Jerome Blyden v.

BLD-333 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 15-2852
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IN RE: JEROME BLYDEN,
Petitioner
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On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from
the District Court of the Virgin Islands
(Related to D.C. Crim. No. 3-09-cr-00020-002)
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Submitted Pursuant to Fed. R. App. Pro. 21
September 11, 2015
Before: AMBRO, JORDAN and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges
(Filed: September 18, 2015)
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OPINION*
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PER CURIAM
Jerome Blyden has filed a petition for writ of mandamus. For the reasons that
follow, we will deny the petition.
Blyden was convicted following a jury trial in the District Court of the Virgin
Islands of assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering activity, in violation of
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(3). He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 78 months, to be
followed by three years of supervised release. We affirmed the criminal judgment, see
United States v. Blyden, 431 F. App’x 133 (3d Cir. 2011). The United States Supreme
Court denied Blyden’s petition for writ of certiorari on February 21, 2012.
On February 21, 2013, Blyden signed and placed into the prison mailing system a
motion to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, raising these grounds for relief: (1)
the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to convict him in the absence of an
indictment; (2) bail was excessive; (3) counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the
absence of an indictment, in failing to secure bail, in allowing him to be sentenced for a
time-barred act, and in lying to the Court of Appeals; and (4) the District Court erred in
calculating the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range. On September 13, 2013, the United
States Attorney answered the § 2255 motion, and the matter then was referred to the
Magistrate Judge. On May 13, 2015, the Magistrate Judge submitted a Report and
Recommendation, recommending that Blyden’s § 2255 motion be denied on the merits.
Thereafter, in July, 2015, Blyden was arrested for violating the terms of his supervised
release, and the Magistrate Judge appointed counsel to assist him in opposing the
Government’s petition to revoke his supervised release. Blyden filed several motions pro
se either in support of his § 2255 motion or in opposition to his detention.
In an order entered on September 3, 2015, the District Court adopted the
Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, denied Blyden’s § 2255 motion, and
declined to issue a certificate of appealability. On that same day, the Magistrate Judge
issued an order denying Blyden’s motion for her recusal. In a Judgment entered on
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September 8, 2015, the District Court revoked Blyden’s supervised release, sentenced
him to 37 days in prison (time served), and imposed a new term of supervised release of
34 months.
Meanwhile, on August 4, 2015, Blyden filed the instant mandamus petition. He
submitted the required motion to proceed in forma pauperis on August 24, 2015. Our
Clerk granted him leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Blyden’s numerous requests for
mandamus relief were, with only a few exceptions, related to the adjudication of either
his § 2255 motion or his opposition to the Government’s attempt to detain him pending
the outcome of his supervised release revocation hearing. Blyden urged us to grant
mandamus relief, arguing that the delay in the resolution of his many outstanding motions
amounted to a denial of due process.
We will deny the petition for writ of mandamus. To the extent that the District
Court has acted during the pendency of the instant petition to dispose of all matters
related to Blyden’s § 2255 proceedings and his detention pending his revocation hearing,
his request for rulings no longer presents a live controversy and is moot. See, e.g.,
Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 975 F.2d 964, 974 (3d Cir. 1991); see also Blanciak v. Allegheny
Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698-99 (3d Cir. 1996) (“If developments occur during the
course of adjudication that eliminate a plaintiff's personal stake in the outcome of a suit
or prevent a court from being able to grant the requested relief, the case must be
dismissed as moot.”).
Two of Blyden’s mandamus requests relate to a matter that is still pending before
the District Court. We will deny these requests because a writ of mandamus is an
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extreme remedy that we employ only in extraordinary situations. See Kerr v. United
States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976). In a motion filed on December 16, 2013,
see Docket Entry No. 527, Blyden asked the District Court to enforce its December 10,
2010 order directing the Government to return all seized property; he noted in this motion
the property that had not been returned and he noted an improper encumbrance on an
escrow account that had not been removed. The Government filed a thorough answer to
this motion, see Docket Entry No. 531, and (1) asserted that it was ready to return more
property but could not because Blyden was (then) incarcerated and no longer represented
by counsel; (2) listed property that already had been returned to Blyden’s trial counsel
while he was still actively representing Blyden; and (3) asserted that it had no knowledge
of any Federal encumbrance relating to an escrow account. On August 29, 2014, Blyden
filed a motion to compel the Government to return all seized property, see Docket Entry
No. 537, and also filed on the docket a “Notice of Non-Compliance,” in which he stated
that the following items had not been returned to him: (1) cash in the amount of $1,500;
(2) cash in the amount of $93,000 seized from an escrow account held at the Bank of
Nova Scotia; and (3) cash in the amount of $12,500 seized from an escrow account held
at the Bank of Nova Scotia.
Generally, the management of its docket is committed to the sound discretion of
the District Court. In re: Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982).
Nevertheless, a writ of mandamus may be warranted where undue delay is tantamount to
a failure to exercise jurisdiction. Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996).
Blyden’s most recent motion, see Docket Entry No. 537, seeking to enforce the District
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Court’s December 10, 2010 order directing the Government to return all seized property
has been pending now for over 12 months, and this delay has the potential to offend due
process. See Johnson v. Rogers, 917 F.2d 1283, 1285 (10th Cir. 1990) (Court’s
congested docket did not justify 14-month delay in adjudicating habeas corpus petition);
Jones v. Shell, 572 F.2d 1278, 1280 (8th Cir. 1978) (District Court’s 14-month delay in
adjudicating petition following remand from appeals court denied petitioner due process).
We are confident, however, that the matter was inadvertently overlooked due to the
pendency of more pressing matters related to Blyden’s personal liberty -- his § 2255
motion and supervised release revocation hearing -- and thus that the delay in resolving
the property dispute is not tantamount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction. Should the
District Court decline to rule within 45 days of Blyden writing to that court and
requesting a ruling as seems reasonable now that the § 2255 and revocation proceedings
have been resolved, Blyden may renew his petition for a writ of mandamus before this
Court.
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for writ of mandamus without
prejudice to renewal if the District Court does not rule within the specified time frame.
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