Gabriel Maldonado Vasquez v. Oscar Aviles

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 15-2214
_____________
GABRIEL MALDONADO VASQUEZ,
Appellant
v.
OSCAR AVILES, Director of Corrections, Hudson County Correctional Center;
CHRISTOPHER SHANAHAN, Field Office Director, New York Office - ICE;
SECRETARY UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY;
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
_____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(District Court No. 2-15-cv-02341)
District Judge: Honorable Claire C. Cecchi
_____________________________________
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on November 12, 2015
Before: CHAGARES, RENDELL and BARRY, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: February 24, 2016)
____________
O P I N I O N*
____________
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
RENDELL, Circuit Judge:
Gabriel Maldonado Vasquez appeals the District Court’s dismissal of his 28
U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus petition and its denial of his civil contempt motion. Because
we discern no reversible errors in these rulings, we will affirm the District Court.
I. BACKGROUND
Vasquez was born in Guatemala and is a citizen of that country. In 1993, at the
age of six, he immigrated to the United States. In 2005, he pled guilty to two
misdemeanor offenses—reckless endangerment and theft—and the next year he pled
guilty to resisting arrest. Then, in 2007, an immigration judge ordered him to be removed
and deported to Guatemala. Soon thereafter, he pled guilty to possession of marijuana.
Years later, in 2015, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agents arrested
him and held him in custody pending his removal.
While detained by ICE, Vasquez claimed that he should not be removed because
he was eligible for the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) program,
which allows certain undocumented immigrants to temporarily stay in the country. These
immigrants can be considered for the program even if they are “already in removal
proceedings or subject to a final order of removal.” (App. 118.) To be eligible for
DACA, an individual must satisfy several requirements, one of which mandates that the
individual cannot have “been convicted of . . . a significant misdemeanor offense [or]
multiple misdemeanor offenses.” (App. 117.) Significantly, the decision to grant relief
under the program is an “exercise of prosecutorial discretion.” (App. 118.)
2
To apply for DACA, an individual usually submits an application to U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services. But that process is unavailable to individuals who
are currently “in immigration detention.” (App. 299.) Instead, they must contact their
“deportation officer, the relevant ‘Jail Liaison,’ [or] the ICE Field Office Director.” (Id.)
On April 2, 2015, Vasquez’s counsel was informed by “Deportation Officer
Carey” that Vasquez was “ineligible for DACA due to his misdemeanor convictions.”
(App. 14.) That same day, Vasquez filed a § 2241 habeas petition in the District of New
Jersey. He claimed that his detention violated his due process rights because he was
eligible for DACA relief, and because he was being detained contrary to certain federal
regulations. He also claimed that his detention violated 8 U.S.C. § 1231, which limits
how long one can be detained after a removal order is issued.
The next day, Christopher Shanahan, an ICE field office director, denied an I-246
application for stay of removal that Vasquez had filed soon after he was detained by ICE.
In that application, Vasquez had asserted, among other things, that he deserved a stay of
removal because he was eligible for DACA. Shanahan rejected the application, finding
“no compelling reason to warrant a favorable exercise of [his] discretion.” (App. 115.)
Several days later, on April 7, Vasquez filed an emergency motion to stay his
removal. The next day, a judge granted the motion and ordered a temporary stay. But
that order came too late: Vasquez had been deported to Guatemala three hours before it
was issued. Vasquez subsequently filed a motion to hold the appellees in civil contempt,
claiming they had purposefully violated the stay order by deporting him.
3
On April 24, 2015, the District Court concluded that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over Vasquez’s habeas petition because it was grounded in his 2007 removal
order and therefore was not reviewable by a district court. It also held that, given
Vasquez’s removal from the United States, his petition was moot to the extent that it
challenged the legality and length of his detention. Lastly, it denied his contempt motion,
concluding that the appellees could not have violated the stay order because they had
removed Vasquez three hours before the order was issued.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction1
Under the REAL ID Act, a district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a § 2241
habeas petition if that petition seeks “judicial review of an order of removal.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(5). A petitioner may request review of such an order only “with an appropriate
court of appeals.” Id. Relying on § 1252(a)(5), the District Court held that it lacked
jurisdiction because Vasquez’s petition was “grounded in” his January 2007 removal
order. (App. 7.) We will affirm the District Court, albeit on a different ground.
Vasquez argues that the District Court erred because his § 2241 habeas petition
pertained “to his relief from removal, not the removal order itself.” (Vasquez’s Br. 17.)
In effect, he contends that he was challenging not his removal order but the government’s
subsequent failure to grant him discretionary relief under DACA. For support, he draws
on Nnadika v. Attorney General of United States, 484 F.3d 626 (3d Cir. 2007), a case in
1
We review a district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo.
Gould Electronics Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000).
4
which an individual subject to an order of removal filed a § 2241 petition challenging the
denial of his application for asylum relief. We held that the district court had jurisdiction
to consider his petition because the petition did not “directly implicate the order of
removal,” as it “point[ed] to no legal error in the final order of removal.” Id. at 632–33.
