Document Info

DocketNumber: 00-3050

Filed Date: 10/18/2000

Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/13/2015

  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2000 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    10-18-2000
    S. v. Scranton School Dist.
    Precedential or Non-Precedential:
    Docket 00-3050
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    Recommended Citation
    "S. v. Scranton School Dist." (2000). 2000 Decisions. Paper 224.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2000/224
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    Filed October 18, 2000
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 00-3050
    DANIEL S., a minor by his parents and next friends,
    Cynthia and Scott S.; CYNTHIA S.; SCOTT S., on their
    own behalf
    v.
    SCRANTON SCHOOL DISTRICT,
    Appellant
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    (D.C. No. 98-cv-00243)
    District Judge: The Honorable A. Richard Caputo
    ARGUED July 18, 2000
    BEFORE: BECKER, Chief Judge, SLOVITER, and
    NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
    (Filed October 18, 2000)
    Harry P. McGrath, Esq. (Argued)
    Suite 532, 538 Spruce Street
    Scranton Life Building
    Scranton, PA 18503
    Attorney for Appellant
    Mary A. Clausen, Esq. (Argued)
    R.D. #1, P.O. Box 1494
    Saylorsburg, PA 18353
    Attorney for Appellees
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
    In this case, filed under the Individuals with Disabilities
    Education Act, 20 U.S.C. SS 1400-1490, the Scranton
    School District appeals from an order granting attorneys'
    fees to the parents of Daniel S. under S 1415(i)(3)(B) of the
    Act. The School District argues that the meeting for which
    attorneys' fees were awarded was not "convened as a result
    of an administrative proceeding or judicial action," and that
    the fee award was thus barred by the Act. We disagree, and
    will affirm the District Court's order.
    I. Background Law
    Congress enacted the Individuals with Disabilities
    Education Act to ensure that educational programs were
    available to children with disabilities, to enable responsible
    educational authorities to provide appropriate educational
    programs, and to assure the effectiveness of such
    programs. See 20 U.S.C. S 1400(d). To that end, the Act
    provides financial assistance to states that comply with its
    requirements. See 
    id. SS 1411,
    1412. One provision requires
    each participating state to identify and evaluate the needs
    of all children residing within its borders who are disabled
    and who need special education or related services. See 
    id. S 1412(a)(3)(A).
    Once the state has identified and evaluated a disabled
    child in need of special education and related services, it
    must have an Individual Educational Program (IEP) in effect
    for that child at the beginning of each school year. See 
    id. S 1414(d)(2)(A);
    see also 
    id. S 1414(d)(1)(A)
    (identifying the
    required components of an IEP). Each IEP is designed by an
    "IEP Team" composed of the parents of the child, a multi-
    disciplinary collection of appropriately qualified educational
    professionals, and, when appropriate, the child. See 
    id. S 1414(d)(1)(B).
    The Act requires participating states to establish a
    comprehensive set of procedural safeguards designed to
    2
    protect the interests of all parties. See 
    id. S 1415.
    One such
    safeguard allows parents who have lodged complaints about
    the identification, evaluation, placement, or IEP
    development processes to request an impartial
    administrative due-process hearing. See id.S 1415(f)(1). If
    the hearing is conducted by a local educational agency, any
    party aggrieved by its findings and decision may appeal to
    the state educational agency. See 
    id. S 1415(g).
    If, however,
    the hearing is conducted by the state educational agency,
    an aggrieved party may bring a civil action in a state court
    of competent jurisdiction or in federal district court. See 
    id. S 1415(i)(2).
    In addition to granting other appropriate relief, a court
    may, in its discretion, "award reasonable attorneys' fees to
    the parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing
    party." 
    Id. S 1415(i)(3)(B).
    Following a 1997 amendment,
    however, "[a]ttorneys' fees may not be awarded relating to
    any meeting of the IEP Team unless such meeting is
    convened, [inter alia], as a result of an administrative
    proceeding or judicial action." Id.S 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii) (emphasis
    added). It is this limitation, and its application to a specific
    IEP Team meeting, that is at issue in this appeal.
    II. Background Facts & Procedure
    In December 1996, the Scranton School District
    identified Daniel S. as a student in need of special
    educational services. An IEP Team consisting of Daniel's
    parents and education professionals engaged in a series of
    meetings intended to produce an IEP for Daniel. The School
    District then presented Daniel's parents with an IEP, which
    they rejected. The School District again presented the same
    IEP, which Daniel's parents again rejected.
    Sometime during the summer of 1997, the advocate
    representing Daniel's interests in the IEP process contacted
    Mary Anne Clausen, a private attorney specializing in
    education law. See App. at 191:15-23. Thereafter, Daniel's
    advocate "from time to time asked [Clausen] a few
    questions about things" concerning the effort to develop an
    acceptable IEP for Daniel. See 
    id. 3 In
    August, the IEP Team met again, but again failed to
    produce a mutually acceptable IEP. The School District
    then requested an administrative due-process hearing to
    determine the adequacy of the IEP it was offering Daniel. A
    hearing was scheduled, and, in the interim, Daniel's
    parents decided it would be best to teach him at home until
    an appropriate IEP was in place at school.
