Jerome Katz v. Commissioner Social Security

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 19-1268
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JEROME I. KATZ,
Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY
_______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 2-17-cv-04821)
District Judge: Honorable William J. Martini
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 20, 2019
Before: CHAGARES, MATEY, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed: December 20, 2019)
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OPINION
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
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, does not
constitute binding precedent.
MATEY, Circuit Judge.
The District Court affirmed the Social Security Administration’s (“SSA”) denial of
Jerome Katz’s disability insurance benefits. Its well-reasoned opinion explains how the
findings of the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) were supported by substantial evidence,
why Katz received a full and fair hearing, and why Katz could not present new evidence.
Finding no error in those conclusions, we will affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In 1982, Jerome Katz experienced a host of challenges including taxing work
responsibilities, marital difficulties, and the loss of his home. As a result, he struggled with
his co-workers and suffered anxiety, paranoia, and stress. For that reason, he sought state-
sponsored disability benefits prompting a medical examination from three doctors who all
concluded that he could not continue his job as a social worker. On that basis, New Jersey
awarded Katz a state disability pension in 1986, with benefits retroactive to 1984. Since
then, he has not held a steady job.
Katz’s mental health continued to decline, so in 2012 he sought federal disability
insurance benefits retroactive to 1982. As part of his application, he met with two SSA
physicians. The first, James Conneran, M.D., opined that Katz, with some limitations,
“could perform simple, routine work.” (App. at 10, 31.) Dr. Conneran also found that Katz
had “mild restriction of activities of daily living, . . . moderate difficulties in maintaining
concentration, persistence or pace and no repeated episodes of decompensation.” (Id. at 8,
31.) A second expert, Christopher Williamson, Psy.D., concluded Katz was completely
disabled as of “the early 1980s.”
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Weighing these opinions, and other evidence, the SSA denied Katz’s claim for
federal disability benefits. Katz disagreed with that conclusion and sought review before
an ALJ. The ALJ upheld the SSA’s decision, agreeing with the SSA that Katz did not
satisfy the criteria for federal benefits. Katz then administratively appealed, and sought to
supplement the record with more documents, including post-adjudication reports by Dr.
Williamson. But even with the benefit of these materials, the Appeals Council found that
substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision and denied the application. So Katz
sought judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The District Court affirmed the
administrative decision, and Katz filed this timely appeal.
II. ANALYSIS
The District Court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and we have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. When reviewing the administrative findings, we are
limited to considering whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence.
42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005). The
deferential substantial-evidence standard only requires the administrative decision to be
supported by “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (quoting Consol.
Edison Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
A. The Commissioner’s Decisions Are Supported by Substantial Evidence
We begin by noting our focus on federal law. Katz already receives benefits from
the State of New Jersey, and that award is not part of this action. To obtain federal disability
insurance benefits, Katz must satisfy the five-step test codified at 20 C.F.R.
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§ 404.1520(a)(4).1 As Katz lacked gainful employment during the relevant period and
documented severe impairments, the ALJ found he succeeded at the first two steps. Id.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(ii). (App. 26.) At step three, the ALJ found that Katz did not meet the
criteria for a per se disability under § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P,
App. 1 (2015). For Katz’s impairments to qualify as a per se disability, he needs to meet
the requirements for the affective disorder listing or the anxiety disorder listing. Id.
§§ 12.04(A)–(C), 12.06(A)–(B) (2015). This includes showing he suffered from a marked
restriction in daily activities; a marked restriction in maintaining concentration,
persistence, or pace; or repeated episodes of decompensation. Id. §§ 12.04(B), 12.06(B).
There is substantial evidence in the record supporting the ALJ’s determination that
Katz did not satisfy this requirement. No doctor from the relevant time opined on whether
Katz was totally disabled. Dr. Conneran found Katz only had mild to moderate restrictions
in required areas and did not suffer from repeated episodes of decompensation.
