United States v. Herminio Galindez

BLD-162 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 13-4249
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
HERMINIO GALINDEZ,
Appellant
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Crim. No. 06-cr-00667-002)
District Judge: Honorable Harvey Bartle III
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Submitted for Possible Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 and
Determination of Whether a Certificate of Appealability is Necessary
January 30, 2014
Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: February 18, 2014)
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM
Herminio Galindez appeals from an order of the District Court that denied his
motion filed pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the order
denying his motion for reconsideration of that decision. As the appeal raises no
substantial question, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s decisions.
In October 2006, Galindez and codefendant Jose Del Valle were arrested by
police, who found cocaine and cash in the vehicle they were occupying. Galindez’s
motion to suppress was denied and a jury in the Eastern District convicted him of
conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846; possession with the intent to
distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(A); and aiding and abetting the possession of 5 kilograms or more of cocaine in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Galindez was
sentenced to 262 months of incarceration. We affirmed the conviction and sentence.
United States v. Galindez, 323 F. App’x 122 (3d Cir. 2009).
Shortly thereafter, Galindez filed a pro se motion in the District Court, styled as a
“Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence.” Attached to the motion was an affidavit from
his codefendant Del Valle, averring that Galindez knew nothing about the drugs in the
vehicle that was stopped and that he was completely innocent of the drug charges. The
District Court denied the motion on October 15, 2009.
In September 2013, Galindez filed a “Request to File a Motion for the Following
Reason Under Rule 60(b)(6).” The basis of his motion is not entirely clear, but he stated
again that he is innocent, attaching Del Valle’s earlier affidavit. He also cited Alleyne v.
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United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013),1 and argued that due process requires a court to
give a defendant “the benefit of clarifying interpretation of the law in fact at the time of
his conviction, even if the judicial clarification did not occur until well after the
Defendant’s conviction was final.” The District Court denied the motion, noting that a
jury had found him guilty, that this Court had found sufficient evidence to sustain his
convictions, and that his claim of innocence was supported with nothing except
conclusory statements. Galindez then filed a timely motion for reconsideration, raising
new claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The District Court denied the motion
without opinion and Galindez appealed. He has filed a document in opposition to this
Court’s listing for possible summary action and also seeks appointment of counsel.
To the extent that Galindez’s motions in the District Court attempted to raise
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or a claim based on Alleyne, his motions were
“if not in substance” § 2255 motions, “at least similar enough that failing to subject
[them] to the same requirements would be inconsistent with” AEDPA. Gonzalez v.
Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 531 (2005) (discussing a Rule 60(b) motion in the context of a §
2254 proceeding); see also Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002)
(“Motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 are the presumptive means by which federal
prisoners can challenge their convictions or sentences that are allegedly in violation of
the Constitution.”). The District Court might have recharacterized the motions as § 2255
1
In Alleyne, the Court held that any fact that increases a mandatory minimum sentence
must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 2163-64.
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motions after giving Galindez proper notice pursuant to United States v. Miller, 197 F.3d
644 (3d Cir. 1999), but such a procedure was not necessary, as a § 2255 motion already
was barred by AEDPA’s statute of limitations at the time Galindez filed his motions.2
United States v. Chew, 284 F.3d 468, 470 (3d Cir. 2002).
To the extent Galindez is attempting to raise a freestanding claim of actual
innocence based on Del Valle’s affidavit, that same claim was denied by the District
Court in October of 2009. Galindez does not explain why he did not attempt to appeal
the denial at that time, or file a timely § 2255 motion raising the claim.
For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s
judgment.3 The motion for appointment of counsel is denied.
2
This Court affirmed Galindez’s conviction on appeal on April 28, 2009. His conviction
thus became final when his time to seek certiorari review expired, in July 2009. Kapral
v. United States, 166 F.3d 565, 570-71 (3d Cir. 1999). Galindez filed his Rule 60(b)
motion in September of 2013. Galindez could, perhaps, argue that his motion is timely
because it is based on Alleyne. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) (one-year period for filing
motion may run from “the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the
Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review”). But apart from the fact that
Galindez does not explain how his claims rely on Alleyne, that case has not been made
retroactively applicable by the Supreme Court. Simpson v. United States, 721 F.3d 875,
876 (7th Cir. 2013).
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We decline to issue a certificate of appealability to the extent one is required.
4