    While awaiting the hearing, Daniel's mother contacted
    Attorney Clausen directly concerning truancy proceedings
    that the School District had initiated against Daniel. See 
    id. at 192:8-193:15.
    Attorney Clausen had further
    conversations on the truancy matter with Daniel's mother
    and with his advocate in the ensuing weeks. See 
    id. at 194:20-195:15.
    Ultimately, Attorney Clausen performed a
    few minor legal services on Daniel's behalf regarding the
    truancy proceedings against him. See 
    id. at 196:2-197:9.
    In September, the IEP Team then met again for a third
    time, but again failed to produce a mutually acceptable IEP
    for Daniel. Shortly thereafter, the School District presented
    his parents with a revised IEP that conceded to some, but
    not all, of their demands. In response, Daniel's mother sent
    the School District a letter explaining why she was
    dissatisfied with the latest IEP and setting forth her
    remaining demands. See 
    id. at 197:15-22;
    203:11-19;
    207:16-18.
    Daniel's parents asked Attorney Clausen to represent
    them in their continuing battle with the School District over
    Daniel's IEP. See 
    id. at 197:23-198:1.
    In the hope that the
    parties would be able to resolve the matter without her
    assistance, Attorney Clausen refused to represent them
    until after they had received a response to their letter. See
    
    id. In October,
    the School District sent Daniel's parents yet
    another version of the IEP, conceding to some, but again
    not all, of the demands expressed in their previous letter.
    Thereafter, Attorney Clausen "entered into a retainer
    agreement [with Daniel's parents] to negotiate on their
    behalf at that point in time and to see if we could get a
    settlement of the matter for them." 
    Id. at 198:13-24.
    Daniel's parents rejected the School District's latest IEP
    4
    and, on the same rejection form, checked a box requesting
    a due process hearing. See 
    id. at 479.
    Attorney Clausen called the School District's attorney
    and requested a "settlement conference" to break the
    impasse. More specifically, she explained that the efforts to
    produce a mutually acceptable IEP for Daniel "had been
    ongoing for a long time" and that she would "like to try to
    settle it rather than going to due process." 
    Id. at 212:24-
    213:4. The School District's attorney agreed, and the
    parties met on October 20 and signed an attendance sheet
    labeled "Settlement Conference." See 
    id. at 46.
    The School District made a number of concessions at the
    conference and, in the course of the ensuing few days,
    made several more. As a result, the parties produced a
    mutually acceptable IEP that Daniel's mother signed. The
    request for a due-process hearing was then withdrawn.
    Shortly thereafter, Attorney Clausen asked the School
    District to pay her fees related to the October 20 settlement
    conference and subsequent services rendered on Daniel's
    behalf. When the School District refused, Daniel's parents
    filed a civil action in the District Court for the Middle
    District of Pennsylvania. Following a bench trial, the
    District Court entered an order awarding attorneys' fees to
    Daniel's parents.
    In a memorandum explaining its order, the District Court
    found that the October 20 conference was not a settlement
    conference at all. In "the Court's view," because everyone
    who attended the meeting, with the exception of Attorney
    Clausen, was a member of the IEP Team, "regardless of
    what the meeting was labeled, it was a meeting of the IEP
    Team within the meaning of the Act." Dist. Ct. Mem. of
    02/12/1999 at 3. The District Court also concluded that
    the School District's request for a due process hearing had
    "initiated" an "administrative proceeding." 
    Id. at 5.
    The
    court further concluded that "[g]iven the initiation of that
    proceeding, and the impending hearing, it is inescapable
    that the meeting of October 20, 1997 . . . was convened as
    a result of the administrative proceeding." 
    Id. The District
    Court concluded:
    5
    It seems quite clear . . . that counsel fees may be
    awarded in any instance where a party prevails as a
    result of an IEP team meeting which is convened as a
    result of an administrative proceeding. Such is exactly
    what occurred here, and therefore fees will be awarded
    to . . . plaintiff 's counsel.
    
    Id. at 6.
    The School District disagrees that the meeting was
    "convened as a result of an administrative hearing," and
    appeals from the order awarding Attorney Clausen's fees.
    III. Discussion
    The sole issue raised in this appeal is whether the 1997
    amendment of the Act bars this award of attorneys' fees.
    The parties both contend that "[t]his case isfirst and
    foremost a matter of statutory construction." Appellee's Br.
    at 10; see also Appellant's Br. at 12 ("The Appellant
    believes that the language of S 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii) is clear,
    unambiguous and therefore no further analysis is
    required."). To a degree, they are correct. But resolution of
    this issue ultimately does not turn on a question of law.
