Loretta Tutein v. InSite Towers

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 13-3869
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LORETTA TUTEIN; ROBERT TUTEIN; JAMES THOMAS; JEANINE THOMAS;
DANDRIDGE HENRY; DEROY JEREMIAH; EVANNIE JEREMIAH;
JOAQUIN MERCADO; LISEL MERCADO;
CARLTON GREENE; FRANCIS DANIEL;
ROSE DANIEL; CAROLYN JOSEPH
v.
INSITE TOWERS, LLC;
UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLANDS DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING AND
NATURAL RESOURCES
Loretta Tutein; Robert Tutein; James Thomas; Jeanine Thomas;
Dandridge Henry; Deroy Jeremiah; Evannie Jeremiah;
Carlton Greene; Francis Daniel; Rose Daniel,
Appellants
On Appeal from the District Court
of the Virgin Islands – Appellate Division
(District Court No.: 1-12-cv-00071)
District Judge: Wilma A. Lewis
Argued on May 13, 2014
Before: RENDELL, FUENTES and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 10, 2014)
Kye Walker, Esquire (Argued)
2006 Eastern Suburb
Suite 101
St. Croix, VI 00820
Counsel for Appellant
Alfred J. Stone, III, Esquire (Argued)
Nycole A. Thompson, Esquire
Bolt Nagi
Suite 21
5600 Royal Dane Mall, Corporate Place
Charlotte Amalie
St. Thomas, VI 00802
Counsel for Appellee
OPINION
RENDELL, Circuit Judge:
Appellants, homeowners on St. Croix, sued Insite Towers, LLC (“Insite”) over its
construction of a cellular transmission tower, and related personal injuries and property
damage. Appellants have also sued the U.S.V.I. Department of Planning and Natural
Resources (“DPNR”) for failing to abide by its own regulations in permitting the
construction of the tower. The District Court dismissed the case because of Appellants’
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. For the reasons set forth below, we will
affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the District Court.
I. Background
A. Facts
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The facts of this case are essentially undisputed. On July 22, 2008, Puerto Rico
Tower, Inc. (predecessor in interest to InSite) applied for an Earth Change Permit from
the DPNR to construct a 100-foot tall cellular transmission tower on a parcel of land on
St. Croix designated as Plot Number 72. DPNR deemed that application completed on
September 11, 2008, and issued the permit two weeks later. On October 7, 2008, InSite
applied for a Building Permit to construct the cell tower and the permit was issued on
October 29, 2008. (App. 125.)
In December 2008, before InSite began construction, DPNR issued a moratorium
on the construction of cell towers in the Virgin Islands. During the moratorium, a new
statute governing the construction of cell towers was enacted and DPNR drafted the
accompanying regulations. The statute, 29 V.I.C. § 294a, was enacted on October 7,
2011 and the corresponding regulations, 29 V.I. A.D.C. § 1, were promulgated on
December 28 of that year.
However, before the issuance of the regulations, on December 15, 2011 the
Commissioner of the DPNR responded to a request from InSite to waive the moratorium
and allow construction of the tower on Plot Number 72. The Commissioner granted the
waiver and, in so doing, required InSite to comply with the terms of the then-pending
new regulations, as well as to limit the tower to 75 feet.
InSite then formally filed for renewal of the Earth Change Permit and the Building
Permit for Plot Number 72. On January 12, 2012, DPNR received InSite’s application
and issued the permits the same day. In April 2012, InSite posted the permits along the
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boundary of Plot Number 72. Construction of the tower was completed soon thereafter.
However, as of the date of the District Court hearing, it had not been activated.
Appellants brought suit, alleging that the manner in which DPNR granted InSite
the permits to construct the tower violated law and regulations, which required notice to
homeowners and a hearing, and also constituted a procedural and substantive due process
violation. Appellants also allege that the tower constitutes a (1) private nuisance, (2)
public nuisance, (3) negligent infliction of emotional distress, (4) intentional infliction of
emotional distress and (5) negligence per se. (App. 124.) They subsequently filed a
motion for preliminary injunction, requesting the District Court order the tower be
removed and enjoining activation. The motion was denied.
