Lui v. Comm Adult Ent

Opinions of the United
2004 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
5-26-2004
Lui v. Comm Adult Ent
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential
Docket No. 03-2437
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PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF Argued April 19, 2004
APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge,
__________ GARTH, and BRIGHT * , Circuit Judges
No. 03-2437 (Filed: May 26, 2004)
__________
OPINION
JEFFREY LUI, DAVID LUI, and __________
FANTASIA RESTAURANT &
LOUNGE, INC.,
Lewis H. Robertson(Argued)
a corporation of the State of Delaware
Lewis H. Robertson, P.C.
Appellants
116 Oceanport Avenue
Little Silver, New Jersey 07739
v.
Attorney for Appellants,
COMM ISSION ON ADULT
Jeffrey Lui, David Lui and
ENTERTAINMENT
Fantasia Restaurant & Lounge, Inc.
ESTABLISHMENTS OF THE STATE
OF DELAWARE,
an entity within the State of Delaware
Thomas H. Ellis(Argued)
Department of Administrative
Deputy Attorney General
Services, Division of Business &
State of Delaware Department of Justice
Occupation Recreation,
820 North French Street, 6 th floor
M. JANE BRADY, in her capacity as
Carvel State Building
Attorney General of the
Wilmington, Delaware 19801
State of Delaware, STATE OF
DELAWARE, and
Attorney for Appellees,
NEW CASTLE COUNTY, a political
Commission on Adult
subdivision
Entertainment Establishments of
of the State of Delaware
the State of Delaware, M. Jane
Brady, and State of Delaware
__________
On Appeal from the United States
District Court
for the District of Delaware *
Myron H. Bright, Circuit Judge,
Civil Action No. 02-177
United States Court of Appeals for the
District Judge: Honorable Kent A. Jordan
Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
1
Mary A. Jacobson(Argued) the sole shareholder of Fantasia, and his
Assistant County Attorney son Jeffrey Lui is the general manager of
New Castle County Office of Law Fantasia. Lui desires to offer nude
87 Reads Way dancing at Fantasia. In order to do so, Lui
New Castle, Delaware 19720 must satisfy the zoning and licensing
requirements imposed by both New Castle
Attorney for Appellee, New Castle County and the State of Delaware.
County
New Castle County (the “County”)
requires the owner or proprietor, in this
Garth, Circuit Judge:
case Lui, who wishes to offer nude
Appellants Jeffrey Lui, David Lui dancing, to first obtain zoning certification
and Fantasia Restaurant & Lounge, Inc. (a permit or license) from the County. To
appeal from the District Court’s summary obtain County zoning certification, Lui
judgment in favor of Appellees based on had to satisfy the New Castle County
the abstention doctrine announced in Department of Planning that the location
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). of the proposed adult entertainment
After Lui1 filed the instant appeal, the establishment complied with the zoning
Delaware Superior Court rejected on the and subdivision provisions of the New
merits Lui’s motion to dismiss the Castle County Unified Development Code
criminal prosecution pending against him, (the “County Code”). In particular, Lui
which arose out of Lui’s failure to obtain was required to co mply with
an adult entertainment establishment § 40-133(a)(13) of the County Code,
license. For the reasons set forth below, which mandates that adult entertainment
we will affirm the District Court’s establishment be 2,800 feet from a church
decision to abstain under Younger, but we or other place of worship, and sets limits
will remand the case to the District Court on proximity to schools, residences, and
with direction to discharge the stay and other adult entertainment establishments.2
dismiss the case with prejudice.
I. 2
§ 40-133(a)(13) states in
Fantasia Restaurant & Lounge, Inc. relevant part:
(“Fantasia”) is a bar and restaurant located
at 1031 South Market Street (Route 13) in Massage parlors which provide services
New Castle County, Delaware. Fantasia on and/or off premises, adult bookstores
currently offers exotic dancing by women and adult entertainment centers shall
dressed in brief costumes. David Lui is be permitted as follows:
(a) No such use shall be permitted within
500 feet of any property containing a
1
Appellants will collectively be dwelling or other residence located
referred to as “Lui.” within any residentially zoned district.