    The operative statutory phrase calls for the Court to
    determine if the IEP team meeting was "convened as a
    result of an administrative proceeding," thus raising a
    question of causation.
    In applying the pre-1997-amendment version of S 1415,
    we have held that causation can be established on either of
    two theories. See Wheeler v. Towanda Area School Dist.,
    
    950 F.2d 128
    , 132 (3d Cir. 1991) (considering when
    litigation is casually connected to the relief obtained by a
    prevailing party). In the context of pre-amendmentS 1415,
    litigation was held to be causally connected to the relief if
    it either produced that relief directly (i.e., through a
    favorable judgment), or, under an alternative "catalyst"
    theory, if "the pressure of the lawsuit was a material
    contributing factor in bringing about extrajudicial relief." 
    Id. (citations omitted).
    In the context of this case, an administrative proceeding
    can be causally connected to the prevailing party's relief if
    the pressure of the proceeding was a material contributing
    factor in bringing about the relief sought and ultimately
    6
    obtained by the child's parents. Thus, the real question in
    this case is one of fact: was the scheduled due process
    hearing the catalyst for the October 20 meeting that
    ultimately produced a mutually acceptable Program for
    Daniel?
    The School District takes no issue with the District
    Court's conclusion that the October 20 meeting was an IEP
    Team meeting, but argues, essentially, that an IEP Team
    meeting can never be convened as a result of an
    administrative hearing that has not yet occurred. See
    Appellant's Br. at 10. That is incorrect. An administrative
    hearing need not actually have occurred for it to be the
    cause of an IEP Team meeting. The mere threat of a
    scheduled hearing alone may induce opposing parties to
    agree to meetings in which they would not otherwise have
    participated, if only to avoid the cost, burden and
    uncertainty of the hearing itself. Cf. Sullivan v.
    Pennsylvania Dep't of Labor & Indus., 
    663 F.2d 443
    (3d Cir.
    1981) (finding the requisite causal link to recover attorneys'
    fees on Title VII claim where EEOC complaint caused union
    to take case to arbitration where relief was ultimately
    granted).
    Despite a series of IEP Team meetings, as well as
    exchanges in writing and by telephone, the parties were
    unable to produce a mutually acceptable IEP for Daniel. By
    September 3, the School District had determined that the
    Program it was offering Daniel was appropriate, and that
    IEP Team meetings were becoming "off focus" and
    "counterproductive." App. at 336:19-23. In short, it, too,
    had lost confidence in the IEP Team process, and had
    decided that a due process hearing would likely be
    necessary to break the impasse. Thereafter, the parties held
    one more "regular" IEP Team meeting on September 30.
    The October 20 meeting at issue was unlike the previous
    meetings in several significant respects. First, by the time
    the October 20 meeting was scheduled Daniel's parents had
    made their own request for a due process hearing, implying
    that they believed the IEP Team process had broken down.
    Second, whereas all prior meetings had been scheduled by
    the parties themselves following the notice requirements set
    forth in the Act, the October 20 meeting was scheduled by
    7
    the parties' respective attorneys. Third, although the
    attorneys did not attend any of the previous meetings, and
    Daniel's attorney declined to become directly involved in the
    IEP process until it was clear that the IEP Team was
    deadlocked and an administrative hearing was imminent,
    both attorneys attended the October 20 meeting. See App.
    at 46. As noted, the District Court concluded that the
    School District's September 3 request for a due process
    hearing "initiated" an administrative proceeding. See Dist.
    Ct. Mem. of 02/12/1999 at 5.
    We reject the parties' invitation to formulate a bright-line
    test for determining when an IEP Team meeting results
    from an administrative proceeding. Under Appellant's
    proffered test, an IEP Team meeting would never result
    from an administrative proceeding if it occurs before the
    administrative proceeding has actually been convened.
    Conversely, Appellees ask us to hold that an IEP Team
    meeting results from an administrative proceeding any time
    it occurs after the administrative proceeding has been
    requested, whether or not the requested proceeding was the
    catalyst for the meeting in question. We reject both tests,
    and hold that whether a particular IEP Team meeting
    results from an administrative proceeding is first a factual
    question of causation, opening the District court'sfindings
    to our review for clear error. Thereafter, the decision to
    award fees remains within the discretion of the court. See
    20 U.S.C. S 1415(i)(3)(B), which we review for an abuse in
    the exercise of its discretion.
    Against this factual backdrop, we see no error in the
    District Court's finding the meeting was convened as a
    result of the pending administrative hearing, nor in its
    determination that the pending due process hearing was
    the catalyst for the October 20 IEP Team meeting. Looking
    at the facts, we cannot accept the School District's claims
    that it was merely being proactive when it filed its
    September 3 request for a due process hearing. The
    evidence is to the contrary. The record indicates that by the
    time the School District requested a due process hearing it
    had concluded that the IEP Team process had become
    unfocused and counterproductive. Although it subsequently
    scheduled one final IEP Team meeting for September 30,
    8
    that meeting was also unproductive. By the time the parties
    scheduled the October 20 meeting, all involved believed the
    IEP Team process had reached an impasse and that a due
    process hearing was imminent without the successful
    intervention by their attorneys. Accordingly, we conclude
    that the District Court's finding that the October 20
    meeting was convened as a result of the due process
    hearing scheduled for November 10 is fully supported by
    the evidence. Upon that finding, an award of attorney fees
    was well within its discretion.
