Cyrus Sanders v. Stephen Downs

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 10-1783
___________
CYRUS R. SANDERS,
Appellant
v.
STEPHEN G. DOWNS, The Bradford County District Attorney.;
ALBERT C. ONDREY, Assistant District Attorney; FRANCIS D.
RINEER, Assistant District Attorney.; GREG HOSTETTLER,
Bradford County Detective; CAPTAIN DONALD C. PETERS;
TROOPER BERNOSKY; TROOPER PETROS; DAVID C.
PELACHICK; GEORGE C. CONFER; UNKNOWN TROOPERS,
Pennsylvania State Police; DANIEL J. BARRETT, District Attorney
Bradford County; JEFFREY SMITH, Bradford County Judge;
MARYLOU VANDERPOOL, Bradford County Court Administrator;
JOHN KERN, JR.; LEONARD SIMPSON, District Attorney Sullivan
County; CYNTHIA DUNLAP
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 08-cv-01560)
District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 14, 2011
Before: SLOVITER, FISHER and WEIS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 22, 2011)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM.
Cyrus Sanders, a prisoner proceeding pro se, filed in the District Court a
complaint under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. Sanders appeals from the District Court’s
order granting the defendant-appellees’ motion to dismiss. For the reasons that follow,
we will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand the matter for further proceedings.
I.
Sanders’ complaint, filed in August 2008, alleged that his constitutional
rights were violated by four different groups: the Pennsylvania State Police and Bradford
County police officers; Cynthia Dunlap, a private citizen; prosecutors in Bradford and
Sullivan Counties; and officials of the Court of Common Pleas, Bradford County. The
complaint arose from two courses of conduct.
First, in January 2006, Sanders was arrested at his home on a fugitive
warrant. Sanders claimed that he refused the arresting officers’ request to search his
property, but, notwithstanding his refusal, the officers conspired with Cynthia Dunlap to
obtain such permission, even though she did not have authority to give such consent.1
Sanders contended that, “[a]fter Petitioner was taken to the Bradford County P.S.P.
Barracks, an extensive search was made at his home without a warrant or Petitioner’s
consent.” D. Ct. Doc. No. 1, 6 ¶ 35. In his amended complaint, Sanders further alleged
that “[m]embers of the P.S.P. deprived Petitioner, who was at the scene and readily
1
Nothing in the record explains the nature of Sanders’ relationship to Ms. Dunlap.
At a minimum, it appears that Dunlap was a guest on Sanders’ property, and he
believes that officers agreed to overlook Dunlap’s possession of drug paraphernalia in
exchange for her agreement to allow a search of Sanders’ property.
2
available, of the right to refuse consent to a warrantless search of his home . . . .” D. Ct.
Doc. No. 21, 17 ¶ 65. As a result of the search, Sanders -- who had been incarcerated
since the day of the search -- was charged with additional crimes and convicted. Sanders
argued that the conspiracy and unlawful search violated his constitutional rights.
Second, Sanders alleged that between June 2006 and March 2007, while he
was incarcerated, certain individuals, including Dunlap, stole thousands of dollars in
property from his home. Sanders and his personal representative made several attempts
to obtain assistance from the police, prosecutors, and the courts, but received no help.
Sanders claimed that the various officials’ failures to act violated his constitutional rights
to due process and equal protection.
The defendants filed motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). The Magistrate Judge recommended that the complaint be
dismissed, and the District Court granted the motions over Sanders’ objections. Sanders
appealed.
II.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we may affirm on
any grounds supported by the record. See Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 122 n.1 (3d
Cir. 2001). We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s order dismissing
Sanders’ complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). See Capogrosso v. Sup. Ct. of New Jersey, 588
F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing McGovern v. Philadelphia, 554 F.3d 114, 115 (3d
Cir. 2009)). “We accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and draw all
3
reasonable inferences in [Sanders’] favor.” McGovern, 554 F.3d at 115. “The District
Court’s judgment is proper only if, accepting all factual allegations as true and construing
the complaint in the light most favorable to [Sanders], we determine that [he] is not
entitled to relief under any reasonable reading of the complaint.” Id. Although the
District Court appropriately dismissed the bulk of Sanders’ claims, we conclude that the
District Court erred in dismissing his unlawful search claim.
The District Court reasoned that Sanders’ unlawful search claim was barred
by the statute of limitations. In § 1983 cases, federal courts apply the state personal
injury statute of limitations, which is two years in Pennsylvania. See Smith v. Holtz, 87
F.3d 108, 111 & n.2 (3d Cir. 1996); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524 (West 2004). “A
[§] 1983 cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the
injury upon which [his] action is based.” Sameric Corp. of Delaware v. Philadelphia, 142
F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998). The District Court reasoned that, based on the averments
in Sanders’ complaint, he was present for the search (in January 2006), but failed to file
his complaint until August 2008 -- several months beyond the two-year limitations
period. The District Court expressly relied on a portion of Sanders’ amended complaint,
which reads: “Members of the P.S.P. deprived Petitioner, who was at the scene and
readily available, of the right to refuse consent to a warrantless search of his home . . . .”