1
Once zoning certification is secured cannot obtain a State license necessary to
from the County, the requirements operate an adult entertainment
imposed by the State of Delaware (the establishment in New Castle County
“State”) pursuant to the Delaware Adult without first receiving a permit from the
Entertainment Establishments Act (the County demonstrating compliance with
“Act”), 24 Del. C. Ch. 16, must be the applicable provisions of the County
satisfied. This Act required Lui to file an Code. See Amico v. New Castle County,
application for an adult entertainment 571 F. Supp. 160, 163 n.3 (D. Del. 1983).
establishment zoning certification with the Indeed, the Act prohibits all counties in
Delaware Commission on Adult the State of Delaware from issuing permits
Entertainment Establishments. Lui’s or licenses for adult entertainment
application had to include a copy of the establishments unless their distance
County’s zoning review results. The State restrictions match those decreed by the
would then review the application to State.
ensure that Fantasia’s proposed location
A.
complied with all local laws and
ordinances, pursuant to 24 Del. C. Lui filed his first request for
§ 1610(a).3 Effectively, an applicant County zoning certification on July 30
1996, before construction of Fantasia was
underway. In his application, Lui stated
(b) No such use shall be permitted within that Fantasia would be located more than
2,800 feet of a school, church or other 2,800 feet from any house of worship. On
place of worship. August 12, 1996, the New Castle County
(c) No such use shall be permitted within Department of Planning granted Lui’s
1,500 feet of each other. request for zoning certification, but
3
24 Del. C. § 1610 provides, in stipulated that because Fantasia had yet to
relevant part: be constructed, the “certification may
(a) No license issued under this chapter
shall authorize the licensee to engage in 500 feet of any residence regardless of
or carry on the business of operating an how such property is zoned, or within
adult entertainment establishment in any 2,800 feet from a church or school . . .
place other than the premises set forth in Distances shall be measured from
said license. . . property line to property line.
*** (d) Notwithstanding any provision of
(c) No new adult entertainment law to the contrary, no municipal
establishment as defined in § 1602 of corporation or county may adopt any
this title shall operate in the same ordinance or charter amendment with
building or in separate buildings less distance restrictions less than those
than 1,500 feet from each other, within provided in this section.
2
become null and void due to changing B.
conditions in the future.” On August 23,
On November 22, 2000, Fantasia
1996, the County’s certification was
opened for business. Lui concedes that
revoked because Fantasia was, in fact,
Fantasia offers live female exotic dancers
located within 2,800 feet of a church. Lui
dressed in brief costumes, which cover the
appealed, and the revocation was affirmed
genitals and the areola region of the
by the New Castle County Board of
breast, and that Fantasia is located within
Adjustment. Lui appealed that
2,800 feet of a church.
determination to the Delaware Superior
Court. On December 31, 2001, Lui was
criminally indicted by the State of
Lui filed a second request for
Delaware on three counts of operating and
County zoning certification on September
conspiring to operate an adult
24, 1996. He argued that the church that
entertainment establishment without
was located within 2,800 feet of the
obtaining an Adult Entertainment
Fantasia site had ceased to operate as a
Establishment zoning certification. On
church, and that the County’s denial of
April 30, 2002, Lui filed a motion to
certification violated his due process
dismiss the state indictment, challenging
rights. The New Castle County
the constitutionality of the Act and of
Department of Planning again denied
§ 40-133(a)(13) of the County Code.5
Lui’s application, and the Board of
Adjustment affirmed. In State court, Lui argued that the
restrictions imposed by the State and
Lui appealed to the Delaware
County effectively deny adequate
Superior Court, which consolidated Lui’s
alternative avenues of communication for
two appeals and denied both in a
the presentation of adult entertainment.
November 20, 1998 opinion. Fantasia
Rest. & Lounge, Inc. v. New Castle County
Bd. of Adjustment, 735 A.2d 424 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1998). The Delaware Supreme compliance with § 40-133(a)(13) of the
Court affirmed. Fantasia Rest. & Lounge, County’s zoning code. In May 2002,
Inc. v. New Castle County Bd. of counsel for Lui asked the State to
Adjustment, 734 A.2d 641 (Del. 1999).4 withhold action on Lui’s application.
5
As stated above, 24 Del. C.
§ 1610(d) directs that no “county may
4
In late March or early April adopt any ordinance or charter
2002, Lui submitted a third application amendment with distance restrictions
for zoning certification. This time, Lui less than those provided in this section,”
applied directly to the State Commission thus subjecting Fantasia to the relevant
– he did not first secure zoning portions of New Castle County’s Unified
certification from the County in Development Code.