    IV. Conclusions
    We hold that the District Court did not err in finding, as
    a matter of fact, that the IEP Team meeting at issue in this
    case was convened as a result of an administrative
    proceeding, nor did it abuse its discretion by awarding fees.
    Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court's order.
    9
    BECKER, Chief Judge, concurring in the judgment:
    Under the 1997 amendments to IDEA, on which the
    School District relies, "[a]ttorneys' fees may not be awarded
    relating to any meeting of the IEP Team unless such
    meeting is convened as a result of an administrative
    proceeding or judicial action." 20 U.S.C. S 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii).
    Consequently, the School District can prevail only if: (1) the
    October 20 meeting was one of Daniel's IEP Team; and (2)
    the meeting was not convened as a result of an
    administrative proceeding or judicial action. The Court
    agrees that the October 20 meeting was an IEP Team
    Meeting, but affirms the District Court's judgment awarding
    fees because it concludes that the meeting took place as a
    result of the due process hearing scheduled for November
    10.
    The linchpin of the Court's holding is its conclusion that
    the District Court's "factual" finding "that the pending due
    process hearing was the catalyst for the October 20 IEP
    Team meeting" was not clearly erroneous. See opinion of the
    Court at 8. I disagree. No administrative proceeding ever
    took place, and none was even scheduled to occur prior to
    November 10--three weeks after the October 20 meeting.
    While the October 20 meeting may have occurred as a
    result of the School District's decision to initiate the
    administrative process and in anticipation of the scheduled
    due process hearing, the statute simply does not refer to
    IEP Team Meetings "convened as a result of the initiation of
    an administrative process" or "convened in anticipation of
    an administrative proceeding."
    On the other hand, I also believe that--under any
    standard of review--the October 20 meeting was not an IEP
    Team Meeting. IDEA contains no definition of the phrase
    "meeting of the IEP Team." Absent a definition or other
    controlling authority, I would hold that parties may clearly
    designate a meeting as a settlement conference rather than
    an IEP Team Meeting, and I believe that that precept is
    satisfied in this case. The October 20 meeting was
    scheduled by counsel for the parents as a settlement
    conference, and, with the exception of the parents' attorney,
    every person at the October 20 meeting signed a sheet
    referring to it as a "Settlement Conference." Although
    10
    lawyers are not designated as being part of an IEP Team,
    two attorneys (one for the parents and one for the School
    District) attended the October 20 meeting.
    The impetus for and subject of the meeting was likewise
    closer to that of a settlement conference than of an IEP
    Team meeting because the parties were, at that point,
    trying to avoid the need for a due process hearing, rather
    than simply attempting to arrive at an IEP that was best for
    Daniel. In addition, the School District did not give the
    parents formal notice of the October 20 meeting--
    something that Pennsylvania law explicitly requires it to do
    before an IEP Team Meeting. I therefore conclude that the
    October 20 meeting was not an IEP Team Meeting within
    the meaning of IDEA, and would affirm the judgment on
    this ground.
    I.
    To explain the rationale behind the conclusions I reach,
    it is necessary to recapitulate the chronology of events. In
    December 1996, the Scranton School District identified
    Daniel S. as a "child with a disability" as that term is
    defined under IDEA. With the assistance of Daniel's
    parents, the School District prepared a comprehensive
    evaluation of Daniel's disabilities. When Daniel's IEP Team
    began meeting, however, it could not agree on a plan for
    him. Without an IEP in place, Daniel was forced to remain
    out of school between January and November of 1997.
    During those ten months, Daniel's parents and other
    members of his IEP Team met or had discussions on
    numerous occasions. IEP Team Meetings took place on
    April 1, April 29, and August 27, 1997, but the Team was
    unable to agree on an IEP because Daniel's parents felt that
    none of the proposals adequately accounted for his special
    needs. In early September, the School District officially
    requested a due process hearing at which an independent
    third party would be asked to determine Daniel's fate. In an
    effort to avoid this result, the IEP Team met one more time
    on September 30, 1997. Daniel's parents rejected the IEP
    proposed at the meeting and hired an attorney, Mary Ann
    Clausen, to represent them at the due process hearing.
    11
    With the due process hearing scheduled for November
    10, 1997, Clausen contacted the School District and
    requested that a meeting be held in an attempt to resolve
    matters before the hearing. In scheduling the meeting,
    Clausen characterized it as a "settlement conference," and
    counsel for the School District did not object to this
    characterization. The parties, including most of Daniel's IEP
    Team, assembled on October 20, 1997. This was first time
    that lawyers for both the School District and Daniel's
    parents attended a meeting regarding Daniel. All of the
    parties (except Clausen) at the October 20 meeting signed
    an attendance sheet labeled with the heading "Settlement
    Conference." The parties discussed Daniel's IEP, but came
    to no agreement regarding Daniel's educational plan.
