Julie Graham v. Secretary United States Department of Veterans Aff

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 22-2633
___________
JULIE A. GRAHAM,
Appellant
v.
SECRETARY UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 1:19-cv-01339)
Magistrate Judge: Honorable Susan E. Schwab (by consent)
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
on March 7, 2023
Before: SHWARTZ, BIBAS, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 7, 2023)
____________________________________
___________
OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant Julie Graham appeals the District Court’s order granting summary
judgment to the defendant, the Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs. For the
reasons detailed below, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
While employed by the Department of Veterans Affairs (“the VA”) as a licensed
practical nurse, Graham was charged with aggravated assault, sexual assault, simple as-
sault, and recklessly endangering another person. Each of the charges concerned Gra-
ham’s alleged failure to disclose her HIV-positive status to a sexual partner.
The VA then placed Graham on paid leave pending “the completion of administrative
investigations regarding criminal complaints made against you.” ECF No. 38-1 at 7. Af-
ter Graham waived her right to a preliminary hearing, the VA suspended her without pay
“until the completion of the law enforcement investigation and any related judicial pro-
ceedings pertaining to this conduct.” Id. at 13.
Eventually, the Commonwealth withdrew the three assault charges, and the remaining
charge, reckless endangerment, was resolved through accelerated rehabilitative disposi-
tion. Soon thereafter—about a year after the initial suspension—the VA lifted the sus-
pension and directed Graham to return to work. See id. at 34. Graham did so, and
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
2
requested, through counsel, that she be given back pay and other benefits that she missed
out on due to her suspension. See id. at 36. The VA denied the request on the ground
that the suspension was appropriate and it would not be financially responsible to pay an
employee for time on suspension pending criminal charges.
Graham then filed a complaint with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC), alleging that the VA discriminated against her on the basis of her disa-
bility when it denied her request for back pay and benefits for the time she was sus-
pended. The EEOC concluded that Graham had not shown that she had been subjected to
disability discrimination and issued a right-to-sue letter. See id. at 97–98.
Graham then filed her federal complaint. She alleged that the VA “discriminated
against Plaintiff because of Plaintiff’s Disability after she was diagnosed as HIV positive
and her condition was made public.” ECF No. 1 at 2. The District Court, interpreting
Graham’s complaint to raise claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
and the Rehabilitation Act (RA), granted summary judgment to the defendant because
Graham failed to show that the VA discriminated against her based on her disability.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise a plenary standard of
review, and apply the same standard as the District Court to determine whether summary
judgment was appropriate. State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Pro Design, P.C., 566
F.3d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 2009).
3
We agree with the District Court’s analysis of this case. To analyze Graham’s claims
of disparate treatment under the ADA and RA, 1 we apply the burden-shifting framework
set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). This requires Gra-
ham to first make out a prima facie case that she was (1) disabled, (2) subject to an ad-
verse employment action, (3) qualified for her position, and (4) the adverse employment
action was because of her disability. Fowler v. AT&T, Inc., 19 F.4th 292, 298 (3d Cir.
2021). Like the District Court, we will assume that Graham made this showing. The
burden then shifts to the defendant “to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
for its actions.” Id. We agree with the District Court that the defendant did so: it denied
back pay and benefits because Graham had been suspended pending the resolution of se-
rious criminal charges. See generally In re Trib. Media Co., 902 F.3d 384, 402 (3d Cir.
2018).
The burden then shifted back to Graham. To survive summary judgment, she needed
to present evidence that the VA’s explanation “is merely a pretext, meaning evidence that
could cause a jury either to (1) disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate reasons,
or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivat-
ing or determinative cause of the employer’s action.” Fowler, 19 F.4th at 299 (altera-
tions, quotation marks omitted). “To discredit the employer’s proffered reason, however,
the plaintiff cannot simply show that the employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken,
1
We consider the ADA and RA claims “together because the substantive standards for
determining liability are the same.” Furgess v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 933 F.3d 285, 288 (3d
Cir. 2019) (quotation marks omitted).
4
since the factual dispute at issue is whether discriminatory animus motivated the em-
ployer, not whether the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent.” Fuentes v.
Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994).
The District Court correctly concluded that Graham failed to present evidence dis-
crediting the VA’s explanation. In its contemporaneous communications, the VA invari-
ably identified the criminal charges as the impetus for its actions, and its conduct—esca-
lating the suspension after Graham waived her preliminary hearing and then lifting the
suspension when the charges were resolved—was consistent with that explanation.
Graham argues at some length that the criminal charges were illegitimate and that
the VA should not have relied on them, but this does not show that the VA’s reliance was
pretextual. See id. Further, while Graham has vaguely claimed that another employee
who was charged with driving under the influence was treated more leniently, this does
not make the necessary showing because she has failed to establish that that employee
was “similarly situated in all respects.” In re Trib. Media Co., 902 F.3d at 403 (quotation
marks and alteration omitted). Finally, it is true, as Graham says, that in its written state-
ment discussing the appropriate penalty, the VA did at times refer to her disability. See
ECF No. 38-1 at 17–20. However, we agree with the EEOC that Graham’s “criminal
charges were intertwined with her medical condition, and it would have been nearly im-
possible to discuss and evaluate the criminal allegations without mentioning her medical
condition.” ECF No. 38-1 at 97.2 The written statement focused on Graham’s conduct,
2
In her appellate brief, Graham contends that the VA denied her due process, but because
she did not raise this claim in the District Court, we will not address it here. See Simko
5
not her disability, and the references to HIV do not reflect animus toward Graham’s disa-
bility or suggest that the VA was not actually focused on the criminal charges. See gen-
erally Salley v. Cir. City Stores, Inc., 160 F.3d 977, 981 (3d Cir. 1998); Harris v. Polk
Cnty., 103 F.3d 696, 697 (8th Cir. 1996).
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
v. U.S. Steel Corp., 992 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2021). We note also that the District
Court concluded that Graham failed to exhaust any direct challenge to the suspension.
See ECF No. 44. Graham has not challenged that decision in her appellate brief, so we
likewise will not address that issue. See M.S. by & through Hall v. Susquehanna Twp.
Sch. Dist., 969 F.3d 120, 124 n.2 (3d Cir. 2020).
6