Lisa Ostuni v. WaWa Mart

GLD-390 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 13-2784
___________
LISA MARIE OSTUNI,
Appellant
v.
WA WA'S MART; PAULINE COUNTERMAN; OFFICER PAUL DUFFY
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 3:12-cv-00714)
District Judge: Honorable Richard P. Conaboy
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
August 15, 2013
Before: FUENTES, FISHER and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 22, 2013)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Pro Se Appellant Lisa Marie Ostuni appeals an order of the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissing her complaint under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e) and denying her motion for reconsideration. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review over the District Court’s order. See Allah v.
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). We review a District Court's denial of
reconsideration for abuse of discretion. Max's Seafood Cafe v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669,
673 (3d Cir. 1999). Because the appeal does not present a substantial question, we will
summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P.
10.6.
Ostuni filed a pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on April 17,
2012, arising from a September 4, 2009, incident during which she was arrested at a
WaWa Convenient Mart by Officer Paul Duffy of the Stroudsburg Police Department.
Ostuni was convicted of aggravated assault and sentenced to a maximum term of
imprisonment of 18 months at the Monroe County Correctional Facility. 1 The allegations
of the complaint are difficult to discern, but a Magistrate Judge construed Ostuni’s
complaint as raising a Fourth Amendment false arrest and excessive force claim
regarding her September 4, 2009 arrest and recommended that Ostuni’s complaint be
dismissed with prejudice. 2 By order entered June 13, 2012, the District Court dismissed
Ostuni’s complaint with prejudice, except to the extent that her false arrest claim against
1
At the time the District Court issued its opinion, Ostuni had fully served this
sentence and she was incarcerated at SCI-Cambridge Springs, serving an unrelated
sentence of two to six years for her guilty plea following charges of homicide by vehicle
while driving under the influence and related offenses stemming from a June 2009
incident.
2
While Ostuni’s complaint fails to meet the pleading requirements of Rule 8 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, affording Ostuni with the liberal construction we
must give to pro se pleadings, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), we agree
with the District Court that Ostuni’s complaint can be construed to assert claims for false
arrest and excessive force.
2
one of the defendants could be raised if her conviction were ever overturned or
invalidated. The District Court ordered the Clerk to close the case. On July 13, 2012,
Ostuni filed a motion for reconsideration, which the District Court denied on July 23,
2012. On September 27, 2012, the District Court denied Ostuni’s motion for extension of
time to appeal. We vacated that decision and remanded the case to the District Court to
analyze whether the neglect in filing an untimely appeal was excusable under the
standard set forth in Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S.
380 (1993). See Ostuni v. WaWa's Mart, No. 12-3871, 2013 WL 1122706 (3d Cir. Mar.
19, 2013). Thereafter, the District Court issued a Memorandum holding that there was
excusable neglect for not timely filing an appeal under Pioneer and, therefore, granted the
motion for extension of time. We now consider the District Court’s dismissal of Ostuni’s
§ 1983 action and the denial of her motion for reconsideration. 3
Here, the District Court did not err in dismissing the complaint without providing
Ostuni with an opportunity to amend her complaint, because any such amendment would
be futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). If the
allegations, taken as true, show that relief is barred by the applicable statute of
limitations, a complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim. See Jones v.
Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007); see also, e.g., Bethel v. Jendoco Constr. Corp., 570 F.2d
1168, 1174 (3d Cir. 1978). Although the running of the statute of limitations is ordinarily
3
An appeal from a denial of a motion for reconsideration also “brings up the
underlying judgment for review,” Fed. Kemper Ins. Co. v. Rauscher, 807 F.2d 345, 348
(3d Cir. 1986).
3
an affirmative defense, where that defense is obvious from the face of the complaint and
no development of the record is necessary, a court may dismiss a time-barred complaint
sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim. See, e.g.,
Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006).
In this case, Ostuni’s claims were subject to Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of
limitations for personal injury actions. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 189-90 (3d
Cir. 1993); Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified Fed. Agents, Employees or Officers,
855 F.2d 1080, 1087 n.3 (3d Cir. 1988); see also 42 Pa. C.S. § 5524. Her cause of action
accrued when she knew or should have known of the injury upon which her action is
based. See Sameric Corp. of Delaware v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d
Cir. 1998). Claims for false arrest and excessive force typically accrue on the date of the
arrest or the assault, because, at that point, the plaintiff has reason to know of the injury.
See Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 126 (3d Cir. 1998).
In this case, Ostuni knew or should have known of her claims of false arrest and
excessive force on the night of September 4, 2009. Because she filed her complaint more
than two years later, in April 2012, both claims were time-barred and subject to
dismissal, notwithstanding the favorable termination rule of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.
477 (1994). See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007). 4
4
We need not decide whether the District Court correctly concluded that Ostuni
would be entitled to equitable tolling from December 17, 2010, to February 28, 2011- the
period from when she submitted a complaint to an incorrect address to when it was
returned to her by the Superior Court- because excluding this two and one-half month
period does not render her action timely.
4
For the foregoing reasons, we modify the judgment of the District Court to dismiss
the false arrest claim with prejudice, and in all other respects, we affirm the judgment of
the District Court. 5
5
We conclude that the District Court properly denied Ostuni’s motion for
reconsideration because it did not meet the requirements under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e). See Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010) (per
curiam) (citation omitted).
5