B. District Court Opinion
InSite, joined by DPNR, then filed a motion to dismiss. InSite argued that
Appellants had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, by not appealing the
DPNR decisions to the Virgin Islands Board of Land Use Appeals (“BLUA”).
Appellants contended that they were excused from exhausting such remedies. The
District Court noted that a plaintiff may be excused from completing administrative
appeals where, inter alia, (1) the challenged agency action constitutes a clear and
unambiguous violation of statutory and constitutional rights, or (2) where the
administrative procedures are inadequate to prevent irreparable injury.
The District Court determined that the regulations accompanying this statute were
not retroactively enforceable, and so, viewing the renewal to relate back to the original
permit granted in 2008, held that certain claims concerned acts prior to December 28,
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2011, the issue-date of the new regulations, and therefore lacked merit. Concerning
claims after December 28, the Court determined that the new regulations did not require
DPNR “to provide notice to the public or an opportunity to be heard regarding the
renewal or reissuance of previously approved permits.” (App. 15.) Accordingly, the
District Court concluded that no statutory violation had been shown. The Court similarly
found that no clear constitutional violations had been shown sufficient to excuse
Appellants from exhausting their administrative remedies.
Appellants also argued that the BLUA could not provide injunctive relief and so
the administrative procedures were inadequate to prevent the irreparable injury suffered
by plaintiffs. The District Court rejected this claim, finding that the BLUA can reverse or
modify any order of the DPNR, such that an appeal to the BLUA was not clearly
inadequate to prevent the alleged harm. The Court concluded that Appellants had not
excused their failure to exhaust administrative remedies and so granted the motion to
dismiss. Appellants now urge that the District Court erred in dismissing the case.
Separately, Appellees maintain an alternative argument which was advanced before, but
not addressed by the District Court, namely that Appellants’ claims are preempted by
federal statute.
II. Standard of Review1
When reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a claim, we review the decision de
novo. Similar to the standard at the district court, we must accept all well-pleaded
1
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1446(c)(2) and 1332(a). We
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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allegations as true and all favorable inferences that can be drawn from them. However,
“[w]hen the District Court declines to grant an exception to the application of exhaustion
principles, we review for abuse of discretion.” Harrow v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 279
F.3d 244, 248 (3d Cir. 2002).
III. Discussion
The nature of Appellants’ claims makes resolution of this issue a close call. On
the one hand, they complain of DPNR’s failure to follow its own procedures. On the
other hand, they attack InSite’s failure to provide adequate notice of construction, and,
further, contend that whether or not the proper procedures were followed, they have
nuisance and other related claims against InSite. Accordingly, this action appears to be a
hybrid, some aspects of which are directed at the DPNR and cry out for agency
exhaustion, while other aspects stand on their own against a private party, InSite.
A. Claims Against InSite
We note initially that the administrative appeals process at the BLUA is geared
towards the correction of agency action. That is, a BLUA appeal is only open to those
aggrieved by an agency decision. 29 V.I.C. § 295(a) (“Any person who feels that an
injustice has been done him by any order . . . of the Commissioner of Planning and
Natural Resources . . . may appeal therefrom to the Board of Land Use Appeals . . . .”)
Further, the relief that the BLUA may provide is generally limited to correcting the
agency action. Id. at § 295(b)(3)(“The Board may . . . reverse or affirm, wholly or in
part, or may modify the order . . . appealed from . . . .”) Appellants’ claims against
InSite, however, do not directly pertain to agency action and instead focus on torts aimed
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at a private entity, such as nuisance, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
negligence per se. Such claims thus appear to be outside the bounds of the BLUA’s
jurisdiction and not amenable to agency resolution. We will not require exhaustion of an
administrative appeal as to the claims against InSite, when such proceedings could do
nothing to resolve those claims. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the District
Court on this ground, and hold that Appellants’ claims against InSite should not have
been dismissed.
