Howard Hill, II v. Attorney General United States

DLD-192 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 12-4337
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HOWARD L. HILL, II,
Appellant
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA; CHARLES E. SAMUELS, Director of
Bureau of Prisons; WARDEN D. SCOTT DODRILL,
Assistant Director of Correctional Programs Division;
HARRELL WATTS, General Counsel, Central Office;
WARDEN J.E. THOMAS, United States Penitentiary,
Lewisburg, Special Management Units
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 3-12-cv-02268)
District Judge: Honorable Richard P. Conaboy
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Submitted for Possible or Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
April 11, 2013
Before: AMBRO, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 9, 2013)
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM
Appellant Howard Hill, II, appeals an order of the District Court denying his habeas
corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, without prejudice to any right he may have to reassert his
claims in a properly filed civil rights action. For the reasons that follow, we will summarily
affirm.
Hill, a federal prisoner confined at the United States Penitentiary in Lewisburg,
Pennsylvania (“USP-Lewisburg”), filed his habeas corpus petition in the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, asserting that he was “a Mental Health Prisoner”
who was placed in the Special Management Unit (“SMU”) upon his transfer to USP-
Lewisburg in May, 2011. Hill claimed that his ongoing placement in the SMU, which resulted
from disciplinary proceedings at his former place of incarceration, is unlawful under the
Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 553. He argued that the creation of the
SMU was undertaken by the Bureau of Prisons without proper publication, notice to prisoners,
and an opportunity for comment, all as required by the APA. Moreover, the conditions in the
SMU are deficient with respect to the amount and type of mental health care provided, among
other things. Hill sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including his immediate transfer
into the general population.
In an order entered on November 16, 2012, the District Court denied the petition
without prejudice, reasoning that habeas corpus review is available only where the deprivation
of constitutional rights impacts the fact or length of the prisoner’s detention, Leamer v. Fauver,
288 F.3d 532 (3d Cir. 2002). Hill’s claims did not meet this test. He did not claim entitlement
to a speedier release from custody, nor was he challenging the legality of his present
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incarceration. Moreover, although section 2241 allows a prisoner to challenge the execution of
his sentence, Woodall v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2005), Hill did
not contend that he had been sanctioned to a loss of good conduct time. Rather, his challenge
was to the conditions of his confinement in the SMU, which must be raised in a properly filed
civil rights action.
Hill appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.1 The parties were advised
that we might act summarily to dispose of this appeal, and were invited to submit argument in
writing. Hill has submitted argument which we have considered. Specifically, he argues that
he may bring his claims under the APA in a petition for writ of habeas corpus, citing Pimental
v. Gonzalez, 367 F. Supp.2d 365 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), and he argues that USP-Lewisburg’s SMU
program violates the APA. He disagrees with the District Court that his real challenge is to the
BOP’s housing determination in his case and the conditions of his confinement.
We will summarily affirm the order of the District Court because no substantial
question is presented by this appeal, Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. We agree with
the District Court that Hill’s claim, if successful, would not result in his speedier release from
custody; it thus does not lie at “the core of habeas corpus.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74,
82 (2005). See also Leamer, 288 F.3d at 542-44. Nor does Hill’s claim fall within the narrow
jurisdictional ambit of Woodall, 432 F.3d 235. In Woodall, we addressed whether a challenge
to BOP regulations that limited a prisoner’s placement in community confinement to the lesser
of ten percent of his total sentence or six months was cognizable in federal habeas corpus. We
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The District Court’s order dismissing the habeas corpus petition without prejudice is final and
appealable because the deficiency in the petition cannot be corrected without affecting the
cause of action, see Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 50, 51 (3d Cir. 1976).
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held that it was a proper challenge to the execution of a prisoner’s sentence because placement
in the community is something more than a simple transfer from one prison to another or from
one unit to another. Pimental, 367 F. Supp.2d 365, on which Hill relies, also involved a
challenge to the BOP’s rule that categorically limited a prisoner’s community confinement to
the last 10% of his sentence, not to exceed six months.
Hill’s claims, in contrast, are not a challenge to the execution of his sentence and are not
cognizable in federal habeas corpus because he seeks to invalidate procedures used to confine
him in the SMU. Success for him means at most that he would be released into the general
population; it would not mean a shorter stay in prison or placement in the community.
Accordingly, section 2241 is not available to him to bring the APA claims.
For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the order of the District Court
denying Hill’s petition for writ of habeas corpus without prejudice.
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