    The October 20 meeting proved fruitful, for it paved the
    way for further informal conversations and exchanges of
    information between the parties. Based on these exchanges,
    an IEP was agreed upon and signed by Daniel's mother on
    October 31, 1997. The IEP that Daniel's mother signed was
    more favorable to Daniel than the School District's previous
    proposals had been. With the October 31 agreement in
    effect, the adversarial proceeding scheduled for November
    10 was rendered unnecessary.
    II.
    Because the District Court concluded that the October 20
    meeting was one of Daniel's IEP Team, it was required to
    consider whether the meeting was "convened as a result of
    an administrative proceeding." 20 U.S.C. S 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii).
    The Court reasoned that the October 20 meeting was
    "convened as a result of " the School District's decision to
    request the due process hearing scheduled for November 10
    and in anticipation thereof. Specifically, Court stated that:
    [g]iven the initiation of that proceeding, and the
    impending hearing [on November 10], it is inescapable
    that the meeting of October 20, 1997 which resulted in
    an acceptable plan on October 31, 1997, was convened
    as a result of the administrative proceeding. There
    appears to be no other requirement under the plain
    meaning and plain language of the statute.
    12
    The Court agrees with the District Court, characterizing the
    inquiry as "a factual question of causation" reviewable for
    clear error. Opinion of the court at 8. I disagree.
    The key question is whether an IEP Team Meeting can be
    convened as a result of a due process hearing that has not
    yet taken place. This is a question of law because it
    involves statutory interpretation. And because it is a
    question of law, the appropriate standard of review is de
    novo.1 See United States v. Zwick, 
    199 F.3d 672
    , 678 (3d
    Cir. 1999) ("We exercise plenary review over questions of
    statutory interpretation."). Neither the Supreme Court nor
    any court of appeals has previously considered this issue.
    Absent binding precedent, we must follow the Supreme
    Court's repeated admonition that where a statute's text is
    clear, the task of interpretation begins and ends there. See
    Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 
    525 U.S. 432
    , 438 (1999).
    The relevant portion of the statutory text refers to IEP
    Team Meetings "convened as a result of an administrative
    proceeding." There is no dispute that the due process
    hearing scheduled to take place on November 10 would
    have qualified as an "administrative proceeding" within the
    meaning of IDEA. The question, therefore, is whether the
    October 20 meeting was "convened as a result of " the due
    process hearing scheduled for November 10. In the absence
    of a statutory definition or some other compelling reason,
    we interpret the words of a statute in accord with their
    ordinary meaning. Result means "a consequence, effect,
    issue, or conclusion." Webster's Third New International
    Dictionary 1937 (1966). An event (such as an IEP Team
    Meeting) cannot be a "consequence" of another event (such
    as a due process hearing) that has not yet occurred nor can
    an "effect" precede its purported cause.
    This common sense interpretation is supported by the
    ways in which the phrase "as a result of " is used in other
    sections of the United States Code. Its only other use in
    _________________________________________________________________
    1. I agree with the Court that if, as a matter of law, an IEP Team Meeting
    can occur "as a result of " a due process hearing that has not yet taken
    place, the question whether a particular IEP Team Meeting did so occur
    would be a question of fact that would be reviewable for clear error. See
    opinion of the Court at 8.
    13
    IDEA provides that "[a]s a result of more than 20 years of
    Federal support for research . . . , there is an important
    knowledge base for improving results for children with
    disabilities." 20 U.S.C. S 1471(a)(2)(A). Other provisions of
    the United States Code use "as a result of " in a similar
    manner--i.e., one that makes clear that an event may not
    be the result of another event that has yet to occur.2
    I can think of but three ways, none of them satisfactory,
    to blur this clear statutory language. The first would be to
    read the statute as saying "unless such meeting is
    convened as a result of the initiation of or request for an
    administrative proceeding." The second would be to read
    the statute as saying "unless such a meeting is convened in
    anticipation of an administrative proceeding." The problem,
    of course, is that these alternate formulations are simply
    not in the statute and their insertion would substantively
    alter its meaning. A final possibility would be to conclude
    that the commencement of the administrative proceedings
    took place when the School District requested the due
    process hearing. But this argument ignores the fact that
    the statute does not say "administrative process," it says
    "administrative proceeding," and the only administrative
    proceeding that even potentially qualifies in this case never
    occurred.
    The only judicial decisions I have been able to locate
    dealing with this issue support my reading of the statute.
    The first, M.V. v. Gordon, No. 98 C 8408, 
    1999 WL 417394
    (N.D. Ill., June 15, 1999), involved a 13-year-old boy who
    had been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity
    Disorder. M.V. was suspended from school after he engaged
    in what seems to have been highly inappropriate behavior.