D. Ct. Doc. No. 21, 17 ¶ 65.
4
Sanders’ statement is somewhat vague, and we disagree with the District
Court’s conclusion that the statement -- read in the light most favorable to Sanders --
indicates his presence during the search. Construing his amended complaint liberally,
one could reasonably conclude that Sanders did not admit to being present at the time of
the search. This approach is consistent with both the statement in his original complaint
that the search occurred “[a]fter Petitioner was taken to the Bradford County P.S.P.
Barracks,” D. Ct. Doc. No. 1-2, 6 ¶ 35, and his argument on appeal that he refused
consent to search and was immediately taken to jail. According to Sanders, the search
did not occur until after he was taken to jail, and he did not learn of the search until
around August 25, 2006, when he was unexpectedly transported from jail to be arraigned
on charges stemming from the search. 2 If, as Sanders contends, he refused requests to
search his property, was removed from the premises before any search occurred, and was
not made aware of the search until, at the earliest, his August 2006 arraignment, then it
appears his August 20, 2008, complaint was timely, albeit just barely. Taking Sanders’
assertions as true, as is required under Rule 12(b)(6), we conclude that the District Court
erred in dismissing his complaint as untimely.
We also disagree with the Magistrate Judge’s alternative conclusion --
which the District Court implicitly adopted -- that Sanders’ unlawful search claim was
2
We take judicial notice that, according to the docket sheet related to Sanders’
proceedings before the Magisterial District Judge in Albany Township, Bradford
County, Pennsylvania, Sanders was arrested and arraigned on August 23, 2006.
5
barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the Supreme Court held
that, “in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a
conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or
sentence” no longer stands. Id. at 486-87 (footnote omitted). However, Heck does not
typically bar actions for Fourth Amendment violations, such as those Sanders alleges. 3
See id. at 487 n.7.
As to Sanders’ § 1985 conspiracy claim, the District Court correctly
reasoned that Sanders failed to state a cognizable claim because he did not allege in his
complaint or amended complaint that any racial or otherwise class-based discriminatory
animus lay behind the defendants’ actions. See Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health
Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 267-68 (1993).
The District Court also properly dismissed Sanders’ claims that officials
violated his right to due process by failing to properly respond to the reports of alleged
thefts from his home. As to Sanders’ claim against the Pennsylvania State Police and the
Bradford County police officers, the District Court correctly reasoned that there is no
constitutional right to the investigation or prosecution of another. See Mitchell v.
3
We also note that Dunlap’s status as a private citizen does not shield her from
liability. “[A] private party can be liable under § 1983 if he or she willfully
participates in a joint conspiracy with state officials to deprive a person of a
constitutional right . . . .” Max v. Republican Comm. of Lancaster Cnty., 587 F.3d
198, 203 (3d Cir. 2009).
6
McNeil, 487 F.3d 374, 378 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614,
619 (1973) (observing that “a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the
prosecution or nonprosecution of another”)). Sanders’ claims against prosecutors in
Bradford and Sullivan Counties necessarily fail because prosecutors enjoy absolute
immunity for the failure to adequately investigate a case and for the decision to initiate,
or decline to initiate, a prosecution. See Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1463-64
(3d Cir. 1992).
Relatedly, Sanders asserted throughout his amended complaint that the
police and prosecutors’ failure to respond to his complaints violated his right to equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court reasoned that Sanders’
equal protection argument failed for the same reason as his due process argument: there
is no constitutional right to a criminal investigation or a prosecution. However, an equal
protection analysis concerns whether government actors discriminated against an
individual for an impermissible reason, such as race, religion, or some other unjustifiable
classification. See Price v. Cohen, 715 F.2d 87, 91-92 (3d Cir. 1983). An appropriate
reason for dismissing Sanders’ equal protection claim, then, is that he failed to allege that
he was discriminated against on an impermissible basis. To the extent that Sanders
alleged that he was discriminated against based on his status as a felon, he did not allege
that felons, as a class, receive disparate treatment; nor did he allege that non-felons
receive more help.
As to Sanders’ claim against Judge Smith of the Court of Common Pleas,
7
Bradford County, the District Court reasoned that Judge Smith was entitled to absolute
judicial immunity for his decision denying Sanders’ petition for review of the District
Attorney’s decision not to initiate a prosecution based on the thefts from Sanders’ home.
We agree. See Capogrosso v. Sup. Ct. of New Jersey, 588 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009).
Finally, Sanders’ complaint included a claim against Marylou Vanderpool,
Bradford County Court Administrator, for failing to file his court documents. The
Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure require that documents be filed in the Clerk’s
Office, and that they also be served upon the court administrator. See Pa. R. Crim. P.
576. The District Court correctly reasoned that, although Vanderpool apparently had
assisted Sanders in complying with Rule 576 in the past, she was under no duty to do so
in all instances and did not violate his right to due process by requiring him to file his
documents with the Clerk’s Office. We agree. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455
U.S. 422, 437 (1982) (“The State may erect reasonable procedural requirements for
triggering the right to an adjudication . . . [a]nd the state certainly accords due process
when it terminates a claim for failure to comply with a reasonable procedural . . . rule.”
(emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted)).
Accordingly, we will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand the matter
for further proceedings.
8