But even if we credit Vasquez’s argument, we must still conclude that the District
Court lacked jurisdiction over his § 2241 petition insofar as it pertained to his claim that
he was entitled to relief under DACA. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), titled “Exclusive
jurisdiction,” “notwithstanding . . . section 2241 of Title 28 . . . no court shall have
jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by . . . any alien arising from the decision or action
by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal
orders against any alien under this chapter.” This provision deprives all courts of
jurisdiction to review a denial of DACA relief because that decision involves the exercise
of prosecutorial discretion not to grant a deferred action. See Reno v. American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 485 (1999) (“Section 1252(g) seems clearly
designed to give some measure of protection to ‘no deferred action’ decisions and similar
discretionary determinations . . . .”). The District Court therefore lacked jurisdiction to
consider Vasquez’s challenge to his denial of DACA relief.
B. Mootness of Habeas Petition2
The District Court also held that Vasquez’s arguments in his § 2241 petition as to
the legality and length of his detention itself became moot upon his removal. On appeal,
2
We review a district court’s dismissal for mootness de novo. See Ne. Women’s Ctr.,
Inc. v. McMonagle, 939 F.2d 57, 61 (3d Cir. 1991).
5
Vasquez argues that his petition did not become moot upon his removal because (1) he
was in custody when he filed it; and (2) he has suffered a collateral consequence from his
removal. Neither argument has merit.
Under § 2241(c), habeas corpus relief “shall not extend to a prisoner unless [h]e is
in custody.” However, “what matters for the ‘in custody’ requirement is whether the
petitioner was in custody at the time his habeas petition was filed.” Kumarasamy v.
Attorney Gen. of U.S., 453 F.3d 169, 173 n.7 (3d Cir. 2006). Accordingly, “[a]s long as
the petitioner was in custody when he filed his petition, a subsequent release from
custody (e.g. a subsequent removal) will not divest the court of jurisdiction.” Id.Vasquez thus contends that “the fact that [he] has been removed does not moot his
petition, since he was in custody when it was filed.” (Vasquez’s Br. 20–21.) But the
District Court never held that Vasquez’s removal caused his petition to become moot
because it no longer satisfied § 2241’s “in custody” requirement. Rather, it correctly held
that his petition was moot insofar as it challenged the legality and length of his detention,
for upon his removal his petition no longer presented a justiciable case or controversy.
“Under Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution, the exercise of judicial
power depends upon the existence of a case or controversy.” Chong v. Dist. Dir., I.N.S.,
264 F.3d 378, 383 (3d Cir. 2001). For a case or controversy to exist, a petitioner,
throughout each stage of the litigation, “must have suffered, or be threatened with, an
actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial
decision.” DeFoy v. McCullough, 393 F.3d 439, 442 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
As a result, “a petition for habeas corpus relief generally becomes moot when a prisoner
6
is released from custody before the court has addressed the merits of the petition.” Id.Nevertheless, a habeas petitioner may obtain judicial review of the petition by
showing that “secondary or ‘collateral injuries’ survive after resolution of the primary
injury.” Chong, 264 F.3d at 384. Vasquez thus argues that his petition is not moot
because he has endured a collateral consequence from his removal. Under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii), an alien “who has been ordered removed . . . and who seeks
admission within 10 years of the date of such alien’s departure or removal . . . is
inadmissible.” Given this ten-year bar to his reentry, Vasquez contends that his removal
has caused him to suffer “a sufficient collateral consequence.” (Vasquez’s Br. 22.)
We disagree. The only argument that Vasquez makes in his § 2241 petition that
could implicate his alleged collateral consequence is that he is entitled to relief under
DACA. That is, if a court agreed with him that the failure to grant him DACA relief was
error, he could remain in the United States and avoid § 1182’s ten-year bar to reentry.
Yet, as discussed above, no court has jurisdiction to review that decision. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(g). Vasquez’s alleged collateral consequence is therefore incapable of being
redressed by any court and cannot save his petition from mootness. See Abdala v. I.N.S.,
488 F.3d 1061, 1064 (3d Cir. 2007) (“For a habeas petition to continue to present a live
controversy after the petitioner’s release or deportation, . . . there must be some
remaining ‘collateral consequence’ that may be redressed by success on the petition.”).
C. Civil Contempt3
3
We review a district court’s denial of a contempt motion for abuse of discretion. See
Robin Woods Inc. v. Woods, 23 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 1994).
7
Lastly, Vasquez argues that the District Court erred when it denied the civil
contempt motion that he filed against the appellees. Specifically, he contends that they
should have been held in contempt because they removed him despite the Court’s order
temporarily staying his removal. But, as the District Court explained, the temporary stay
of removal was not issued until several hours after ICE had removed him. The District
Court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion. See Roe v. Operations
Rescue, 919 F.2d 857, 871 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[T]o show civil contempt, a plaintiff must
establish the following: ‘(1) that a valid court order existed; (2) that the defendants had
knowledge of the order; and (3) that the defendants disobeyed the order.’”).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the rulings of the District Court.
8