3
See State of Delaware v. Fantasia Rest. & (citing N.W. Enters v. City of Houston,
Lounge, Inc., et al., Nos. 0112001060, 352 F.3d 162, 182 (5th Cir. 2003)).
0109002426, 0112000958 (Del. Super. Ct.
The State prosecution against Lui is
filed Mar. 9, 2004). On March 9, 2004,
presently pending.
the Delaware Superior Court denied Lui’s
motion to dismiss, holding that the State C.
and County zoning laws at issue
On March 11, 2002, Lui filed a
constituted reasonable time, place and
four count Complaint pursuant to 42
manner regulations of protected speech
U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District
because (1) they are content-neutral; (2)
Court for the District of Delaware. He
they are narrowly tailored to serve a
filed an Amended Complaint on April 24,
substantial government interest; and (3)
2002. The Complaint echoed the
they leave open adequate alternative areas
arguments Lui raised in his motion to
of communication. See id.
dismiss the State court indictment. He
Specifically, the Superior Court made the following four allegations:
determined that the laws are content-
Count 1: that the Act and County
neutral because they do not constitute a
Code violate the First Amendment;
total ban on adult entertainment, but
merely “ban adult entertainment Count 2: that the County’s
establishments from some parts of the requirement that he pay a $500 application
state and county based upon location.” Id. fee (while a fee of $50 is typical), and the
at 12. The laws, which set the minimum State’s requirement that he include the
distance between an adult entertainment results of his County zoning review in his
establishment and a church or school, are State application, violate the Equal
narrowly tailored to serve a substantial Protection Clause;
government interest because they “are
Count 3: that the State prosecution
particularly aimed at protecting those of
of Lui was motivated by his race6 and
tender age and/or seeking spiritual
violated his Due Process and Equal
guidance from exposure to the negative
Protection rights; and
effects o f a d u l t e n te r t a in ment
establishments.” Id. at 13. And they leave Count 4: that the Act is
open adequate alternative areas of unconstitutionally broad.
communication because Lui has
Lui sought declaratory and injunctive
acknowledged that twelve available
relief, monetary damages, and fees and
potential adult use locations exist within
New Castle County, a number which the
Superior Court found to be
6
“constitutionally sufficient for purposes of The record indicates that Jeffrey
the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 23 and David Lui are of Chinese-American
descent.
4
costs pertaining to Count One; declaratory In its January 31, 2003 order, the
and injunctive relief, monetary damages District Court held that:
from the County only,7 and fees and costs
(1)Lui’s claims for equitable relief
on Count Two; and declaratory and
are dismissed without prejudice;
injunctive relief and fees and costs from
the State only on Counts Three and Four. (2) Lui’s claims for monetary
damages against the State of Delaware, M.
Lui moved for partial summary
Jane Brady, and the Commission on Adult
judgment on Count One (violation of the
Entertainment Establishments of the State
First Amendment), and alternatively for a
of Delaware are dismissed with prejudice;
preliminary injunctio n preventing
enforcement of the State Act, 24 Del. C. (3)Partial summary judgment is
§ 1610, and the County Code, § 40- entered for New Castle County against Lui
133(a)(13). He argued that the restrictions on the issue of the County’s liability for
imposed by the State and County damages under Count One of Lui’s
effectively deny adequate alternative Amended Complaint; and
avenues of communication for the
(4)Further activity is stayed until
presentation of adult entertainment. The
the final resolution of Lui’s criminal
County cross-moved for summary
prosecution by the State of Delaware, now
judgment, and both the State and the
pending in Delaware Superior Court.
County filed motions to dismiss Lui’s
Amended Complaint. The District Court’s order did not
identify each Count in its disposition. We
Both the State and County argued
have been able to cure that deficiency by
that the District Judge was required to
reference to the proceedings and the
abstain from exercising jurisdiction under
District Court opinion, to the following
the doctrine announced in Younger v.
effect: The equitable claims made in
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), because of the
Count One were dismissed without
ongoing criminal prosecution of Lui in
prejudice under Younger. The District
state court. The County also argued that it
Court determined that the State and
could not be held liable for enforcing a
County were immune to money damages
zoning restriction imposed upon the
under the Eleventh Amendment and state
County by State law.
law. Accordingly, the claim for money
damages against the State and County
were dismissed with prejudice. As to
7
Lui conceded that the State was Count Two, the equitable claims
immune to Lui’s claims for damages pertaining to Equal Protection were
under the Eleventh Amendment. Lui dismissed without prejudice, and the
also withdrew all claims against claims for monetary damages and fees and
defendant M. Jane Brady, Attorney costs were stayed. At oral argument,
General of Delaware.