B. DPNR and Exhaustion
At the same time, we agree with the District Court that, as to the claims against the
DPNR, Appellants must exhaust administrative remedies. The allegations against the
DPNR clearly concern the agency’s decision to approve InSite’s construction permits
without notice or a public hearing. As such, those claims would be within the jurisdiction
of the BLUA, making exhaustion an appropriate requirement.
In LaVallee Northside Civic Ass’n v. Virgin Islands Coastal Zone Mgmt. Comm'n,
866 F.2d 616, 620 (3d Cir. 1989), we noted that:
Although the benefits to the judicial system from insistence on administrative
exhaustion generally are substantial, there are occasions for pragmatic exceptions
designed to promote efficiency. We have noted that the requirement is excused
when the challenged agency action constitutes a clear and unambiguous violation
of statutory or constitutional rights, when reliance on administrative procedures is
clearly and demonstrably inadequate to prevent irreparable injury, and when
exhaustion is futile.
Id. at 620-21. These exceptions to the exhaustion requirement, of (1) futility, (2)
violation of statutory or constitutional rights, and (3) inadequate to prevent irreparable
harm, remain good law. See PennMont Sec. v. Frucher, 586 F.3d 242, 246 (3d Cir. 2009)
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(noting the exceptions of inadequate remedies, and violations of constitutional or
statutory rights). These exceptions apply even in instances where a statutory scheme
explicitly provides for administrative remedies. See id. (noting SEC administrative
remedies provided for in statute).
Here, Appellants first contend that appeal to the BLUA would be futile because it
is not empowered to provide the injunctive relief sought. Appellants urge that because
the BLUA’s enabling statute does not explicitly provide for injunctive authority, the
BLUA does not have such power. However, the statute provides generally that the
BLUA has the power to “reverse or affirm, wholly or in part, or may modify the order”
appealed from. 29 V.I.C. § 295(b)(3). A companion provision establishes that the
BLUA shall have “all the powers of the officers from whom the appeal is taken,” which
appears to include referring a violation for prosecution and abatement. Id. at § 236(a)(2).
In addition, “[i]n order to invoke the futility exception to exhaustion, a party must
‘provide a clear and positive showing’ of futility before the District Court.” Wilson v.
MVM, Inc., 475 F.3d 166, 175 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). The statutory language
cited above indicates that the BLUA has broad powers which presumably include
injunctive authority. At the very least, Appellants have made no clear showing that the
BLUA lacks such power. We accordingly conclude that Appellants’ failure to exhaust
administrative remedies cannot be excused due to futility.
Appellants next contend that the DPNR committed a clear statutory violation, in
failing to hold a public hearing prior to permitting the tower, thus excusing the failure to
pursue administrative remedies. We agree with the District Court that Appellants have
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not shown a “clear and unambiguous violation” of statutory rights. See LaVallee, 866
F.2d at 621. 29 V.I.C. § 294a, establishes that: “[u]pon receipt of a completed
application and all documentation required for a wireless support structure or substantial
modification of an existing structure, the Department shall hold a public hearing on the
application no later than 60 days after receipt of a completed application.” The parties
disagree as to whether this section is applicable to a renewed construction permit such as
that obtained by InSite in January 2012. In fact, the statute says nothing about whether
hearings are required for towers that had already been permitted.
Previously permitted towers are explicitly addressed by the regulations
accompanying the statute. 29 V.I. A.D.C. § 2-12(b) states that, “[a] wireless support
structure or wireless facility permitted prior to the promulgation of these regulations shall
remain permitted under these regulations provided however that such structures shall
conform to applicable regulation requirements within six (6) months of adoption . . . .”
