Uzoka v. Attorney General of the United States

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 11-4610
___________
OSITA HILARY UZOKA,
AKA Hilary Fidelis,
AKA Osita Uzoka,
AKA Uzoka Osita,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A71-870-675)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Leo Finston
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 23, 2012
Before: JORDAN, HARDIMAN and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 26, 2012)
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM
Petitioner Osita Hilary Uzoka, proceeding pro se, seeks review of a final order of
removal. For the reasons that follow, we will deny his petition for review.
I.
Uzoka, a citizen of Nigeria, first entered the United States in 1986 on a student
visa; he made subsequent entries in 1992 and 1994. In December 2005, he became a
lawful permanent resident through his citizen wife. In October 2008, Uzoka was
convicted of a second degree offense of endangering the welfare of a child under N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 2C:24-4(a). He was sentenced to five years of imprisonment, and he is now
in the custody of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). DHS began removal
proceedings, and Uzoka applied for cancellation of removal, asylum, withholding and
deferral of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).
In May 2011, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) sustained one of the charges against
Uzoka, finding that he had been convicted of an aggravated felony as defined under 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) (in this case, relating to the sexual abuse of a minor). Thus, the
IJ concluded, Uzoka was statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal and asylum.
See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(a)(3), 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), 1158(b)(2)(B)(i). The IJ also determined
that Uzoka’s conviction was presumptively a “particularly serious crime,” and, on that
basis, denied withholding of removal under either 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) or the
CAT.
Finally, the IJ considered Uzoka’s request for deferral of removal under the CAT.
The IJ acknowledged the evidence of human rights abuses in Nigeria, including at the
hands of law enforcement officials against militant groups, criminal suspects, and
members of particular tribal and regional groups. The IJ also considered Uzoka’s
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testimony that he will be shunned by his family, targeted by vigilante groups, persecuted
for his Christian religious beliefs, and tortured by the government under a law known as
“Decree 33.”1 The IJ ultimately concluded, however, that Uzoka had failed to establish
that he would be subjected to torture if removed to Nigeria. The Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed his appeal. Uzoka filed a timely pro se petition for review
and a motion for a stay of removal. The government filed a response opposing the stay
and a motion to dismiss. We denied the stay motion, and we now deny the motion to
dismiss.
II.
The government seeks to have the petition for review dismissed, claiming that this
Court lacks jurisdiction to review the final order of removal entered against Uzoka. See 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). This Court is precluded from exercising “jurisdiction to review
any final order of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of” a conviction
for any aggravated felony, as well as certain controlled substance violations. 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(2)(C); see also Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S. 348, 351 (2001). However,
this Court retains jurisdiction to determine jurisdictional facts, including whether a
petitioner is an alien, or, as in this case, whether he committed an aggravated felony. See
Drakes v. Zimski, 240 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2001).
1
Apparently, “Decree 33” requires that criminal deportees who have been
convicted of drug offenses are to be detained upon their return to Nigeria, where they
may be subjected to prosecution.
3
In In re Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 991, 995-96 (1991), the BIA
concluded that 18 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(8)2 was “a reasonable interpretation” of the INA’s
“sexual abuse of a minor.” We also found, in Stubbs v. Att’y Gen., 452 F.3d 251, 255
(3d Cir. 2006), that the statute that Uzoka was convicted under, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:24-
4(a), does not necessarily constitute “sexual abuse of a minor” under the INA. Unlike §
3509(a)(8), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:24-4(a), “does not necessarily require that an act with a
child took place.” Stubbs, 452 F.3d at 256. Thus, as in Stubbs, the IJ and BIA properly
considered the charging documents and indictment to determine whether Uzoka’s
conviction constituted an aggravated felony. See Stubbs, 452 F.3d at 254 (N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 2C:24-4(a) invites inquiry into facts beyond charging statute to determine whether
conviction constitutes an aggravated felony).
Uzoka’s record of conviction is distinguishable from the petitioner in Stubbs. In
Stubbs, the only detail of the conviction available was the charge identified in the
indictment that the petitioner had “engage[d] in sexual conduct which would impair or
debauch the morals of the child.” Id. at 252 n.1. In contrast, the charge that Uzoka was
convicted of—Count 12—contains specific allegations describing his conduct. Count 12
read: “[B]etween on or about the 18th day of November, 2001 and the 17th day of
November, 2002, . . . [Uzoka] did knowingly engage in sexual conduct: to wit touched
2
Section § 3509(a)(8) defines “sexual abuse” as “the employment, use, persuasion,
inducement, enticement, or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to
engage in, sexually explicit conduct or the rape, molestation, prostitution, or other form
of sexual exploitation of children, or incest with children.”