5
counsel for Lui stipulated that all of Count dismiss Lui’s appeal for lack of appellate
Two should be regarded as having been jurisdiction.
dismissed with prejudice. Counts Three
We address jurisdiction of this
and Four sought only equitable relief, and
Court at the outset. Although the
were dismissed by the District Court
timeliness of Lui’s appeal was questioned
without prejudice. In his appellate brief,
by the County, our independent analysis
Lui conceded that Counts Three and Four
shows that the County’s claim of
were properly the subject of Younger
untimeliness is without merit for two
abstention.
reasons. First, the order which the County
Thus, what remains for us to decide identified as being “final” was, in fact,
is whether the District Judge erred in interlocutory, as it was “without
applying Younger abstention to Count prejudice.” See Borelli v. City of Reading,
One, and whether he erred by retaining 532 F.2d 950, 951-52 (3d Cir. 1976) (per
jurisdiction over Lui’s claim for fees and curiam). Second, the District Court
costs brought in the same Count.8 retained jurisdiction over the fees and
costs claimed by Lui under Count One,
Lui filed a timely appeal from the
thereby ostensibly leaving its order non-
District Court’s orders of January 31, 2003
final.
and February 27, 2003.
This latter issue, which we discuss
II.
later in this opinion, did not affect the
The District Court had jurisdiction finality of the District Court’s order,
over Lui’s federal action pursuant to 28 however, because a ruling which orders
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3) and (4). Younger abstention transfers the entire
Lui asserts that this Court has jurisdiction proceeding to the State court for
over the instant appeal pursuant to 28 adjudication, including all of its collateral
U.S.C. § 1291. The County moved to aspects – in this case, fees and costs. We
have therefore held that a district court’s
Younger abstention order constitutes a
8
In its February 27, 2003 opinion, final, appealable order under 28 U.S.C.
the District Court denied Lui’s motion § 1291 because, under Younger v. Harris,
for reargument without prejudice to a the effect of such an order is to surrender
later filing of a motion to reconsider, jurisdiction of the federal action to a state
which the District Judge restricted to the court. By doing so, the Younger
issue of the availability of fees and costs abstention order becomes immediately
pursuant to § 1988. In effect, the appealable. See Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d
District Court retained jurisdiction over 101, 105 (3d. Cir. 1989); Moses H. Cone
the fees and costs, as they pertained to Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
Count One (violation of the First 460 U.S. 1, 10 (1983). As we said in
Amendment). Schall:
6
Because we are convinced (3d Cir. 1992).
that ‘the object’ of the
IV.
district court’s [order and]
stay was ‘to require all or an We now turn to the question at the
essential part of the federal heart of this appeal – was the District
suit to be litigated in a state Court’s decision to invoke Younger
forum,’ Moses H. Cone, 460 abstention proper? Lui asserts that the
U.S. at 10 n. 11, we District Court erred in applying Younger
conclude that the district in this case.
court’s stay order was an
We have had a longstanding public
abstention order that is final
policy against federal court interference
within the meaning of 28
with state court proceedings. Younger has
U.S.C. § 1291.
taught us that federal courts should not act
885 F.2d at 105.9 to restrain a criminal prosecution where
the appellant here, has an adequate remedy
III.
at law in state court and will not suffer
This Court exercises plenary review irreparable injury if denied equitable
over the District Court’s legal relief. Moreover, this principle, Younger
determination that the requirements for teaches,
Younger abstention have been met.
is reinforced by an even
University of Maryland v. Peat Marwick
more vital consideration, the
Main & Co., 923 F.2d 265, 270 (3d Cir.
notion of ‘comity,’ that is, a
1991). If the requirements for abstention
proper respect for state
have been met, this Court reviews the
functions, a recognition of
District Court’s decision to abstain under
the fact that the entire
Younger abstention principles for abuse of
country is made up of a
discretion. Gwynedd Properties, Inc. v.
Union of separate state
Lower Gwynedd Tp., 970 F.2d 1195, 1199
governments, and a
continuance of the belief
9
We also had concerns as to t h a t t h e N at i o n al
whether we had jurisdiction to entertain Government will fare best if
this appeal because Count Two was the States and their
dismissed by the District Court without institutions are left free to
prejudice. As noted in text, when we perform their separate
raised this question with counsel for Lui functions in their separate
at oral argument, he conceded that Count ways.