This compliance is achieved by having an engineer explain how the tower will come into
compliance with the new regulations, including information such as the “[d]ate the
wireless support structure was constructed;” “[d]etails on the current structural integrity
of the wireless support structure;” and “[d]etails on the current capacity of the wireless
support structure . . . .” Id. at §§ 2-12(b)(1)(B), (D)-(E). These regulations do not
mention the public hearing requirement as applicable to previously permitted towers.2
2
These regulations may also be limited in their application to previously permitted towers
where the towers themselves were built before the regulations became effective.
However, this is not entirely clear.
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To reiterate, given the absence of any directive concerning public hearings and
previously permitted towers, we find no “clear and unambiguous violation” of statutory
rights. See LaVallee, 866 F.2d at 621. We have held that where the “lawfulness of
the . . . conduct is far from clear and unambiguous,” it is “precisely the sort of question
that would have benefited from administrative review . . . .” PennMont Sec. v. Frucher,
586 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir. 2009). Especially in this instance, concerning a new,
ambiguous statute and accompanying regulations, we find that the DPNR is best
positioned to evaluate Appellants’ claims in the first instance. Thus, we will not excuse
Appellants’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies because of a statutory violation.3
Similarly, with regard to Appellants’ constitutional arguments, we find no “clear
and unambiguous” constitutional violation. The District Court correctly noted that “[i]n
order to state a claim for failure to provide due process, a plaintiff must have taken
advantage of the processes that are available to him or her, unless those processes are
unavailable or patently inadequate.” Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000).
We find that Appellants have failed to pursue an appeal before the BLUA and
accordingly cannot now claim a procedural due process violation.
We also agree that Appellants have not shown a substantive due process violation.
The District Court properly found that government action must “shock the conscience” to
state such a claim. See United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, PA,
316 F.3d 392, 399 (3d Cir. 2003). Appellants’ claim – that the DPNR failed to provide
3
We can well understand Appellants’ choice to seek a court order when the tower
appeared to be constructed with notice given by InSite so belatedly. It is likely that an
appeal to the BLUA at the time would have appeared to be an unsatisfactory remedy.
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adequate pre-deprivation procedures prior to approving construction – does not rise to the
level of conscience-shocking. See Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 286 (3d
Cir. 2004). Accordingly, there is no “clear and unambiguous” violation of constitutional
rights at issue, and Appellants cannot be excused for failure to pursue administrative
remedies on this ground.
We therefore affirm the judgment of the District Court, as it concerns Appellants
claims against the DPNR, such that those claims are dismissed for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.4
C. Preemption
Appellees’ argument warrants only brief mention. Appellees argue that because
the Federal Telecommunications Act preempts tort-based claims involving cellular
radiation, those parts of the Complaint invoking radiation as a harm are necessarily
preempted. Further, Appellees claim, because all alleged injuries are incorporated in
each substantive count, it is impossible to determine whether the Complaint can stand
without the radiation allegations, and as such the entire Complaint must be dismissed.
In El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 479 (1999), the Supreme
Court held that “absent a cross appeal, an appellee . . . may not ‘attack the decree with a
view either to enlarging his own rights thereunder or of lessening the rights of his
adversary.’” Similarly, in New Castle County v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co.,
4
We leave the decision of whether to hold the retained InSite claims in abeyance,
pending the outcome of administrative proceedings, to the sound discretion of the District
Court.
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933 F.2d 1162, 1206 (3d Cir. 1991) (abrogated on other grounds), we held that, “[i]f . . .
an appellee aspires to alter the trial court’s decision (either increasing its rights or
decreasing those of its opponent), a cross-appeal is required.” Appellants note that here,
a finding of preemption would not simply affirm the District Court’s ruling of a dismissal
without prejudice, but expand it into a dismissal on the merits with prejudice.
We think it plain that a finding of preemption on appeal would alter the District
Court’s decision, decreasing the rights of Appellants, such that a cross-appeal was
required. Appellees’ preemption argument is accordingly rejected as improperly raised.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment
of the District Court. We will remand the case for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
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