    His parents submitted a request for a due process hearing.
    _________________________________________________________________
    2. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. S 1103(b)(3) (relaxing publishing requirements for
    new federal regulations that are "temporary in nature and [are]
    necessary to be implemented expeditiously as a result of an emergency");
    8 U.S.C. S 1440-1(b) (allowing for posthumous grant of citizenship to
    certain noncitizens who served in the United States armed forces and
    "died as a result of injury or disease incurred in or aggravated by that
    service"); 10 U.S.C. S 829(a) (stating that members of a court martial may
    not be "absent or excused after the court has been assembled for the
    trial of the accused unless excused as a result of a challenge").
    14
    An IEP Team Meeting was convened and a settlement was
    reached that rendered the due process hearing
    unnecessary. 
    Id. at *1.
    The parents thenfiled an action to
    recover attorneys fees "relating [to] IEP meetings." See 
    id. at *2.
    The court granted the school district's motion to
    dismiss, finding the language of the 1997 amendments
    "clear and unambiguous." 
    Id. Responding to
    the parents'
    claim "that it was their request for a due process hearing
    . . . that was the ``catalyst for the relief obtained,' " the court
    stated:
    Plaintiffs have not demonstrated how the hearing
    request alone entitles them to fees. Although Plaintiff[s]
    cite cases which granted recovery of fees in similar
    situations [citing the parents' brief], those cases pre-
    date the 1997 IDEA amendments which now clearly
    limit recovery of fees Plaintiffs seek unless they are the
    result of "an administrative proceeding or judicial
    action." Plaintiffs have not established that the[School]
    District convened the IEP meeting as a result of an
    "administrative proceeding." On the contrary, Plaintiffs'
    own allegations reveal that the [School] District took a
    proactive role at an early opportunity thereby removing
    the need for administrative proceedings.
    
    Id. at *3.
    Accordingly, the court denied the request for
    attorneys fees. See 
    id. The case
    most heavily relied upon by Daniel's parents,
    F.R. v. Board of Education, 
    67 F. Supp. 2d 142
    (E.D.N.Y.
    1999), provides little support for their claim that attorneys
    fees may be awarded in this case. Although the Court in
    F.R. awarded fees for work done prior to a due process
    hearing, the fees requested were not intended to
    compensate an attorney for attending an IEP Team Meeting.
    The court noted that:
    [P]laintiffs do not seek fees in connection with their
    attorney's presence at the CSE meetings held to
    develop and modify [the child's] IEP. . . . Instead . . .
    [the] fees sought to be reimbursed relate to attorney
    work performed in connection with investigation of the
    case, discussions with opposing counsel, client
    meetings and preparations of requests for impartial
    hearings.
    15
    
    Id. at 148
    (emphasis added). In contrast, as   the facts are
    interpreted by the Court, this case involves   a request for
    fees for attending an IEP Team Meeting. F.R.   provides no
    support that such fees are recoverable after   the 1997
    amendments.3
    III.
    The rule announced by the Court today will undermine
    the goal of the 1997 amendments, which was to make IDEA
    less costly for local school districts. The (admittedly limited)
    means chosen to accomplish this goal involved restricting
    the ability of parents to recover attorneys fees associated
    with attendance at IEP Team Meetings. The causation test
    adopted by the Court will allow one party (parents, or, more
    accurately, their lawyers) to undermine these limits
    unilaterally by requesting a due process hearing early on so
    that they can claim that any subsequent IEP Team
    Meetings occurred as a result of that request. Even if courts
    often reject such claims on the grounds that a causal
    connection between the request for a hearing and the
    resolution of the dispute is lacking, the litigation over fees
    will itself be costly and time-consuming for school districts.
    On the other hand, a rule that attorneys fees are never
    recoverable for any meeting that occurs prior to an
    administrative proceeding would likewise undermine the
    purpose of the 1997 amendments. The costs of paying for
    parents' attorneys to attend a successful settlement
    conference will almost always be lower than the costs
    associated with their attendance at a due process hearing.
    But if parents' lawyers could not recover fees for attending
    settlement conferences but could recover them for
    attending due process hearings, then they would lack an
    incentive to try to settle disputes prior to a hearing.
    _________________________________________________________________
    3. The only other cases cited by the parties are unhelpful in resolving
    this issue. In Lucht v. Molalla River School District, 
    57 F. Supp. 2d 1060
    ,
    1062 (D. Ore. 1999), the IEP Team Meeting for which the parents
    demanded fees occurred after a due process hearing had taken place.
    And Christopher P. v. Upper Merion Area School District, No. CIV A. 99-
    402 (E.D. Pa., Jan. 19, 2000), does not discuss the impact of the 1997
    amendments.
    16
    Accordingly, an ideal system to hold down overall costs
    must take account of (and encourage) bona fide settlement
    conferences.
