Clarence Schreane v. Seana

CLD-048 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-3193
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CLARENCE D. SCHREANE,
Appellant
v.
J. SEANA, Correctional Officer; K. SWARTZFAGER, Correctional Officer;
EDWARD Lieutenant; RENDA, Disciplinary Hearing Officer; DUNAHUE,
Correctional Officer; ALONGA, USP Canaan Special Housing Unit Officer;
WARDEN RONNIE HOLT
____________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 3:11-cv-00613)
District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
November 21, 2012
Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and GARTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: December 13, 2012)
_________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_________
PER CURIAM
Clarence D. Schreane, a federal inmate currently incarcerated at USP Lewisburg
in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania and proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denying his motion for
reconsideration of the order dismissing with prejudice his second amended complaint
pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bur. of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971). Because this appeal does not present a substantial question, we will
summarily affirm the District Court‟s order with one modification. See 3d Cir. L.A.R.
27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
I.
Because we write primarily for the parties, we need only recite the facts necessary
for our discussion. In his second amended complaint, Schreane asserts that he was issued
a misconduct write-up for violating Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) Code 205, engaging in a
sexual act in front of a correctional officer. He requested to see the surveillance video of
the incident and alleges that in retaliation for this request, Officer Swartzfager made false
accusations against him and wrote a false incident report charging him with another Code
205 violation. Schreane also argues that Lieutenant Edward, the officer charged with
investigating the incident, refused to allow Schreane to see the video, failed to review the
video himself, and failed to advise him on his due process rights. According to Schreane,
Disciplinary Hearing Officer (“DHO”) Renda refused his requests to call witnesses and
play the video at his hearing and found him guilty based only on the misconduct reports
and no corroborating evidence. Finally, Schreane alleges that Warden Holt refused to
review the video. Schreane subsequently lost good time credits for both Code 205
violations.
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Schreane also asserts that he was charged with possession of an illegal object
inside of an ink pen. According to Schreane, Officer Alonga planted the item inside the
pen to “set him up.” Schreane requested to see the surveillance video, but his request was
denied and he subsequently spent time in the Special Handling Unit (“SHU”) and lost
good-time credits. Finally, Schreane alleges that Officer Donahue violated his First
Amendment right to free exercise of religion by failing to secure his religious oils.
According to Schreane, he wrote to Warden Holt, asking him to return the oils and
review the videos of the theft of the oils. In response, Warden Holt stated that he would
not review the videos and would sustain the decision of the DHO.
On May 1, 2011, Schreane filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to Bivens; he
then filed an amended complaint on April 25, 2011. On June 13, 2011, a Magistrate
Judge entered a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that Schreane‟s
claims for specific monetary damages be dismissed; that his Fifth Amendment due
process claims against Holt, Seana, Swartzfager, Edward, Renda, and Alonga be
dismissed as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); and that his First
Amendment claims against Donahue, Seana, and Swartzfager be dismissed. On
November 15, 2011, the District Court dismissed Schreane‟s § 1983, Fifth Amendment
due process, First Amendment, and Eighth Amendment claims with prejudice, dismissed
his equal protection claim without prejudice, and provided Schreane with the opportunity
to file an amended complaint stating an equal protection claim.
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On December 20, 2011, the Magistrate Judge recommended that Schreane‟s suit
be dismissed without prejudice because he had failed to file a second amended complaint
to comply with the District Court‟s November 15, 2011 order. However, Schreane filed
his second amended complaint on January 5, 2012. In this complaint, he again alleged
violations of his Fifth Amendment due process and equal protection, First Amendment,
and Eighth Amendment rights. Accordingly, the District Court rejected the second R&R.
On April 13, 2012, the Magistrate Judge entered a third R&R recommending that
Schreane‟s second amended complaint be dismissed with prejudice. On May 30, 2012,
the District Court adopted the R&R and dismissed Schreane‟s second amended complaint
with prejudice. Schreane subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
denied by the District Court on July 23, 2012. He then timely filed a notice of appeal.
II.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because
Schreane‟s timely appeal from the denial of his motion for reconsideration “brings up the
underlying judgment for review,” we will review the District Court‟s dismissal of his
second amended complaint as well as its denial of his motion for reconsideration.
LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass‟n, 503 F.3d 217, 225 n.6 (3d Cir. 2007); see
also McAlister v. Sentry Ins. Co., 958 F.2d 550, 552-53 (3d Cir. 1992) (“[A]n appeal
from a denial of a Motion for Reconsideration brings up the underlying judgment for
review.”). We exercise plenary review over the District Court‟s dismissal order. See
Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). We review a denial of a motion
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for reconsideration for abuse of discretion, but review a district court‟s underlying legal
determinations de novo and its factual determinations for clear error. Max‟s Seafood
Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999). We may
summarily affirm on any basis supported by the record. Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d
246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
III.
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Allah, 229 F.3d at 223. To survive
dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to „state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‟” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). We look for
“„enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of‟
the necessary elements” of a claim for relief. Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d
224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “A Bivens action, which is
the federal equivalent of the § 1983 cause of action against state actors, will lie where the
defendant has violated the plaintiff‟s rights under color of federal law.” Brown v. Philip
Morris Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 800 (3d Cir. 2001).