Dr. Williamson, a treating physician, disagreed with Conneran. But he began treating Katz
decades after the relevant period. The ALJ was within her discretion to credit Conneran’s
1
As stated in the regulation, a claimant must not have substantial gainful
employment and must have a severe impairment or combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), (ii). He must also have either a qualifying disability or lack the residual
functional capacity to perform his past work. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (iv). Finally, even
if the claimant could not return to past work, benefits will be denied if the SSA can show
that someone with the claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, education, and work
experience could adjust to other employment. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v).
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opinion instead of Williamson’s and find that Katz fails to show a per se disability.2
The ALJ then considered whether Katz’s impairment prevents him from performing
his past work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). After finding that he could not return to his
prior position as a social worker, the ALJ considered whether Katz possessed the residual
capacity for alternative employment. (App. at 28.) To that end, the ALJ performed a
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) analysis, which concluded that Katz could
accomplish “low stress . . . routine work” that avoids heights, dangerous machinery, and
more than occasional interactions with the public and co-workers. (App. at 28.) The ALJ
based that conclusion on a “careful consideration of the entire record,” and explained her
reasoning. (App. at 28–32.) For example, the ALJ highlighted Katz’s long history of mental
health issues and physical injuries leading to his inability to perform social work. On the
other hand, the ALJ’s RFC assessment found that Katz seldom took medications or
received treatments. And the ALJ noted the lack of medical evaluations during the relevant
period. Finally, the ALJ reviewed and credited Dr. Conneran’s finding that Katz could
perform simple, routine labor. Taken together, her well-reasoned analysis of the record is
supported by substantial evidence.
Finally, as required by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v), the ALJ found other jobs exist
in significant numbers in the national economy that Katz could perform, based on his age,
education, work experience, and the RFC analysis from step four. Katz attacks this finding
2
The ALJ found no restriction on daily activities, despite Dr. Conneran’s finding of
a mild restriction. But this disparity is immaterial, as a mild restriction would not satisfy
the test either.
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on multiple fronts. First, he asserts that he could not perform any work during the relevant
period. But he can point to no corroborating medical report from that time. Second, he
argues that the ALJ should have credited a 2015 report by Dr. Williamson that Katz was
totally disabled during the relevant period. But as the District Court identified, that report
hinges on second-hand information, and the ALJ was within her discretion to reject that
conclusion. Third, Katz argues that a hypothetical posed to a vocational expert during the
proceedings was faulty. But his argument is simply a rehash of his argument at step four—
a disagreement over the ALJ’s determination of his RFC. And finally, he argues that the
vocational expert relied on outdated scholarship. But no precedent supports this argument.
All in all, there is substantial evidence that Katz cannot meet the disability
requirements for the relevant period. The District Court correctly denied Katz’s application
for disability insurance benefits, because the ALJ’s decision was grounded in substantial
evidence.
B. Katz Was Not Denied a Full and Fair Hearing
Katz claims the ALJ impermissibly rushed his hearing to make a later appointment.
While the ALJ twice commented that she had another engagement later that afternoon, both
Katz and a vocational expert testified without limitation. Moreover, Katz’s counsel said
that he had no additional evidence and no further questions. So the hearing was not hurried
to conclusion.
C. Katz May Not Introduce Additional Evidence
Katz offers additional documents to rebut the ALJ’s findings. Yet remand is
appropriate only if Katz can show, for example, there was good cause for the delay in
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presenting them. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). He cannot. Some documents were authored after the
administrative hearing, and Katz does not show why they could not have been prepared
and presented earlier. Others were in Katz’s possession at the time of the hearing, but
inaccessible because of his tendency to hoard. We agree with the District Court that this is
insufficient for Katz to show “good cause” for the delay. Remand is therefore
inappropriate.
III. CONCLUSION
The District Court properly found the ALJ’s findings were supported by substantial
evidence, and Katz received a full and fair hearing. For those reasons, we will affirm.
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