Charles Paladino v.

DLD-270 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 12-3078
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IN RE: CHARLES PALADINO,
Petitioner
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On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(Related to E.D. Pa. No. 11-cv-07470)
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Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.
August 30, 2012
Before: AMBRO, JORDAN AND VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: September 6, 2012)
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM
Charles Paladino petitions for a writ of mandamus to compel the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to act on his request for the
production of documents in the proceedings on his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
We will deny the petition for a writ of mandamus.
I.
In his habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Paladino challenges his 2008
conviction for robbery, robbery of a motor vehicle, conspiracy, and possession of the
instruments of crime in connection with the February 2006 robbery of a taxi cab. The
District Court referred Paladino’s petition to a Magistrate Judge. The Magistrate Judge
originally recommended that Paladino’s petition be dismissed without prejudice because
it included both exhausted and unexhausted claims. Of the numerous claims asserted in
Paladino’s petition, the only ones the Magistrate Judge found that he had exhausted were
(1) his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, and (2) his claim that his sentence
was illegal because the sentences for robbery and robbery of an automobile should have
merged. Paladino filed objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation
(R&R) in which he indicated that he wanted to withdraw his unexhausted claims and
proceed only with the exhausted claims. The District Court approved and adopted the
R&R in part. In light of Paladino’s response, the District Court concluded that, rather
than dismissing the petition without prejudice, the petition should be returned to the
Magistrate Judge for review of the exhausted claims. The Magistrate Judge then ordered
the respondents to file a supplemental response to the petition. The time for them to do
so was extended to September 17, 2012.
On March 29, 2012—around the same time that he filed his response to the
Magistrate Judge’s original R&R, but before the District Court had issued its order
referring the matter back to the Magistrate Judge—Paladino filed a Motion for
Production of Documents. In that motion, he requested that the District Court order the
respondents to produce various tax forms and a warehouse order for the period 2006
through 2012. Paladino also filed a motion to compel the production of those documents
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on May 11, 2012. He contends that neither the District Court nor the respondents have
acted upon either his original document request or his subsequent motion to compel. He
now requests that we issue a writ of mandamus requiring the District Court to take action.
II.
Mandamus is a drastic remedy available only in the most extraordinary of
circumstances. Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976). It “has traditionally
been available to a court of appeals only ‘to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise
of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to
do so.’” Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 77 n.3 (3d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). Such
action is appropriate only where (1) the petitioner has no other adequate means to obtain
the relief sought; (2) the right to the issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable; and (3)
we are satisfied in the exercise of our discretion that mandamus is appropriate under the
circumstances. In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378-79 (3d Cir. 2005).
We have explained that the manner in which a District Court disposes of the cases
on its docket and conducts discovery is committed to its sound discretion. In re Fine
Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817-18 (3d Cir. 1982). However, there are instances
where “undue delay is tantamount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction,” which may
warrant mandamus relief. Madden, 102 F.3d at 79. So far it appears that the Magistrate
Judge and the District Court have been diligently handling Paladino’s habeas petition.
We do not find that the short delay so far in resolving Paladino’s discovery motion rises
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to the level of a denial of due process warranting the drastic remedy of mandamus. See
id. (addressing five-month delay).
Paladino also suggests that the District Court has a simple duty to authorize his
discovery. Contrary to his assertions concerning the broad scope of discovery under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, though, “[a] habeas petitioner, unlike the usual civil
litigant in federal court, is not entitled to discovery as a matter of ordinary course.”
Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997). Rather, Rule 6 of the Rules Governing §
2254 Cases provides that a judge may, upon a showing of good cause, permit discovery.
Under Rule 6(b), the “party requesting discovery must provide reasons for the request.”
Ultimately, “[t]he burden rests upon the petitioner to demonstrate that the sought-after
information is pertinent and that there is good cause for its production.” Williams v.
Beard, 637 F.3d 195, 209 (3d Cir. 2011). Although we observe that it is not readily
apparent how Paladino construes the requested documents as being pertinent to his
habeas petition, we will leave it to the District Court to determine in the first instance
whether Paladino has satisfied the standard for obtaining discovery under Rule 6(b). We
are fully confident it will do so without undue delay.
III.
In sum, because the extraordinary circumstances justifying a writ of mandamus are
absent, we will deny the petition.
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