Two should be dismissed with prejudice, 401 U.S. at 44. Accordingly, Younger
and he forwarded a letter to us states that “it has been perfectly natural for
acknowledging that fact.
7
our cases to repeat time and time again defending a pending criminal prosecution
that the normal thing to do when federal in State court. Second, the District Court
courts are asked to enjoin pending Judge concluded that the State’s criminal
proceedings in state courts is not to issue prosecution of Lui implicated important
such injunctions.” Id. at 45. State courts State interests – namely, the State’s effort
are every bit as competent to deal with the to control the negative effects of adult
claims of the appellant (in this case, the entertainment establishments through the
defendant in the criminal proceeding) as enforcement of its zoning laws. Third, the
are the federal courts and this, of course, District Court Judge held that Lui had
includes the ability to address claims failed to carry his burden of showing that
under both the State constitution and the he could not present his constitutional
Federal constitution. Thus, we have been claims as a defense in State court. See
instructed that the concerns of comity and Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1,
federalism which underlie the Younger 14 (1987) (“the burden on this point rests
doctrine command the federal courts to on the federal plaintiff to show that state
respect the independence and functioning procedural law barred presentation of its
of the state courts. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 claims.”). Furthermore, as we noted
U.S. 362, 380 (1976). above, Lui had already filed a motion to
dismiss the State indictment which
Following Younger, this Court has
challenged the constitutionality of the
set out a three-prong test to determine
State zoning statute. Thus the District
whether courts should abstain from
Court concluded that Lui had the
addressing the merits of a federal action in
opportunity to raise all of his
the face of ongoing state criminal
constitutional claims in State court.
litigation. Abstention under Younger is
appropriate only where: (1) there are On appeal, Lui argues that Younger
ongoing state proceedings that are judicial abstention was not proper because Count
in nature; (2) the state proceedings One of his federal claim does not
implicate important state interests; and (3) implicate important state interests, and
the state proceedings afford an adequate because the State proceedings might not
opportunity to raise the federal claims. afford him an adequate opportunity to
Gwynedd Properties, Inc. v. Lower raise his federal claims. Reviewing the
Gwynedd Tp., 970 F.2d 1195, 1200 (3d District Court’s Younger analysis under a
Cir. 1992). plenary standard, we reject both of Lui’s
arguments. First, Count One implicates
In the instant case, the District
the State’s valid and important interest in
Court Judge determined that all three
regulating the location and effect on the
prongs of the Gwynedd Properties test
community of adult entertainment
were met, and Younger abstention should
establishments, particularly their effect on
therefore be invoked. First, it was
individuals attending school or a house of
undisputed that Lui was – and still is –
8
worship. See Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, unconstitutional.10 But here, as in
Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 121 (1982) (zoning Younger, a criminal proceeding raising the
laws may be validly used to regulate the same issues and affording Lui an
environment around schools and churches, opportunity to assert all of his
given the legitimate interest in insulating constitutional claims was pending in State
them fro m certain commercial court. As Younger teaches us, any injury
establishments). to which such a defendant may be exposed
is solely “that incidental to every criminal
Second, it is beyond dispute that
proceeding brought lawfully and in good
the State court prosecution has afforded
faith.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 49 (internal
Lui an opportunity to raise his sole
quotations omitted).
remaining federal claim – Count One
(Lui’s First Amendment claim). By the We are satisfied that the record and
time Lui filed his federal action, he had the principles we have related clearly
already brought a motion to dismiss the demonstrate that there is no merit to the
charges filed against him by the State, and arguments that Lui has advanced. The
that motion, among other things, District Court Judge did not abuse his
challenged the constitutionality of the discretion when he determined that all
State Act. See State v. Fantasia Rest. & three prongs of the Gwynedd Properties
Lounge, Nos. 0112001060, 0109002426, test were met, because (1) Lui is
0112000958 (Del. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 9, defending a pending criminal prosecution
2004). Indeed, the submissions made by in state court, (2) the prosecution
Lui in defense of the State criminal implicates the State’s interest in
charges are identical to the Amended controlling the negative effects of adult
Complaint which he filed in Federal court entertainment establishments, and (3) Lui
and from which the District Court has actually did raise, albeit unsuccessfully,
abstained. Thus it is not surprising that his constitutional claims as a defense to
the District Court concluded that Lui has his prosecution in State court. The
the opportunity to raise his Federal
constitutional claims in State court.
