United States v. Yajaira Navarro

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 10-4664
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
YAJAIRA NAVARRO,
Appellant
_____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
District Court No. 1-09-cr-00703-002
District Judge: The Honorable Renee M. Bumb
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
January 12, 2012
Before: SCIRICA, RENDELL, and SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Filed: January 12, 2012)
_____________________
OPINION
_____________________
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Yajaira Navarro was convicted in a jury trial of importing cocaine and
1
aiding and abetting in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 960(b)(2)(B) and 18
U.S.C. § 2, and of conspiracy to import cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§
952(a), 960(b)(2)(B), 963. Navarro timely appeals from the District Court‟s
judgment, claiming that the court erred: (1) by admitting expert testimony as to the
street value of the imported drugs; (2) by instructing the jury on willful blindness;
and (3) by denying Navarro‟s motion for judgment of acquittal based on the
insufficiency of the Government‟s evidence.1 We will affirm.
First, Navarro argues that the District Court should have excluded expert
witness testimony about the street value of the imported cocaine both because the
value of the drugs was not an element of the charged offenses, and because the
testimony was unduly prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. We review
the decision to admit expert evidence for an abuse of discretion. United States v.
Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d 238, 269 (3d Cir. 2010). We also review the decision to
deny a Rule 403 objection for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Kemp, 500
F.3d 257, 295 (3d Cir. 2007).
Although the value of the imported cocaine was not an element of the crime,
it supported the Government‟s theory of the case—that “drug suppliers might be
unwilling to entrust such valuable cargo to an ignorant courier, fearing that she
1
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction
under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2
might be insufficiently motivated to ensure that it safely reaches its destination.”
United States v. Ayala-Tapia, 520 F.3d 66, 68 (1st Cir. 2008). The District Court
thus did not abuse its discretion in admitting the expert testimony as “evidence that
may assist the trier of fact.” Pineda v. Ford Motor Co., 520 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir.
2008); see also Fed. R. Evid. 401, 702. Because of the probative value of this
testimony, the District Court also did not abuse its discretion in denying Navarro‟s
Rule 403 objection.
Second, Navarro argues that the District Court erred by instructing the jury
on willful blindness. We review for an abuse of discretion. Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d
at 252. At trial, the Government provided evidence to support such an instruction
by showing that Navarro‟s co-conspirator purchased an abnormal number of
shampoo bottles on the last day of their trip, and that the bottles emitted a strong,
chemical odor (later discovered to be due to the presence of cocaine). This
evidence could support the inference that Navarro “deliberately avoided „ask[ing]
the natural follow-up question[s]‟ . . . despite [her] awareness of a high
probability” that she was committing an illegal act. Id. at 259 (quoting United
States v. Wertz-Ruiz, 228 F.3d 250, 257 (3d Cir. 2000)). Moreover, even if no such
instruction was warranted, any error was harmless given that “„the instruction itself
contained the proper legal standard,‟” and that there was evidence from which the
jury could infer that Navarro had knowledge of the contents of the bottles. Id. at
3
260 n.26 (quoting United States v. Leahy, 445 F.3d 634, 654 n.15 (3d Cir. 2006)).
Finally, Navarro argues that the District Court erred by denying her motion
for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. Navarro
argues that the Government provided insufficient evidence to show that Navarro
had the requisite mental state to sustain either the importation charge or the
conspiracy charge. We “review[ ] the sufficiency of the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government and must credit all available inferences in favor of the
government.” United States v. Riddick, 156 F.3d 505, 509 (3d Cir. 1998). If a
rational juror could have concluded that the Government proved its case beyond a
reasonable doubt, we must sustain the verdict. United States v. Cartwright, 359
F.3d 281, 286 (3d Cir. 2004).
While the record does not contain a “mountain of evidence,” as claimed by
the Government, it contains sufficient circumstantial evidence to allow a rational
trier of fact to conclude that Navarro agreed to the conspiracy, and that she knew
that the shampoo bottles contained cocaine. Specifically, a rational juror could
have inferred an agreement and the requisite mental state from the Government‟s
evidence that: (1) Navarro‟s expedited passport application was paid for by an
unidentified third party; (2) Navarro lied on her expedited passport application
about the purpose of her trip to Costa Rica; (3) Navarro was aware that her co-
conspirator purchased an abnormally large number of large shampoo bottles on the
4
last full day of a three night trip; (4) the bottles emitted a strong chemical odor and
contained a thick, pasty substance; (5) identical bottles were found both in
Navarro‟s luggage and in her co-conspirator‟s luggage, filled with approximately
the same amount of cocaine; and (6) Navarro‟s demeanor instantly changed when
Customs and Border Patrol began to inspect the bottles—her face turned pale, she
was wringing her hands, her legs were shaking, and she looked “very worried.”
We will affirm.
5