Schreane first alleges that several defendants violated his Fifth Amendment right
to procedural due process. Specifically, Schreane states that several of the defendants
filed false charges against him as retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights
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and for requesting to view the surveillance tapes of the incidents leading to his various
misconduct charges. He also argues that other officers used unconstitutional procedures
to conduct his disciplinary hearings.
In 1994, the Supreme Court held that if the success of a § 1983 damages claim
brought by a prisoner “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or
sentence,” the prisoner may only bring the claim where the conviction or sentence has
been invalidated. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). Three years later, the
Court extended that rule to prison disciplinary sanctions, holding that a prisoner cannot
bring a suit under § 1983 where the success of that suit would “necessarily imply the
invalidity of the deprivation of his good-time credits.” Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641,
646-48 (1997). This bar not only applies to requests for money damages, but also to
requests for equitable and declaratory relief. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-
82 (2005). The Heck rule applies to bar such claims under Bivens as well. See Lora-
Pena v. F.B.I., 529 F.3d 503, 506 n.2 (3rd Cir. 2008) (citing Williams v. Hill, 74 F.3d
1339, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam)). Instead, the proper avenue of relief is a
federal habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to challenge the duration of
the sentence. See, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (habeas corpus is
the exclusive remedy when a prisoner seeks “a speedier release from . . . imprisonment”
as through the restoration of good time credits).
Here, Schreane is challenging disciplinary proceedings that resulted in the loss of
good time credits. A ruling in his favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of the
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punishment imposed by the defendants. We agree with the District Court that his Fifth
Amendment procedural due process claim is not cognizable under Heck and Edwards;
however, a dismissal pursuant to Edwards should be without prejudice. See, e.g., Fottler
v. United States, 73 F.3d 1064, 1065-66 (10th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, we modify the
District Court‟s dismissal of Schreane‟s due process claim so that it is without prejudice
to either renewal upon a favorable termination of the disciplinary findings against
Schreane or a challenge to Schreane‟s loss of his good time credits through the filing of a
federal habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
As his second claim, Schreane alleges that Officer Donohue violated his First
Amendment freedom of religion rights when his religious oils were lost, misplaced, or
stolen during his confinement in the SHU. According to Schreane, Donohue failed to
secure his religious oils and should have been more attentive to his duties. A prisoner
retains “those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a
prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrective system.” Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). However, an isolated act of negligence does not
violate an inmate‟s First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. See Gallagher v.
Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1070 (10th Cir. 2009). Here, Schreane alleges that Donohue was
negligent in securing his religious oils after his move to the SHU; he does not allege that
Donohue intentionally chose not to secure the oils. Accordingly, the District Court
properly dismissed Schreane‟s First Amendment claim.
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Schreane next asserts a general claim that his Eighth Amendment right to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment was violated because of his removal to the SHU and
because of his loss of good time credits. The relevant Eighth Amendment inquiry is
whether the alleged deprivation is “sufficiently serious” and whether the inmate has been
deprived of the “minimal civilized measure of life‟s necessities.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). An inmate
must demonstrate that “he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of
serious harm” and that prison officials demonstrated “deliberate indifference” to his
health or safety. Id. We agree with the District Court that Schreane failed to state an
Eighth Amendment claim because he did not suffer any pain or interference with his
health or basic needs.
Throughout his second amended complaint, Schreane alleges that Appellees
violated his Fifth Amendment rights to equal protection because he was convicted of two
Code 205 violations based on the fact that he is African-American. However, we agree
with the District Court that Schreane failed to plead an equal protection claim because he
never supported his allegation with evidence that he received treatment different than that
received by other similarly situated individuals.1 Williams v. Morton, 343 F.3d 212, 221
(3d Cir. 2003).
1
The District Court did not provide Schreane leave to amend his First Amendment and
Eighth Amendment claims after dismissing them with prejudice on November 15, 2011.
While courts should not dismiss pro se complaints without granting leave to amend
unless “amendment would be inequitable or futile,” Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp.,
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Finally, Schreane timely filed a motion for reconsideration of the District Court‟s
order dismissing his second amended complaint with prejudice. A motion for
reconsideration “must rely on one of three grounds: (1) an intervening change in
controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; or (3) the need to correct clear error
of law or prevent manifest injustice.” Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir.
2010) (per curiam). Schreane did not identify any of these factors in his motion, wherein
he merely restated his argument regarding the need to review the surveillance videotape.
Given that Schreane‟s motion merely reiterated his previous argument in support of his
Bivens action, we discern no abuse of discretion in the District Court‟s denial of
Schreane‟s motion.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, no substantial question is presented and we will affirm
the judgment of the District Court. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. Although we
will affirm, we modify the dismissal of Schreane‟s due process claim to be without
prejudice to either renewal upon a favorable termination of the disciplinary findings
against Schreane or Schreane‟s challenging the loss of his good time credits through the
filing of a federal habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002), we conclude that the District Court did not err in
declining to allow Schreane an opportunity to amend these claims because we do not see
how any amendments would have been successful. Likewise, we conclude that the
District Court did not err in denying Schreane another opportunity to amend his equal
protection claim because he had previously received one such opportunity after the
dismissal of his first amended complaint.
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