Joseph Aruanno v. Dennis Cavanaugh

CLD-080 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 11-4298
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JOSEPH ARUANNO,
Appellant
v.
DENNIS CAVANAUGH;
STEVEN JOHNSON;
JOHN/JANE DOES 1-20
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 11-cv-5778)
District Judge: Honorable William J. Martini
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Submitted for Possible Summary Action
Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
December 30, 2011
Before: RENDELL, HARDIMAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed January 31, 2012)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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PER CURIAM
Joseph Aruanno appeals an order of the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey dismissing his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). We
will affirm the District Court‟s judgment.
I.
Aruanno, who is civilly confined at the Special Treatment Unit (“STU”) in
Kearney, New Jersey pursuant to the New Jersey Sexually Violent Predators Act
(“SVPA”), filed a pro se complaint against the Honorable Dennis Cavanaugh of the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey; Steven Johnson, Assistant
Superintendent of the STU; and John and Jane Doe Defendants.1 He also filed a motion
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”).
In his complaint, Aruanno alleged that his civil rights had been violated as a result
of Judge Cavanaugh‟s conduct and judicial rulings in an unrelated civil case pending in
the District Court, Alves v. Ferguson, Civil No. 01-0789 (DMC) (filed February 15,
2001). Aruanno is one of several consolidated plaintiffs in that case. Aruanno‟s
complaint did not allege any facts describing any wrongdoing by Steven Johnson.
1
The District Court characterized Aruanno‟s entire complaint as a 42 U.S.C. § 1983
action. Because Judge Cavanaugh is a federal employee, that claim should have been
construed as arising under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971).
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By order entered November 15, 2011, the District Court granted the IFP motion
but dismissed the complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B), concluding that it failed to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. This appeal followed.
II.
We have jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of a District Court‟s sua
sponte dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim is plenary, requiring us to draw
all reasonable inferences therefrom in the plaintiff‟s favor. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d
220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). On review, we will summarily affirm the District Court‟s
judgment because no substantial issue is presented on appeal. See L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P.
10.6.
We agree with the District Court that Aruanno‟s claims for damages against Judge
Cavanaugh are barred by judicial immunity. See Azubuko v. v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303
(3d Cir. 2006) (“A judicial officer in the performance of his duty has absolute immunity
from suit and will not be liable for his judicial acts.”). “A judge will not be deprived of
immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess
of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the „clear
absence of all jurisdiction.‟” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (citation
omitted). Indeed, the doctrine of judicial immunity applies even to allegations of malice
or corruption. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967), overruled on other grounds
by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Because none of Judge Cavanaugh‟s
actions at issue in the complaint was taken outside of his judicial capacity, we agree with
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the District Court that Aruanno‟s claims for damages against Judge Cavanaugh are
subject to dismissal. We further agree that Aruanno did not demonstrate any basis for
granting injunctive relief. See Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303-04 (3d Cir. 2006).
The District Court also properly dismissed the complaint as to Defendant Johnson.
Aruanno did not allege that Johnson had any personal involvement in the alleged denial
of his constitutional rights and we have consistently held that “[a] defendant in a civil
rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability cannot be
predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.” Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845
F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).
Ordinarily, a District Court should not sua sponte dismiss a complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim without providing the plaintiff an
opportunity to amend his complaint. As it appears that amendment would be futile, we
conclude that the District Court did not err in declining to afford Aruanno leave to
amend. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).
As this appeal does not raise a substantial question, we will affirm the judgment of
the District Court. See Third Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
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