    I believe that the best way to hold down overall costs is
    to allow parties to designate meetings as settlement
    conferences rather than IEP Team Meetings. The special
    education world is largely made up of sophisticated, repeat-
    player counsel for both parents and school districts. A clear
    rule that attorneys fees are not recoverable for pre-hearing
    meetings unless the parties agree that the meeting is a
    settlement conference rather than an IEP Team Meeting
    would allow the parties to agree ex ante whether a given
    meeting may later be subject to a claim for fees. School
    districts will not agree to a settlement conference, however,
    unless and until they conclude that further resort to the
    non-adversarial IEP process is unlikely to yield agreement.
    Accordingly, settlement conferences will be held only when
    the choice has truly become one between settlement and a
    formal hearing, and, under such circumstances, IDEA's
    policy of holding down costs is served by allowing recovery
    of fees.
    IV.
    There is neither statutory language nor substantial case
    law defining what constitutes an IEP Team Meeting. 4 But
    _________________________________________________________________
    4. The phrase "meeting of the IEP Team" is contained only in the 1997
    amendments. 20 U.S.C. S 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii). IDEA defines the "IEP Team"
    as "a group of individuals composed of " the child's parents, certain
    teachers, other persons trained in working with children with
    disabilities, other individuals familiar with the child and the local
    curricular offerings, and, whenever appropriate, the child him- or
    herself.
    
    Id. S 1414(d)(1)(B).
    The IEP Team is charged with developing and revising
    a child's IEP and must consider certain factors. Individual members of
    the IEP Team are given certain responsibilities. See 
    id. S 1414(d)(3-5).
    Other provisions of the statute instruct the IEP Team to consider
    particular data or attach consequences to determinations made by the
    IEP Team. See S 1414(c)(1); 
    id. S (2);
    id. S (4); 
    id. S (d)(1)(A)(v)(I);
    
    id.
    S (vii)(II); 
    id. S 1415(k)(1)(B)(ii); 
    id. S (3)(A); 
    id. S (4)(B-C). 
    One
    Section
    attaches specified consequences to a failure of the child's parents to
    inform the IEP Team that they are rejecting a proposed placement for
    their child. See 
    id. S 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(I)(aa).
    Nowhere, however, does
    the
    statute provide real guidance for determining whether a meeting is one
    of the IEP Team.
    17
    absent controlling authority to guide us, I would hold, for
    the reasons stated above, that parties may designate a
    meeting as a settlement conference rather than an IEP
    Team Meeting. Because I believe that under any standard
    of review the parties did so in this case, I conclude that the
    parents' request for attorneys fees is not barred by the
    1997 amendments, and I would affirm the District Court's
    order granting fees on this alternate ground.
    The District Court held that the October 20 meeting was
    an IEP Team Meeting. See A28 ("It is therefore the Court's
    view that regardless of what the meeting was labeled, it was
    a meeting of the IEP team within the meaning of the Act.").
    The Court agrees.5 See opinion of the Court at 5, 7. I do not.
    The first question, which the Court does not even
    address, is the appropriate standard for reviewing the
    District Court's decision that the October 20 meeting was
    one of Daniel's IEP Team. Some of the District Court's
    statements, i.e., those about the identities of the people at
    the meeting, the fact that they signed a sheet titled
    "Settlement Conference," and the matters discussed at the
    meeting, are findings of fact that should be reviewed for
    clear error. On the other hand, the meaning of the phrase
    "meeting of the IEP Team" is a legal question that should be
    reviewed de novo. I need not determine the appropriate
    standard for reviewing the District Court's application of
    _________________________________________________________________
    5. Curiously, the Court appears to suggest that this issue is not before
    us because "[t]he School District takes no issue with the District Court's
    conclusion that the October 20th meeting was an IEP Team Meeting."
    Opinion of the Court at 7. While this observation is true--after all, the
    School District cannot prevail on this appeal unless the October 20
    meeting was one of Daniel's IEP Team--it is also irrelevant. The School
    District has appealed the District Court's judgment awarding attorneys
    fees to the parents. Before this Court, the parents argue, inter alia,
    that
    we should affirm the District Court's judgment because the October 20
    meeting "was not an IEP team meeting." Because a party that ultimately
    prevailed before a district court may urge affirmance on different
    grounds, this issue is properly before us. See Alvin v. Suzuki, No. 99-
    3245, 
    2000 WL 1281478
    , at *1 (3d. Cir., Sept. 12, 2000) (affirming a
    district court's decision to grant summary judgment against a plaintiff
    alleging a procedural due process violation on different grounds from
    those articulated by the district court).
    18
    the law to the facts, however, because I conclude that
    under any standard of review the District Court erred in
    holding that the October 20 meeting was one of Daniel's
    IEP Team.
    I will begin with the objective evidence. Although IDEA
    provides no definition for the phrase "meeting of the IEP
    Team," there are, as I see it, three characteristics of such
    meetings that inform the inquiry, and each of these factors
    supports the conclusion that the October 20 meeting was a
    settlement conference rather than an IEP Team Meeting.