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the breasts of T.L., date of birth 11/18/89, while the said Osita Uzoka, had a legal duty or
had assumed the responsibility of caring for T.L.” (A.R. 321.) The victim was
approximately twelve years old and was Uzoka’s stepdaughter, he had assumed
responsibility of caring for her, and he had engaged in sexual conduct with or against her,
as defined in § 5509(a)(8) and (9). Thus, Uzoka’s conviction qualifies as an “aggravated
felony”—in this case, the sexual abuse of a minor—under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A).
Accordingly, we may exercise jurisdiction over Uzoka’s constitutional claims or
questions of law only. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).
Uzoka’s claim that the removal order is based on a not-yet-final (due to his
pending post-conviction petition), and ultimately invalid, conviction presents a legal
argument that this Court would have jurisdiction to consider. However, there is no
indication that he asked the IJ or BIA for a continuance of the proceedings (and was
denied) so that he could pursue post-conviction relief, and it appears that Uzoka did not
exhaust this claim to the IJ and the BIA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Abdulrahman v.
Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 594-95 (3d Cir. 2003) (exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional).
Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction to address it. In any event, his underlying
criminal proceedings have not been “reopened,” as he alleges. Rather, he filed a petition
for post-conviction relief, which is currently pending. Based on the record available at
this time, there is not enough information to know what claims he raised in his post-
conviction petition, including whether he raised a claim under Padilla v. Kentucky, 130
S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
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Uzoka challenges for the first time the finding that his conviction qualifies as an
aggravated felony. We retain jurisdiction to review, using a de novo standard, whether
“an alien was convicted of a non-reviewable aggravated felony.” Restrepo v. Att’y Gen.,
617 F.3d 787, 790 (3d Cir. 2010). However, as the BIA noted, Uzoka did not challenge
the IJ’s determination—during proceedings before the IJ or on appeal to the BIA—that
his conviction qualified as an aggravated felony or that he was ineligible for cancellation.
Thus, the claim is unexhausted, and we may not review it. See Castro v. Att’y Gen., 671
F.3d 356, 365 (3d Cir. 2012); Abdulrahman, 330 F.3d at 594-95. Even if we did have
jurisdiction to review the claim, the BIA properly agreed with the IJ that Uzoka’s
conviction constituted an aggravated felony, as discussed above.
Uzoka also seeks to challenge the finding that his conviction constitutes a
“particularly serious crime” under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B). He argues that the BIA
failed to consider certain mitigating factors in considering whether his conviction was a
particularly serious crime. Such a challenge is a reviewable legal question. See Alaka v.
Att’y Gen., 456 F.3d 88, 103-04 (3d Cir. 2006). Because Uzoka received a five-year
sentence for his conviction, his conviction is categorically “particularly serious.” See,
e.g., § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) (withholding of removal not available to “alien[s], having been
convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime . . .”); Kaplun v. Att’y Gen.,
602 F.3d 260, 267 (3d Cir. 2010).
Finally, Uzoka claims that the IJ and BIA erred in denying him deferral of
removal under the CAT (which is unaffected by the severity of his conviction). To
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qualify for deferral of removal, an alien must establish that it is more likely than not that
he will be tortured if removed. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.17(a), 1208.16(c)(2). He must also
show that the torture will be inflicted “by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official . . .” See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1).
Uzoka argues that the IJ and BIA failed to properly consider all of his evidence in
support of his claim for deferral. We liberally construe this argument as a reviewable due
process claim, and exercise plenary review. See Singh v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 533, 537,
541 (3d Cir. 2006). However, contrary to Uzoka’s claims, the record shows that the IJ
and BIA did consider his evidence regarding “Decree 33,” human rights abuses in
Nigeria, religious and tribal tensions, as well as his testimony about his fear of being
targeted by vigilante groups. Further, Uzoka’s evidence of the violence his family
members’ have suffered is not persuasive. According to Uzoka, his sister and her baby
were innocent bystanders in an attack, and he speculated that his brothers were targeted
by vigilantes or because of religious reasons. Thus, Uzoka has failed to demonstrate any
due process error.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the petition for review in part (to the
extent we lack jurisdiction), and deny it in part. In light of our disposition, the
government’s motion to dismiss is denied as moot.
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