10
See Samuels v. Mackell, 401
We have previously noted that the U.S. 66 (1971) (holding that declaratory
District Court dismissed all of Lui’s relief is improper when a prosecution
equitable claims, which included a request involving the challenged state statute is
for an injunction to prevent enforcement pending in state court at the time the
of the State Act and the County Code federal suit is initiated, and the same
against him, and a declaratory judgment principles that govern the propriety of
that the State Act and the County Code are federal injunctions of State criminal
proceedings govern the issuance of
federal declaratory judgments in
connection with such proceedings).
9
District Court did not err in abstaining awards to the party who prevails on the
pursuant to Younger v. Harris, supra. merits of the federal claim. See Healy v.
Town of Pembroke Park, 831 F.2d 989V.
(11th Cir. 1987). Defense of a State
Having determined that the District criminal prosecution is not a proceeding
Court correctly analyzed Lui’s claims in for which fees and costs can be awarded
accordance with the principles and under § 1988. See Venuti v. Riordan, 702
instruction of Younger v. Harris, we are F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1983); see also Greer v.
obliged to hold that the District Court did Holt, 718 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1983). Thus,
not correctly implement its order because even a successful defense of the State
it retained jurisdiction over Court One as criminal charges would not entitle Lui to
it pertained to fees and costs, and we now seek fees and costs in federal court, and
address that issue. In Moses H. Cone, the the stay of those claims was therefore in
Supreme Court observed that where “a error.
stay of the federal suit pending resolution
VI.
of the state suit meant that there would be
no further litigation in the federal forum; Having held that the District Court
[then] the state court’s judgment on the did not err in abstaining from deciding the
issue would be res judicata . . . [and the] merits of Lui’s federal complaint, we have
stay order amounts to a dismissal of the no occasion to address the merits of Lui’s
suit.” Moses H. Cone, 400 U.S. at 10. In constitutional arguments. These were
Schall, this Court extended the holding in properly transferred to the Delaware
Moses H. Cone, which was a Colorado courts, and are not the subject of our
River abstention case, to the Younger analysis. Indeed, the opinion of the
abstention context. Thus, as we noted Delaware Superior Court, which was filed
above, a Younger abstention stay requires during the pendency of Lui’s federal
a dismissal with prejudice of the federal appeal, reflects that the Delaware Superior
suit. Court, addressing the exact same
constitutional claims made by Lui here,
The District Court’s February 27,
rejected on the merits all of the issues
2003 order, see note 8, supra, implies that
which Lui sought to have us decide. This
if Lui were successful on the merits in
being so, if for no other reason, the
State criminal court he could then revisit a
doctrines of res judicata on the one
portion of his federal claims to seek fees
hand,11 or Rooker-Feldman on the other,12
and costs from the State and County
ostensibly under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and
thus a stay of those claims was
11
appropriate. We cannot agree. Section Res judicata bars suit where
1988(b), which governs fee and cost there was (1) an earlier decision on the
awards for § 1983 claims, allows such issue, (2) a final judgment on the merits,
and (3) the involvement of the same
10
would militate against our deciding the
merits of the federal claim in any event.
One thing more needs to be said.
The stay which the District Court imposed
on the request for fees and costs in Count
One must, as a matter of law, be
discharged. As we have pointed out, the
abstention order transferred the whole “kit
‘n caboodle” of Count One to the state
court to be adjudicated. Thus the fees and
costs, as well as all the other elements of
Count One, no longer remained in the
federal court, and the District Court could
not under any circumstance rule on those
issues.
Thus, we will affirm the District
Court in all respects except one – we are
obliged to reverse and remand to the
District Court the stay which was
improviden tly and consequentl y
erroneously entered pertaining to the fees
and costs. The District Court is instructed
to correct its judgment accordingly, so that
all matters that remained in the District
Court are now remitted to the Delaware
Superior Court for adjudication.
parties, or parties in privity with the
original parties. Restatement (Second)
of Judgments §§ 17, 24 (1982).
12
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine
divests a federal district court of
jurisdiction if the plaintiff’s claim was
either (1) actually litigated in state court
or (2) if the claim is inextricably
intertwined with the prior state court
ruling. See Desi’s Pizza, Inc. v. City of
Wilkes-Barre, 321 F.3d 411, 419 (3d Cir.
2003).