    The first characteristic of an IEP Team Meeting is the
    identities of those in attendance. Unlike every previous
    meeting of Daniel's IEP Team (a series of four meetings
    spanning six months), counsel for both parties attended the
    October 20 meeting. Lawyers are not mentioned in the
    section of IDEA listing members of an IEP Team. See 20
    U.S.C. SS 1414(d)(1)(b)(i)-(vii). In contrast, lawyers are
    mentioned in the section of IDEA providing for the
    procedural rights that parents must be accorded at due
    process hearings. See 
    id. S 1415(h).
    Further, as the admittedly sparse legislative history to
    the 1997 amendments demonstrates, IEP Team Meetings
    are meant to be fora at which parents and school
    administrators--outside the presence of counsel and the
    threat of litigation--can resolve their differences and arrive
    at an IEP best suited to the disabled child's interests. See
    H.R. Rep. No. 105-95, at 105 (1997), reprinted in 1997
    U.S.C.C.A.N. 78, 103 ("The Committee believes that the IEP
    process should be devoted to determining the needs of the
    child and planning for the child's education with parents
    and school personnel. To that end, the bill specifically
    excludes the payment of attorneys' fees for attorney
    participation in IEP meetings, unless such meetings are
    convened as a result of an administrative proceeding or
    judicial action."). Thus, in terms of participants, the
    October 20 meeting was more like a settlement conference
    arranged in anticipation of a due process hearing than a
    typical IEP Team Meeting.
    In its conclusory disagreement, the Court appears to
    adopt the District Court's reasoning that because"the
    parties in attendance, with the exception of Ms. Clausen,
    19
    were members of the IEP team," the meeting was inherently
    "a meeting of the IEP team within the meaning of the Act."
    This seems wrong to me for two reasons. First, it glosses
    over the fact that attorneys for both parties were present6
    (which, for the reasons explained above, is highly
    significant). Second, it assumes that any meeting including
    the members of a child's IEP Team is a "meeting of the IEP
    Team" within the meaning of IDEA. But individuals who
    make up the membership of a group may meet without
    thereby convening the group. The panel of this Court, for
    example, could surely go out for a social lunch without
    constituting the United States Court of Appeals for the
    Third Circuit. While I recognize that the purpose of the
    October 20 meeting was to agree on a satisfactory IEP for
    Daniel (which is, at least, related to the normal purpose of
    an IEP Team meeting), this does nothing to undercut the
    argument that the mere presence of members of the IEP
    Team cannot be decisive.
    A second characteristic of an IEP Team Meeting is its
    subject matter. As the District Court noted in its opinion,
    the parties did meet to discuss Daniel's IEP. In fact, there
    was pressure to agree upon the IEP because neither party
    wanted to go through a due process hearing and risk losing
    control over the outcome while incurring the costs of
    presentation before an administrative tribunal. Thus, while
    the basic subject matter of the October 20 meeting was
    consistent with IEP Team Meetings in general, the
    chemistry of the meeting was transformed by the presence
    of negotiating counsel. In short, the meeting was more like
    the settlement conference it had been titled by the parties
    than like an IEP Team Meeting.
    A final characteristic of IEP Team Meetings--at least in
    Pennsylvania, and not present in this case--is the type of
    notice school districts must provide parents before
    scheduling a meeting. Pennsylvania law requires that
    _________________________________________________________________
    6. The District Court's statement that all those in attendance except
    Clausen (the parents' lawyer) were members of Daniel's IEP Team
    appears to be clearly erroneous. The statement of undisputed facts
    submitted by the parties states that counsel for the School District, who
    was not a member of Daniel's IEP Team, was also present.
    20
    school districts formally notify parents when IEP Team
    Meetings will be held. See 22 Pa. Code 342.32(c)(2). This
    notice must inform the parents of the IEP Team Meeting's
    purpose as well as who will be in attendance. See 
    id. The undisputed
    record reflects that the School District did not
    provide such notice to Daniel's parents before the October
    20 meeting.
    In addition, other aspects of the parties' conduct support
    the view that the October 20 meeting was a settlement
    conference rather than an IEP Team Meeting. The meeting
    was arranged when Clausen (counsel for the parents)
    contacted counsel for the School District. Clausen's letter
    suggesting a meeting referred to it as a "settlement
    conference," and the response by the counsel for the School
    District never objected to this characterization.
    Furthermore, each person in attendance (including counsel
    for the School District but excluding Clausen) signed a
    sheet of paper titled "Settlement Conference." Whether or
    not these two references standing alone would establish as
    a matter of law that what took place on October 20 was not
    an IEP Team Meeting, I can reach no other conclusion
    when the evidence is considered in its entirety. I therefore
    would affirm the District Court's judgment on this alternate
    ground.
    A True Copy:
    Teste:
    Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    21