John Kenney v. Warden Lewisburg USP

ALD-146 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 15-2871
___________
JOHN CHARLES KENNEY,
Appellant
v.
WARDEN LEWISBURG USP
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 1-14-cv-01030)
District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.
February 19, 2016
Before: AMBRO, SHWARTZ and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: February 23, 2016)
_________
OPINION*
_________
PER CURIAM
Appellant John Charles Kenney, an inmate at U.S.P. Lewisburg, appeals from the
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
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District Court’s denial of his habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Because this
appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm. See Third
Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.
Kenney challenges his August 7, 2013 disciplinary proceedings for assaulting
another inmate, in which he was sentenced to 27 days’ loss of good conduct time, loss of
phone privileges, loss of commissary privileges, and loss of visiting privileges for 120
days. Kenney denies committing the assault. He also claims that his disciplinary
proceedings violated his constitutional right to due process for three reasons: (1) the
Disciplinary Hearing Officer (“DHO”) who presided over his hearing refused to call two
witnesses on Kenney’s behalf, (2) the staff representative who was appointed to assist
Kenney refused to conduct pre-hearing preparation and refused to contact people on his
behalf, and (3) insufficiency of the evidence. The District Court agreed that Kenney’s
challenge was to the execution of his sentence, and therefore appropriate under § 2241. It
denied his petition, however, finding that Kenney was afforded his minimum procedural
due process rights as set forth by the Supreme Court’s decision in Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 563-67 (1974). Additionally, finding that the DHO’s findings were
supported by “some evidence,” the District Court held that the DHO’s decision was
entitled to deference. See Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 456-57 (1985).
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We exercise
plenary review over the district court’s legal conclusions and apply a clearly erroneous
constitute binding precedent.
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standard to its factual findings.” Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538
(3d Cir. 2002).
The District Court correctly concluded that Kenney was not denied his
constitutional right to due process. As the Supreme Court has stated, inmates are
afforded the right to: (1) appear before an impartial decision making body; (2) twenty-
four hour advance written notice of the disciplinary charges; (3) an opportunity to call
witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense when it is consistent with
institutional safety and correctional goals; (4) assistance from an inmate representative if
the charged inmate is illiterate or complex issues are involved; and (5) a written decision
of the fact finder of the evidence relied upon and the rationale behind the disciplinary
action.
The record reflects that Kenney was afforded these rights. Kenney was given
written notice of his charges on July 11, 2013, and his hearing was not until August 7,
2013, well over twenty-four hours later. He was afforded a staff representative for his
hearing,1 and does not dispute the impartiality of the DHO who presided over his hearing.
Finally, he was given a written decision with the reasons for his disciplinary action –
multiple eye-witness accounts of prison staff indicated that Kenney kicked Coutinho-
Silva several times in the abdomen and legs on the morning of July 11, 2013. He refused
1
Kenney complains that the staff representative, Mr. Hollenbach, did not conduct pre-
hearing preparation. This is unsupported by the record.
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to stop despite being ordered to do so several times, and stopped only when chemical
agents were deployed on him. D.C. dkt #1-1 at 3.
Kenney complains that two witnesses were not called on his behalf during his
disciplinary hearing: inmate Coutinho-Silva and Lieutenant Roger Miller. He claims that
Coutinho-Silva, whom he allegedly assaulted, would have testified that Kennedy did not
assault him. He testified that Lieutenant Roger Miller would have “clear[ed] all this up.”
D.C. dkt #1-1 at 3. Coutinho-Silva was not called as a witness because he was housed in
a Special Management Unit separate from Kenney at the time of the hearing, and calling
him as a witness would have presented security concerns. Id. His account, which stated
that Kenney did not assault him, was read during the hearing. Id. Miller was not called
as a witness because he documented his eyewitness account of the incident in a
memorandum, which was read during the hearing. Id. The DHO stated that, in any case,
Miller would have been an adverse witness. Id. The DHO’s refusal to call these
witnesses is in line with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Wolff. As the Court stated,
“Although we do not prescribe it, it would be useful for the [DHO] to state its reason for
refusing to call a witness, whether it be for irrelevance, lack of necessity, or the hazards
presented in individual cases.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566. Inmates do not have an
“unqualified right to call witnesses.” Id. We conclude that the DHO’s refusal to call
Coutinho-Silva and Miller did not deprive Kenney of his right to due process.
The District Court also correctly concluded that the DHO’s decision to sanction
Kenney was supported by “some evidence,” as required under Superintendent v. Hill.
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“[W]here good-time credits constitute a protected liberty interest, a decision to revoke
such credits must be supported by some evidence.” 472 U.S. at 447. However,
“[a]scertaining whether the “some evidence” standard is satisfied does not require
examination of the entire record, independent assessment of witnesses’ credibility, or
weighing of the evidence, but, instead, the relevant question is whether there is any
evidence in the record to support the disciplinary board’s conclusion.” 472 U.S. at 455-
56. Here, the DHO explained that the weight of the evidence indicated that Kenney
assaulted Coutinho-Silva because multiple prison staff who were eye-witnesses of the
incident stated that Kennedy committed the assault. The Court therefore correctly
concluded that this meets the “some evidence” standard.
As this appeal presents no substantial question, we grant the Appellees’ motion for
summary affirmance and will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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