Freddy Aguilera Quinjano v. Howard Hufford

CLD-159 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 12-3581
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FREDDY AGUILERA QUINJANO,
Appellant
v.
WARDEN HOWARD HUFFORD;
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 3:11-cv-02254)
District Judge: Honorable James M. Munley
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
March 14, 2013
Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: April 2, 2013)
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM
Freddy Aguilera Quinjano, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court‟s
order denying his habeas petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the reasons that
1
follow, we will summarily affirm.
I.
Because we write primarily for the parties, we discuss the background of this case
only to the extent needed to resolve this appeal. Quinjano is a federal prisoner
incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution at Schuylkill in Minersville,
Pennsylvania. In 1988, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida (hereinafter “SDFL”) sentenced him to thirty years‟ imprisonment for possession
and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute at least five kilograms of cocaine, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. Between 1989 and 1997, three other federal
district courts sentenced him to prison time for various drug-related offenses. The most
recent of those sentences, imposed by the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania (hereinafter “the District Court”), is a life term (without parole)
for violations of § 846 and the federal aiding and abetting statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2.
In 2011, Quinjano commenced this action by filing a pro se habeas petition in the
District Court pursuant to § 2241. The petition essentially took issue with the fact that
the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) was treating his SDFL sentence as a non-parolable
sentence. According to Quinjano, because his SDFL offenses were committed before the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”) went into effect on November 1, 1987,1 he was
eligible for parole from his SDFL sentence.
2
After the Government filed its opposition to the petition, the United States
Magistrate Judge who was assigned to the case issued a report recommending that the
District Court deny the petition on the merits. Quinjano subsequently filed objections to
the report. On August 29, 2012, the District Court overruled those objections, adopted
the Magistrate Judge‟s recommendation, and denied the petition. This appeal followed.
II.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a).2
We review the District Court‟s denial of habeas relief de novo, exercising plenary review
over the court‟s legal conclusions and reviewing its findings of fact for clear error. See
Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2007). We “may affirm the District
Court‟s judgment on any basis supported by the record.” Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d
246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
Having carefully considered Quinjano‟s arguments, we agree with the District
Court‟s decision to deny his request for habeas relief. First, as the District Court
highlighted, there is no evidence that the BOP treated his SDFL sentence as one imposed
under the SRA. Second, he has not established that the BOP erred by failing to treat that
sentence as being subject to parole. It appears that his SDFL offenses may have been
1
The SRA replaced “indeterminate sentences and the possibility of parole with
determinate sentencing and no parole.” Lyons v. Mendez, 303 F.3d 285, 289 (3d Cir.
2002) (per curiam) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
2
Quinjano does not need to obtain a certificate of appealability to proceed with this
appeal. See United States v. Cepero, 224 F.3d 256, 264-65 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc),
abrogated on other grounds by Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641 (2012).
3
committed after the effective date of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (“ADAA”),
which, inter alia, amended 21 U.S.C. § 841 such that “„no person sentenced under
[§ 841(b)(1)(A)] shall be eligible for parole during the term of imprisonment imposed
therein.‟” United States v. Marisio-Gonzalez, 46 F.3d 438, 440 (5th Cir. 1995) (per
curiam) (quoting section 1002 of the ADAA). Even if his SDFL offenses predated the
effective date of the ADAA, he is still ineligible for release on parole in light of the life
sentence imposed against him by the District Court in 1997.3
Because this appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily
affirm the District Court‟s judgment. See 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
3
Quinjano‟s habeas petition, perhaps conveniently, failed to mention his life sentence.
4