Hector Tavarez v. Township of Egg Harbor

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 13-2170
HECTOR TAVAREZ,
Appellant
v.
THE TOWNSHIP OF EGG HARBOR;
JAMES J. MCCULLOUGH;
STANLEY GLASSEY;
PAUL HODSON;
JOHN W. RISLEY, JR.;
JOHN CARMAN, JR.;
JOHN DOE (1-10)
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(Civ. No. 1-09-cv-06119)
District Judge: Hon. Joseph H. Rodriguez
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 19, 2014
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, CHAGARES and
NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 16, 2014)
OPINION
McKEE, Chief Judge.
Hector Tavarez appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the
Township of Egg Harbor and individual members of the Township Committee
1
(hereinafter “Egg Harbor”) on the racial discrimination claim asserted against Egg
Harbor. We will affirm.
I.
Inasmuch as the district court has set forth the factual and procedural history of
this case, it is not necessary to repeat that complete history here. Tavarez v. Township of
Egg Harbor, 2013 WL 1288164 (D.N.J. March 25, 2013). Accordingly, we will recite
only as much of the facts and procedural history as are helpful for our brief discussion.
In a “nutshell,” Tavarez alleges that Egg Harbor’s failure to promote him to
Captain of Police in 2007, 2008, and 2009, constituted racial discrimination.1 Summary
judgment motions in § 1981 actions are governed by the burden shifting analysis
established in McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), that are
generally applied in Title VII cases. See Chauhan v. M. Alfieri Co., 897 F.2d 123, 126
(3d Cir. 1990); Brown v. J. Kaz, Inc., 581 F.3d 175, 181-82 (3d Cir. 2009). Under that
burden-shifting analysis, the plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie
case of unlawful discrimination. If the plaintiff meets that burden, the burden of
production shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for the employee’s rejection. If the defendant answers the plaintiff’s prima facie
case with legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its decision, the burden rebounds to
the plaintiff to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s explanation
is pretextual.
1
We note that Tavarez was promoted to Captain in 2011, prior to his retirement from the
Police Department.
2
In the district court, Egg Harbor conceded that Tavarez had established a prima
facie case of racial discrimination for failure to promote based on race for the 2007, 2008
and 2009 promotions at issue. Specifically, Egg Harbor agreed the Tavarez is a member
of a protected class – a Hispanic male; that he was qualified for the position of Captain in
each year but did not receive the promotion; and that a Caucasian male was promoted to
Captain in each year. As a result of these concessions, the issues before the district court
were whether Egg Harbor presented legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for not
promoting Tavarez in the years at issue and whether Tavarez produced any evidence to
show that Egg Harbor’s proffered reasons for not promoting him were pretextual.
In its opinion, the district court carefully and fully explained its reasons for finding
that Egg Harbor offered legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for not promoting
Tavarez in 2007, 2008 and 2009, and for finding that Tavarez failed to demonstrate that
Egg Harbor’s proffered legitimate reasons were pretexts for discrimination. 2013 WL
1288164 at *4-10. We are in complete agreement with the district court’s thoughtful
analysis, and the record supports the court’s findings. Accordingly, we will affirm the
district court substantially for the reasons set forth in the district court’s opinion without
further elaboration.
3