiction over the Title VII and ADA claims under 28
U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction over the PHRA claims under 28 U.S.C. §
1367(a). We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a grant of
summary judgment de novo. Gonzalez v. AMR, 549 F.3d 219, 223 (3d Cir. 2008).
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
2
We apply the McDonnell Douglas framework because, despite his claims to the
contrary, James offers no direct evidence of discrimination. See Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1071 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc).
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“providing evidence that would allow a fact finder reasonably to (1) disbelieve the
employer’s articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory
reason was more likely than not the motivating or determinative cause of the employer’s
action.” Sarullo v. United States Postal Service, 352 F.3d 789, 799-800 (3d Cir. 2003)
(citations and internal quotations omitted). 3
Sutliff claims James’s employment was terminated because his position was ably
filled by another technician while he was absent on extended medical leave, and when
James returned from leave there was not enough work to support two appearance
technicians on staff. Sutliff claims it chose to retain James’s replacement because he was
an exemplary employee.
Disputing this proffered explanation, James points to evidence that he argues casts
doubt on Sutliff’s reasons. First, James asserts his own belief that he was fired on account
of his race. Second, James alleges that a previous disciplinary incident reflected racial
animus since he was disciplined for a mess in the detailing shop even though he had been
away on leave, while two white co-workers, who had been present, were not disciplined.
Third, James alleges that the General Sales Manager reprimanded him without cause
when he visited the facility five days before his discharge. Fourth, James claims the Vice
President of Sales and Marketing made light of his discharge and told him over the
phone, “You’re outta here.” Finally, James cites the circumstances of his discharge: that
he was one of only three African-American employees at the Harrisburg facility; that he
was discharged immediately upon his return from medical leave, while a white employee
3
To the extent the District Court said otherwise, this is the standard we apply on review.
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was permitted to return to work after several months of leave; and that he, with six years
of experience, was replaced by a white employee with significantly less experience.
James’s evidence of pretext is insufficient. James’s unsupported belief that he was
fired for discriminatory reasons “falls far short of establishing pretext.” Sarullo, 352 F.3d
at 800. The comments made by members of management shortly before and after James’s
discharge may betray interpersonal tensions or insensitivity, but they carry no hint of
racial animus. Nor do the circumstances of James’s discharge discredit Sutliff’s
explanation. The bare fact that James’s replacement was white and had less experience
does not support an inference that race motivated the decision, particularly where James’s
disciplinary record does not compare favorably with that of his replacement. Likewise,
the contrast James draws between his experience and that of a white employee who
returned to work after a leave of absence does not support an inference of discrimination.
Because the white employee worked as an administrative assistant, not as an appearance
technician, her experience does not cast doubt on Sutliff’s explanation that there was not
enough appearance technician work to retain James. Finally, James’s own statements
undercut his claim that race was a motivating factor in his discharge. In his deposition,
James acknowledged that he believed the prior disciplinary incident was unfair because
he had been absent on leave, not because the discipline was based on race. Further, when
pressed to give a reason why he believed his manager fired him because of race, James
could only offer that his manager did not seem to like him.
Accordingly, we conclude that James submitted insufficient evidence to allow a
reasonable factfinder to conclude that Sutliff’s explanation of the discharge was a pretext
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for discrimination. The District Court’s grant of summary judgment on the race
discrimination claim was proper.
B.
James also contends the District Court erred in granting summary judgment on his
disability claim. The court declined to consider the disability claim, finding that James
failed to follow the procedural requirements for prosecuting a charge of discrimination
under the ADA. To bring such a claim in court, an employee must first exhaust his
administrative remedies by filing the charge “in writing under oath or affirmation” with
the EEOC and equivalent state agency where appropriate. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. The
regulations clarify that the charge must “be in writing and signed and verified,” defining
“verified” to require that the charge be sworn to under oath “or supported by an unsworn
declaration in writing under penalty of perjury.” 29 C.F.R. § 1601.9; 29 C.F.R §
1601.3(a). 4 James’s original race discrimination charge satisfied this verification
requirement. The intake questionnaire James filed to add a claim of disability
discrimination did not. 5
Our decision in Hicks v. ABT Associates, 572 F.2d 960 (3d Cir. 1978), presented
similar but not identical circumstances. There, we vacated the grant of summary
judgment, holding the case raised a genuine issue of whether the charging party had
reasonably attempted to file an amendment to his discrimination charge, which was
4
The PHRA similarly requires a charging party to file a “verified complaint, in writing,”
43 P.S. § 959(a).
5
The regulations do not specify whether an amendment to a verified discrimination
charge must itself be verified. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b); 16 Pa. Code § 42.35. For
purposes of this appeal, we assume without deciding that it must.
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improperly rejected by the EEOC. Id. at 964. We reasoned that “[o]nce the charging party
has done all that he can reasonably do to amend his charge in accordance with the
Commission’s regulations, the statutory policy of providing the EEOC with an
opportunity to reconcile the grievance has been fulfilled.” Id. In short, “[t]he individual
employee should not be penalized by the improper conduct of the Commission.” Id. at
964-65. The District Court distinguished Hicks with respect to only one of its two
holdings, 6 indicating the decision was inapposite because in that case, unlike this one, the
initial discrimination charge was broad enough to encompass both theories of
discrimination alleged by the plaintiff. But this purported distinction has no bearing on
whether James made a reasonable attempt to amend his charge.
In September 2006, James contacted the PHRC through counsel, requesting an
amendment to his claim and asking Smedley, the PHRC case manager, how to proceed.
Instead of sending James the PHRC’s standard intake form, which includes language
intended to satisfy the verification requirement, Smedley sent a two page printout from
the agency’s internal case management software, which contained no verification
language, and directed James to answer the specified questions “in any format.” After
complying with these instructions, James reasonably believed that his amendment was
being processed. Our analysis in Hicks applies here. James only failed to verify his
6
In Hicks, we also considered the possibility that the plaintiff did not file any amendment
with the EEOC. Assuming this were the case, we held that if the additional charge was so
related to the acts that constituted the charge actually filed with the EEOC, such that the
EEOC’s investigation could reasonably be expected to encompass both bases of
discrimination, then the additional charge should be cognizable in a subsequent lawsuit.
Hicks, 572 F.2d at 965-67. In distinguishing Hicks, the District Court cited this portion of
the opinion.
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amended charge because he was misdirected by the PHRC’s express filing instructions.
By complying with those instructions, James satisfied the statutory policy of providing
the PHRC with an opportunity to reconcile the grievance. He should not be penalized for
the PHRC’s error. On these facts, we conclude that James’s failure to verify the
amendment does not bar his disability discrimination claim.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the grant of summary judgment on
James’s race discrimination claim, vacate the grant of summary judgment on James’s
disability discrimination claim, and remand to the District Court to consider the merits of
that claim.
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